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ABSTRACT
PUBLIC POETRY, MEMORY, AND THE HISTORICAL PRESENT: 1660-1745
by
Paul H. McCallum 
University of New Hampshire, September, 1997
“Public Poetry, Memory, and the Historical Present: 1660-1745” examines the role 
public poetry played in the fashioning of social memory during the so-called Augustan age 
of English literature; further, it traces in the rise and decline of public poetry during this 
period the emergence and subsequent estrangement o f two distinctive modes of public 
memory: one highly emblematic and allusive in nature, fostering and indeed dependent 
upon a well-endowed collective sense of historical and literary tradition; the other far more 
literal and individualistic, fashioning social memory o f  the historical present—the present 
moment set against the backdrop of historical consciousness—by encouraging a personal 
awareness of the immediate, prosaic realities of the everyday world. Both modes of 
memory, the figurative and prosaic, were made broadly available to English society at large 
with the rise of public poetry in the years after the Restoration. They are generally united in 
the work of John Dryden, whose rise as a public figure coincides with the rise of public 
poetry itself in England, but it was the fate of Dryden’s greatest literary inheritor. 
Alexander Pope, to preside over—even accelerate— what one might call the divorce 
between the figurative and literal modes of public memory, the subsequent decline of the 
commercial appeal and cultural authority of formal verse, and the gradual eclipse of the 
figurative mode of public memory, which had tended to accommodate the habits of mind 
and memory inculcated by poetry. This “divorce” coincides with the gradual supplanting of 
occasional, journalistic poetry (broadsheet ballads as well as formal verse) by prose 
journalism and the novel, but also at work were the continuing shift from orality to literacy 
and an evolving sensibility—rationalist, individualist, and mercantilist in nature—in which
vi
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the habit of emblematic allusion to a shared historical and literary tradition ceased to be 
relevant and viable. In tracing the broad cultural effects of an important poetic mode, 
therefore, I explore an important moment in the evolution o f  social consciousness, a 
moment that stands as the proximate origin of our own habits of memory.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
1. Memory in the Twentieth Century 
The realization seldom comes without a  pang: Our lives are largely unintelligible to 
others. Declare ourselves as we will, exhibit as we will the emblems of our inner selves—  
the books, the paintings, the music, the layers o f bric-a-brac—it is all but impossible to 
provide others with anything more than a very rough idea of who we are. Indeed, we sel­
dom know ourselves from one decade, one year to the next We might offer our acquain­
tances running explications of our experiences, actions, and artifacts, but in our absence— 
temporary or otherwise—what could our closest friends make of the settings, the trappings 
of our lives? I survey the clutter o f my den: there are too many books for the small room; 
they are wedged into shelves improvised from coffee cans and discarded lumber; they are 
piled in small stacks all about the floor, anticipating and intercepting one’s every step, like 
hungry cats demanding attention. The floor is papered with file folders, notebooks, book 
catalogues, back issues of Harper’s and The New Republic, and fragments of dissertation 
typescript A bizarre coterie of knick-knacks has taken up residence in this room: the solid 
plastic, anatomically correct warthog from China, the Moroccan pencil vase, the pair of 
glasses for viewing stereoscopic photographs, the semi-melted wax frog, the single Eng­
lish teacup and saucer. But the room, though cluttered, is not a muddle. I know where 
everything is; I know the history of each book and object and why it occupies its present 
space. The untrained eye sees only chaos; my eye sees arrangements whose order, if not 
rationally executed, may at least be reasonably explained. Sooner or later, however, I must 
surrender this room and its contents to the scrutiny o f untrained eyes. What will they make 
of it? As those eyes scan the shelves and shelves o f books; rifle countless manila folders 
stuffed with notes, newspaper clippings, and photocopies of comic strips and critical 
essays; and read through the dozens of spiral-bound notebooks filled with my journals.
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reading lists, and occasional jottings—what sense, what possible sense will they be able to 
make of this jumble o f a  life? To those who hardly knew me I will seem mildly eccentric; to 
those who thought they knew me well, I will suddenly become a total stranger. For though 
others may enumerate the facts and artifacts of our lives, they cannot hope to recapture the 
ceaseless swirl of our consciousness, which must, if closely scrutinized, appear as chaos, 
if not outright madness. We are, each o f us, alone. Our condition is such that we each may 
say with John Clare (1793-1864), the nineteenth-century farmer-poet of Northamptonshire 
who spent his final years in a madhouse, “I am! yet what I am none cares or knows. / My
friends forsake me like a memory lost; /  And e’en the dearest—that I loved the best—
/ Are strange—nay, rather stranger than the rest.”1
Human beings have always been alone with respect to the larger world and to one 
another. Our perceptions, experiences, and consciousness are not quite those of others. 
From the moment in childhood when we realized that our thoughts and sensations were 
self-enclosed, unknown to others as theirs were unknown to us, we have been alone in the 
strictest sense of the word. Alone, in life and in death. But the conscious sense of the 
absoluteness of our isolation, and o f its essential antagonism toward others and the 
institutions of our society, is a  fairly recent phenomenon. Georges Duby writes that for the 
medieval European “if  private life meant secrecy, it was a secrecy shared by all members of 
the household, hence fragile and easily violated. If private life meant independence, it was 
independence of a collective sort” (510). The unfamiliar, unlike, or unknowable in other 
persons, cultures, and peoples— these have always been suspect, their strangeness a 
catalyst for seeking the reassuringly familiar in groups of people much like ourselves: the 
family, the clan, the caste, the village, the nation. The long, slow emergence of Western 
individualism, however, has not only forced us to detach our sense o f personal identity
H  Am!" U. 1-2; 11-12.
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3from that of the larger group, but has left us estranged from i t  The larger group cannot 
exist in the face of unchecked individualism, and therefore seeks to compel obedience in its 
members; their sense of personal autonomy challenged, individual members seek to 
undermine the collective authority of the group. Under the best of circumstances, an uneasy 
balance is achieved. Yet the rise o f the modem nation-state has exacerbated the mutual 
antagonism of society and the individual. In The Great War and M odem Memory (1975), 
Paul Fussell notes two lasting psychological effects of the First World Wan an ironic (even 
paranoid) worldview created by the unbridgeable chasm between the war’s ostensibly 
glorious ideals and its grotesque reality (29ff.), and the habit of “gross dichotomizing” 
(75), “what we can call the modem versus habit: one thing opposed to another, not with 
some Hegelian hope of synthesis involving a dissolution of both extremes,. . .  but with a 
sense that one of the poles embodies so wicked a deficiency or flaw or perversion that its 
total submission is called for” (79). The carnage of 1914-18 made problematic the 
traditional obligations of the individual to the state—patriotism, trust, sacrifice—but it also 
undermined larger cultural notions of virtue and innocence, right and wrong, progress and 
purpose. The experience of the Great War thus destroyed many of the foundations of 
communal meaning and identity, intensifying the already immanent sense that such things 
must be determined individually. And yet, since Freud’s splitting of the psyche at the end 
of the last century, the integrity of the autonomous self has been so insistently challenged 
that it appears we have at last come full circle: there is now no such thing as the Self, whole 
and sovereign, only an ever-shifting collection of socially determined attitudes, aspirations, 
and power roles; the very notion of individualism, we are told, is an ideological ploy to 
hide from us that there can indeed be no such thing. (But is it not rather the most extreme 
expression of individualism—or at least of egotism—to suspect that the ultimate threat to 
one’s sovereignty comes from one’s sense of being unique? Only the effectively 
autonomous Self can supply its own worst adversary.)
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4But if our belief in the autonomous Self has been lost, we have not regained the 
reassuring sense of collective identity our medieval ancestors enjoyed. Reinforcing both 
our antagonism toward the larger society and our skepticism about individuality itself is one 
o f the great paradoxes o f the modem world: Because of worldwide radio, television, and 
computer networks, as well as the globalization o f the means of production, distribution 
and consumption, culture (in its broadest sense of acquired knowledge and behavior) has 
never before been so broadly (and distressingly) uniform. At the same time, however, the 
choices in information, entertainment, and consumer goods provided by these 
communication and marketing networks have enabled us to assert our individualities by 
allowing us to indulge an almost infinite number o f minute, idiosyncratic preferences. If 
our personalities may be said to consist o f unique collections of universal traits, as 
individuals of the late twentieth century we distinguish ourselves by peculiar patterns of 
choice among goods, services, and information available to every consumer. Thus I can 
call attention to the eccentricities o f my den: probably no other room on the planet contains 
a pair of stereoscopic glasses, an English tea cup (with saucer), and a  solid plastic warthog 
from China; no other library contains precisely the same collection of books. Yet each of 
the “eccentric” objects in this den and each of the books has been mass-produced in the 
thousands (if not hundreds of thousands), and made available to anyone with an inclination 
to purchase i t  It might be excessively reductive to argue that in the late twentieth century 
evidence for our individuality lies not in ourselves—for our society has grown faceless, 
and we have become largely anonymous to one another—but in the contexts we provide for 
our purchases, and in the irreplicable arrangements of our personal artifacts. However, 
there is no escaping the fact that the commodities of our communication and marketing 
networks have become essential to our personal expositions of ourselves (in our 
conversation, dens, living rooms, and wardrobes, for example), for we have almost no 
other way of demonstrating who we are.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5The same commodities make up the means by which our societies continually 
redefine and remember themselves. Paul Connerton argues in How Societies Remember 
(1989) that “the essence of modernity is economic development, the vast transformation of 
society precipitated by the emergence of the capitalist world market” (64). Such a market, 
Connerton says, “requires the constant revolutionising o f production, the ceaseless 
transformation of the innovative into the obsolescent. The clothes people wear, the 
machines they operate, the workers who service the machines, the neighborhoods they live 
in—all are constructed today to be dismantled tomorrow, so that they can be replaced or 
recycled” (64). By “generating] an experience of time as quantitative and as flowing in a 
single direction, an experience in which each moment is different from the other by virtue 
of coming next, situated in a chronological succession of old and new, earlier and later” 
(Connerton 64), consumerism has provided us, one might argue, with a uniquely modem 
form of communal memory. We account for ourselves collectively as we account for 
ourselves individually, through aggregations of mass-produced commodities and the 
distinctive materials, design styles, and what we might call the social ambience associated 
with each successive generation o f them. No doubt fashion has always provided a rough 
guide to the passage of time, but so rapidly have technical and stylistic innovations 
proceeded in, say, the last century and a half, that the function and form of most of our 
goods might now be identified not just with a particular decade but with a specific year. So 
temporal are the characteristics of the things we build and buy that there is no mistaking the 
goods produced in one decade for those produced in another, allowing us to use period 
technologies and modes as a ready means o f historical reference. Handy as it is, this habit 
of “consumerist allusion” tends to narrow rather than expand the compass of individual and 
collective memory. Since the goods we mass-produce are distinctive enough to be precisely 
referential, each generation will be “locked in,” as it were, not only to an identification with 
the objects with which it is most familiar, but to the personal and cultural references they 
embody. Because such objects serve as temporal markers for our personal histories, those
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6that predate or follow our formative first two decades will likely have little emotional hold 
upon us, will remain at an unclosable psychological distance. And given the accelerated 
rates of stylistic innovation and technological obsolescence in the modem marketplace, the 
frame o f historical reference provided by each generation o f consumer goods grows 
narrower, more specific and situational; the connections between these references grow 
more difficult to make; and as a result it becomes more difficult to imagine just what life 
was like before one’s own historical moment Consequently, the past grows ever more 
obscure—and more quickly obscure—even as the present moment and its material 
trappings assume ever larger proportions in our consciousness. We become aware of the 
truth of this when, for instance, we look back upon the fashions and music of only thirty, 
twenty or even ten years ago and are struck by their strangeness, or when such things are 
“rediscovered” and recycled and successively passed off as absolutely new.
Our communication networks reinforce the habit of consumerist allusion. They do 
so directly, as when films, news clips, photographs or recordings seem to freeze time in 
images and sound, forever associating certain groups of objects with particular temporal 
settings. But these images and sounds are commodities in themselves, produced, 
distributed, and consumed much like any other—and in their allusive power are as integral 
to the fashioning of collective memory. In her discussion of a recent German film, The 
Promise, which depicts the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, 
Margaret Talbot demonstrates how the marketed image of a significant event becomes part 
of our “personal” memory of it. Describing the film’s version of the Wall’s destruction, 
Talbot observes,
All o f the scenes . . . were exact recreations of the familiar television 
footage of that night—down to the camera angles and lighting, the gestures 
and facial expressions o f the actors playing the real people who had 
swarmed across the border. There’s a way in which those pictures—the 
indelible images of communism’s collapse—crowd the imagination. 
Certainly they crowded [the director] von Trotta’s. It reminded me of an 
interview I had seen with Gunter Gaus . . . .  Gaus said that the fall of the
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7wall and the reunification o f  Germany had been so mediated by television 
that no one in Germany could really have his or her own memory of i t  He 
compared the collective memory of 1989 with that o f the end of World War
II. However hard Germans may have tried in the war’s immediate aftermath 
to repress their memories o f i t  when they began to remember, at least they 
summoned up their own pictures, not a TV producer’s (43).
So vivid are such images that it is easy to believe that we ourselves have witnessed the
events they portray; and so ubiquitous are they, so generally available, that it is literally true
that we witness them collectively, and collectively on the broadest possible scale. Thanks to
the electronic media, the far side of the globe need not remain obscure to us; images of
local, regional, or national events are now quite likely to be incorporated into the world's
collective memory.
Yet the practical effect o f an electronically miniaturized world has been, perversely 
enough, to reduce our personal experience of it, for the multiplication of experience (as of 
sensation or choice) forces our already finite attentions to narrow still further in order to 
comprehend at least some small part of the whole. In fact, so much of the world has been 
brought into our view as to erode not only our belief that the whole may be comprehended, 
but that any “whole” or even a broad swath of it may be captured. For we lose the habit of 
seeing wholes. The larger our frame of reference becomes, the more bewildering and 
superficial the panorama before us—and the more problematic the notion that we can ever 
carve it up for ourselves into discrete, autonomous, fully comprehensible plots. If we can 
no longer tend our own little gardens, it is not simply because we know that so much lies 
beyond their walls, but also because the garden itself dissolves before our fragmenting 
gaze. So little is knowable in relation to what might be known that the former itself comes 
to seem an impossibility. It is hardly a coincidence that the post-modernist notion of 
irresolvably disordered experience has evolved in this, an age of pervasive, seemingly all- 
encompassing electronic media. The sheer volume of experience brought to us by 
electronically composed and distributed newspaper and magazine stories and photographs; 
by television images and soundbites; by radio talkshows and popular music; and, more
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8recently, by CD-ROM technology and on-line information services that stretch across the 
globe is not only bewildering in itself. Our inability to coordinate what we might know o f 
the world is compounded by the way we have become accustomed to experience it, that is, 
at second- or third-hand. So little o f what we might experience of the world may be 
experienced directly. We must subject ourselves to what someone else—almost always 
someone unknown to us and all but incapable o f ever being known to us—has selected for 
us to see or hear or read; we must accept another person’s version of experience for our 
own. This is an inescapable fact o f existence (we cannot experience for ourselves 
everything we know), yet so pervasive is this way of witnessing the important events of 
our “small” world that we come either to discount our own idiosyncratic experience o f 
things (after all, we cannot individually have the “whole story”), or (at the very least) to 
measure our experience against what passes for the “official” version o f events. In either 
case, the experiential authority is shifted to another—and not a familiar collective entity 
with which we personally identify, but a faceless news service, entertainment corporation, 
or government agency.
As we gather about ourselves unique collections o f  goods that have been mass- 
produced, so do our personal recollections o f public events tend to consist of a singular 
assemblage of widely replicated images. And as our personal memories are often 
embodied—and circumscribed—by the objects with which our personal experience is 
identified, our public memories are likewise emblematized and restricted by the graphic 
impressions we store away, for as with physical artifacts, the images of public memory 
represent specific, discrete things; the narrative and thematic connections between them are 
not obvious or easily made. We might reduce notable episodes or even whole decades to a 
series of images, yet have no sense of the flow of events or o f the feeling o f being alive at 
that precise historical moment. This might not matter, except that improvements in the 
technology of “capturing” present experience and the consequent efficiency with which that 
experience is objectified have tended to heighten rather than alleviate our anxiety that the
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9historical record be “complete,” that is, truthful to our individual or communal sense of 
things. Only when the repository for memory passes from the spoken to the written word 
does it become possible to make oneself aware of inaccuracies or omissions in the cultural 
record, and in general, the more readily manipulable experience becomes, the more likely a 
society will see the present and past as fully reconstructable. In turn, as belief in the 
recoverability of experience increases, so does a fear that significant portions of it will be 
excluded from what we think will be taken for an exhaustive account of the present 
moment. Hence our eagerness to recover “lost” or “suppressed” histories; hence our 
contemporary concern over the “possession” of history, that is, over “whose” history our 
society “privileges”—and hence our modem conundrum, the problem o f personal identity 
and social memory in the late twentieth century: never before has it been so easy for us as 
individuals to distinguish ourselves from the larger group, yet never before has the 
individual been so anonymous to that group; never before have we known so much about 
ourselves as a society, both past and present, yet never before have we been so skeptical 
about our ability to define ourselves collectively, to fashion our impressions of the present 
and our memories of the past into a  cohesive, authoritative whole. When the individual 
members of a society are essentially estranged from one another and the larger community 
alike, the accumulation of private knowledge brings about the dissolution of public 
meaning.
2. Figurative and Literal Modes of Memory in the Seventeenth Century 
The distinctive characteristics of personal and public memory in our time have 
relatively distant origins. We may, for instance, trace the individualist impulse back to the 
Protestant Reformation, consumerism to the Industrial Revolution, and the mutual 
antagonism of individual and state to the ideologies (nationalism, historical materialism, 
and laissez-faire capitalism) spawned by Darwinism. And these elements are in their turn
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the products of yet more distant and diverse forces. However, the manifestations and 
alignments o f individualism, capitalism, and political doctrine with which we are familiar 
are unique to the twentieth century; consequently, the combined influence of these and 
other elements upon the matter and manner o f public memory is also unique. It follows, 
then, that since the nature and configuration o f the cultural, technological, and intellectual 
forces that shape social memory differ from age to age, the techniques and ends of memory 
likewise change over time. Collectively or as individuals we do not—cannot—remember as 
people did before the advent and spread o f literacy, or as they did during the Middle Ages 
and Renaissance. In fact, whatever their particular approach or argument, historians of 
social memory tend to place the advent of modem memory at or about the time of the 
French Revolution. In Orality and Literacy: The Technoiogizing o f the Word (1982), for 
example, Walter Ong argues that our modem text-based habits of thought and memory 
could only arise once technology allowed the spoken word to be captured, replicated 
infinitely and in inexpensive, easy-to-read editions, and distributed to a wide reading 
public. Such technology and such an audience emerged, Ong asserts, only during the late 
eighteenth century, and therefore he concludes that it is only then that literacy may be 
supposed to have finally supplanted primary orality in Western society. Historians who use 
public commemoration to study social memory point out that the nationalism and overt 
socio-political ideology of the Revolution gave rise to the nineteenth-century propensity for 
rediscovering “centuries-old” traditions and myths that in fact were of quite recent 
invention. It was in Revolutionary France, Paul Connerton asserts in How Societies 
Remember (1989), that the practice o f self-consciously reclaiming public and personal 
rituals from the ostensibly antique past first emerged as a  means of overthrowing the old 
order and permanently establishing the new (7-10)—an example, Connerton notes, of 
which the Nazis were to make shrewd and sinister use (41-42). Still other historians base 
their discussion of public memory on the methods societies have used to preserve or 
reconstruct the past In his History as an Art o f Memory (1993), Patrick Hutton, himself a
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specialist in the history and historiography of the French Revolution, traces modern 
historical method to the nineteenth-century historicists who believed that it was their duty to 
“reenter the mind-set of the historical actors they would examine” in order to “[recollect] die 
world as it was once perceived” (xxiii). Hutton indeed argues that the historiographical 
methods Giambattista Vico had distilled by the third edition of his The New Science (1744) 
composed a prototype of modem historicism, yet Hutton is careful to point out the 
anomalous precocity of Vico’s ideas in his own time and the profound obscurity into which 
they fell soon after the philosopher’s death.
Significantly, many of the late nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers, 
social scientists, and historians included in Hutton’s impressive survey of historical method 
use the French Revolution and its aftermath as a case study for their several theories of 
personal and public memory. Without doubt the French Revolution is a convenient sign­
post for demarcating the temporal bound of the Modem Era. It unleashed the forces that 
overturned not simply the personages and institutions o f the Ancien Regime but their 
philosophical underpinnings as well; it launched Napoleon upon his magnificent and 
ruinous career of Continental conquest; and when that career had at last run its course, the 
memory of the Revolution and the upheaval it spawned greatly influenced the blueprint for 
world order drafted at the Congress o f Vienna (1815), an order that would disintegrate only 
with the conflagration of the First World War. Moreover, the Revolution coincided with— 
even when it and the reaction to it did not overtly advance—the scientific, technological, 
political, and economic developments that provide the immediate foundation for the 
structure of contemporary Western society. And further, the configuration of these and 
other elements, if  not absolutely contemporary, is at least recognizably modem. If the 
material and cultural trappings of nineteenth-century Western Europe might initially perplex 
visitors from the late twentieth century, we would nonetheless readily adapt ourselves to 
the progressive, consumerist, and individualist sensibilities o f the age. It is altogether 
reasonable, therefore, that the French Revolution and the period following it be taken for
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the locus of the proximate origins of our own habits o f memory. But upon reaching the 
First Cataract we must not suppose that we have found the source o f the Nile. The elements 
shaping modern social memory traced by Ong, Connerton, and Hutton—technology, 
commemoration, and acute historical awareness, respectively—remain confluent beyond 
the escarpment of the French Revolution, and we may push somewhat farther upstream 
before the course of modern memory disappears into a  maze of traceless streams.
For the English-speaking world at least, the components o f  modern memory begin 
to emerge and coalesce during the second half o f the seventeenth century. England during 
this time was as yet a pre-industrial society, but the new scientific thinking and methods 
were making possible the technological advances that would soon make the shift from 
cottage industry to factory production practicable. Further, Donald Bush notes that the first 
half of the century saw the establishment o f complex networks o f trade and commerce that 
bound the kingdom more securely in economic unity (10-13); these networks provided a 
solid base for the development of colonial trade as the expansion and consolidation of the 
empire accelerated after midcentury, making both raw materials and markets—the building- 
blocks of industry—available to Britain. By century’s end the foundations of the Industrial 
Revolution had been laid.
One consequence of this economic development was the rise o f the social and 
political influence of the trading and monied classes. This rise, combined with the break in 
England's political and social history occasioned by the Civil War and Commonwealth, 
reconfigured the relationship of King, Parliament, and People. Charles Q had no use for 
the absolutist posturings of his father, in part because his temperament tended toward 
pragmatism rather than unbending assertion o f royal authority, but mainly out of 
recognition of new political realities: Parliament and People had deposed one King and 
recalled another; whatever political theorists such as Hobbes and Sir Robert Filmer might 
assert, absolutism was dead in England—as James II discovered in 1688. Gone, too, was 
the old thinking about the commemoration of royal power. The anniversary of Charles II’s
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restoration was observed as an almost sacred day, yet each May 29 celebration was as 
much a reiteration o f the new contract between King and People as o f the Stuarts’ right to 
rule. In fact, given the effective shift in political power, public ceremony in the decades 
following the Restoration took on a controversialist character. The annual Pope-burning on 
Queen Elizabeth’s Day (November 17), for example, came to have vaguely seditious 
overtones during the Exclusion Crisis, when Opposition leaders played on Protestant fears 
of a Catholic resurgence in their attempt to bar James from succeeding his brother; the 
several progresses o f Shaftesbury’s creature, the Duke o f Monmouth, through the 
countryside in 1680 likewise constituted a public ceremony that challenged the established 
order in its mimicking o f Charles’ own progress from Dover to London in 1660; and many 
civic rituals in London—the election of the Lord Mayor, for instance, or the appointment of 
sheriffs, the selection o f juries, or the city’s reiteration of its sovereignty under its 
Charter—were during the late 1670’s and early 1680’s reenacted with an eye toward 
immediate political effect In short because the Restoration Settlement settled little with 
regard to the political, religious, and dynastic make-up of post-Commonwealth England, 
the commemoration of important personages and social institutions in the decades after the 
Restoration had to become, to use Connerton’s phraseology, more self-consciously 
“performative” than previously. In stable, homogeneous, self-enclosed communities, 
Connerton argues, “the gaps in shared memory are much fewer and slighter” than in large, 
politically and socially complex urban societies; in these latter, Connerton continues, “we 
must produce or at least imply a history of ourselves: an informal account which indicates 
something of our origins” and explains “our present status and actions in relation to that 
audience” (17).
The necessity for such self-conscious public performance was reinforced by the 
break in England's constitutional and cultural history effected by the Civil War and eleven 
years of Parliamentary rule. As popular wisdom would have it, the troubled 1640’s and 
1650’s were God’s trials for a sinful nation; now that England had recognized its sins and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
restored its true King, it would emerge a  cleansed and blessed land and experience a wholly 
unprecedented era of heaven-sent stability, prosperity, and martial achievement But if this 
sense o f newness gave England an invigorating confidence, it also lent the nation an intense 
awareness of its own historical present, and forced it to define itself, its character and 
destiny, anew against its past It compelled England to answer in a self-conscious way two 
fundamental questions: Who are we English to be as a people? How are we to best order 
ourselves and our society? Though it was natural to seek parallels for this ostensibly new 
society in Augustan Rome or Elizabethan England, wholly new forces ensured that the past 
would remain die past and the present, fashioning its own identity, would increasingly look 
toward the future. The New Science, for one, not only challenged the last vestiges o f 
medieval ecclesiastical and scholastic authority, it enabled the Western mind to reconfigure 
its cosmology, enabled humanity to manipulate and to some degree liberate itself from 
external nature to a degree heretofore unknown. And if the scientific method enabled us to 
shape our physical environment, it could allow us to reshape our society as well—perhaps 
even the mind itself—according to the prescriptions of a pragmatic rationalism. It was 
Locke who provided the theoretical structure for the reconfiguration of society when he 
argued that the mind contained no innate ideas and when he stressed the role of education in 
the formation of sensibility. According to his doctrines, the proper education and ordering 
of the mind could remove those obstacles to a just and reasonably ordered society: 
prejudice, dogmatism, immoderate self-love, even madness itself. Moreover, the careful 
supervision of human perception and experience could shape consciousness, perhaps even 
reorder the way we thought about ourselves, and about history and time. Empiricism, in 
short, made it possible to believe in such a  thing as Progress—material, political, social, 
intellectual, and psychological. Henceforth time would bear us forward to the fullest 
approximation of perfection that humanity might achieve; precedent need no longer 
circumscribe us. And anyway, as Paul Hazard observes, a new mindset was taking 
possession of the Western world at large. History was regarded with increasing skepticism:
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“The very notion o f historicity was tending to disappear. If, now, men turned their backs 
on the past, it was because they thought it something evanescent, Protean, something 
impossible to grasp and reclaim, something inherently and inveterately deceptive” (30); the 
authority of history was being rapidly supplanted by the new cult of novelty. Paraphrasing 
Paul VaI6ry’s pronouncement upon the modem ethos of innovation for its own sake1 and 
applying it to the latter half of the seventeenth century, Hazard comments,
Novelty, which in the nature of things must be perishable, fleeting, has 
assumed such overwhelming importance in our eyes, that, if it is absent, 
nothing else avails; if it is present, nothing else is needed. If we would 
escape the the reproach o f nullity, if  we would avoid being objects of 
ridicule, if we would save ourselves from utter boredom, we have to be 
constantly more and more advanced, in art, in morals, in politics, in ideas, 
and now, such is our nature, all we care about, all that matters to us, is the 
shock of wonderment and surprise (30).
The presence of acute historical awareness, of politically charged public ceremony, 
and of the beginnings of industrialism and commercialism in this period should not surprise 
us, for the mid- to late-seventeenth century is, after all, the threshold to our own 
modernity, in our habits of memory as well as in our rationalism, skepticism, and sense of 
progress. But subsuming the bare materials o f memory traced by Hutton, Connerton, and 
Ong, is the mode according to which the intellect, psyche, and body fashion cognitive, 
emotional, and physical experience into working memory. The mode of, say, a literary 
work is generally determined by three things: the attitude of its author toward its subject 
matter, the author’s design or intent for the work, and (consequently) the expectations for 
tone, conventions, and theme the work fosters in the reader. Analogously, the predominant 
mode of memory in a given society at a given time is largely determined by that society’s 
relationship to its past, which in turn determines the ends to which the materials of public 
memory are put, as well as the expectations for the present and future significance of such 
materials and the memory into which they are fashioned. Out of many possible social
- In Regards sur le monde actuel (1931).
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attitudes toward the past, two are particularly important for our discussion here. The first 
regards the past as an integral element of the present: past and present in effect compose a 
single atemporal moment, atemporal because from this perspective the matter of history— 
human nature, its perceptions, appetites, and motives; human society, its order and 
institutions; and human endeavor, whether in statecraft, learning, or the arts—is considered 
constant and universal. When there is no allowance for rapid, wholesale change, let alone 
moral and material progress, time itself is more or less fixed. Thus, insofar as the past is 
distinguished from the present, its patterns and precedents inform contemporary 
experience, giving society a lens through which to perceive and interpret the elements of its 
present moment The lens of the past may be turned on the present day with ironic intent or 
effect (for instance, to remind us that we are not living up to the example o f our 
predecessors), but because the past is a repository o f cultural values and traditions, and as 
such the source of collective identity, it is itself viewed altogether unironically with regard 
to the present
But whereas this perspective emphasizes continuity between past and present the 
second looks upon the past and sees differences, discontinuities separating it from the 
present day. Yet greater here than the real differences in material circumstances, social 
institutions, and philosophical systems is the psychological distance between past and 
present a distance sufficient to encourage a belief in the inevitability of change and 
progress, and with these, a sense of dramatic irony when one looks back from the present 
age upon a less advanced, less enlightened past From the ironic perspective, the past is not 
a living thing, integral to one’s sense of the present, but a thing quite apart from i t  because 
completed—and complete in itself, history comprising but a series o f present moments in 
which the current one must surrender its place to the next and that to the next, ad 
infinitum. At most the past merely harbors the causes of the conditions now being 
experienced. And because of its detachment and essential estrangement from the present 
the past cannot properly be studied in terms o f continuities, lest one lapse into
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anachronism, but must be reconstructed, reassembled from painstakingly recovered and 
sifted evidence, both physical and documentary. History thus becomes a  discipline, an 
occupation for the specialist, and comes to consist o f the facts we can establish with 
certainty rather than those things which we merely believe to have been true.
When a society looks upon its past and sees continuity with the present, its mode of 
memory tends to be what we might call “figurative.” The conditions of the historical 
present, assessed and interpreted as they are in terms o f historical or literary precedent, are 
thereby endowed with more than their literal significance, for they seem to refer not only to 
themselves but to all earlier parallels. Indeed, the more connections that can be made (and 
the more explicitly made) between past and present, the better such explicit connections 
channel the often bewildering whirl of the present more securely within the familiar courses 
of the past Thus the materials of memory are fitted into existing patterns of narrative and 
interpretation, as in the practice of typology, making accounts of present-day circumstances 
highly emblematic and allusive in nature, fostering and indeed dependent upon a well- 
endowed collective sense of spiritual, historical, and literary traditions. When, however, 
the past is understood in terms of its differences from the present, the mode of memory 
tends to be “literal.” That is, the historical present, believed to be generally discrete and 
definable, as any other moment in time, largely in terms of its characteristic material, 
cultural, and organizational features, invites investigation and description according to 
minute particularization and categorization of these defining features. An understanding of 
the present moment, therefore, requires close scrutiny o f the immediate, prosaic realities of 
the everyday world. This self-referentialism encourages a fair degree o f historical relativity, 
for it implicitly acknowledges that age will differ from age; moreover, it allows for and 
even encourages a personal awareness of the present historical moment, making the literal 
mode of social memory far more individualistic than its opposite, for each member of 
society can describe the realities about him. Indeed, it is in the interest of individual 
members to make themselves aware of these everyday realities, since in societies in which
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the present is psychologically detached from the past, political power and influence are 
derived less from traditional institutions o f order and authority, than from the ability to 
fashion current circumstances into plausible pronouncements upon the defining 
characteristics—governmental, commercial, and diplomatic strengths and deficiencies, for 
instance—of the present day. Such definitive assessments, after all, have a good deal to do 
with shaping administrative, economic, and military policies, as well as with creating a 
picture of the age that gives its inhabitants a sense of themselves both as individuals and as 
members of a collective body with a collective purpose—a very necessary orientation for 
the most part lost once the present has become estranged from any notion of a “living” past.
It is only logical that the figurative mode o f memory would tend to flourish in 
preliterate societies rather than in literate ones. Ong’s description of thought in oral 
societies—as coming into being in “heavily rhythmic, balanced patterns, in repetitions or 
antitheses, in alliterations and assonances, in epithetic and other formulary expressions, in 
standard thematic settings . . .  in proverbs which are constantly heard by everyone so that 
they come to mind readily and which themselves are patterned for retention and ready 
recall, or in other mnemonic forms” (34)—might well be a list o f the techniques of 
figurative memory. It is equally logical that highly literate societies would tend toward the 
literal mode, which stresses the importance o f documentation and employs methods of 
historical inquiry that could not exist without the possibilities for textual retrieval and 
analysis made available by literacy. However, though a society’s predominant mode of 
memory may be greatly influenced by its degree of literacy (as well as other, nontechnical 
factors, such as its system of cosmology), it is not necessarily determined by i t  Indeed, as 
the Western world discovered in the seventeenth century, the Chinese and the ancient 
Egyptians possessed both highly literate cultures and a profound, even religious sense of 
continuity with the past And in this present age of what Ong terms “secondary orality,” 
when the ubiquitousness of visual media has replicated the power of the spoken word, the 
“participatory mystique,” “communal sense,” and “concentration on the present moment”
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found in primary orality (136), a reconstituted oral culture finds itself isolated from even its 
recent past, as I have suggested above, by its dependence upon screen imagery, sound­
bites, and consumer goods for self-definition.
Mnemonic mode must therefore be considered in any examination of social 
memory, for it provides the framework for the materials of memory in a given society at a 
given time. Having briefly traced the materials of modem memory back to the latter half of 
the seventeenth century, I will now go a step farther and argue that for the English- 
speaking world it is during this period that our modem mode of memory is established as 
well. For it is during this period that the two modes o f memory I have just outlined, the 
figurative and the literal, cease to be mutually complementary and emerge as competing 
modes of social memory. Their coexistence is remarkable not in itself, for there is nothing 
to prevent several modes of memory from coexisting, especially in such a setting as 
seventeenth-century England, which witnessed one o f the greatest series of cultural 
transitions to ever occur. At the beginning of the century, England's absolutist bent, its 
complacent repose upon ecclesiastic and scholastic authority, and its intellectual isolation 
showed that it had yet to throw off the trappings o f late medievalism; by century’s end, 
absolutism had effectively been replaced by constitutional monarchy and relatively broad 
popular participation in political affairs, the aristocracy of blood by an aristocracy of 
finance and commerce, the reassurances of faith by the methods o f the New Science, and 
intellectual obscurity by a burst of philosophic brilliance that only France could rival. No, 
the remarkable thing here is not the presence of two rival mnemonic modes, but that the 
struggle that developed between them became so openly, so self-consciously contested. By 
the end of the Augustan period the outcome had been decided: the literal mode had 
triumphed and the figurative was in ever-deepening eclipse, an obscurity from which it has 
never significantly emerged. The divorce of these two modes would thus have important 
consequences for the subsequent evolution of social memory; in fact, as I hope to
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demonstrate, it would largely determine the habits of collective memory from the mid­
eighteenth century down to our own time.
The literal mode certainly benefited from the increase of literacy during this period, 
as well as from political, economic, and social changes that increased popular authority at 
the expense of the Crown and aristocracy. One must also cite significant shifts in thinking 
about time and history. As Hazard explains, researches into the histories of the ancient 
Egyptians and Chinese showed that the world was far older than Christian Europe had 
supposed (42-44). As the bounds of the human past receded into darkest obscurity, doubt, 
which typified the temper of the age toward all received knowledge, at last fell upon 
historical knowledge as well. Not only, as I have noted above, was the reliability of one’s 
information about the past in question,3 that information, once uncovered, was often treated 
as if it were the stuff of epic, tragedy, or romance. Was not Clio, after all, the sister Muse 
of Calliope, Melpomene, and Erato? Hazard sums up the ethos o f the “old history” thus:
Drama, pathos—these things are of the stuff of History; therefore she must 
be allowed a sumptuous setting. Battles, conspiracies, revolutions, 
schisms—first-rate material, fine subjects these! With her taste for rhetoric, 
she is akin to poetry, for what is poetry but a form o f eloquence, an 
eloquence controlled by rhyme? Noble herself, she breathes the sublime as 
her native air. She must, of course, provide a rich assortment o f speeches, 
descriptions, maxims, analyses, parallels (31).
In short, history had been a literary art first, and a  professional discipline second. Put
another way, it was understood and practiced as a figurative endeavor. This did much to
undermine its respectability in a century that, beginning with Bacon, came to believe that
the world external to the human self could be objectified, understood in itself apart from
3 In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), for instance, Locke underscores the tenuousness 
of historical knowledge in his discussion of the unreliability of traditional testimonies: “I think 
nothing more valuable rhan the Records of Antiquity: I wish we had more of them, and more 
uncorrupted. But this. Truth it self forces me to say. That no Probability can arise higher than its first 
Original’'—that is, the original testimony upon which subsequent historical accounts are based,
[which] though cited afterwards by hundreds of others, one after another, is so far from 
receiving any strength thereby, that it is only the weaker. Passion, Interest, Inadvertency,
Mistake of his meaning, and a thousand odd Reasons, or Caprichio’s, Men's Minds are 
acted by . . .  may make one Man quote another Man's Words or Meaning wrong (664).
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human prejudices and limitations. The problem, however, was to liberate one’s perceptions 
and assessments from the received notions o f the scholasticists and the vagaries o f 
imprecise language. Bacon observes in aphorism LX in Book I o f The New Organon 
(1620), for example, ‘T he idols imposed by words on the understanding are of two kinds. 
They are either names of things which do not exist,. . .  or they are names of things which 
exist, but yet confused and ill defined and hastily and irregularly derived from realities" 
(342). Similarly, he declares in aphorism LXIX that existing methods of inquiry and 
demonstration “do little else than make the world the bondslave o f human thought and 
human thought the bondslave of words" (348).
Hobbes is more of a relativist than Bacon, but he, too, believes that absolute fact 
can be established if we steer clear o f linguistic tangles (what he frequently terms 
“insignificant speech”), of the slough of moral abstraction (what one society calls wisdom, 
justice, and gravity another may call fear, cruelty, and stupidity), and, especially, of the 
maze of Fancy, which if  unchecked leads us into a kind of madness, “such as they have, 
that entring into any discourse, are snatched finom their purpose, by every thing that comes 
in their thought, into so many, and so long digressions, and Parentheses, that they utterly 
lose themselves” (Leviathan XIII, 136). If Fancy is to “be more eminent” in poetry, it is 
because poems “please for the Extravagancy”; but Judgement must predominate in history, 
“because the goodnesse consisteth, in the Method, in the Truth, and in the Choyse of the 
actions that are most profitable to be known” (136). But even method, truth, and the proper 
subject cannot redress the fundamental problem with historical knowledge. Though 
Hobbes calls history “the Register o f Knowledge o f Fact,” that is, of “Absolute 
Knowledge” (IX, 147-8), he also insists that when we cannot verify a fact for ourselves, 
we must take on faith another’s account of it, and, moreover, that all knowledge of cause 
and effect “is not Absolute, but Conditionall. No man can know by Discourse, that this, or 
that, is, has been, or will be; which is to know absolutely: but onely, that if This be, That 
is; if This has been, That has been; if This shall be, That shall be” (VII, 131). Since all or
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most historical testimony is provided by others and must be taken on faith, its explanations 
of cause and effect linking fact with fact must be doubly suspect, making history of a kind 
with religious belief: we may believe or not, as we choose. As with scriptural history, “so 
it is also with all other History. For if  I should not believe all that is written by Historians, 
o f the glories of Alexander, or Caesar, I do not think the Ghost of Alexander, or Caesar, 
had any just cause to be offended; or any body else, but the Historian. If Livy say the Gods 
made once a Cow speak, and we believe it not; wee distrust not God therein, but Livy” 
(VII, 133-134). Whatever ideals Hobbes might hold for history as a repository of 
“knowledge of Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable” (V, 115), it seems clear that for 
him the limitations o f historical knowledge induce its compilers to include in their works 
much that is merely received and repeated from tradition or myth, or that is in itself 
fantastic, hyperbolic, episodic, and (to use Bacon’s term) “parabolic” (that is, 
allegorical)—in short, much that partakes of the figurative and cannot be verified either as 
absolutely or literally true.
If Hobbes’s insistence upon a  distinct separation of history and poetry, of the 
factual (literal) and fanciful (figurative), ends up calling itself into question, his impulse is a 
common one for his age. So low had the figurative habit sunk in the estimation of many of 
the age’s leading thinkers that as early as mid-century Hobbes can give a  nasty twist to the 
well-worn truism that, as even the prosaic Bacon bad declared in De Dignitate et Augmenris 
Scientarum  (1623), “[Sjince the acts and events which are the subjects o f  real history are 
not of sufficient grandeur to satisfy the human mind, Poesy is at hand to feign acts more 
heroical; since the successes and issues o f actions as related in true history are far from 
being agreeable to the merits of virtue and vice, Poesy corrects it, exhibiting events and 
fortunes as according to merit and the law of providence” (407). Hobbes turns this on its 
head. When historical poetry is allowed to pass for history itself, he says, the results may 
be potentially destructive: young men “nourished by the Histories, or Fictions of Gallant 
persons” (Leviathan VI, 125) are likely to be incited to vainglorious imitation of their
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heroes, disrupting the settled order of human society in violation of the first law of nature, 
which is to seek peace. Early in the century, it was possible to idealize figurative truth; by 
mid-century such idealization was highly suspect By the end of the century Locke would 
go further, and list figurative language, even when used in “Discourses, where we seek 
rather Pleasure and Delight than Information and Improvement” as an abuse of speech: 
“fl]f we would speak of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, 
besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence 
hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and 
thereby mislead the Judgement and so indeed are perfect cheat” (An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, HI, viii, 508). But in the meantime, at midcentury, so long as the 
figurative made no pretense to be literal, and the literal avoided the trappings of the 
figurative, all was well.
But as it happened, poetry did not stay “poetic,” did not isolate itself and its 
figurative way of representing human experience from the literalism of the everyday world. 
It did not content itself with fanciful retellings of the martial and amorous exploits of 
mythological heroes, with closely veiled allegories of the political intrigue of court, with the 
business of seduction among the aristocratic classes, with the problems of faith for the 
individual Christian soul, or with the playful distortion of poetic diction and conceit On the 
contrary, the political, social, and economic forces unleashed or hastened by the Civil Wars 
that had effected a slow society-wide shift in the mode o f memory were effecting likewise 
the emergence of a new kind o f poetry, occasional, journalistic, satirical in tone and 
broadly public in its appeal, a poetry that could participate in and to some degree frame the 
subjects and terms of public debate. The unprecedented influence of poetry in the public 
sphere is important in itself, but this new public mode of poetry also serves as an apt 
vehicle for the study of the estrangement of the figurative and literal mnemonic modes 
during the Augustan period, and for two reasons. First, even as the value and integrity of 
figurative habit came to be increasingly suspected, public poetry trained the figurative lens
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upon the historical present and presumed to encompass and explain everyday political and 
social experience in a  manner that was highly analogical, emblematic, allusive, and 
rhetorical It did not claim to present its audience with the literal truth, nor offer itself up as 
literal truth’s pale auxiliary, “poetic truth”; rather, it sought to force its readers to see in the 
political, social, and cultural events o f the day another dimension: a  broader historical 
significance, a  greater moral and ethical universality. This dimension is discernible, 
however, only when one learns to descry the archetypal in the everyday, and the everyday 
relevance of the archetypal—to see the literal in the figurative and the figurative in the 
literal. In short, the figurative is not a  substitute for literal truth; it reveals more of literal 
truth than immediately meets the eye. This combination or blending of the actual with the 
emblematic, the poetic with the prosaic, allows us to trace in public poetry the 
complementary and competing claims of figurative and literal mnemonic techniques, but 
further, the viability o f public poetry for the better part of a century, from 1660 to 1745, 
suggests as well that the figurative might well have maintained its place alongside the literal 
in the formation of social memory.
That it did not, and was rapidly giving way to the literal by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, may be attributed to the peculiar rise, evolution, and decline of public 
poetry from the advent of John Dry den, whose own rise as a  public figure coincides with 
that of the public mode itself in England, through the death o f Alexander Pope, whose 
career as Dry den’s greatest literary inheritor witnessed what has proven to be the lasting 
triumph of the literal mode of social memory over the figurative. Thus the period of public 
poetry’s preeminence in English literary history constitutes, secondly, an important 
moment in the evolution of social consciousness, a moment that stands as the proximate 
origin of our own habits of memory. For as it unfolded, the comparatively brief career of 
public poetry inadvertently helped to ensure the eventual ascendancy of the literal 
mnemonic mode. In the decades after the Restoration, and even during the first years of the 
eighteenth century, the two main mnemonic modes remain largely united not only within
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public poetry, but to a sufficient degree within the periodical essay (as practiced, say, by 
Addison and Steele) as well, allowing these potential generic rivals to remain essentially 
complementary. Ultimately, however, two factors would put these genres at odds with one 
another. The first is the appeal o f  the immediacy and specificity o f  prose journalism and 
fiction. These not only contributed greatly to the commercial success of prose at the 
expense of poetry, but sapped the latter’s cultural authority as well, for they inculcated 
habits of reading and of seeing the larger world that depended very little upon the emblem, 
allusion, and precedential parallels public poetry used to reinforce its readers’ sense of 
participation in their nation’s historical and literary traditions. In journalism, the present 
moment is news; yesterday belongs to the obscurity of the past. And as for poetry’s new 
rival, John Feather points out that, “From the [book-] trade’s point of view, the 
significance of the novel lay not in its literary merit but in its essential triviality. It was seen 
as an ephemeral production to be read once and then forgotten. This meant that, once the 
demand had been created, a continuous supply of new novels was needed to fill it” (97). 
By mid-century, readers had become accustomed to and demanded novelty above all else. 
As in our own day, the habit o f  seeing the past in the present ceased to be relevant and 
viable; explication o f the present moment in terms of itself was now what mattered.
The second factor has to do with public poetry itself. Put simply, as the standard- 
bearer of the figurative mode o f  social memory, it little by little ceased to adequately 
illuminate the prosaic realities o f the everyday world and thereby gradually lost its 
credibility as an interpreter o f the historical present. Though its primary spokesman, 
Alexander Pope, would, like Dry den, come to serve his contemporaries and successors as 
a social emblem, a cultural mnemonic that defined the aesthetic ideals of the age, these 
ideals were no longer integral to the way the age went about fashioning its definitions of 
itself. In particular, Pope’s attempts to “epicize” his times in increasingly agonistic verse 
produced some of the most brilliant satirical poetry in the language, but the more forceful 
his attempts to impose a figurative interpretation of the historical present upon his audience.
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the more his work alienated its readers. Its sensibility was at odds with theirs, and 
seemingly out o f synch with the world it purported to describe and define. When Pope in 
his final years at length claimed that Universal Darkness was about to bury all, and forever, 
the inhabitants of a  economically prosperous, politically stable, militarily potent England 
probably wondered what on earth the eccentric little man could have in mind. Public poetry 
had initially recommended itself by appealing to common experience of everyday realities: 
the poet could blend the figurative with the literal, the poetic with the prosaic, because 
individual readers could be expected to verify the aptness o f his observations for 
themselves; now common experience had grown independent o f the society’s poet- 
prophets.
3. The Purpose of the Present Project 
Literature, and particularly public poetry, was the last sphere in which the 
techniques of the literal and figurative mnemonic modes remained mutually informative. 
But as the preponderance of the literal in prose and of the figurative in poetry effectively 
segregated these two modes of social memory as well as the two genres, the English- 
speaking world lost a  way of remembering that it had employed for centuries, for the 
cultural eclipse of poetry and the figurative habits of mind and memory it inculcated would 
prove more or less permanent This eclipse would prove to be very important for the 
evolution of the habits of memory with which we are today familiar, and which seem to be 
so impervious to alteration. However, if the eclipse of the figurative mode shows us 
anything, it is that the methods of memory do evolve, and thus the struggle between 
mnemonic modes in the Augustan age provides an opportunity for an investigation of how 
and why the techniques o f social memory change over time, and, more specifically, how 
the foundations of our own habits of memory came to be laid.
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The purpose of this project, then, is to trace in the rise, evolution, and decline of 
public poetry in England from 1660 to 1745 the estrangement and divorce of the figurative 
and literal modes o f social memory, and to explore the consequences of this divorce for the 
cultural importance of poetry in the Augustan age, for the age’s definitions of itself, for our 
own understanding of the age, and for our understanding of techniques of fashioning social 
memory in the late twentieth century.
4. The Origins and Design of the Present Study 
An account of the origins of this project will, I hope, go some way toward 
explaining and justifying its method and structure. I began with an Augustan conundrum 
that had plagued me almost since my introduction to the literature of the Restoration and 
eighteenth century: the discrepancy between the temperament o f the age as described by its 
literary successors and historians, and the temperament o f the age as manifested in its 
literature. Received opinion from the time of Johnson until at least 1988, when I was 
presented with it in graduate school, holds that it was an age of imitation, not innovation; 
that the Augustan poet had to practice emotional restraint and observe a strict propriety of 
manner; that the poet and his or her poetry must subscribe to a  rigid classification of poetic 
forms, styles, and subjects, and to a prescribed poetic diction; that it was the business of 
the poet to make general pronouncements of universal truths, and that this imperative 
entailed a rejection of the particular and the personal. Useful shorthand, perhaps, but as the 
young Mary Pierrepont so rightly observed to her future husband, “General Notions are 
generally wrong”4. This is an age, after all, in which existing poetic models (such as verse 
satire) were so revised as to be in effect remade; an age that saw the emergence of many 
new literary forms, among them the novel, the periodical essay, and the polite letter. This is
4Letter to Edward Wortley Montagu, March 28, 1710.
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an age in which regularity of form and propriety of manner and diction were frequently 
followed for ironic effect or abandoned altogether; an age in which political and literary 
controversy often made literature very personal and minutely particular. Could we expect 
otherwise of the period of Rochester, Dryden, Dennis, Bentley, Swift, Pope, and Lady 
Mary herself? Still, gratifying as it might be, one cannot wholly attribute the disparity 
between Augustan reputation and reality to the willful misunderstandings of the Romantics 
(particularly Wordsworth) or the complacency o f  literary historians. For often they simply 
repeated what the age had said o f itself. After all, Addison merely echoes Dryden and 
anticipates Pope when he declares in Spectator N o. 253 (December 20,1711),
It is impossible, for us who live in the later Ages of the \Aft>rld, to make 
Observations in Criticism, Morality, or in any Art or Science, which have 
not been touched upon by others. We have little else left us, but to represent 
the common Sense of Mankind in more strong, more beautiful, or more 
uncommon Lights (253).
Pope’s own An Essay Upon Criticism  (1711) cautions his reader against the impulsive 
adoption of new or archaic words, against wanton deviation from classical precedents, and 
against the exercise of the imagination unchecked by judgement And in Johnson’s 
Rasselas (1759) we find Imlac’s oft-quoted admonishment to poets, perhaps the very 
emblem of eighteenth-century literary theory:
“The business of a poet” said Imlac, “is to examine, not the individual, but 
the species; to remark general properties and large appearances: he does not 
number the streaks of the tulip, or describe the different shades in the 
verdure of the forest He is to exhibit in his portraits of nature such 
prominent and striking features, as recall the original to every mind” (527- 
28).
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No wonder that such pronouncements should have prompted successive generations of 
critics to mine the period’s literature for decorous statements of universal truths. It will not 
do, however, to take Addison, Pope, and Johnson at their word; the form, temper, and 
subjects of their own works too often belie their theoretical assertions.
Put another way, if we have misrepresented the Augustan age, it is largely because 
the age misrepresented itself to itself. One might say it tnisremembered itself, mistaking its 
ideals, its cherished myths, its favorite images for its realities—or rather, that it came to 
retain the memory of certain realities and discard that o f others, fashioning its identity from 
what was obvious and easily preserved. There is nothing unique to the Augustans in this; 
every age does the same. Nor is there anything sinister in the practice. It is merely 
necessary. For memory is not so much a matter of retention as o f propitious forgetting: it is 
impossible to remember until we have forgotten enough to make manageable what we have 
known; memory is not the print on a page, but the white spaces between the line and 
letters. But it is also possible for us to adopt a contrary view and argue that Augustan 
literature has indeed preserved more of the truth of its times than is apparent at first glance. 
The trick is to recover, not the bewildering variety o f experience of late seventeenth- and 
early eighteenth-century England—we can never know exactly what it was like to be alive 
during that time—but the components o f social memory and, especially, the manner (or 
mode) of their configuration. Their recovery is essential to making the perceptual, 
intellectual, and aesthetic idioms of the period more readily accessible, that is, richer and 
more explicit in their significations. And such access, in turn, allows us to reconstruct the 
ostensible and implicit motivations informing the habits of social memory with which the 
Augustans fashioned their historical present into patterns of experience sufficiently coherent 
and emblematic to serve as plausible definitions of the age and its inhabitants.
Thus what I have labelled the “conundrum’’ o f the Augustan age led me to examine 
the processes of public memory during the years 1660-1745; further, the vigorousness of 
these processes as they played themselves out in the public poetry of the period led to my
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decision to choose poetry as the best medium in which to examine them. Tracing the rise, 
development, and decline of public poetry makes a  chronological survey only logical, but 
even if it were feasible, it is well beyond the scope o f this study to survey the period year 
by year or poem by poem. Rather, it occurred to me that by comparing two points in time, 
related in many respects but sufficiently distant from one another to be readily 
distinguished, one might more readily discern broad differences of sensibility, worldview, 
and thereby mnemonic technique by gaining the advantage of retrospective overview—that 
is, of a before-and-after comparison. It was fortuitous (though, as I hope to show, not 
wholly coincidental) that the advent o f public poetry coincides with the career of John 
Dryden, and its demise with that o f  Alexander Pope. Their contrasting portrayals of the 
historical present, as well as their differences in subject, tone, and method, aptly 
demonstrate the shifts in sensibility and thereby those in mnemonic modes between 1660 
and 1745. The poetic works of Dryden and Pope thus serve as ready case studies for the 
evolution in mnemonic matter and method during the Augustan age. But in addition, both 
Dryden and Pope as public personages were in their own times recognized as important 
vehicles for social self-perception as well as indispensable components of their societies’ 
emerging self-definitions; in fact, by virtue of their enduring popularity and the sheer 
figurative power of their verse, they came to be reconstituted by their contemporaries and 
successors into cultural mnemonics of a sort, living emblems o f a whole complex of 
aesthetic, philosophical, moral, and political values that in its turn epitomized an important 
chapter in Britain’s literary and social history. It is this consideration that prompts me to 
choose the careers o f these two major figures as the main pillars supporting the arch of my 
thesis. For the lives, works, and personae of these two poets, I would argue, not only best 
demonstrate the immense role poetry had in shaping the historical present and habits of 
memory in early modem Britain, but also neatly comprehend the struggle between the 
figurative and literal mnemonic modes during the period 1660-1745.
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However, I would not be taken to imply that to support my argument I shall consult 
only the public poetry of the period, or only that poetry composed by Dryden and Pope. In 
order to trace the influence of poetry upon the sensibilities of the period, I intend to make 
frequent reference to contemporary drama, letters, diaries, newspapers, and memoirs, as 
well as popular histories. And here it might behoove me to point out that I am very much 
aware that it is one thing to make a  case for public poetry’s capacity for giving shape to the 
historical present or to enumerate its efforts toward so doing, and quite another to establish 
definitively the exact measure either of its impact upon the private understanding of 
individuals or of its influence upon the work of professional historians. We are unlikely, 
for instance, to discover diary entries or personal letters that are as highly figurative in their 
accounts of events as the occasional poetry of the period; nor should we expect that 
Dryden’s treatment of the Exclusion Crisis, say, or Pope’s portrayal of the administration 
of George II should appear undiluted in the writings of professional historians. That is, the 
test of public poetry’s influence is not its being taken for and applied as literal truth. 
Although, as Roy Porter notes in his biography of Gibbon, the contemporaries of Dryden 
and Pope quite “self-consciously acted out their lives on a historical stage, fortified by the 
maxims of the past, playing the parts of ancient soldiers and sages” (30), and the practice 
of history itself in their time was comparatively figurative in the sense that it often presented 
the past as an unfolding narrative of Providential design or as a series of morally edifying 
exempla (24ff.), we must remember that after all the importance of public poetry in this 
period is its ability to make the significance of the events and personages of the day readily 
comprehensible, usually by placing them in an immediately recognizable figurative context, 
be it historical, literary, or typological. Public poetry thus participates in what Connerton 
labels “communal memory,” that is, in the creation and continuation of society’s 
“informally told narrative histories” (17), rather than in the textual and archaeological 
reconstruction of the past usually associated with the practices of the professional historian. 
Therefore, the test of public poetry’s importance for the shaping of worldview is its
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capacity to fashion a plausible present meaning for the present moment, and it does this 
through the deftness o f its figuration, its power to persuade and to provoke in its readers 
the desired thought and action. As for Dryden and Pope, they are not the only poets of their 
age who were able to incite, inspire, and, in some cases, indict their public and their 
society; they are instead starting points for my researches, emblems of the public person­
ages whose works provide the material for my investigations.
I have organized those investigations as follows. Chapter 1, “Public Poetry: A 
Definition and Historical Overview,” offers a working definition of public poetry and an 
admittedly brief and selective survey of its history in England, beginning with the oral 
poetry of the Anglo-Saxons and ending with the death of the first truly public English poet, 
Ben Jonson. The first half o f Chapter 2, “Public Poetry in the Middle Decades of the 
Seventeenth Century,” continues the history o f public poetry in England, exploring the 
political, social, and cultural forces underlying public poetry’s rise to preeminence at the 
time of the Restoration. The second half of the chapter looks at the career o f John Dryden 
during the 1660’s and 1670’s, focusing specifically upon his displacement o f the courtly 
wits as literary arbiters. In tracing the particular rhetorical strategies and figures by which 
Dryden eroded the esthetic prerogative of the gentleman-amateur, this portion of the 
chapter incidentally demonstrates how public poetry—in this case, dramatic prologues and 
epilogues—could effect major changes in the larger society’s assessment o f and 
expectations for its cultural values and identity. Chapter 3, “Poetry and Memory in 
Augustan England,” provides the classical background for seventeenth-century notions o f 
memory, then examines the late seventeenth century’s own “aesthetics of memory,” which, 
even as it offered a theoretical explanation for poetry’s impact upon memory, also justified 
poetry’s participation in public affairs in an age grown skeptical of figurative expression. 
Chapter 4, “The Exclusion Crisis and Images of English Puritanism: A Case Study o f 
Poetry and Memory in Augustan England,” shows how in practice public poetry worked to 
shape social memory in the decades after the Restoration. Chapters 5 and 6, “From ‘Great
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Anna!* to 'Great Anarch!”* (Parts I and II), discuss Pope’s futile attempt to advance both 
the authority of public poetry and the efficacy o f figurative memory. In the conclusion to 
the study, I survey the immediate and long-term consequences of Pope’s peculiar influence 
upon English poetry, paying particular attention to how one o f those consequences, the 
demise of the figurative mnemonic mode, has shaped the matter, manner, and tone of 
memory in our own age, and has—at least indirectly—bequeathed to us the anxious, ironic 
temper of our own solipsistic, slightly paranoid century.
My hope for the present study is twofold. First, I hope to add to our understanding 
of memory in our own time by plausibly tracing its proximate origins to a time earlier than 
commonly supposed and to a specific conflict of mnemonic modes, the resolution of which 
has helped shape our own habits of communal memory. This study is intended, then, as an 
exercise in “practical” criticism to complement earlier studies of memory, whether 
theoretical or practical, such as Frances Yates’ The Art o f Memory (1966), Walter Ong’s 
Orality and literacy: The Technologizing o f the Word (1982), Paul Connerton’s How 
Societies Remember (1989), Patrick Hutton’s H istory as an A rt o f Memory (1993), Mary 
Carru tilers’ The Book o f Memory: A Study o f Memory in M edieval Culture (1990), David 
Cressy’s Bonfires and Bells: National Memory and the Protestant Calendar in Elizabethan 
and Stuart England (1989), Jocelyn Harris’ Jane Austen’s Art o f Memory (1989), and Paul 
Fussell’s The Great War and M odem Memory (1975) and Wartime (1989). As even this 
brief list suggests, in recent years the study of memory has been regularly applied to 
historical and literary topics; to my knowledge, however, no such study has been 
undertaken on the years 1660-1745. Moreover, by focusing on the role of public poetry in 
the shaping of Augustan memory and self-definition, I hope both to add a literary 
dimension to recent social histories of the period, such as Roy Porter’s English Society in 
the Eighteenth Century (1982) and Linda Colley’s Britons: Forging a Nation, 1707-1837 
(1992), and to introduce the problem of memory into discussions—such as Howard
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Weinbrot’s recently published Britannia’s Issue—of literary history and the emergence of 
historical consciousness.
My second aim is the more ambitious by far: to give the modem reader an 
appreciation both for the energy o f Augustan poetry and for a world in which poetry had a 
major part to play in the shaping of social sensibility—a role, sadly enough, that poetry has 
forfeited in our own time.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I
PUBLIC POETRY: A DEFINITION AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
1. Private. Semi-Private, and Public Poetry
To argue, as I do, that poetry of the second half of the seventeenth century had an
unprecedented influence upon the matter and manner of historical consciousness and
therefore upon the fashioning of social memory, one must argue likewise that during this
period the relationship between poetry and society at large was equally unprecedented And
to claim that this new relationship between poetry and society constituted a triumph of
public poetry, I am compelled to do three things. First, I must make clear what I mean by
the term “public poetry”; second I must show how the predominant poetic mode of this
age differs from those of earlier periods; and third I must establish the means by which
and the terms upon which poetry in this period became a force for shaping public
perception, consciousness, and memory. For if I cannot make a case that such a thing as
public poetry exists, and further, that Augustan poetry in particular could (in theory) and
did (in practice) play a prominent public role, subsequent demonstrations of the specific
effects of particular poems will be spurious. In this chapter, then, I shall offer a working
definition of “public poetry” and attempt (by way of historical overview) to contrast the
fully public with what might be called the private and semi-private (or semi-public) poetic
modes; the following chapter will focus on the rise o f poetry to a position o f broad cultural
authority following the Restoration.
One should begin by observing that though all poetry can be made public, only
certain poetry can be public in the fullest sense of the word Consider, for instance, the
following poem, which appeared in 1648:
Display thy breasts, my Julia, there let me 
Behold that circummortal purity:
Betweene whose glories, there my lips lie lay,
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Ravisht, in that faire Via Lactea.
The year 1648 was a decisive one in England’s history. Late in 1647 Charles I had escaped 
from the clutches of the New Model Army; by the end of the year he had made a deal with 
the Scottish Presbyterians, who had fallen out with both the Army and Parliament The 
Royalist cause, crushed two and a half years earlier at Naseby, was given a seeming 
second life: early in 1648 the Civil War broke out anew. It did no t however, last long. The 
Royalists, ill-organized and out-generalled, were defeated decisively by Cromwell at 
Preston, and in Essex by Fairfax; the King was seized on the Isle of Wight; the Army 
purged Parliament leaving, as Ashley says, “a sectarian ‘Rump’” (89) that in short order 
tried and convicted Charles for treason. The King was beheaded on January 30,1649.
This tumult is a world away—at least—from the epigram on Julia’s breasts. With 
the events of 1647-8 in mind, one might, conceivably, be led to argue that the poet, in full 
psychological retreat from the violence and chaos of the public sphere, seeks out the 
reassuring, almost maternal embrace of his mistress. Yet, detached from their historical 
context, these lines suggest nothing beyond the immediate circumstances they portray. Of 
those circumstances much may be observed. The speaker and Julia are apparently long-time 
lovers, this being a poem not of seduction, but of consummation. The poet, so bold in his 
request, can be no bolder than his Julia will tolerate; both must delight in frank eroticism, 
an eroticism at once heightened and tempered by their easy familiarity. Further, their 
eroticism is as rational and as spiritual as it is physical. When the speaker refers to the 
“circummortal purity” of Julia’s “glories,” and renames them a “Via Lactea,” the abstraction 
of his phrases suggests an intellectual distance between the speaker’s apprehension of 
Julia’s beauty and his assessment of it (as does the Latin phrase); his declaration o f  her 
beauty’s “circummortal purity” recalls the neoplatonic reconciliation o f body and soul 
found in the secular thought of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.
Having inferred this much, what yet eludes us? For one thing, we know few 
particulars of the poet or his mistress. We would know the poet’s name, for its appears on
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the title page of the volume in which this poem is found: Hesperides: or The Works Both 
Humane & Divine o f Robert Herrick Esq. But who is Robert Herrick? His portrait in the 
frontispiece shows a burly, double-chinned fellow with a  boldly arching nose and a great 
tempest of bushy hair. Given the prominence of these features, we might suppose that this 
Robert Herrick is something of an epicure—precisely the person to write a poem about his 
mistress’ breasts. Taking his poem and his portrait together we might infer that Herrick is a 
Royalist: no Roundhead would strike such a  fleshly pose; no ardent Parliamentarian would 
trifle with sensual epigrams. And presumably by the time we had read through the poems 
preceding “Upon Julia’s Breasts” we would have reached certain tentative conclusions 
about his education, personal and mental habits, poetic style, and the like. In short, 
Herrick’s volume suggests much to us about its author. But it tells us next to nothing. As 
for Herrick, his character, as opposed to that of his poetic persona, remains elusive; we 
know nothing of his condition or circumstances. Moreover, we know little of the 
circumstances of the poem itself, its date of composition, the conditions under which it was 
composed, and its intended audience. Who is Julia? “Julia” is no doubt a fictional name— 
and might well be a wholly fictional personage. (Indeed, given the rather intimate nature of 
much of the poetry in Hesperides, we would expect Herrick to be discreet regarding his 
mistress, lest too many men claim too intimate a knowledge o f her.) Without knowledge of 
the poem’s circumstances, our suppositions regarding Herrick himself begin to erode. 
Herrick m ight be a Cavalier, but if we learned that he composed this piece much before the 
Civil War we might instead account him an imitator of Jonson’s erotic poetry.
Herrick’s poem leaves us with such doubts and questions because as readers we are 
left to look in at this poem, its characters and the drama between them, from the outside. 
We are mere spectators here, and vulnerable spectators at that: we cannot be sure that we 
understand the poet’s frame of reference, and have no chance either to endorse or to deny 
his claims. Perhaps Herrick’s lines, playful and spry as they are, will trigger the reader’s 
own pleasant recollections, but in general the mind’s eye has few imagistic details upon
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which to work. As readers we are silent, passive, aural witnesses to the poet’s
exclamation—as if we were hearing him through a thin wall; we must take the poet at his
word, or not, as we are inclined.
This is not quite the case with the next poem, the Earl of Rochester’s ballad.
“Signor Dildo,” which was composed around December 1673, but published only thirty
years later, in 1703. Whereas Herrick’s lines are largely self-contained, Rochester’s poem
is fully coherent, its humor fully comprehensible, only if  the reader can account for the
allusions it makes to various contemporary events and personages. The first two stanzas,
for example, firmly establish the setting and occasion of the poem’s events:
You ladies all of merry England
Who have been to kiss the Duchess’s hand,
Pray did you lately observe in the show 
A noble Italian called Signior Dildo?
This signior was one of Her Highness’s train,
And helped to conduct her over the main;
But now she cries out, “To the Duke I will go!
I have no more need for Signior Dildo" (11. 1-8).
Why have the ladies o f England been to Court to “kiss the Duchess’s hand"? What has
been the occasion of “the show"’s pageantry? The Duchess has lately come from Italy and
has married the Duke. Specifically, Mary of Modena and James, Duke o f York have lately
wed. Circulating among Courtly circles the month after the November marriage,
Rochester’s poem could not have baffled his aristocratic contemporaries. It would not have
given commoners much confusion, for James’ second marriage was an important public
event By 1670 James was known to be an avowed Papist; his marriage to Mary, whom
J.P. Kenyon describes as “a bigoted young Italian Catholic whose family were traditional
clients of France" (22S), worried both ministers and the masses. Should Charles die
without an heir, the crown would pass first to James, then to his two Protestant daughters,
Mary and Anne. However, should the Duke and Duchess of York produce a son (as they
subsequently did in 1688), that Catholic son would succeed his father and reestablish, in
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effect, a Catholic monarchy in England. An intricately conditional scenario to be sure, but 
vexing enough even in prospect to contribute to the breakup of the Cabal ministry. 
Shaftesbury’s violent opposition to the marriage led to his dismissal from Court in 1674. 
Soon afterward, anxiety over England’s future led the other members of the Cabal to turn 
against one another, and split into mutually hostile camps.
I do not mean to suggest that Rochester’s poem hints at all or any of these 
consequences o f James’s marriage. Rather, I wish only to point out that “Signior Dildo” 
makes plain that the catalyst far its composition is a national episode, one with which 
Rochester’s readers, whether actual or hypothetical, would have been very familiar. 
Whereas Herrick’s poem proceeds from a private, publicly unverifiable frame of reference, 
Rochester’s poem begins with a public allusion that every individual may confirm and 
reflect upon for himself. James, Duke of York did indeed make an Italian noblewoman, 
Mary Beatrice of Modena, his duchess. The event is one of public record, subject to public 
scrutiny and comment Somewhat less public are Rochester’s allusions to the women of 
Court who turn or will likely turn their attentions to the slighted Signior “My Lady 
Southesk” (1. 16), “the good Lady Suffolk” and her daughter Lady Betty (11. 21-2), “the 
countess of Ralph” (1. 29), “Her Grace of Cleveland” (1. 37), “The countess o f th’ 
Cockpit” (1. 45), “Red Howard, red Sheldon, and Temple so tall” (1. 49), “doll Howard” 
(1.53), “Tom Killigrew’s wife” (1.65), “fair Madame Knight” (1.70), and “the good Lady 
Sandys” (1. 89). Most of these women were at least semi-public figures; if they were not 
known personally or by sight to the reader, their titles would indicate their general 
identities. Rochester dispenses with the coy literary pseudonyms that Herrick might have 
used and “names names.” By doing so he greatly heightens his readers’ interest: readers 
can themselves point out any of these personages and declare that this one or that one is 
given sexual notoriety by Rochester’s poem. Indeed, Rochester’s poem would lose much 
of its power to entertain if readers could not, by confirming for themselves the actual 
existence of these women, participate vicariously in the moral scandals of Charles II’s
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Court (themselves a matter o f public record). His references to the countesses of “Ralph” 
and “th’ Cockpit” might not be immediately clear, but we are sure, since he has been 
careful to use real names, that Rochester has particular persons in mind—as it turns out, 
Elizabeth, wife of Ralph, Earl and Duke o f Montagu, and Nell Gwynn, respectively. If 
anything, this bit of obscurity draws us further into the poem: intrigued, we make inquiries 
and count ourselves lucky to be among the few “in the know.”
Yet Rochester’s poem is nowhere close to being fully public. For one thing, though 
it is topical and its frames of reference are public, the poem is not generally available to the 
public. Its intended and actual audience is Rochester’s own circle o f Courtly Wits. As 
Samuel Hynes has observed, “Good gossip requires a closed society with open mouths” 
(41). Rochester’s details are explicit enough—the Duchess of Cleveland “has swallowed 
more pricks than the ocean has sand” 0- 38); “Doll” (Dorothy) Howard, “her teeth being 
rotten, . . . smells best below” (1. 55)— but given the closed circle o f Courtly sexual 
intrigue, those outside its narrow compass cannot personally verify such details. Outsiders 
need not verify them for them to be titillating. But the private, unverifiable details of the 
poem show it to be generally self-enclosed: their frill comic and satiric force will be 
appreciated only by those few who know Rochester’s subjects personally, at first-hand. If 
Herrick’s lines are comprised of private sentiments uttered privately, Rochester sets private 
details within a vaguely public framework. And though Rochester’s poem is addressed to 
“You ladies all of merry England,” the address is no more than superficial. The poem does 
not continue to address “you ladies all,” but becomes a  catalogue o f  eccentric sexual 
proclivities. Rochester’s details might invite his cohorts to peer and leer over his shoulder, 
but his poem acknowledges the reader only slightly more than Herrick’s—and neither 
poem asks the reader to be more than a  spectator to the poet’s revelations. Indeed, the 
reader-at-large can be no more than a  spectator, for though the poem is nominally 
occasional, it is made available to the general public only thirty years after the events to 
which it alludes have occurred.
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We might, for the sake of rough classification, label Herrick’s poem “private” and
Rochester’s “semi-private.” A third example will, I hope, make clear and justify these
labels, and establish the distinction between partly and fully public poetry. In June 1668 an
actor of the King’s Company stepped before the audience and delivered the following lines:
When first our poet set himself to write,
Like a  young bridegroom on his wedding-night 
He laid about him, and did so bestir him,
His Muse could never lie in quiet for him:
But now his honeymoon is gone and past,
Yet the ungrateful drudgery must last,
And he is bound, as civil husbands do,
To strain himself, in complaisance to you;
To write in pain, and counterfeit a  bliss 
Like the faint smackings of an after-kiss.
What strikes us about these lines is, first, that the poet makes himself the subject of his
poem, and, second, that he compares himself to a  husband grown weary o f his wife’s
embraces. Once he had belabored his Muse—but now his Muse belabors /urn, and he is
forced to feign an interest in “the ungrateful drudgery” that he does not feel. In plain
language, the poet, having set up for a writer, must continue to pursue his craft despite his
present inclinations. What may yet baffle us is that “you” in line 8: the speaker seems to say
that he embraces his Muse-wife in order to please the playgoers—implying that they are a
pack o f voyeurs. The next few lines, however, indicate that the poet has been merely
anticipating a shift in metaphor. The ill-pleased wife o f line 11 is no longer his Muse but
his audience—an audience delighted with the embraces of any poet who happens along:
But you, like wives ill-pleas’d, supply his want:
Each writing Monsieur is a fresh gallant;
And tho’, perhaps, ’t was done as well before,
Yet still there’s something in a new amour (U. 11-14).
As is turns out, the poet continues to address his auditors directly, extending the metaphor
of the cuckolding audience throughout the rest of the poem, making it ever more explicit
His general sense is this: Cuckold him as it might with “each writing Monsieur,” his
audience will find that their lover-poets have not the stamina of “your good man at home”
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(1. 20): “Their fine small-timber’d wits would soon decay: /  These are gallants but for a 
holiday” (II. 21-22). Other gallants, for all their “pomp and glory” (1. 25), will prove 
outright impotent: “Their useless weight with patience long [is] borne, / But at last you 
[throw] ’em off with scorn” (11. 27-28). Pursue “fresh delight” (1. 31) if you must, the 
speaker admonishes his listeners, but remember that three times a year “he claims in you an 
husband’s right” (1.30), and will expect your lovers to make way for him: “That only time 
from your gallants he’ll borrow; / Be kind today, and cuckold him tomorrow” (11.34-5).
Thus does John Dryden harangue his audience in the prologue to his play, An 
Evening’s Love or, The Mock-Astrologer. One sees immediately that this poem is different 
in kind than those of Herrick and Rochester—and not simply because it is a prologue to a 
dramatic performance. In the seventeenth century prologues were often published separate 
from their plays, as broadsides; and though this particular prologue was not published 
separately, it was to appear in print, available for general purchase, in 1671. So prologues 
were not necessarily dependent upon the plays they prefaced. And as this particular 
prologue progresses it soon becomes evident that it is in feet self-contained, independent of 
the comedy that follows. It does not introduce or summarize the play, nor does it expend 
much effort cajoling the audience to receive it favorably; rather, it spars with the audience, 
indicts its morals and aesthetic tastes, and all but dares it to find fault with the playwright 
and his play. That would seem to be the very purpose of this prologue. It is not set against 
the backdrop of a national crisis (though Clarendon had fallen the previous year); it makes 
no direct reference to an important national event. Yet by reason of its awareness of its 
audience, its manner of address, its subject matter, and the persona it employs, this 
prologue may be called a fully public poem.
As James Anderson Winn notes throughout his biography of Dryden, Restoration 
audiences, perhaps taking their cue from the Court, had a great appetite for sexual innuendo 
and expected bawdy word-play from their dramatists. But Dryden is more than simply 
aware o f the appetites of his audience, and does more here than toss off a risque metaphor.
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Indeed, the equation of poet to weary husband and audience to promiscuous wife is an apt 
vehicle for the critique o f his listeners’ ssthetic tastes that Dryden means to deliver. First, 
and most generally, Dryden draws a  parallel between a hierarchy o f dramatic merit and one 
of sexual morality. At the top o f  the scale are the plays composed by the laboring 
playwright, whose long association with his craft and audience puts special claims upon the 
loyalties of the latter; at the bottom are the “writing Monsieurs,” who please merely by way 
of their novelty: “This pleases you with some by-stroke of wit, /  This finds some cranny 
that was never hit” (U. 17-18). Their newness wearing off, they strain after wit but “soon 
[fall] flat before ye” (1.26). As the legitimate playwright is cuckolded by pretenders to wit, 
so is the husband’s lawful embrace foregone for the illicit but ultimately unsatisfactory 
embraces of adulterous rivals. As Winn points out, Dryden has the troupes o f French 
actors (hence “writing Monsieur”) that had recently become fashionable among London 
playgoers specifically in mind (193). But in addition to likening foreign dramatic fashions 
to sexual pathology, Dryden seeks to challenge, even incite, the audience itself. His 
metaphor implies not only infidelity on its part, but infidelity with thoroughly unworthy 
partners. In this, Dryden sets up, not a third party, but the audience itself as the object of 
his satire. In doing so, he forces its members to face the choice before them regarding their 
dramatists and dramatic values: fidelity or fickleness. And whether or not Dryden’s self- 
portrait is ironic, it is important that he portrays himself at all, and for two main reasons. 
First, he steps before the public, if  not physically, at least before its mind’s eye, giving it 
an image of himself it may easily comprehend and assess. By positing such a persona 
Dryden can fashion a  public ethos and thereby lay direct claim to the attention and fellow 
feeling of his auditors. Secondly, he can use the persona he establishes for himself as a 
rhetorical “space” from which he can challenge the assumptions and expectations of the 
crowd and satirize those he finds unacceptable.
The differences between this poem and those of Herrick and Rochester become 
particularly clear when one considers the use to which their one common element—sexual
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imagery—is put In Herrick’s poem, as I have noted above, the language or eroticism is 
muted by its abstraction. At least, it is muted for the reader; for Herrick, no doubt, it is 
sufficiently vivid, for it serves the purpose o f recalling to the poet a series of private 
associations.1 For Rochester, sexual imagery and sexually-charged language serve the 
purposes o f Courtly satire—though, as noted, much of that satire is lost on those 
personally unacquainted with Rochester’s subjects—but also of Courtly reportage. There 
would seem to be enough literal truth to Rochester’s observations to reinforce what was 
commonly whispered and believed within his narrow circle. In Dryden’s poem, sexual 
imagery constitutes neither private allusion nor direct, personal satire. It is instead purely 
metaphorical in form and in purpose purely rhetorical—on two levels. Dryden’s central 
conceit is explicit enough to titillate, to excite the imagination of the crowd, even as its 
analogies convey his critique of its lack of aesthetic judgement His sexual language is not, 
as it is for Herrick, a  private mnemonic, nor is i t  as it is for Rochester, an end in itself; it is 
a means to an end, that end being the refinement of critical judgement in the Restoration 
audience.
If I claim that from the foregoing examples one can construct a good working 
definition of fully public poetry, it may be claimed against me that in choosing these poems 
I have stacked the deck in my favor. That I have stacked the deck I cannot deny; that I have 
stacked it in my favor is quite another matter. If anything, I have stacked it against myself. 
It is no accident that my examples o f private, semi-private, and fully public poems have all 
been more or less erotic in mode and content The erotic never falls out of fashion; eros is 
perhaps the one topic of general and perpetual interest. This being the case, eros, if 
anything, will make a private or semi-private poem seem a public one. I might also point 
out that though Dryden wrote many politically-charged prologues and epilogues (not to
1 Of course, Herrick’s Julia may be wholly fictional. Even so, the fiction is Herrick’s private fiction.
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mention his great satires o f  the early I680’s), the prologue I chose to examine was 
comparatively void of political or social allusion. It was “merely” the grousing o f an 
underpaid playwright at the fickle tastes of his audience. But even so, it will serve to 
demonstrate the mode o f fully public poetry, as the poems o f  Herrick and Rochester 
illustrate, if  only emblematically, the modes o f private and semi-private poetry, 
respectively. Proceeding, then, from the examples above, public poetry may be defined by 
the following characteristics. First, it is poetry that takes for its subject topics of interest to 
a broad, general audience; this audience, the public for the poem, consists o f all those who 
might conceivably read and respond to it, whether in thought, discourse, or action. It 
follows from this that, secondly, public poetry is addressed to readers beyond the poet's 
immediate circle of acquaintance, to persons the poet does not himself know, and over 
whom he has no powers o f supervision or coercion. He cannot control the circumstances 
under which his poem is read; he cannot look over each reader’s shoulder and point out that 
here, here, and here are the key points o f the poem; he cannot, in person at least, interpret 
the poem for the reader. Any control the poet is to have over his readers must therefore 
come from within the poem itself. Thus the public poem is, thirdly, likely to be rhetorical 
or persuasive in nature, and to employ forms, diction, imagery, and allusions that are not 
only broadly comprehensible but designed to manipulate audience response. It follows, 
fourthly, that the readers o f  public poetry are not simply spectators, but supposed to be 
active participants: the public poem is fundamentally provocative—calling for a response, 
whether emotional, intellectual, or behavioral—and pragmatic, its aim being to educate, 
reform, incite, or pacify its readers. Fifth, and finally, the public poem self-consciously 
invokes its own historical moment; it draws attention to its own circumstances (political, 
social, cultural, economic, and ssthetic), and to those of the reader, in doing so defines not 
only those circumstances but its reader’s perception of them. The occasional, public poem 
thus creates both its public and its occasion.
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The public poem, in its turn, is the creation of the public poet. Here, too, the 
foregoing poems will give us a good idea of just who is and is not a public poet. For 
though all poets, like their poetry, might appear publicly, the fully public poet—or, put 
another way, the poet when adopting a  fully public role—is to be distinguished by certain 
general characteristics. Perhaps most evident is the assumption of an openly public stance. 
This stance may be either literal and first-hand, as with the poet who reads or recites his 
poetry in public, or figurative and second-hand, as with the poet who creates for himself a 
readily recognized public persona. Such a stance must be assumed because by definition 
public poetry has addressees, and an address, to be effective (that is, attended to, believed, 
and acted upon), must have a discernible source, a source whose character or ethos the 
addressees may evaluate for themselves. Thus one may, with Herrick, write of a universal 
human experience, erotic intimacy, or, with Rochester, fashion an account in verse of 
public personages and events, without writing public poetry. In both cases the poet’s 
audience is largely himself; consequently, neither Herrick nor Rochester need take pains to 
define himself. The matter is quite otherwise with Dryden’s prologue. Though Dryden 
does not appear in person, he must give his auditors some sense of who it is that presumes 
to admonish them. Defining himself and his audience with a bawdy analogy, Dryden 
establishes with the strength of his wit his prerogative to pronounce upon dramatic values. 
The reason for Dryden’s admonishment suggests a second characteristic of the public poet, 
namely, that he is likely to be a professional. As a professional playwright, Dryden must 
concern himself with rivals for the box office take. In a more general sense, he must 
concern himself with the attitudes and tastes of his society at large; he may try to reform or 
refine these tastes, but if he is to earn his living he must ultimately defer to them. Thus 
professionalism in itself forces the public poet not only to address a general audience but to 
exhibit himself before it. This need for exhibition and the professionalism that entails it 
mean that the public poet of this period is more likely to be a member of the middle to 
upper-middle classes than an aristocrat Few noblemen would scandalize themselves by
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plying a trade dependent upon public whim and fashion; few would jeopardize their social 
standing by subjecting themselves, their person and character, to public scrutiny. There is 
no such stigma for the poet with roots in the trading and professional classes. On the other 
hand, public exhibition is at least potentially problematic for the middle-class poet, for he 
can claim no a priori authority to address, much less admonish the public at large. The poet 
may cite the rank, wealth, and taste of his aristocratic patrons, should he have them; he may 
cite precedents from classical Greece and Rome for his audacity; he may decry the 
viciousness o f the times and plead that though he would be humble his love of virtue leaves 
him no choice but to take up his pen in her defense. Such appeals to patrons, precedent, 
and probity may impress us, but they are really beside the point For fundamentally the 
authority o f the public poet comes from the frequent general approbation of his poetic 
performances. This is not to say that all who please the public may lay just claim to its 
esteem, but to argue, as Sidney did, that an audience may not be effectively admonished or 
taught unless it first be moved, “For who will be taught, if he be not moved with desire to 
be taught?” (123). The aesthetic and cultural authority the poet is able to establish for 
himself has one consequence that rounds off the primary characteristics of the fully public 
poet, namely, it makes the poet himself a cultural icon, a sort of social mnemonic in which 
are embedded a great range of collective values, associations, and allusions. “The Age of 
Pope,” for instance, certainly refers to the period and works of Pope’s life, but it implies 
more than Pope’s preeminence during those years. It functions emblematically to bring to 
the mind first Pope’s circle, its ideas and works, its allies and foes, then its social and 
historical contexts. When one says, “Pope,” the image of a crook-backed little poet may 
come first to mind, but soon after come other personages, images and events: Swift, Gay, 
Arbuthnot, Harley, the ill-fated Tory government under Anne, the subsequent Whig 
ascendency, Walpole and the first two Georges, Bolingbroke and the Opposition, the 
South Sea Bubble, Handel’s operas and Hogarth’s prints. As I will argue later with regard 
to Dryden, the “canonization” of writers is more than the reductionism of literary historians;
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it is important historical shorthand for the writer’s own age, an important component of its 
ever-evolving self-definition.
2. Public Poetry in England Before Dryden
It may be that in pointing out these features o f public poetry and the public poet I 
have merely stated the obvious. Even so, these features, if obvious, must nevertheless be 
borne in mind if the fully public poem is to be distinguished from those poems that merely 
appear in public, or that appeal generally to public interest and appetite. They must be kept 
in mind if  we are to distinguish the role and work of Dryden and later poets from those of 
their predecessors. And they must be kept in mind if  we are to have any chance of 
understanding how and why such poets and their poetry flourished between the Restoration 
o f the Stuarts and the death of Pope. The characteristics of public poetry and of the public 
poet may seem self-evident, but the fully public mode is not a common one much before 
the middle o f the seventeenth century, nor would it survive the eighteenth century. 
However, public poetry would have a lasting impact upon English historical 
consciousness, helping to foster in its readers habits of mind and memory that are near 
ancestors to our own. Only by closely investigating the backgrounds and methods of this 
mode of poetry can we can hope to comprehend the shape and content of the self­
definitions that emerged from this period of British history and have been handed down to 
us, often greatly distorted, by the intervening centuries.
But at this point I must malm an important qualification. I have just said that public 
poetry is the product of the mid-seventeenth century. I should have said that the public 
poetry that flourished at that time was the literate reincarnation of a distant progenitor, 
Anglo-Saxon oral culture. The foregoing definitions of public poetry and poets would be 
apropos to an Anglo-Saxon scop. In oral cultures poetry is not separate from religion, 
history, ethics, cosmology, or observation of the natural and human worlds. Poetry
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
49
subsumes all these things. As Walter Ong points out in O rality and Literacy (1982), 
“performance o f an oral epic, for example, can serve also simultaneously as an act of 
celebration, as paideia or education for youth, as a strengthener of group identity, as a  way 
of keeping alive all sorts o f lore—historical, biological, zoological, sociological, venatic, 
nautical, religious—and much else. Moreover, the narrator typically identifies with the 
characters he treats and interacts with his real audience, who by their responses in turn help 
determine what he says—the length and style of his narrative” (161). The Anglo-Saxon 
poet, like his counterparts in other oral or semi-literate cultures, directed his poetry to broad 
sections of his society. This society was rather rigidly hierarchical, and its great poetry 
tended to focus on the deeds and sorrows of its aristocratic members. Yet for all that, each 
Anglo-Saxon, whether of low or noble birth, could fashion an identify for himself from the 
heroes and wisdom of his culture’s poetry. These heroes, this wisdom and lore, belonged 
not to a class, but to a people, to an entire race. Dorothy Whitelock observes, “The Anglo- 
Saxons regarded themselves as Germans, and continued to repeat the songs and legends 
which they had brought over with them—including versified catalogues of the kings and 
tribes of Germany and the North” (18). When, in the dark fastness o f winter, the Anglo- 
Saxon bard sang to the crowded meadhall o f Beowulf or Byrhtnoth or the Battle of 
Brunanburh, kings, retainers, artisans, laborers, and slaves together heard the familiar 
alliterative rhythms and locutions bring familiar stories to life. And though their names are 
lost to us, the singers of these songs must have been greatly revered, for as Michael 
Alexander points out, “In such a society the poet is the keeper of the traditions which hold 
the cynn (kin) together, just as the king (cyn-ing) is the keeper of the treasure which is the 
cynn's only possession and defence. The older a sword was, the older a word was, the 
more it was valued by the cynn. In a primitive society the poet is historian and priest, and 
his songs have ritual significance” (11-12). The poet’s songs defined the audience, its 
culture, and its place in this “middle-earth.” Thus the poet himself was in his person and
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craft a literal social mnemonic, far more so than would be his seventeenth-century 
counterparts.
I make this reference to Anglo-Saxon oral culture for three reasons. First, it gives 
us an absolute archetype against which we can measure the respective relationships o f poets 
to their larger societies in later ages. The Anglo-Saxon poet’s audience was the whole of 
Anglo-Saxon society; his identification with that audience was one-to-one. Never again 
would poetry and poets have such broad cultural power. Anglo-Saxon heroism was a 
response to their own profound fatalism. The speaker in “The Seafarer” declares that “the 
praise of living men who shall speak after he is gone, the best of fame after death for every 
man, is that he should strive ere he must depart. . .  so that the children of men may later 
exalt him and his praise live afterwards among the angels for ever and ever” (77).- But as 
the Seafarer implies, heroism as a  response to fatalism only makes sense if heroic deeds 
can be translated into heroic poetry, that is, into tribal and cultural history. Fatalism found 
its antidote in the fame only poets could dispense. Secondly, though the public poets of the 
seventeenth century could not claim the absolute authority of their Anglo-Saxon 
predecessors, the manner and methods of their poetry and the public pose they would 
assume recapitulate in a general way many of the characteristics o f Anglo-Saxon oral 
culture. Though not intentional, this recapitulation is probably inevitable. As I hope to 
demonstrate in the following sections, the public poet in the seventeenth century could 
presume to inform, persuade, and shape the memory o f his audience only by adapting 
ancient methods of oral address, instruction, and memorization to their present purposes. 
By the seventeenth century England had been a literate society for nearly a millennium, but 
it was far from being fully literate (in several senses of the word), and as Ong notes it 
would retain a strong residual orality through the Romantic period (133, passim ). The 
transition from orality to something like full literacy in this period allowed Dryden, his
- Translated by R.K. Gordon.
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contemporaries, and their successors to effectively employ the trappings of orality in literate 
discourse. Occasional reference to the example of Anglo-Saxon oral culture will, I hope, 
make clear both the “oral” strategies o f the poets under discussion here and the fundamental 
differences between truly oral and residually oral societies.
Third, the example of the Anglo-Saxons will demonstrate a singular irony in the 
history of English literary culture: it is not until the advent of print culture in England that 
formal poetry could again be as public as it had been during the Anglo-Saxon era. Though 
for many centuries before the introduction of print into Britain (1476) the English had been 
only semi-literate, it is not until the very specialized skill of literacy had been broadly 
acquired (at least comparatively so) that formal verse again became an important part of 
popular culture. There are many reasons for this, but each may be traced back to the social 
and thus cultural polarization of English society after the Norman Invasion. Stratified as 
Anglo-Saxon society had been, all levels of that society shared a single tongue and a single 
tribal and racial heritage that gave each of its members access to the history, myths, lore, 
and riddles bound up in the specialized language o f Anglo-Saxon poetry. The Conquest 
shattered this unity. The displacement o f the Anglo-Saxon aristocracy by William and his 
followers did not simply split English society into a French-speaking ruling class and an 
English-speaking underclass. This split in turn created a schism between “high” and “low” 
culture that has never been fully overcome—even now we speak as if “academic” or 
“learned” culture and “popular” are irreconcilably antithetical, or, perhaps protesting too 
much, as if there is no distinguishing one from the other. This present-day anxiety, I 
believe, is a legacy from a society in which the literary language and traditions of the ruling 
classes were wholly alien to the native population. Poetic genres have always been ranked 
from high to low, from, say, epic to pastoral; but after the Conquest the subject matter, 
genre, form, and language of a poem were closely identified with the social rank o f its 
author. The subordination of English to French from the eleventh to the fourteenth 
centuries made it all but inevitable that poetry composed (orally) in English would go
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
unrecorded and be lost to literary history. Indeed, English as a literary language re-emerges 
only once it began to reclaim its place as the language of Court and o f polite society in the 
middle 1300’s.
This re-emergence was requisite to the rise of public poetry. Still, we cannot begin 
to speak of a true public poetry emerging in England until after the introduction o f printing 
in 1476, and for two reasons. First, print acts as a social and cultural leveller: it makes 
literary, religious, political, philosophical, and scientific writings available (theoretically, at 
least) to all who can read, regardless of class or condition, theoretically removing the 
“natural” bar separating the ranks of the learned and unlearned. (Gerald Mac Lean notes that 
as late as the seventeenth century printing was, along with gunpowder, decried for its 
undermining o f social hierarchies (xii).) Second, and more specifically, printing created a 
reading public before whom the public poet could stand. As John Feather points out, “Late 
medieval England was certainly not a bookless society”; a commercial book trade had 
existed since around 1300, making books “not uncommon among the richer classes” (1-2). 
But as Feather’s last observation implies, very few persons could afford to buy or 
commission works produced manually. Printing, however, meant that books would no 
longer be produced a few at a time (this would not be cost-effective), but in editions 
running into the hundreds, requiring publishers to 1) print works that would find a ready 
audience, and 2) create and service new markets. As it turned out, from the courts of 
Edward IV and Richard III and “the traditionally literate classes”—the clergy, lawyers, and 
merchants—books and literacy soon worked their way down the social scale in the form of 
almanacs, prognostications, sermons and other religious tracts, and practical works (on 
farming, for example): “The extent of literacy depended on the availability of the means to 
acquire it, and having acquired it, of both the means and motivation to retain i t . . .  The 
shift from an oral to a printed culture should not be overemphasised, but it was beginning 
in England in the sixteenth century” (Feather 11-24).
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Literacy among the middle and upper classes in England did not create a 
homogeneous community of readers; one has only to recall that the sixteenth century was a 
period rife with religious controversies attendant upon the English reformation, with 
political intrigue accompanying the problematic successions o f Edward VI in 1547 and 
Mary Tudor in 1553, and with the anxiety produced by England's emergence upon the 
world stage under Elizabeth. In such unsettled circumstances, the levelling power of print 
is more likely to produce contention than consensus among the literate classes, but 
consensus is not so important here as the gradual expansion of literacy that such contention 
(as well as the flourishing of the professional and trading classes)—what Derek Traversi 
calls “an unprecedented expansion o f the appetite for argument and confutation" (100)—  
effected. Feather estimates that by 1750 the national literacy rate was only 50-60% among 
men, slightly less among women (95). Working back from this estimate, we would be 
right to be skeptical of any claims of widespread literacy in sixteenth-century England. 
However, we must remember that though the rate of national literacy may have been low, 
the rate in London, hub of government, trade, business (including publishing), and the arts 
(and the future theatre for public poetry), must have been fairly high, and that despite a low 
national rate, literacy was growing and would continue to grow. As we shall see, this 
growth would prove vital to the rise of fully public poetry in the next century.
For the sixteenth century, however, it is important to note that the arrival and 
establishment of printing coincided—though by no means coincidentally—with the career 
of England's first major public poet, John Skelton. Skelton’s poetry and poetic stance 
fulfill every criterion for the public label save one: he was not a professional poet, but a 
poet in addition to being a clergyman, scholar, and an agent of the courts of Henrys VII 
and VIII. Skelton published his poems irregularly, often years after they had been 
composed (as is the case for Agaynste a Comely Coystmwne, Divers Balettys and Dyties 
Solacyous, and Elynour Rummynge), but he also had a keen sense of occasion, and his 
poetry commemorates such public events as the assassination of Henry Percy, fourth Earl
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of Northumberland (Upon the Dolorus Dethe and Muche Lamentable Chaunce o f the 
Mooste Honorable Erie ofNorthumberlande, 1489), the accession of Henry VIII (A Lawde 
and Prayse Made fo r  Our Sovereigne Lord the Kyng, 1509), and the defeat of King James 
IV and the Scots at the Battle of Flodden (A Ballade o f the Scottysshe Kynge and Agaynste 
the Scottes, 1513). In addition, Skelton engaged in public quarrels with fellow poets, such 
as Alexander Barclay and George Dun das, with scholars, such as William Lily over the 
“new grammar,” and with political adversaries, most notably Cardinal Wolsey, the target of 
Skelton's best-known satires, Speke Parott, Collyn Clout, and Why Come Ye Nat to 
Courte?
Certainly much of Skelton's subject matter is what we would (narrowmindedly) call
“elitist,” derived as it is from academic disputes and political intrigues, celebrating as it
does Henry VTH and his court—ELM. Forster has called Skelton “a mouthpiece,” the voice
of official policy (148). And then there is Skelton’s frequent recourse to Latin in his poems:
even the earthy satire Elynour Rummynge concludes with a bizarre Latin colophon:
A couplet in contempt o f the wicked by Skelton the laureate poet Jealous 
man, however mad you are and however you waste away in your vanity, 
we sing; these places are full o f jests. I recall it well. All women who are 
either very fond of drinking, or who bear the dirty stain o f filth, or who 
have the sordid blemish o f squalor, or who are marked out by garrulous 
loquacity, the poet invites to listen to this little satire. Drunken, filthy, 
sordid, gossiping woman, let her run here, let her hasten, let her come; this 
little satire will willingly record her deeds: Apollo, sounding his lyre, ill 
sing the theme of laughter in a hoarse song (translated by John 
Scattergood).
What use this descriptive invitation—“All women. . .  the poet invites to listen to this little 
satire” —in Larin, a t the poem ’s conclusion, was meant to serve is hard to guess, the 
Elynour Rummynges of the world being notoriously unlearned, illiterate in native as well 
as learned tongues. Perhaps Skelton is inviting his learned friends to share a jest at the 
expense of the unlettered poor; perhaps he is only protecting himself from the frowns of the 
pious—or is implicating the pious and learned for their having doggedly read a 624-line
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poem that graphically renders the “Drunken, filthy, sordid, gossiping” persons and 
pronouncements of the foul, ag£d Elynour and her customers: “haltyng Jone” (1. 326), 
“made [mad] Kyt” (412), “crokenebbed” [crook-nosedl Margery Mylkeducke (1. 427), 
“foggy fat” Maude Ruggy (483), and “whey-wormed” Sybyll (L 553). Or perhaps here as 
in his other poems Skelton gives his readers what Shakespeare gave his audience, a 
double- or triple-tiered work that appeals to every level o f moral and aesthetic 
sophistication. The coarseness o f detail and humor would appeal generally, as would the 
poem's topicality: its depiction of an actual person, Alianora Romyng, who ran a tavern in 
Leatherhead, Surrey, and its reference to the “greate war / Betwene Temple Bar / And the 
Crosse in Chepe" (11.358-60)—the “Evil May Day uprising of 1517, when a London mob 
attacked foreigners in the city whom they blamed for the depressed state of the economy” 
(Scattergood 45 In). The debauchery and abject poverty of the poem’s characters gives 
moralists ample material for cautionary tales, and social reactionaries sufficient evidence to 
decry the collapse o f the feudal economy and the subsequent rise in peasants’ prosperity. 
And habitual readers of polite literature, as Scattergood suggests, would likely see the 
poem as an elaborate inversion of medieval romance and its idealized women (449n). This 
breadth of appeal in a published poem suggests that Elynour Rummynge is indeed fully 
public. Much of Skelton’s poetry is, and by virtue of characteristics to which his poetic 
successors could not lay claim. Whether his subject is social, political, academic, or 
historical, Skelton makes use of “popular” or “native” poetic elements: an oral (not literary) 
logic that works by aural aggregation—rhymes run on and on until the vein of sound is 
exhausted—rather than by tight rhetorical or narrative structuring (reinforce the rhyme with 
a strong beat and heavy base and Skeltonics become uncannily rap-like); rhythms derived 
from folk-song and folk-dance; short, heavily stressed lines that recall the miracle and 
mystery plays that enacted Christian scripture and doctrines for their Bible-less audiences; 
proverbs and colloquial constructions; and dialects taken from many locales and all levels 
of society—Maurice Evans points out that in Skelton’s poetry are preserved hundreds of
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native English words found in no other author (46-48). Moreover, Skelton’s poetry is fully 
in touch with the realities o f its world. Thus Skelton can write a  bawdy poem about 
Alianora Romyng’s tavern; or hastily compose a poem celebrating Howard’s defeat of the 
Scots at Flodden (A Ballade o f the Scottysshe Kynge), then revise it once he has gathered 
more information about the battle (Agaynst the Scottes), then later still add a  reply to those 
who found his revision too “venemously stingyng, / Rebukyng and remordyng” (“Unto 
Dyvers People,” 11. 10-11); or over the course of a year produce the three quite dissimilar 
attacks (given above) upon Wolsey, Henry VIITs lord chancellor, modulating his attack as 
circumstance affords—now he is a parrot, now a humble yeoman, now a jaded courtier— 
for maximum satirical effect
Skelton was himself a very public figure, by temperament as well as tenure. The 
clergyman who flaunts his illegitimate child before his congregation, the Orator Royal who 
publicly lampoons his master’s most powerful servant, the scholar who collects honorary 
degrees from Oxford and Cambridge and styles himself “laureate”—such a man cannot 
help but become notorious. As Evans observes, “To the sixteenth century Skelton was 
known as a satirist and, even more, as a jester and buffoon. He was one of those characters 
to whom all the floating legends o f his generation seem to attach themselves, and the Merry 
Tales o f Skelton with its accounts o f insanity, jokes at the expense o f friars and innkeepers 
was one of the most popular books of the century” (43). But it is dangerous to be famous 
for being eccentric; it makes one easy to dismiss. And so it proved with Skelton’s poetic 
reputation. Skelton the buffoon lingered in the public memory long, long after Skelton the 
poet had been forgotten. Erasmus might have called Skelton “that light and glory of English 
letters” in 1499 (qtd. in Scattergood, 16), but Sidney does not bother to mention him in his
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survey of British literature in The Defence o f Poesy (c. 1582; published 1595) and Pope
could refer to him only as ‘‘beastly.’'3
Skelton’s luck could not have been worse. If at his death in 1529 he had flowed
with the mainstream of British letters, shortly thereafter the sudden violent confluence of
new linguistic, religious, and political currents were to radically alter the course of that
mainstream, leaving Skelton the poet an abandoned, landlocked pool. This confluence, as
we shall see, had important consequences for public poetry in Britain. Skelton had been a
connoisseur of native words and non-literary dialects; colloquial English and learned Latin
often ran together in his poems. Ironic, then, that the language he so loved would “betray”
him. During his lifetime, Evans points out, Skelton had himself introduced about 1000
words into English, but had resisted the introduction of words based on the “new” literary
Latin, and had doubted the literary value of studying Greek; whenever possible, he had in
diction, expression, and subject matter turned to the local, the colloquial (39ff). This left
him and his poetry vulnerable, not only because the new learning of the early Renaissance
would soon make such notions seem quaintly old-fashioned, but because English itself was
changing. Traversi reminds us of the “unsettled” state of the language during the middle
third of the sixteenth century:
Poetry, more particularly, was affected by deep-seated uncertainty 
concerning such matters as the fall o f accents, the value of rhyming words, 
and the state of the final ‘e \  a  survival from the earlier inflected language 
which continued to be written but was becoming obsolete in pronunciation.
These changes, together with important shifts in the meaning attached to 
words, meant that the great achievement o f Chaucer was no longer readily 
available to later writers (99).
If such changes left problematic Chaucer’s East Midland dialect—already the dominant
literary language—they would certainly make Skelton’s irregular lines and literarily obscure
3 The First Epistle o f the Second Book o f Horace Imitated (1. 38). Pope glosses his antipathy in a 
footnote: "Poet Laureat to Hen. 8. a volume of whose [Skelton’s] Verses has lately been reprinted, 
consisting almost wholly of Ribaldry, Obscenity, and Scurrilous Language.”
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diction seem absurd. Further, the new learning entering English academic and public life
predisposed the generation of poets writing after Skelton to follow Continental rather than
native models o f prosody—paradoxically enough, a  self-consciously nationalist move to
allow F-nglish to be on a level aesthetically with other vernacular tongues.
This shift in literary allegiance was paralleled by important changes in Britain's
religious and political climate. Skelton had only been dead a half-dozen years when Henry
VIII declared himself to be Supreme Head of the Church in England. If at first the Church
was Catholic in everything but name, it soon began to distinguish itself doctrinally from
Rome, and perhaps most importantly in matters relating to the treatment of scripture and to
individual conscience. In distinguishing itself from the Church of Rome, the Church of
England made available to its congregations the Authorized Version o f the Bible (1535) and
the Book o f Common Prayer (1548). Of the populace’s newfound access to the scriptures,
S.T. Bindoff says that “in England the Scripture's thus early ceased to be the forbidden
handbook of the agitator and became, under some light safeguards, the common property
of the nation” (109), and of the appearance of the Book o f Common Prayer that among its
effects was the propagation of a “majestic” vernacular prose that helped to unite the
kingdom linguistically by “universalizing the dominant language” (155). Scripture and the
new church’s articles of faith were now firmly in the layman’s hands. This, together with
the crown’s dismantling of the monastic orders and its seizure of their lands and property,
left individual English Protestants spiritually vulnerable. If they could at last read and
interpret the sacred texts for themselves, they could no longer rely upon Church tradition,
or turn to the complex religious infrastructure that had heretofore overseen nearly every
aspect of daily life. The result, many historians agree, was a profound “inward turn” of the
individual psyche and a consequent spiritual anxiety. Evans puts it this way:
The new protestant had a more difficult path to tread than the medieval
Catholic [T]he protestant had to thread his uncertain way through the
world by the light of his own interpretation of the scriptures, no longer 
sheltered in the bosom of a ghostly community which safeguarded him from
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the minute o f his birth to the last moment o f  Extreme Unction and even 
beyond. The medieval Everyman has the dignity and restraint o f basic 
security; the sins are clearly known, the recognised remedies available at the 
right time and in the right order. He has no need of Bunyan’s agonised 
question, “What shall I do to be saved?1’ (22).
This “inward turn” of the conscience was reinforced by the unsettling effect the 
English Reformation had on the political atmosphere of sixteenth-century England. The 
1540’s and 1550’s were years of problematic successions, ruthless political intrigues, and 
violent shifts in religious allegiances. The accession o f the young, sickly Edward in 1547 
was supervised by the Duke o f Somerset, who managed to have himself appointed 
Protector, and who, following Edward’s death in 1553, tried to bypass the established 
succession and put Lady Jane Grey on the throne. His gambit failed: England rose up in 
favor of Edward’s legitimate heir, Mary Tudor—then was thrown into chaos when Mary 
tried to reclaim her nation for Rome. Only with the accession of the Protestant Elizabeth in 
1557, the Settlement of 1559—which established the Queen as the governor of the English 
Church, and left that Church “Catholic in ritual, Calvinist in doctrine, and royalist in 
government” (Roberts and Roberts 288)—and the Queen’s subsequent longevity and skill 
in statecraft was England to have a  chance of fulfilling the Settlement’s “primary purpose, 
the union of all moderate-minded men behind the throne” (Bindoff 194). But even with this 
Settlement, Elizabeth’s reign was an uneasy one. Plots hatched at home and abroad by 
favorites and foes alike, the continued machinations o f Rome, and almost ceaseless war 
with the Continent perhaps justified Elizabeth’s resolve that discord “Shall reap no gain 
where former rule hath taught still peace to grow .. . . /  Our rusty sword with rest, shall 
first his edge employ / To poll their tops that seek such change and gape for joy” (“The 
Doubt of Future Foes,” 11.9-12; 15-16). But nervous monarchs make for nervous Courts. 
Whether they lived and wrote under Henry, Edward, Mary, or Elizabeth, poets of the 
Tudor era found themselves increasingly muzzled and menaced. Feather observes that from 
1534, when the printing and publishing of books by foreigners was forbidden, the crown’s 
statutory control over the press intensified severalfold (I6ff.). In 1538, for example,
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publication could not take place unless the Privy Council had given its prior approval; in 
1559, Elizabeth revised and tightened this prohibition, charging the Stationers’ Company 
(chartered two years earlier) with its enforcement; by 1586, the Company had proven itself 
so trustworthy in its regulation o f  the book trade that it was recognized by the crown as “an 
equal partner with [it] in the suppression of undesirable books” (Feather 34). But more 
discouraging than legislation to the rise of a healthy public poetry during the sixteenth 
century was the precarious life of the courtier, to whom, in the persons of Wyatt, Surrey, 
Sidney, and Spenser, Apollo’s torch had passed following the death of Skelton. As these 
and other figures such as Ralegh and Bacon found, royal favor was difficult to win and 
keep, and its loss was likely to entail loss o f office and property, public disgrace, 
imprisonment, exile (real or effectual), and even death.
No wonder, then, that the poetic imagination of the leading poets from Wyatt to 
Donne was dominated by a profound turning inward, away from the public sphere and 
toward the vicissitudes of the private self, the light and shadow of the private soul. If 
experience is the fool’s teacher, Sir Thomas Wyatt, for one, had no choice but to be 
Fortune’s fool, for the whole o f his life was passed at Court—-or serving it in distant lands, 
or languishing in prison under its sentence. His success as a diplomat during the 1520’s 
was countered by unceasing ill fortune during the late 1530’s. In 1535 he was knighted for 
his services to the crown; in 1536 he was imprisoned in the Tower—under no charge and 
upon no evidence. His release in June 1536 was followed by a series of preferments and 
royal favors; he was even entrusted, in 1537, with the difficult task of negotiating with 
Charles V and heading off a Catholic alliance against England. By the autumn of 1538 his 
lack of success led to his being charged with treason. These charges were set aside at the 
time, no doubt under the influence of Thomas Cromwell, Henry’s chief minister and 
Wyatt’s friend and patron. When, however, Cromwell himself fell from Henry’s favor and 
was executed in 1540, the charges against Wyatt were renewed: he was again imprisoned 
in the Tower, his lands and goods seized, his family forcibly displaced from AUington
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Castle. Wyatt was successfully prosecuted, and if he was not executed it was by reason of 
the king’s current favorite, Catherine Howard, petitioning Henry for clemency. Despite 
Wyatt’s disgrace, the month after his release (March 1541) he was given charge of a light 
cavalry unit and the responsibility of protecting Calais while the city was being fortified. 
The next year, when there was talk of war with France, it was whispered that Wyatt was to 
be made vice-admiral of the English fleet Such a life required a fittingly ironic end: 
dispatched by the king to welcome Charles V’s envoy at Falmouth, Wyatt rode hard, 
became overheated, and caught a  fever. He died a week later, on October 11, 1542, at the 
age of thirty-nine. During his short life Wyatt published nothing save his translation of 
Plutarch’s Q uiet o f Mind (1528), which he undertook at the request of Henry’s first queen, 
Katherine o f Aragon. But he was a prolific poet and, as literary history remembers him, an 
inveterate experimenter with poetic form and language. Had he published his work he 
might also have been remembered as a great public poet: Wyatt had a sharp eye for physical 
detail and dramatic circumstance, a fine sense of psychological nuance, a deadly ironic edge 
tending to satire, and a soaring moral idealism that wears the mask of world-weary despair. 
Had he been born in 1603 or 1653 he might have lashed and dazzled his age. But he was 
bom in 1503. With the public sphere effectively closed to him, he examined the particulars 
o f his own heart and conscience.
At times, it is true, it is difficult to believe that the unceasing, soul-destroying angst 
of his lyrics is the effect of a love forever unrequited. In fact, Wyatt’s love for Elizabeth 
Darrell was sufficiently requited for her to remain his mistress from 1536 until his death in 
1542, to bear him a son, Francis, and to displace Wyatt’s legitimate wife, Elizabeth 
Brooke, from Allington Castle. But to ascribe the disillusionment, the bitterness, the sense 
of betrayal found throughout Wyatt’s poetry to a mere aping of the conventional lover’s 
plaint he found in his great model, Petrarch, is to ignore the significantly close parallels 
between the lover’s suit and the courtier’s. Nearly all o f Wyatt’s erotic poetry rings with 
the anguished voice of a long-suffering Petrarchan lover protesting the injustice o f his
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mistress: that she not only disregards but scorns his faithful attentions; that she rewards his 
unflagging fidelity by giving her attentions to another; that she wrongly accuses him of 
inconstancy, or of jeopardizing her honor; that she delights in the humiliations he endures 
in serving one whose beauty o f person and spirit compels service. Above all, and in sum, 
Wyatt’s lover complains that he has not been requited as his merit deserves—indeed his 
very devotion has undone him in body, mind, and soul. In “Ye know my heart, my lady 
dear,” a poem typical o f Wyatt’s erotic lyrics, the speaker declares that he is his lady’s 
“thrall” (1. 1), having given himself to her “both whole and clear” (1. 3); yet his “reward 
hath been but small” (1. 4) for all that he has served “faithfully, / And suffered wrong / 
How patiently” (11.9-11). Pleading that “since that I have never swerved / Let not my pains 
be undeserved” (11. 12-13), the speaker complains that he bums in a “fervent flaming fire” 
(1. 17) that has its source in his lover’s “frozen breast” (1.25). So disordering is his being’s 
“unrest” (1. 26) that he must die unless his mistress relents: “For me and mine / And all I 
have / Ye may assign /  To spill or save. / Why are you then so cruel foe / Unto your own 
that loves you so?” (11. 34-39). Against the injustice of his mistress—here or in countless 
other poems—Wyatt’s lover has but one recourse, to scorn love and retire from its lists, as 
he does, for example, in “Farewell, Love:”
Go trouble younger hearts.
And in me claim no more authority.
With idle youth go use thy property 
And thereon spend thy many brittle darts:
For hitherto though I have lost all my time,
Me lusteth no longer rotten boughs to climb (11. 9-14).
For Wyatt, the courtier who has served and suffered for no less cruel a mistress— 
Fortune—has likewise no choice but to retreat, both physically and psychologically, from 
the circle o f Court At times the speaker in Wyatt’s poems voices his disillusionment over 
unspecified wrongs, as in the sonnet “Caesar, when that the traitor o f Egypt”: “if I laughed 
any time or season, /  It is for because I have n’other way / To cloak my care but under 
sport and play” (11. 12-14), or in his epigram, “Lucks, my fair falcon,” where he observes
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that “they that sometime liked my company / Like lice away from dead bodies they crawl”
(11.4-5), concluding, “But ye, my birds, I swear by all your bells, /  Ye be my friends and
so be but few else” (11. 7-8). In another epigram, “Sighs are my food, drink are my tears,”
Wyatt complains a bit more explicitly to his friend Sir Francis Brian that fetters, “stink and
close air” (1. 3) are wearing away his life: “Innocency is all the hope I have” 0- 4). And
why? Because “Malice assaulted [w]hat righteousness should save” (1.6)—but did not As
the devout lover suffers unjustly from his mistress’ suspicions, so does the morally upright
courtier find himself punished for being an honest man in a world where righteousness is
unwilling or unable to discern and reward his merit More explicit still is a  poem apparently
written during Wyatt’s imprisonment in 1536, “Who list his wealth and ease retain.” In
this, the speaker, languishing in his prison cell, admonishes his reader (even as he reminds
himself) to forego ambition and the trappings of Fortune’s favor and live humbly, obscure
to the loci of power and fame: “Himself let him unknown contain” 0- 2)—
These bloody days have broken my heart 
My lust, my youth did them depart 
And blind desire of estate.
Who hastes to climb seeks to revert 
Of truth, circa Regna tonal (11.11-15).
The references to “these bloody days” and to the sight seen from the bell tower, “that in
my head sticks day and night” (1. 17) are generally taken to allude to Henry’s execution of
Anne Boleyn and her several alleged lovers; the poem’s refrain, circa Regna tonat, more
than seems to indict the king’s sanguinary justice, against which it is bootless “of
innocence to plead or prate” (1.23). The one solution left to the persecuted is to “give God
the stem” (1.24)—that is, to resign from public life. This theme of retreat, of retirement,
informs Wyatt’s most explicitly “public” poems, the three epistolary satires, in which the
poet rather generally deplores the soul-destroying temptations and corruptions of the life
spent at court These, he says, have been the cause of his withdrawal to his own estates,
where his actions are unwatched, his pleasures wholesome, his conscience clear:
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But here I am in Kent and Christendom
Among the Muses where I read and rhyme.
Where if thou list, my Poyntz, for to come,
Thou shalt be judge how I do spend my time (Mine own John Poyntz, 11. 100-103).
So closely indeed does the arc o f the courtier’s career in his political poetry match 
that o f the lover’s in Wyatt’s erotic lyrics that one suspects the latter to be the former in 
disguise, that Wyatt has displaced his anger, anxiety, and disgust from their actual objects, 
the king and his creatures, onto a  far safer equivalent: a series of fictional mistresses no less 
powerful, capricious, and morally obtuse than those who now rewarded, now reproved 
Wyatt in real life. Such displacements in Renaissance poetry have received their share of 
critical attention. However, I want to underscore here the circumstantial imperative for 
poetic displacements: the political (not ideological) climate of Wyatt’s day simply did not 
allow for the king, his ministers, or their policies to be brought before the public and 
critically scrutinized. Wyatt’s three courtly satires are generic enough—they name no 
names, refer overtly to no specific events or circumstances—and yet he dared not publish 
them, even had he wanted to. Wyatt does not lack a sense of topicality, but his impulse 
toward it and toward the public exposure of vice and folly must perforce be turned inward, 
their objects finally transmuted to emblems o f the soul’s struggle with the world’s 
trappings. It is a  struggle with no resolution save death, for in his poetry, as in his love and 
politics,Wyatt finds he must retreat silently from the public sphere and, “giving God the 
stem,” leave to divine justice all power of reward and redress.
Wyatt’s inwardness and his tendency toward displacement are generally typical of 
Renaissance poetry; they are the two characteristics that preclude the development of fully 
public poetry in Tudor England. I say this keeping in mind one very important near­
exception: Edmund Spenser. It is quite tempting to label Spenser as a public poet For one 
thing, he published his work^and, as with his first published work, The Shepheardes 
Calender (1579), seems to have taken great pains that it appeared before his public exactly 
as he wished. Second, he does not hesitate to use his poetry to comment on public affairs.
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For instance, the January and April eclogues in The Shepheardes Calender have been read 
as critiques of Elizabeth's supposed intent to marry the French prince Alen$on; the 
February and May eclogues, as criticisms o f Elizabeth’s religious policies; the October 
eclogue concerns itself with the poet’s role in society; and another work, M other Hubberds 
Tale (1591), may reflect Spenser’s disillusionment with the Elizabethan court, and 
particularly his dissatisfaction with Lord Burghley, the Queen’s Secretary. Thus Spenser 
seeks to address a public, to teach it, and to foster in it a  moral sense by which it might 
rightly evaluate matters of public concern. Speaking of The Shepheardes Calender, Thomas 
Cain comments,
Indeed, an inquiring reader of the poem will learn through experience the 
meaning of the dictum in Renaissance literary theory that poetry must not 
only delight but teach. And the best teaching is not didactic but heuristic.
One is tempted to see the reader’s role in each eclogue as a metaphor for 
man’s spiritual situation: above, the orienting zodiacal sign of the heavens 
and the lucid revelation of the woodcut; below, the invitation to wander 
offered by an advocatus diaboli (9).
As the reader picks his way through the “tricky milieu of temptation and perplexing signs”
(Cain 9) in Spenser’s work he will ideally become adept at navigating the moral reefs and
sandbars of the real world. Third, Spenser attempts to use his poetry to define the historical
present—indeed, his very nation—against the heroic classical past: in The Faerie Queene
(1589-96) especially, Spenser sets out to “epicize” England, that is, to lend the land, its
sovereign, its church, its heroes, and its virtues a grandeur and destiny befitting a latter-day
Rome emerging from obscurity to military and cultural preeminence. Without doubt, The
Faerie Queene is, among other things, the greatest expression of nationalism in the
language. Moreover, with regard to himself, Spenser very self-consciously modelled his
own career after that of Virgil, and had no felt no compunction about setting up as the
English Virgil, as England’s national poet It may be said then that Spenser adopted a
specifically public stance in his poetry and with his poetic persona; certainly he was
regarded by his successors as, in Dryden’s words, a poet of verses “so numerous, so
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various, and so harmonious, that only Virgil, whom he profess’dly imitated, has surpass’d 
him among the Romans” {Discourse Concerning Satire, 287). Always acknowledged to be 
one of the greatest English poets, Spenser has long since transcended greatness to become, 
with Chaucer, Shakespeare, and Milton, a  demigod of British literary history.
But having made the case for Spenser’s being a public poet, I will now risk the 
charge of willful perversity by asserting that Spenser is more properly designated a nearly 
public poet For it is his very approximation of the fully public mode that forces us to make 
two rather important distinctions that, I hope, will further clarify my sense and use of 
“public poetry.” The first o f  these distinctions has to do with Spenser’s notion of his 
public, of which we get some clue in his letter to Sir Walter Ralegh prefacing The Fairie 
Queene. Here Spenser declares, “The generall end therefore of all the booke is to fashion a 
gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline”, that is, in “the twelve priuate 
morall vertues” (15): holiness, temperance, chastity, friendship, justice, courtesy, 
constancy, fortitude, patience, truthfulness, and liberality. We get another clue when we 
glance over the work’s seventeen dedicatory sonnets. Among the dedicatees are Sir 
Christopher Hatton, Lord High Chancellor o f England, Lord Burghley, Lord High 
Treasurer, the Earl o f Oxenford, Lord High Chamberlain o f England, the Earls of 
Northumberland, Cumberland, Essex, Ormond and Ossory, the Countess o f Pembroke, 
the Lady Carew, and “All the Gratious and Beautifull Ladies in the Court” From such 
hints I think it fair to suppose that the public for a work such as The Fairie Queene was not 
presumed to consist o f tradesmen, sea captains, or fishwives. On the contrary, from 
Spenser’s statement o f purpose and his list of dedicatees I think it is clear that his epic was 
intended to take its place among the literature of gentlemanly self-fashioning that enjoyed 
great vogue during the sixteenth century. This vogue itself may owe a good deal of its 
power to the political tensions of the Tudor court Traversi observes that the uncertainties 
of courtly life, coupled with the rise o f the “new men”—the nonaristocratic bureaucrats 
who increasingly came to oversee the day-to-day administration of the realm—led to a
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
67
reduction of real aristocratic power. “The life of a courtier," he says, “came to be seen as an 
elaborately formal game, dedicated to the royal fountainhead o f favor and expressive of a 
highly artificial ideal” (IQS). Hus “elaborately formal game” is yet another manifestation of 
the inwardly-tumed psyche, and no doubt it informs much of the non-public, “courtly” 
poetry of the period, the Petrarchan lyrics, the sonnet sequences, the panegyrics dedicated 
to noble patrons. Thus, while the “priuate morall vertues”—holiness, friendship, courtesy 
and the rest—Spenser champions in The Fairie Queene may be useful throughout the social 
hierarchy, they are presented as if they were objets d ’art, to be collected and cultivated by 
the genteel largely for their own sakes. And though the attainment of these virtues may 
prepare one to serve Queen and Country and acquire a sense of noblesse oblige, such ends 
are reserved for a small, self-contained social clique. Certainly, Spenser does not intend to 
democratize the “aristocratic” virtues any more than he means his critiques of Elizabeth's 
policies in The Shepheardes Calender and Mother Hubberds Tale to inspire the lower 
orders to claim a share in the country’s governing, to rise up and reform the administration 
of the state.
In fact, it is very likely that although Spenser took the trouble to publish his poetry, 
he was not much interested in seeing his work disseminated widely among the various 
social classes. He was a gentleman, after all, not a  peddler of fruit It would hardly become 
the English Virgil to cry up his wares in the street As Feather reminds us, though 
nondramatic writing at the end o f the sixteenth century was becoming “a recognisable 
occupation,” its professional practitioners were as yet held in low esteem (27); the genteel 
amateur author did not offer for sale what were in effect pieces o f his or her being. Even 
Ben Jonson, who could not pretend to gentility and who would become a (if not the) 
prototype of the public poet in the seventeenth century, says in “To My Bookseller” 
(published with his Works o f 1616), that though his bookdealer is wise to call a book 
“good or bad, as it doth sell” (1.2), the dealer must allow it
To lie upon thy stall till it be sought;
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Not offered, as it made suit to be bought;
Nor have my title-Ieaf on posts or walls
Or in cleft-sticks, advanced to make calls-----
If, without these vile arts, it will not sell,
Send it to Bucklersbury: there ’twill, well (11.5-8; 11-12).
If I hesitate to label Spenser a fully public poet, I do so in part because, not being a
professional, he cannot claim (even should he wish to) anything like a direct relationship to
the broader public. I have said above that a  poem may be made public without being fully
public in mode. To be fully public, a poem should engage more than its author and his
immediate circle. In Spenser’s day, the trading classes were acquiring sufficient economic
power to make themselves a key part of England’s stability and prosperity, and thus
constituted an increasingly vital part of “the public.” That these classes were not addressed
or appealed to suggests that Spenser either bears them not in mind or that he has more or
less consciously turned a blind eye to them. This the fully public poet cannot afford to do,
for by relegating a significant portion of his potential constituency to the role of spectators,
he will circumscribe his own influence and all but forfeit his attempts to effect change or
reform. The public, after all, is the public poet’s fulcrum; the broader its base, the greater
its stability—and the greater will be the poet’s leverage, his social and cultural authority.
Thus, though Spenser made his works available to the public, the works
themselves are hardly concerned with those beyond his immediate circle who might acquire
them; certainly they do not have a broadly public agenda. But there is yet a second
distinction we must make between fully public poetry and Spenser’s all-but-public works,
such as The Shepheardes Calender and M other Hubberds Tale. This distinction concerns
Spenser’s manner of addressing his public. In my definition of public poetry I noted that it
is likely to employ forms, diction, imagery, and allusions that will make it readily and
generally accessible and that will impress its point upon its readers. At first glance it seems
that Spenser meets this criterion in both The Shepheardes Calender and M other Hubberds
Tale. The former, after all, uses the ancient device of encoding social and political
commentary in the “lowly” pastoral mode. It is the pastoral, Sidney asserts in The Defence
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o f Poesy, that in the guise o f poor shepherds’ conversation “can show the misery of people 
under hard lords and ravening soldiers,” or the “blessedness . . .  derived to them that lie 
lowest from the goodness of them that sit highest,” or “under the pretty tales of wolves and 
sheep can include the whole considerations of wrongdoing and patience” (127). Using the 
conventions and privileges o f pastoral poetry, Spenser’s “February” eclogue presents the 
courtly conflict between old favorites and ambitious upstarts: in Thenot’s tale of the oak 
and briar, the former would overshade the latter, and so kill it, even as the latter would 
twine itself about the great tree and choke it to death. At least, the parable could be read, in 
Cain’s words, as “a broad allegory of competition for power at court, or it may allude to a 
specific set of events like the displacement o f the Roman church by Elizabeth’s Religious 
Settlement” (38). The “April” eclogue celebrates Elizabeth, “the flowre of Virgins” (1.48) 
and in doing so cautions her against marrying (or at any rate marrying unwisely) and 
thereby jeopardizing English sovereignty. When Hobbinol sings the hymn of praise the 
lovelorn Colin has composed for Elizabeth, the scornful Thenot chides Colin in absentia for 
loving above his station. Yet one wonders: who would be worthy of “Eliza” save the 
shepherd-poet who embodies the best qualities of the honest English yeoman? Is Spenser 
warning his Queen against marrying abroad? Or in the “May” eclogue, to what degree is 
Palinode and Hers’ debate of shepherds’ duties an allegory of the religious controversies of 
the time? And with which religious factions are we to identify Hers, Palinode, and the Fox 
(who in Palinode’s tale serves to unite two quarrelling shepherds against a common 
enemy)? If, as Cain says, the applications of Spenser’s allegories and analogies “is no 
longer clear” (38) to modem readers (or scholars), neither can we be sure that Spenser’s 
meaning was clear to his contemporaries, so oblique are his allusions to current events, and 
so baffling is the mysterious “E.K.”’s running gloss on The Shepheardes Calender. 
Indeed, as Cain says, E.K.’s glosses “raise unhelpful assistance to a  new power” (6)— so 
much so that one suspects their purpose to further obscure Spenser’s already cloudy intent 
M other Hubberds Tale (1591) likewise employs age-old literary devices, the estate satire
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and the beast fable, to convey its themes and allusions. In the poem, two imposters, a fox 
and an ape, take advantage of the newly fallen, newly mutable world to pass themselves off 
in successive episodes as shepherds, priests, and courtiers. Though they are repeatedly 
exposed and punished, they at length succeed in ruling (or rather, misruling) in place of the 
sleeping lion king. Ultimately, however, the god Mercury descends and awakes the true 
king, who then slays the villains accomplices, strips and banishes the fox, and crops the 
ape’s ears and tail. The work was sufficiently biting to be suppressed by Queen 
Elizabeth—the character of the fox seemed to glance at Lord Burghley—but as William 
Oram observes, “the particular political targets of the allegory were obscure even when it 
was published” (327).
Bearing these examples in mind, we can distinguish between figures and allegories 
that are designed to disguise or obscure meaning and those that are meant to reveal and 
amplify i t  The difference between them is not so much one of figurative versus literal 
address as of mode, that is, o f the stance the poet assumes toward his audience. A figure of 
speech may be used either as a “parallel language,” an equivalent to its original more or less 
complete in itself, or as a sort o f adjective that points back to the original it modifies—and 
here modifies does more than complete the grammatical metaphor. The figure-as-modifier 
truly alters the original even as it brings it to mind, creating not two separate but equivalent 
ways of naming a thing, but two halves whose values inform one another and combine to 
make a new, hybrid whole. Spenser’s eclogues and his beast fable, for instance, create 
figurative worlds paralleling but largely independent of the courtly world. The realities of 
the courtly world certainly moved Spenser to compose The Shepheardes Calender and 
Mother Hubberds Tale, and the conventions of reading figuratively compel the reader to 
look for referents in the everyday world, yet Spenser has left his eclogues and fable so self- 
contained in their conventions that the bridges crossing from the allegorical to the actual are 
difficult—if not impossible—to discern. Given Spenser’s conception of his public and, 
more generally, the political climate that fostered the Renaissance tendency towards
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“inwardness,” it is likely that the poet did not wish these poems to expose too much to the 
common gaze or to suggest mote than he could personally answer for. Or we might return 
to Cain’s assertion that Spenser’s tuition is heuristic rather than didactic—that he means to 
put an instructive puzzle before the reader. Whatever Spenser’s motives, it is evident that 
he did not take a  truly public stance here because be uses the figurative to equivocate rather 
than modify
The difference in mode effected by a shift from equivocation to modification can be 
seen when we examine Ben Jonson’s On the Famous Voyage, written only twenty years 
after Spenser’s beast fable. Jonson’s poem is no more literal or any less figurative than 
Spenser’s, but its manner of yoking the Literal and figurative establishes it as fully public. 
Jonson’s subject is the journey, undertaken on a wager, o f William Sheldon and Sir 
Christopher Heydon from the Mermaid Tavern to Holbem via the Fleet Ditch. However, he 
makes no attempt to render a literal or realistic account o f their voyage; taking his cue from 
the perilousness of the endeavor (Fleet Ditch, running from Holbem down to the Thames, 
was little more than an open sewer, its fetid air widely believed to be a source of the 
plague), Jonson recasts the trip in epic terms, as a latter-day journey to the Underworld, as 
a feat more than matching the purely fabulous visitations of Hercules, Theseus, Orpheus, 
and Odysseus to Pluto’s kingdom. When such an event (an insignificant trip taken to win a 
bet) is modified by the canon and conventions of classical epic, we are forced to see both 
the event and its modifier in new ways. Fitting contemporary personages, deeds, and their 
settings into an epic framework, Jonson effectively erases the distinctions between present 
and past, between reality and myth. One effect o f this is to revivify—even redefine— 
present-day reality as well as the literary past; another is the creation of a new experiential 
“hybrid” or whole for the reader in this case, a mock-epic. When, for instance, Sheldon 
and Heydon set forth upon “that ugly monster / Ycleped mud” (11. 61-2) they soon find 
themselves caught between nothing so mundane as stone embankments, but between 
“Gorgonian scolds and harpies” (1. 69) and anthropomorphic “stench, diseases, and old
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filth, their mother, /  With famine, wants and sorrows many a dozen” (11. 70-1). Rowing 
on, “like Castor brave and Pollux” (1.77), the intrepid two encounter the giant Briareus;— 
no, the Hydra;—no, the treacherous Scylla. Actually, this new prodigy is a barge loaded 
with the collected filth o f the city: “The meat-boat o f Bear’s College, Paris Garden, / Stunk 
not so ill; nor, when she kissed, Kate Arden” (U. 117-18). At length they pass from Styx to 
Acheron, that is,to Fleet Lane, from the cookshops o f which “grease, and hair of measled 
hogs, / The heads, houghs, entrails, and the hides o f dogs” (11. 145-46) pour into the 
Ditch. Here, among the discarded carcasses of roasted cats, the travellers encounter one 
living feline, who is no cat at all, but the reincarnation of “Old Banks the juggler” 0-156), 
who, as would any self-respecting fiend o f Hell, by turns tries to frighten and dismay 
Jonson’s heroes. There is plague here, the cat hisses, and the Fleet’s brothel is closed: 
“You lose your labours quite, /  Were you Jove’s sons, or had Alcides’ might” (11.181-82). 
Nonetheless, “Castor and Pollux” have fulfilled their part of the wager, and call upon three 
judges, Rhadamanthus (a soap-boiler), Aeacus (a barkeep), and Minos (“an ancient 
purblind fleteher” 0-189)) to witness their achievement:
In memory of which liquid deed,
The city since hath raised a pyramid.
And I [Jonson says] could wish for their eternized sakes,
My muse had ploughed with his that sung A-jax (11.193-96).
Jonson’s achievement here is not simply his inclusion o f topical references: to 
Sheldon and Heydon, for instance, or to the bear-baiting at Paris Garden, or to the 
notorious slattern Kate Arden, or Banks the juggler. Certainly such local details help the 
reader, especially the London resident, to follow and “place” the poem in his mind; there is 
no reference to settings, persons, or Jacobean popular culture that would have been 
obscure to the reader of On the Famous Voyage. I have noted above that one characteristic 
of public poetry is its offering readily verifiable information to its audience’s scrutiny. This 
the poem does—as Spenser’s topical poems do no t However, the more significant 
achievement of Jonson's poem is that it reconfigures everyday reality for everyday people.
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In an age when every street was an open sewer—Robert Gray notes, “An experienced City 
man could have found his way around London blindfolded simply from the distinctive 
smells which the various trades gave their districts” (134)— Fleet Ditch was especially 
notorious for its choking filth. As Jonson enumerates its loathsome elements, he forces the 
reader to reappraise what he perceives every day. Fleet Ditch ceases to be a vague, noxious 
stink. The experience o f its stink becomes clarified, intensified, particularized; the physical 
world in general becomes more readily assessable to the “conscious” eye and nose. And to 
portray Fleet Ditch as a Classical underworld, a short boatride through it as an epic voyage, 
is to simultaneously heighten and diminish the reality of the landmark. Grafted onto the 
legends of an heroic past, Fleet offers the passerby a glimpse o f a reified Hell, and 
transforms the witness himself into a modern-day Orpheus or Hercules. But since the use 
of an exalted style only further diminishes a low or trifling subject and renders it comic, 
and the comic in turn serves to distance the reader psychologically from its object, Jonson’s 
poem envelopes the unpleasant and perhaps deadly Ditch in a  reassuring atmosphere of 
insouciance. Laughter, like knowledge, melts fear and superstition.
But if  Jonson’s use of classicism changes our experience of the everyday world, so 
too does it change our experience of classicism itself. For the classical, too, becomes 
objectified, demystified, rendered practicable once its conventions and myths are dragged 
before the public gaze and used to modify everyday life. Jonson cannot describe the route 
of Sheldon and Heydon as one from Avemus to Cocytus to Styx to Acheron without 
making manifest the world o f the Ancients and its “high” culture accessible to the public at 
large—especially when, as in On the Famous Voyage, its conventions are gently mocked. 
What this public is to do with this culture is an open question, but once we are made to see 
our world in epic terms, it is an easy step to see the worlds o f  Homer and Virgil in our 
terms. Perhaps the final consequence, the “new whole” arising from Jonson’s combining 
the ancient and modem worlds (in this and other poems), is the creation in the reader of a 
greater general perspicacity—toward physical and intellectual stimuli certainly, but also
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with regard to the capacity of fiction and fact and of past and present to inform one another 
habitually in our minds. When they do so, we move easily from the literal to the figurative 
and back again, quadrupling the vocabulary available to our sense of the historical present 
and to our social memory.
I do not mean to be cavalierly emblematic with this single poem of Jonson’s. One 
poem cannot embody the extensive and diverse output of Jonson’s career. On the Famous 
Voyage, however, does neatly embody the mode of the fully public poem, and offers a 
instructive contrast between such poetry and the topical poetry of Spenser. One further 
general distinction between these two modes o f poetry should be made here before I 
discuss more specifically Jonson’s career as a public poet I have argued that for Wyatt the 
complexities of public life are finally reduced to questions for the individual conscience: 
How is the individual to conduct himself in a corrupt and corrupting world? How is he to 
reconcile his ethical and spiritual ideals to that world—and to the physical demands of his 
own body? What must he do to remain sovereign of himself? Spenser, facing many of the 
same corruptions and temptations, unlike Wyatt fixes his attention on the abuses 
themselves; much of his poetry is dedicated to defining and exposing them and to offering 
his readers examples o f right behavior. At base, however, Spenser’s response to the public 
sphere is as individualistic as Wyatt’s, for Spenser is preoccupied with expositional 
technique, with the process of rendering experience into figurative representation. This 
leaves him with poems that, for all their imaginative and formal brilliance, fall short of their 
public potential because the poet has encoded his experiences within generic conventions. 
Who are the shepherds in Spenser’s eclogues? What specific political and religious 
positions do they debate, and what is to be made of their resolutions? Who are the targets 
of M other Hubberds Talel Spenser knows, and has no doubt expressed his vision in ways 
that he found apt and poetically pleasing. But his private experience remains private. For 
Wyatt and Spenser, then, we may say that those circumstances which might have produced 
public poetry were instead used to examine and explicate the individual conscience.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
75
Public poetry inverts this tendency, transmuting individual experience into public 
reality, public memory. We see this characteristic at work in On the Famous Voyage. 
Jonson’s own experience o f Fleet Ditch and knowledge of classical literature are fashioned 
into a mock-epic that likely alters the general perceptions o f both the physical and literary 
landmarks. This tendency o f public poetry is even more evident in another o f Jonson’s 
occasional poems, An Execration Upon Vulcan. Jonson composed this poem after a fire in 
November 1623 destroyed his library, and with it several o f his unpublished works. The 
first part o f the poem is taken up with Jonson’s Job-like apostrophizing of the fire-god: 
“What had I done that might call on thine ire? / Or urge thy greedy flame thus to devour / 
So many my years’ labours in an hour?” (U. 2-4). Does Vulcan have it in for poets since 
Minerva, goddess of wisdom, rejected his love? Has he (Jonson) written libel, treason, 
gimmicky verse, or execrable drama? Perhaps he has written badly, but he argues, “Thou 
shouldst have stayed till public fame said so. / She is the judge, thou executioner” 01. 46- 
7). And in any event, he continues, there is so much bad writing about that should have 
“made a meal for Vulcan to lick up” (1.84). Jonson lists a number of titles—then goes on 
to list what works he has lost in the fire. At this point, roughly halfway through the poem, 
Jonson makes a shrewd move and enumerates Vulcan’s recent campaign against culture 
and learning in London. He has burned down the Globe and Fortune theatres (in 1613 and 
1621, respectively), the banqueting house at Whitehall, site of dances and revels (in 1618), 
and has attempted to destroy the records o f the Inns at Court (in 1621). Citing these 
aggressions, Jonson calls for a “writ out of the Chancelry / Against this Vulcan” (11. 174- 
75) and offers suitable punishments, concluding with a wish that he be forever exiled to the 
Low Countries, where the Spanish and Dutch were at war, and there “Make your petards 
and granats, all your fine /  Engines of murder, and receive the praise /  Of massacring 
mankind so many ways” (11. 206-08). But for God’s sake leave England, where “we all 
love peace / And pray the fruits thereof and the increase” (11.210-11).
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Jonson is able to make private experience publicly relevant because he is able to 
equate his loss with London’s losses. He achieves this equation first by being so explicit 
about his own catastrophe (giving his readers a  chance to sympathize with him) and then by 
demonstrating the City’s case against Vulcan. In effect, he retells his own plight in terms 
readily comprehended by the collective memories o f recent disasters he evokes. But above 
all in importance is Jonson’s reflexive identification o f himself with the public sphere. It 
simply does not seem to occur to him that the loss of his library is not a public event—or 
that the loss of the Globe might not affect him personally, does not provide a way to 
describe the destruction of his books and manuscripts. This comes close to being one-to- 
one identification of poet to audience, and in Jonson’s case such identification carries with 
it some forceful claims indeed. For one thing, it means that Jonson’s equation o f his 
grievances with London’s is no idle association: for him his experience really is on a level 
with the larger society’s. For another, he implicitly claims for poets, and for himself 
particularly, a public prominence that is the equivalent of prominent city landmarks. In 
other words, the loss of his library is a matter of public concern because it is his, Ben 
Jonson’s. As a poet he is engaged in cultivating for his king and society the fruits o f the 
peace that “we all” love (11. 209-10). As an agent of the civilized arts, he is, he implies, 
coequal with the monarch who has kept England out of the slaughter of the Thirty Years’ 
War, in which the arts of war are “massacring mankind in so many ways.” This would 
lend him authority enough, but then he is not any poet, but Ben Jonson: by juxtaposing all 
the bad writing that should have been burnt with a catalogue of his lost labors—a 
translation of Horace, a record o f his walk to Scotland, his grammar of the English 
language, several plays, and “humble gleanings in divinity” (L 102)—Jonson distinguishes 
himself from the writers of romances, sensationalist news pamphlets, and poetic follies 
such as anagrams and acrostics. By virtue of his own poetic skill he is entitled to the 
public's attention and esteem. In sum, Jonson’s assumption is that he is, being Ben 
Jonson, a public icon. He can therefore presume to tell the City of his private misfortunes
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because his identity and London's are inextricable. The boundaries dividing public and 
private identity, individual and collective experience, have been effectively erased.
Such a close identification with one's audience would seem requisite for the public 
poet, the essential instinct from which proceed all other characteristics of fully public 
poetry. But Ben Jonson had more than an instinct for the public mode. In 1616 he 
published The Workes o f Benjamin Jonson, a  collection o f  his plays, masques, and poetry. 
Spenser had also published his poetry, and in fact the practice o f publishing individual 
works under an author’s name was becoming more commonplace. Jonson, however, 
presented the world with a weighty and varied body of his literary output and labelled it 
The Workes—as if  it were the legacy of some classical author, presuming thereby to 
bestow a completed canon, a ready-made icon upon the public. Two icons, in fact: his 
book and himself. Though polite society might raise an eyebrow at such presumption in a 
bricklayer-turned-dramatist, Jonson’s audacity (if that is what it was ) was absolutely 
necessary if he was to lay claim to any broad testhedc or cultural authority. The Workes, as 
a public document embodying the ambitions o f a poet who wanted nothing more than to be 
esteemed the English Horace, constitutes Jonson’s successful attempt to create for himself 
a “place to stand,” so to speak, a public space from which to address his audience. London 
had for many years received his plays with enthusiasm; now Jonson was in effect asking it 
to accept him as a poet o f sufficient skill and learning to accept him likewise as its arbiter of 
aesthetic values, as its definitive portraitist. Perhaps in this it helped Jonson that he was not 
a bom gentleman, that he had been acquainted with the half lights and shadows of London 
life, that he had had to grasp at learning and literature as a means o f staying one step ahead 
of poverty and ill-fame. Such a background gave him a comprehensive view of his world 
and every order of its citizens; it enabled Jonson to depict them with the authority o f first­
hand knowledge and the masterfulness o f a long-practiced craftsman. It is Jonson’s 
craftsmanship, his notion of poetry as a profession, George Parfitt maintains, that allowed 
him to stake a claim to the public’s attention, for this claim “owed less to birth or social
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position than to the weight which he gave to the artist’s role in society and to the conviction 
with which he acted out the defined role” (136). That role has been much discussed by 
Jonson scholars, but nowhere is as forcefully stated as it is by Jonson himself in his 1607 
preface to Volpone, when he undertakes to defend poetry from its detractors:
For, if men will impartially, and not asquint, look toward the offices and 
function of a poet, they will easily conclude to themselves the impossibility 
of any man’s being a good poet, without first being a good man. He that is 
said to be able to inform young men to all good disciplines, inflame grown 
men to all virtues, keep old men in their best and supreme state, or, as they 
decline to childhood, recover them to their first strength; that comes forth 
the interpreter and arbiter o f nature, a  teacher of things divine no less than 
human, a master o f manners; and can alone, or with a few, effect the 
business of mankind: this, I take him, is no subject for pride and ignorance 
to exercise their railing rhetoric upon (400).
Jonson here refers specifically to dramatic poetry, but it is nonetheless worth noting how
very different his notions of his audience and the ends o f  his poetry are from Spenser’s.
There is no enumeration here o f the manners a  gentleman must acquire to complete his self-
fashioning, no preoccupation with the world o f Court, no division of humanity according
to social rank. Instead, Jonson divides his audience—humanity at large—by more general
delineations: age—youth, maturity, dotage—virtue, and reasonableness. Jonson seems to
imply that the values and vices he portrays in his plays (particularly his comedies) and
poems are universally accessible, and further, that persons o f all conditions may be brought
to embrace the former and shun the latter. As Parfitt puts it, Jonson “worked both to
convey what the actualisation o f human potential would feel like and the horrors of
individuals and societies which have abandoned the positive vision, or are in danger of
doing so” (136). And in fact Jonson declares a bit later in his preface to Volpone that the
“principle end of poetry” is “to inform men in the best reason of living” (401). To
undertake, then, what amounts to a program o f pragmatic self-fashioning is to assume a
task far vaster and in its way nobler—because more idealistic—than the inculcation of
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gentility. It is a task that can only be undertaken by the poet who takes society at large as 
his forum.
I do not mean to argue that Jonson was a  man of democratic ideals. If nothing else, 
his own egotism would not permit him to be. Like many a public figure he could “bear no 
brother near the throne." Certainly he does not spare his scorn for fellow poets—or for 
anyone who would presume to condemn or acclaim him. As his epigrams, “On Poet- Ape.” 
“The Old-End Gatherer,” “To Playwright,” “To Censorious Courtling,” and “To Groom 
Idiot” (among many others) m ake clear, Jonson will not bear the literary presumptions of 
inferior talents or being misunderstood by the dim-witted: as he chides his “idiot” groom, 
“Idiot, last night I prayed thee but forbear /  To read my verses; now I must to hear: / For 
offering with thy smiles thy wit to grace, /  Thy ignorance still laughs in the wrong place” 
(11. 1-4). Jonson likewise has no tolerance for popular tastes. In An Execration on Vulcan, 
for instance, he offers a lengthy catalogue of what he sees as loathsome poetical growths: 
riddles, logogriphs, palindromes, eteosdcs (chronograms), shaped-poetry, telestichs; in a 
longish epigram, “To Captain Hungry,” he sneers at those who make their livelihoods from 
propagating the rumor and braggadacio that passes for news among the ignorant; and in his 
two odes to himself, Jonson attacks the supposed lack of wit and sophistication that has led 
to the death of arts: in the first ode he laments that “the greedy fry / Be taken with false baits 
/ Of worded balladry, / And think it poesie” (11.18-21), and in the second he wrinkles a lip 
at Shakespeare’s pandering to the public’s appetite for the hackneyed in his Pericles, which 
Jonson pronounces “stale / As the shrieve’s crusts, and nasty as his fish- /  Scraps,” “raked 
into the common tub” (11. 23-25). In addition to his aggressively discriminating 
temperament, Jonson was very much the outsider who made his way into the inner circles 
of power and patronage. After the publication of The Works, James I appointed him Poet 
Laureate and granted him an annual pension of £100; in 1618 Jonson was made Master of 
the Revels, and in 1628, chronologer of London. Jonson enjoyed the prolonged patronage 
of the Sidney family and wrote many poems in its praise, among which To Penshurst is
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only the most famous. “Such poems,” F. W. Bradbrook comments, “are the natural 
product o f that intellectual, courtly, and refined society where intimacy and friendship 
naturally express themselves in formal written compliment” (136). Having established 
himself as an aristocrat of letters, enjoying the favor o f his social counterparts, Jonson was 
perhaps a public poet more in effect than by design.
This being said, it is nonetheless significant that Jonson takes the time to condemn 
bad poetry and to reprove public taste, for this suggests that in addition to distinguishing 
himself from poetic rivals and pretenders he had a simultaneous interest in fostering proper 
ssthetic ideals—if only to make the public all the more receptive to his own plays and 
poems. Moreover, despite Jonson's personal and poetical aspirations he was able to keep 
in view a startlingly wide swath of his society. As Ian Donaldson, editor of the Oxford 
edition of Jonson’s poems, says.
His poems address, assess, commend, and vilify an astonishing range of 
people. To read through even a  single group of poems, such as the 
Epigrams, is to be made vividly aware of the existence of an entire society, 
headed by the king himself and peopled both by identifiable individuals and 
semi-fictionalized characters who nevertheless have clear roots in the society 
of Jonson’s time (xiv).
Though Jonson was not an ssthetic or political democrat, his poetry remains readily 
accessible to the common reader; in matter and method it is a virtual gazette for his place 
and time. For example, in his Epigrams, published in The Works, we find poems on 
James’s proposed union with Scotland (#5), a new bawdy house (#7), a bloodless court- 
creature (#11), John Donne (#’s 23 and 96), Parliament (#24), the rumored assassination 
of King James (#51), a number of noble personages (including King James, Lady Mary 
Wroth and Lucy, Countess of Bedford), and on a host of explicitly drawn characters 
familiar to those who know the world: Sir Cod, a would-be dandy (#’s 19 and 20,50), the 
depraved epicure Sir Voluptuous Beast (#’s 25, 26), Bank the Usurer (#31), the feminist 
Fine Lady Would-Be (#62), the impudent and untalented Playwright (#’s 49,68, and 100),
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Prowl the Plagiary (#81), the foppish English Monsieur (#88), the lecher Groin (#117), 
and Gut the glutton (#118). To consider just this last group for a moment: the delineation 
of character types is an ancient literary genre, Theophrastus (371-287 BC) its great 
practitioner; Jonson’s characters are general rather than particular, yet they are, like 
Martial’s, fairly specific both in conception and detail. Thus Jonson portrays not simply “a 
vain man,” or “a dandified man,” but “an English Monsieur" who so affects French dress 
(down to the scarf, hat, feather, shoe, tie, and garter), manners (“it doth move, /  And 
stoop, and cringe” (1. 13-14)), and vanity (he attends services in S t Paul’s to observe the 
new fashions), “That he, untravelled, should be French so much, / As Frenchmen in his 
company should seem Dutch” (11.7-8). So particularized are Jonson’s characters that one 
has no difficulty believing that Jonson drew them from the life. Expanding and enriching 
the topicality of his classical models, Jonson gives his readers pen portraits that anticipate 
those of Samuel Butler or the citizens of Mr. Spectator’s London. And his portraits, like 
theirs, draw the reader’s eye to that which might have been overlooked or only vaguely 
seen and defined. In this way, Jonson’s occasional poetry helps to “fix” the human and 
moral topography o f London for his audience.
As important for Jonson’s public mode as the topicality and specificity o f his poetry 
is its style. I have already noted above Jonson’s method o f  merging the literal and 
figurative, the historical and contemporary. Here it remains to underscore what has 
probably become evident from the many lines I have quoted from Jonson, namely, 
Jonson’s accessibility, the ease with which his poetry is entered into and comprehended. 
As Douglas Bush comments, “Reacting against Elizabethan vagaries of matter, form, and 
style, Jonson demanded, and unceasingly strove for, the ageless classical virtues of clarity, 
unity, symmetry, and proportion; in short, the control of the rational intelligence” (111). 
These characteristics, above all Jonson’s reliance on the exercise of the rational 
intelligence—his own and that of his reader—comprise a fair part of Jonson’s legacy to 
later writers. In the spare concision of his verse, which tends toward the epigrammatical
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and proverbial; in his development of the couplet as a means of rendering and assessing 
experience—often, as Bradbrook notes, in “the ironical opposition of the actual and the 
classical” (136); in his unabashed use of the particular and immediate to portray the 
universal and timeless; in his moral sense and his practical application of wide learning; in 
his worldliness and good sense (as, for instance, his eschewing of courtly idealization in 
favor of a blunt erotic pragmatism, or his skepticism regarding human nature)—in all these 
things Jonson not only made occasional poetry more broadly relevant than it had ever been 
before, but also anticipated the great age of English public poetry that begins with the 
Restoration and ends with the death of Pope.
In his own day Jonson was regarded with veneration; his circle of friends included 
Shakespeare, Donne, Chapman, Beaumont, Fletcher, and Bacon, and figures such as 
Carew, Suckling, and Herrick, were eager to style themselves “sons of Ben.” However, 
though they may have adopted his ideals of clarity and restraint, his easy classicism, and 
his equally easy cynicism, Jonson’s poetic inheritors did not retain the public mode of their 
great master. Instead, the Jonsonian model was adapted for use in a revised courtly (or 
cavalier) verse that largely resumed the erotic preoccupation of Renaissance poetry from 
Wyatt to Shakespeare. Here and there exceptions crop up, as we shall see in the next 
section, but in general it may be said that as the nation drifted toward civil war in the late 
1630's and early 1640’s, and then erupted into prolonged conflict, the Cavalier school 
increasingly identified itself with the royalist cause—and so once again the main line of 
poetry in England found itself divorced from the everyday world of everyday people, 
irrelevant—even offensive—to the trading classes, as once more it turned inward, away 
from the public sphere and toward the gentlemanly pleasures of the court and an idealized 
past. This would have many consequences: one was the disrepute into which such poetry 
fell during the years of the Commonwealth and Protectorate; another was that once the arts 
were restored along with Charles II Jonson’s example had in effect been lost, and could 
only be followed at second hand, through two minor imitators: even as Dryden’s
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generation praised Waller’s sweetness and Denham’s strength. Jonson’s own successful 
employment of the public mode receded into obscurity.
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PUBLIC POETRY IN THE MIDDLE DECADES OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
1. The Triumph of Public Poetry
“Our condition is best understood,” says Paul Fusseil in a recent occasional essay, 
“by imagining an alternative” (137). With this in mind it might be useful at this point in my 
(admittedly selective) survey of public poetry in England to jump forward a bit, to the time 
of the Restoration, and sketch out a likely scenario for politics and poetry under Charles II. 
After all, there is no such thing as historical inevitability; the ages unfold to no particular 
end, though we often pretend otherwise, and given the state o f poetry at the time of the 
Civil War—the lyrical inward-looking and conspicuously silent on public affairs, the 
dramatic preoccupied with pleasing Queen Henrietta Maria’s artsy coterie and flattering 
Charles I’s notions of divine right and absolutist rule—we should not automatically 
suppose that the restoration of the Stuarts would not also entail a restoration of the courtly 
mode eclipsed during the years of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. In short, there was 
never any guarantee that the public mode would ever emerge predominant from the 1640’s 
and 1650’s.
One can in fact make a good case for its never reappearing at all. The collapse of the 
Protectorate in 1658 and of the pretense of Parliamentary rule in 1659 obliged England for 
the sake of order and security to reconcile itself with monarchy and recall Charles II from 
Holland Word of his return, says J.P. Kenyon, was “received with rapture” (193-4): 
“Charles II [was] recalled with the general approval of the great majority of the nation, and 
the enthusiastic support of many. He had no visible enemies, nor serious critics” (210). 
Christopher Hill says that the enthusiasm of the vast crowds cheering Charles H as he made 
his progress through London May 29, 1660, had been “bought” (The World Turned 
Upside Down, 354); but John Evelyn, though no friend to the Commonwealth, offers a
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convincing portrait of the City’s reception of its king—T h e  wayes straw’d with flowers, 
the bells ringing, the streetes hung with Tapissry, fountaines running with wine —  the 
windos and balconies all set with Ladys, Trumpets, Musick, and [myriads] of people 
flocking the streets” (182)—and of the rapturous joy that had frenzied the populace:
I stood in the strand, and beheld it [Charles n ’s procession], and blessed 
God: And all this without one drop of bloud, and by that very army, which 
rebell’d against him: but it was the Lords doing, et mirabile in oculis nosrris: 
for such a Restauration was never seene in the mention of any history, 
antient or modern, since the retume of the Babylonian Captivity, no so 
joyfull a  day, and so bright, ever seene in this nation: this hapning when to 
expect or effect it, was past all humane policy (182).
Evelyn’s extravagance only matches that found in the pulp press of the day, perhaps the
surest barometer of popular opinion, as Jerome Friedman suggests in The Battle o f the
Frogs and Fairford’s Flies (1993). Friedman quotes at length from an anonymous
pamphlet of 1660, The Mystery o f  Prophecies Revealed; in this work, the author casts
Charles II as “the David of these days, the man spoken of in the Revelation, riding on the
clouds of heaven and ordained to have the Government over Nations”; and it is Charles n,
“the person most dear in God’s eye,” who is to lead the three nations (England, Scotland,
and Ireland) into a time of unprecedented glories, and restore “the ruined church” (233).
The new king’s hither, in this pamphlet and a good many other places, was portrayed as a
royal martyr for his people. At the time of his execution an anonymous ballad, “King
Charles’ Speech,” had depicted a Christlike Charles “cheerfully” going to his death so that
his people might be spared the horrors of wan “He wisht what ere was past, / That he
might be the last, / No sorrow might we taste, /  but wars might cease” (U. 21-24). With the
Restoration came Charles’ complete rehabilitation from the Puritans’ portrayal of him as a
great tyrant whose death was not only deserved, but called for by ancient prophecy for the
fulfillment of God’s will. Now, as Kenyon observes, “The new cult of monarchy found
expression in the near-deification of Charles I. In the new order of service for 30 January
[the day the king was executed in 1649], reserved by Parliament as a day of fasting,
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repentance and self-abasement in perpetuity, the late king appeared as a  saint-like figure of 
overpowering sweetness, moderation and humility, tormented and destroyed by cruel and 
bloody men” (209). For a great many in England, it seemed that Charles I’s Christ-like 
death had but prefigured the Messianic return o f his son, Charles n .
Such euphoria could not and did not last. However, the atmosphere in England 
following the Restoration was such that the forces that had led to and perpetuated the 
English Revolution—Puritanism, republicanism (whether overt or latent), and the impulse 
toward religious and Parliamentary reform—were greatly discredited, and gave way, in 
Kenyon’s words, to a “new cult of monarchy.” As early as the 1660’s Sir William Petty 
was making a plausible case for the reform of Parliamentary constituencies; yet, says 
K.H.D. Haley, “After what had happened in 1640-60 [Parliament) saw the best safeguard 
for social and constitutional stability in the preservation of traditional rights” (29). Such 
reforms would be postponed until 1832. In the meantime, the Cavalier Parliament moved to 
revenge itself upon those that had killed one king and driven another from his rightful 
throne by attempting to nullify the Act of Oblivion (which granted a large measure of 
clemency to those who had supported the Commonwealth and Protectorate) and passing the 
Acts of Corporation (1661) and Uniformity (1662), which, respectively, required officers 
of the government to take oaths of loyalty and non-resistance to the king, and restored the 
primacy of the Anglican Church, imposing various penalties on ministers and 
congregations that did not recognize the Thirty-Nine Articles or use the Book o f Common 
Prayer. As Hill points out, these acts among others (notably the 1662 Act of Settlement, 
which curbed the poor’s freedom of movement in the kingdom; the prohibition against the 
gathering of petitions; new controls placed on the press; and draconian game laws), bad the 
effects of turning thousands of dissenters out of the government and church and of 
circumscribing liberties enjoyed under the Commonwealth and Protectorate (348ff). 
Though Charles and his Lord Chancellor, Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon made attempts 
to mitigate the severity of this legislation, according to Kenyon, Clarendon in fact had
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dreams of Charles H as an absolutist king, “with an efficient council, a watchful army and a 
compliant and infrequently summoned Parliament” (211). In short, only a few years after 
the Restoration the king was settled firmly on the throne, church and state had been 
cleansed of dissenting elements, the means o f opposition had been proscribed, and a 
nobility and gentry loyal to the monarch enjoyed once more the property and privileges the 
Revolution had stripped from them. Given these developments, it is not difficult to grant 
the seeming plausibility of the absolutist scenario spun by Kenyon:
The Stuart monarchy had been given a  completely new start, and there 
seemed no reason why it should not move with the tide of general European 
development, which was now firmly in favour of royal autocracy and 
against the direct participation of elected assemblies in government, a 
process evident not only in France and Spain but in most of the German 
states (210).
With the reaffirmation of the primacy of the Crown—and Haley notes that “in the 
reign of Charles II the royal Court was of greater importance than it has been in any reign 
since. Most political activities were still conducted in the royal palaces” (8)—came the 
restoration of the Court and aristocracy as the arbiters of ssthetic tastes. Given the 
precedent of the previous Stuart administration, it is not surprising that this should be so. 
Charles I had, claims Sandra Burner, made England “the art center of European civilization 
in the 1630’s” (91)—the decade before both king and culture were undone by civil war. 
Charles was able to lure Gentileschi, Rubens, and Van Dyck to England, where they 
succeeded or joined the Dutch painters of James I’s court—van Blijenbergh, Paul van 
Somer, and Daniel Mytens—and were kept busy with royal and aristocratic commissions. 
It was under Rubens’ guidance that Charles acquired the Mantua pictures, a vast collection 
of paintings gathered by the Gonzaga family over the course of two centuries. Kenyon 
notes that Charles’ critics denounced this purchase “as nothing but a heap of ‘old rotten 
pictures and broken-nosed marbles’” (125). However, Charles and Henrietta Maria’s other 
passion, drama (particularly masques), was shared by the Court. Here, too, the royal taste
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was sure, employing as it did the design genius of Inigo Jones and the literary genius of 
Jonson, James Shirley, and others. But though James Rykwert and other historians credit 
Charles I with “a genuine understanding and love of art” (28), the king was no Wildean 
aesthete; he well understood the propagandists ends to which the visual and dramatic arts 
may be p u t1 While still Prince of Wales, Charles commissioned Rubens to paint the 
ceiling of the Banqueting House at Whitehall. One o f the three main panels of Rubens’ 
masterwork portrays James I as an all-wise Solomon, sitting in judgement over two 
women disputing possession of a child. As John Murdoch explains, “These women are 
England and Scotland, and James’s wisdom exceeds that o f Solomon in that he achieves 
resolution o f the conflict not through division but through unification and peace.. . .  The 
Child is of course Prince Charles” (249-50); a second main panel shows James as “the 
modem Solomon-Christ” (Murdoch 250); the third and central panel depicts the apotheosis 
o f James I, as if  he were a  Roman emperor being translated to godhead, or “the Christ 
returning to his father in heaven” (Murdoch 250). Charles’ patronage of Mytens and Van 
Dyck was also politically significant While wife-hunting in Spain in 1623, Charles had 
been dazzled by the absolutism of the Spanish Court and by the magnificent art of Titian, 
Velasquez, and Rubens that celebrated its power. Returning to England, Charles began 
fashioning his own absolutist image, impressing upon Mytens the need to stress, in
1 Currently there is a tendency to view top-down (but, curiously, not bottom-up) esthetic expression as 
little more than a tool for ideological manipulation, for subliminally encouraging people “to view and 
judge the world about them unthinkingly, without reflecting upon how they might have come by those 
views or judgements" (19), in the words of Gerald Mac Lean, whose own Time's Witness: Historical 
Representation in English Poetry, 1603-1660 (1990) consists largely of explicating the ideological 
ploys embedded in historical poetry of the early Stuart era. But the social dynamics of public art and 
literature are too complex to be reduced simply to an invisible power conspiracy. In an article on 
painting under the Stuarts, John Murdoch notes, “Pictures in the seventeenth century were not part of a 
closed apolitical discourse of Culture. For monarchs especially the distinction between public and 
private was either non-existent or indefinite, and it is possible to see in some of the uses of pictures in 
court circles a movement towards the public advertisement of areas the great man’s life previously 
concealed" (244). Propagandists such paintings may have been, but the fashioning of the royal or 
noble image was very much a public affair; the public exposition of private life and character required 
both subjects and painters to submit much to the authority of popular expectations, understanding, and 
approval. In any event, depictions of the king and aristocracy in art or drama were hardly coercive in 
any surreptitious way, and, should the subject not live up to his or her public portrayal, would have 
been likely to effect ridicule and a consequent loss of authority.
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Murdoch's words, “his personal authority and his membership of the European elite” 
(249). Van Dyck, too, says William Gaunt, “was ideally suited to express the spirit o f an 
autocratic regime”: “Courtly grace and ease, combined with a certain dignified aloofness, 
decorative splendour” (34)— these were the characteristics a monarch with an absolutist 
bent would wish to ascribe to himself. It is, after all, to Van Dyck’s portraits o f Charles I, 
Kenyon argues, that the king owes his lasting image as a “regal, melancholy and aloof” 
man (125-126). As for Charles’ patronage of drama, particularly the Courtly masques. 
Burner only underscores what many scholars have pointed out, that “All the elements of the 
masque are directed towards a  statement o f  the just, wise, and peaceful rule o f the king 
represented by figures of classical myth or personified by the ideal virtues such as love and 
fame” (92). She cites as examples William Davenant’s Britannia Triumpharts (1637), 
which defended the wisdom of the king’s naval policies, and James Shirley’s Triumph o f  
Peace (1634), ravishing in its elaborate pageantry (91-93). For Charles, the arts were a 
private passion, but also an important part of an absolutist program. Rykwert sums it up 
well: “Whereas James saw the splendour o f the court as an adjunct to his Royal state, 
Charles I had an almost instrumental, or at any rate rhetorical, view of Royal 
entertainments. He really did believe that harmonious music reconciled discordant hearts; 
and that masques could be used as declarations of royal policy” (27).
The restored King Charles II had every reason to see himself as he was often 
portrayed in contemporary poetry, as the restorer of the arts to Britain. In Sir John 
Denham’s “The Prologue to His Majesty” (1660), for example, the poet claims, “They that 
would have no KING, would have no Play /  The Laurel and the Crown together went, /  
Had the same Foes, and the same Banishment” (11.6-8). In general, as Hill points out, this 
is how the restored royalists saw themselves: “Dr. P.W. Thomas has shown us how the 
classical principles of regularity and propriety had appealed to isolated royalist intellectuals 
during the decades of defeat They saw themselves as preservers of literary culture in a time 
of barbarism” (World, 355-56). Though the Puritans were hardly a latter-day manifestation
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of the Imperial army that sacked Rome in 1527, ending the Italian Renaissance, they were 
sufficiently antipathetic toward the arts to close the theatres, destroy religious sculpture and 
decoration, sell off the deposed king’s art collection, and even forbid the singing of street 
ballads, which, L.G. Salingar notes, they saw as likely to corrupt the public morals (70). 
Time and again in his diary entries for the Interregnum years, Evelyn notes how Puritan 
rule has lead to the decay if not the outright destruction o f England’s art, architecture, and 
landscape. For instance, in an entry for June 9,1654, he remarks during a stay in Reading 
upon “my Lord Cravons house at Causam now in mines, his goodly Woods felling by the 
Rebells” (153); he notes during a visit to York that its S t Peter’s Cathedral “alone of all the 
greate Churches in England, had best ben preserv’d from the furie of the sacrilegious, by 
Composition with the Rebells, when they tooke the Citty” (161); and laments the 
vandalizing of Lincoln’s cathedral:
the Souldiers had lately knocked off all or most o f the Brasses which were 
on the Gravestones, so as few Inscriptions were left: They [Evelyn’s 
guides] told us they went in with axes and hammers, and shut themselves 
in, till they had rent and tome of some barges full of Mettal; not sparing the 
monuments of the dead, so helish an avarice possess’d them (162).
Thus, his father’s example, together with a predictable royal reaction against the anti-
aestheticism of his late republican foes, would seemingly have led Charles n  to become an
advocate of a court-centered program for the promulgation of absolutist art and literature in
Britain. Certainly he had before him (as Charles I had had in the persons of Louis XITI and
the Philips of Spain) an exemplary model o f the autocrat as patron, France’s Sun King,
Louis XIV. And certainly Charles II had both the taste and temperament to assume the role
of England’s artistic arbiter. Antonia Fraser details Charles II’s fascination and involvement
with the arts in Britain: his patronage of the painters Hugh May, Peter Lely, and Antonio
Verrio (whose Sea Triumph o f Charles II (c. 1674) is as grandiloquent as anything painted
for James or Charles I), and of the carver Grinling Gibbons; his cultivation of “the French
instrumental music he had grown to love in exile” (332), which entailed his sending
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Pelham Humfry to France to acquire the knack of it, as well as his close supervision of 
Humfry’s pupil, Henry Purcell, to whom Charles introduced “the delights o f Italian music 
as well as French” (332); his overseeing o f the reconstruction of London after the Great 
Fire, wisely insisting on the appointment o f Christopher Wren to be its architect, and, 
wiser still, clearing all bureaucratic obstacles from Wren’s path; his love (again, French- 
induced) of gardening and landscaping, modelling his redesigning of S t James Park after 
Le Notre’s work at Versailles; his hearty backing of the theatre, especially theatre in the 
French style—when the court was in London Charles went to see plays nearly every 
afternoon, and he did not hesitate to offer advice about subject and plot to Dryden, 
Crowne, and Otway (298).
Rykwert argues that “the centre of patronage in the second half of the century 
shifted back from the royal court to the homes of the great landowners” (4), but it may be 
said as well that the artistic and literary tastes of the nobility and gentry took their cues from 
the king’s own. Indeed, as portraiture of the royal family in the time of Charles I fostered 
the notion of the legitimacy of dynastic succession , so, too, did the family portraits 
commissioned by the aristocracy convey the apparent settledness o f the patrons’ affluence 
and power, the sureness of their lineage (Murdoch 242). Though the Civil War and 
Interregnum interrupted aristocratic patronage of painting (especially portraiture), 
architecture, and gardening, the Restoration saw a renewed, even heightened patronage of 
these arts, as England's upper classes sought to re-establish themselves as those best suited 
by affluence, character, and heritage to govern the nation. The same is true of aristocratic 
patronage of drama and poetry at the Restoration. The writing coterie of Charles I and 
Henrietta Maria’s court had included Jonson, Shirley, Davenant, Suckling, Carew, 
Habbington, Lovelace, and Cowley. When the theatres were reopened after the 
Restoration, the king commissioned the King’s and Duke’s companies, whose gentlemen- 
directors, Sir Thomas Killigrew and Sir William Davenant, respectively, divided the 
dramatic world between them. Aside from the king, patrons of drama such as the Duke and
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Duchess of Monmouth, the Duke of Newcastle, Charles Sackville, Earl o f Dorset, George 
Villiers, Duke o f Buckingham, and Anthony Cooper, Earl o f Shaftesbury lent their names, 
protection and (at times) money to the day’s popular dramatists, Dryden, Nathaniel Lee, 
Nahum Tate, Thomas Shadwell, and Flkanah Settle among them. They also commissioned 
occasional poems commemorating family marriages, births, and deaths—thereby educing 
poems and dedications in praise o f their characters, taste, and (above all) liberality from 
poets hopeful o f future favor. Patronage of arts and literature not only kept aristocratic 
patrons abreast o f courtly and Continental fashion, it probably served, as Hill suggests 
(above), to foster class identity and solidarity after two decades of shifting social loyalties 
and to put behind them the experiments of Commonwealth and Protectorate. The nobility in 
this period, however, was not content merely to subsidize others; many were dramatists 
and poets themselves, were, as James Winn says, competitors with the writers they 
employed (98). Apart from Killigrew and Davenant, Sir George Etherege, Sir Robert 
Howard (son o f the Earl o f Berkshire), Buckingham, Newcastle, and Dorset penned plays 
of varying quality and success. Moreover, the Restoration Court fostered a notable clique 
of gentlemen-poets, including John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, Sir Charles Sedley, Dorset 
(again), Buckingham, Wentworth Dillon, Earl of Roscommon, Killigrew, and John 
Sheffield, Earl o f Mulgrave.
In sum, given the primacy of King and Court in politics and the general attitude of 
reaction pervading England, there appears to have been no reason why the absolutism with 
which Charles I had flirted could not have taken root and nourished during the reign of his 
son; and given the centralization of the arts among the king, peers, and upper gentry, no 
reason why artistic endeavors in England should not have been presided over, as in the 
France of Louis XIV, by a courtly bureaucracy that controlled and exploited their form and 
content to promote the glories o f an absolutist monarch. More particularly, there is no 
reason why the Cavalier poetry o f the century’s middle decades should not have been 
resumed and re-established as the dominant mode of the 1660’s and after. True, these
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courtly poets were not generally o f the calibre o f those writing during the reigns of 
Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I. But they were competent—often rather more than 
competent In his introduction to the Yale edition o f Rochester’s poems, David Vieth makes 
the case for giving the laurel to the leader o f the Courtly Wits. “In an age when the English 
aristocracy was still politically, socially, and culturally supreme,” Vieth says, “Rochester 
was socially and culturally potent. . . .  In an age when skill in writing verses was a 
practical asset to a courtier, Rochester became the second-ranking poet, excelled only by 
Dry den” (xvii). Vieth goes on to pronounce Rochester’s lyrics o f 1674-75 (among them, 
“Upon Leaving His Mistress,” “Against Constancy,” “The Mistress,” and “Love and Life”) 
as “the finest of the late seventeenth century and among the best in English literature” 
(xxxix); he also credits Rochester’s knack o f engineering the intersection of different planes 
o f experience to heighten dramatic immediacy and ironic effect with creating a new 
dimension to “the new literary sensibility as it developed from 1670 to 1675” (xxxv- 
xxxvi), a dimension that would be perfected by Swift and Pope (xxxiii). Keeping in mind 
(from the discussion of “Signior Dildo” in the first section o f this chapter) that when 
Rochester’s poetry is not lyrical and private in the way of, say, Herrick or Carew, it is 
topical but only semi-public in mode, we might for the moment take Veith’s claims for 
Rochester at face value and, bearing in mind also the aesthetic primacy of the Court, allow 
ourselves to extrapolate a  bit from the given circumstances: Rochester might well have 
survived his thirties and continued to write his lyrics and satires into the eighteenth century. 
If Rochesterian irony added a new depth to satire, and Rochesterian eroticism —sometimes 
sincere, sometimes salacious and cynical—brought about “the finest lyrics of the late 
seventeenth century,” why do we never read the following sentences in literary histories of 
the period?:
John Dryden might have been Charles IPs Poet Laureate, but it would be 
erroneous to suppose that he, any more than Laurence Eusden in his day, or 
Robert Southey in his, was the leading poet of his time. That designation, 
for good or ill, belongs to John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester. Mindful of
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poetry’s aristocratic past, Rochester was able to infuse new life into the 
erotic courtly lyric, grafting a  post-Restoration sensibility—pragmatic, 
unsentimental, libertine—onto a form that had dominated the genre since 
Wyatt’s day and that, because o f  Rochester’s tremendous prestige at the 
courts of Charles n , James II, and their successors, would dominate 
English poetry through his innumerable imitators—including two minor 
poets of note, Alexander Pope and Jonathan Swift, known as George II’s 
“Spaniels” for their spirited defense o f his regime—until the Naturalist 
reaction of the I730’s and I740’s. By then, cynical love poems and 
scathing court satire had had their vogue. The new school, led by James 
Thomson and Edward Young, takes its name from its attention to the details 
of physical nature. It is commonplace to say that this turn from the world of 
Court to that of woodlands, meadows, and mountains was an attempt to 
make poetry “matter” to a nation grown giddy with the discoveries, 
applications, and philosophical optimism o f the New Science. 
Unfortunately, this poetry soon outlived its vogue at Court and proved no 
more relevant to society at large—as the self-indulgence of two later 
Naturist works, Wordsworth’s The Prelude or Coleridge’s Biographia 
Uieraria makes clear.
The Age of Dry den could have been the Age of Rochester—had certain political, 
social, and literary forces present at the Restoration aligned themselves in a certain way. 
Instead, the alignment of these factors was such that the public mode, a subterranean 
current in British poetry at least since the time of Jonson, found sufficient space to emerge 
and establish itself as the poetic mainstream until the middle of the next century. Let me be 
clean I am saying neither that public poetry did not exist before 1660, nor that its rise after 
1660 was inevitable, nor that its appearance muted all other modes, but rather, as Douglas 
Bush says o f historical periods, “While all ages are ages o f transition, there are some in 
which disruptive forces reach maturity and combine to speed up the normal process of 
change” (1). Because of the forces at work in the years immediately before and after the 
Restoration, public poetry was brought to a fruitful maturity and became a potent vehicle 
for and framer of cultural, social, and national self-definition for two successive 
generations.
Beginning with the politics of the Restoration itself, we have already heard John 
Evelyn declare it to be “never seene in the mention of any history, antient or modem, since
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the Babylonian Captivity, nor so joyfull a  day, and so bright, ever seene in this nation.” 
For all his seeming hyperbole and fervid royalism, Evelyn was absolutely correct: the 
Restoration was without precedent in English history. Kings had been deposed before, 
new dynasties had supplanted the old, religious controversy and civil wars had embroiled 
and exhausted the nation; but never before had the institution of monarchy been seriously 
challenged, never had “the people" overthrown and executed their monarch, never had the 
nation had the opportunity to remake itself through constitutional experiment When one by 
one the experiments failed—first commonwealth, then theocratic oligarchy, then hereditary 
autocracy—and England found itself adrift morally and materially, it seemed that all along 
the cure for its malaise had been the restoration of its rightful king. That the bloody removal 
of Charles I could end with the not only peaceful but rapturous return of Charles II must 
have seemed a marvel indeed. For an age that saw the hand o f Providence actively shaping 
the course of human events, such a restoration could only portend a time of unprecedented 
wonders. Tracing the use of “ancient” prophecies in the popular press throughout the 
1640’s and 1650’s, Friedman observes that during most of this period prognosticators 
(particularly William Lilly) writing on behalf o f Parliament had used the early sixteenth- 
century writings of one Ursula Shipton as well as the cryptic fables predicting the fall of a 
White King and of a Dreadful Deadman to make the defeat and death of Charles I appear 
inevitable (59ff.). Now that Charles II was to return, a new set of ancient prophecies— 
incredibly enough—was discovered. These prophecies, such as the one given in A 
Prophecy Lately Found Amongst the Collection o f  the Famous Mr. John Selden (1659), 
ostensibly predated those exploited by Lilly and predicted that the English would kill one 
king, suffer a pretender to rule over them, and at last recall the true king, “under whom,” 
quotes Friedman, “the whole body (exhausted with long war) shall enjoy a firm and 
general peace and shall be happy by Sea and land . . . Happy days return" (232). Such 
apparent vacillations in God’s favor might seem confusing, but not if one took the long 
view (as did the royalist prognosticators): God had permitted the death of his earthly
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representative, Charles I, and the subsequent period of successive monsters, prodigies and 
disasters in order to demonstrate to the English people that they needed a icing, and 
particularly a Stuart king (Friedman 239ff.). Now that the lesson had been learned, a 
chastened, loyal England led by its “David of these days” could experience an 
unprecedented Golden Age. Such was the belief, or at least the hope, o f the many 
thousands gathered to welcome Charles II as he re-entered London May 29,1660.
Yet if an unlooked-for Restoration fostered expectations of heretofore unknown 
glories, an equally unfamiliar set o f political realities faced King, Parliament, and People, 
making it unlikely that these glories would be achieved under the aegis of an absolute 
monarch. For, as Haley says, the Restoration was not a matter “of the old landmarks 
reappearing after the floods began to recede” (3-4)—“everything would have to be done by 
manipulation [that is, cooperatively between the Crown and Parliament], not by the 
enforcement o f a policy by the victors upon the conquered” (6). Parliament had overturned 
the monarchy—only to recall the monarch once more; when Charles II entered London, 
Fraser writes, “everyone” was a royalist (181)—yet the new king could not afford to 
become complacent: the crowds that cheered him might very well send him “on his travels” 
again. The king retained his prerogative; he could still summon, prorogue, and dissolve 
Parliament; he could still conduct foreign policy and make war. But the highhanded tactics 
used by Charles I to subdue stubborn Parliaments and peers had vanished forever. Maurice 
Ashley sums it up: “Unparliamentary taxation, such as ship money and forced loans, stood 
condemned. The criminal jurisdiction of the Privy Council had vanished. The King could 
no longer order the arrest of members of Parliament without showing cause. In fact even if 
it were not as limited as the Roundheads had wanted it to be, the monarchy had become 
‘constitutional’” (121). “Constitutional” in practice, that is, though not by theory or design, 
for the political settlement was a vague, plan-as-one-goes affair. Parliament’s trump-card 
was its absolute control of the king’s purse, which seemed to insure that the king would 
have to remain in its good graces and summon it regularly if  only to enable it to vote him
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the money he desired. Nor did it matter that the new Parliament—the Cavalier or 
Pensionary Parliament—consisted of a restored House of Lords and a House of Commons 
that consisted largely of country gentry eager to demonstrate their loyalty to Charles and 
their loathing of his recent opponents; the Commons soon proved an increasingly 
independent-minded body, insisting, for example, that it retain control over the levying of 
taxes and even as early as 1662 opposing the Crown’s proposed hearth tax, fearing that 
such a tax “would make it unnecessary for Charles to meet his Parliament regularly” (Haley 
27). The Restoration had indeed ushered England across the threshold of a  new political 
age, but probably not in the way the king’s party and its prognosticators had envisioned. 
The political settlement, argues Fraser, “presented the king with, on the one hand, very 
wide powers, and, on the other hand, equally wide problems, which he could not solve 
without the co-operation o f almost everyone in the State” (190).
The consequences o f such a settlement for poetry were indirect, subtle but 
nonetheless significant For one thing, though Charles and his Lord Chancellor Clarendon 
might have attempted to translate the euphoria of the Restoration into a gradual return to 
absolutism, they were in practice precluded from doing so. Fraser underscores the 
unsettled nature of England in 1660: any attempt to impose rule by divine right a 14 Louis 
XIV would have been disastrous. In fact, she observes, if royalist hopes of massive 
redistributions of land in their favor were disappointed, it was due to “the innate wish” of 
Parliament and King not to upset the status quo, “not to disturb England, as she was, more 
than was absolutely necessary to bring about justice” (192). As it turned out, there never 
was a design for making England an absolutist state. Kenyon argues that Charles 
“squandered all his chances” (211), but makes it equally clear that Charles was not by 
character or temperament an autocrat: “He was glad of any opportunity to enhance the 
power of the monarchy, but unlike his brother James he gave no continuous thought to it” 
(212). Easily distracted by his many interests and amours from the discipline of 
government; chronically in debt and dependent upon Parliament; unwilling to risk a return
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of civil strife; self-effacing, ironic, pragmatic to the point of cynicism—Charles was not the 
king to indulge in fantasies of absolutist grandeur. Consequently, though he was not averse 
to the praise of his subjects and might hint to Dry den that the latter might compose a satire 
against his political enemies, he did not surround himself, as his father had, with writers 
and artists who served mainly as apologists for the regime. This left poetry, as well as the 
other aesthetic disciplines, to pursue their own course. And even when they enjoyed royal 
patronage and supervision, the arts and sciences in which Charles interested himself almost 
always had public applications beyond and even exclusive o f service to the Crown. His 
support of the theatre, for instance, made that venue and that genre once more broadly 
public and a vibrant forum for social and political commentary. English music was enriched 
by his encouragement o f its incorporating the French and Italian styles, and his overseeing 
of the reconstruction of London ensured that that city would become not only the nation’s 
jewel but a metropolis suitable for a nation on the verge o f empire. Typical of Charles, 
Fraser says, was his refurbishing of S t James’s Park. Having redesigned it according to 
French and Venetian imperial models, Charles then threw it open to the public and partook 
himself of the games the public played there: croquet, pall-mall, and bowls (296). Not only 
this, but those who amused Charles with their drama, poetry, music, and sports, those 
who built his buildings and his gardens— these existed for him as human beings, 
interesting in their own right, apart from their entertainment value. It is difficult to imagine 
Charles I dining with jockeys, or conversing with natural philosophers about oysters and 
ants’ eggs, or confiding to his Laureate that he was poor enough to be a poet Charles II’s 
personal, generally non-ideological enthusiasm for poetry and its sister arts was very much 
akin to his non-programmatic politics. Both allowed for the entity in question to shape itself 
“organically,’’ that is, according to the circumstances o f the moment as well as the 
inclinations and talents of its many, often feuding participants. Antonia Fraser sums up the 
case well:
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The kind of propaganda exercise indulged in by Louis XIV, with every 
breath he drew every day o f his life, was unthinkable to Charles II. The 
arts, for example, were there for enjoyment: a simple and even laudable 
view, but not one that has been shared by every monarch in history. The 
bewigged and padded creatures of his stage, the saucy mistresses in their 
boys’ clothing, the graceful wielders o f his garlanded violins, the shepherds 
and satyrs of his masques: none of these conspired to glorify the monarchy; 
if they did so, it was purely by accident Dry den as Poet Laureate was given 
no great direction for his verse. Satire—often of the monarchy itself—was a 
far more potent theme in the reign of Charles II than propaganda (466).
The new relationship between Crown and Parliament and the King’s disinclination
to assume an absolutist stance led to further political developments that would have
consequences for post-Restoration poetry. Foremost among these was a change in the role
of “the people” in English politics. “The people”—a vague phrase that identifies no
particular constituency save the ends of the user—here denotes those outside the corridors
of power who nonetheless interested and involved themselves in the workings of their
government The government, for its part, did not at all welcome such attention and
participation. In his 1660 address to the Convention Parliament Clarendon might have
appealed for unity under the King by evoking the national traits of good manners, good
humor and good nature—“Good Nature! A Virtue so peculiar to you, so appropriated by
God Almighty to this Nation, that it can be translated into no other language: hardly
practiced by any other People” (qtd. in OUard, 233)—but apparently did not extend his
notion of common cause and character to the ranks of the governed. In his 1661 speech to
the Cavalier Parliament, he acknowledged that “the common people of England. . .  are in
truth the best and the honestest, aye, and the wisest common people in the world,” but then
declares that “they are not fit to model the government they are to live under, or to make the
laws they are to obey”; such responsibilities, he says, are best left to “the greatest and
leamedest and wealthiest and wisest persons that can be chose out of the nation”—to think
otherwise would be to revive the republican delusions of the late commonwealth (qtd. in
Haley, 29-30). To avoid putting such temptations before the people, Sir Roger L’Estrange,
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Charles II’s Surveyor o f the Press, advocated total prohibition on the reporting of 
Parliamentary business: “I think it [news about the government and its deliberations] makes 
the Multitude too familiar with the actions and counsels of their superiors, too pragmatic 
and censorious, and gives them not only an itch but a kind of colorable right and license to 
be meddling with the government’’ (qtd. in Friedman, 4). Sir Roger was absolutely right, 
and despite the limited electorate—Haley estimates it at 300,000 or 20-25% of the adult 
male population (39)— the restrictions placed upon circulating petitions, and attempts to 
censor the popular press, “the people” managed to exert an ever-increasing pressure upon 
Whitehall and Westminster. Ministers, Parliamentarians, and their appointees might affect 
to slight the political savvy and will o f the populace at large, but the fact of the matter was 
that after the Restoration politicians were more answerable to “the people” than ever before.
There seem to be three main reasons for this. First, the tumults of the 1640’s and 
I650’s had provided a precedent for popular involvement in national politics. The 
conscription and movements of troops during the fighting, the change o f governments, the 
imposition of Puritan religious and social legislation had broad local consequences 
throughout England. Most obviously, they brought home the conflict and the principles at 
stake to many thousands who might otherwise have been content to leave politics to 
politicians. For example, one anti-royalist ballad—and it is important to note that both the 
great balladists of this time and their intended audience were commoners—“Thanks to the 
Parliament” (1642), details the oppressiveness of the King's highhanded extraction of taxes 
and ship-money and his granting o f business monopolies; it goes on to decry the 
“Catterpillers” and “filthy Birds” (stanza 6) gathered about the court, equating them and all 
of Parliament’s foes with “Papists, Atheists, and the Hirarchie” (stanza 11). Royalist 
ballads, in addition to attacking the “usurping” Parliamentarians, tended to stress the moral 
confusion and loss of social cohesion resulting from the revolution. One ballad, one of 
several titled “The World Is Turned Upside Down” (April 1646), asserts that since the 
Puritans’ decisive victory at Naseby ancient traditions of holiday camaraderie and of
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noblesse oblige have been overturned. The balladist calls the Puritans’ ban on the 
celebration o f Christmas the work o f latter-day Herods: “Command is given, we must 
obey, /  And quite forget old Christmas day” (stanza 3). But the ban has had more sinister 
effects: “Our Lords and Knights, and Gentry too, /  Doe mean old fashion to forgoe: /  They 
set a porter at the gate, I That none must enter in thereat. . . . Hospitality it selfe is 
drown’d” (stanza 4). Other ballads took no side, but lamented the consequences of the war 
for the vulnerable poor. “Alas, Poor Tradesman” (1646) calls attention to the many shops 
closed for want of trade, to small, irregular wages, and to farmers’ fields turned into armed 
camps. Only peace will save the poor from utter ruin. “The Good-Fellow’s Complaint” 
(1647) cites a single specific grievance, the hardship caused by Parliament’s 1643 excise 
tax on a multitude o f goods, including food, liquor, and soap. Particularly galling to the 
author of this ballad is the tax on beer, making the poor man’s comrade, counsellor, and 
narcotic either all but unaffordable or all but undrinkable. The ballad, as both Hyder E. 
Rollins and Friedman note, was until about 1647 not just a “translator” of upper class 
learning and culture for the newly or marginally literate (and their numbers and proficiency 
were increasing rapidly), but the major disseminator of news and commentary for a great 
range of classes. Though the news pamphlet surpassed the ballad in these respects, the 
emphasis on examining the particular, local consequences of the Revolution was not lost, 
and the results were seen in the rise of what Friedman calls an “alehouse culture” that was 
the equivalent of the more polite coffeehouse culture (5). In the January 24, 1649 issue of 
The Perfect Weekly Account, publisher George Horton commented, “In these days the 
meanest sort of people are not only able to write, but to argue and discourse on matters of 
the highest concernment and thereupon do desire that such things which are most 
remarkable may be truly committed to writing and made public” (qtd. in Friedman, 5). 
Having once encouraged balladists and pamphleteers to arouse popular loyalty to the King 
(first Charles I, then the exiled Charles II) and antipathy toward the Commonwealth and 
Cromwell, the restored royalists could not now stifle broad public interest in and comment
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on political affairs. The Printing Act o f 1662 was designed to restore order—that is, 
government control—over a press that had long ceased to be effectively regulated. Among 
the Act’s provisions were a tight restriction on the number o f masters, apprentices, and 
presses; the restriction of printing to London, Oxford, Cambridge, and York; and a 
requirement that all works had to be approved prior to publication by a Licenser appointed 
by the Secretary o f State—transferring the power of supervising the press from the 
Stationers’ Company to Parliament However, though the Printing Act seemed to give the 
government a strong grip on the press, in practice the eruption of political controversy, 
such as that attending the fall o f  Clarendon or the Exclusion Crisis, made this act like the 
1680 proclamation banning all unofficial newspapers, largely irrelevant (Feather 51-53). 
Mere legislation could not confound the public’s habitual scrutiny of their masters.
This attention intensified what Roy Porter calls the face-to-face nature of British 
society and politics in this period, the second factor in “the people’s” growing influence on 
government Porter notes, “People were set into the social strata not primarily by choice, or 
by ‘faceless’ bureaucracy and paper qualifications . . . but rather by their personal 
connexions with others, especially authority figures” (35). This was as true in London 
itself as it was in the country villages, and probably to greater practical effect. It was 
forbidden to disclose the contents of Parliamentary debates and before 1680 Parliament was 
even reluctant to publish a record of its daily votes. But, as Haley observes, it was 
impossible to prevent most Parliamentary business from becoming known: the houses of 
Parliament were, after all, adjacent to the law courts, giving lawyers and MP’s a perfect 
place to exchange news and opinion; moreover, he adds, the fact that London was the heart 
of business and trade made inevitable the rise of close connections between merchants and 
politicians: merchants had to know enough about foreign policy to conduct their business 
wisely; politicians had to be sufficiently informed about the needs of England’s traders to 
craft expedient diplomatic, colonial, and military policies (41-44). And such were the 
political and economic networks that bound the nation that the government’s deliberations
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and actions were soon known and commented on throughout the kingdom. Moreover, 
ministers and MP’s could not be indifferent to the climate of opinion in London. The City’s 
siding with Parliament during the Revolution had demonstrated as much, but in the years 
following its orgiastic reception of Charles II, London found itself increasingly at odds 
with the policies of the Administration, as in its successful call for the removal of 
Clarendon after the debacle o f  the Second Dutch War (1665-67), its desire for, then 
opposition to a third trade war with the Dutch (1672-74), its virulent opposition to the 
likely accession of James, its repeated refusal to convict Opposition leaders (notably 
Shaftesbury) charged with suborning the King, and its scrappy though ultimately doomed 
defense of its Charter in the early 1680’s. Fraser notes that, heeding the lessons of the past, 
Charles II had a marked “preference for Windsor Castle as a royal fortress, not simply 
because it was [as Pepys described it] ‘the most romantique castle that is in the world,’ but 
because it could be properly garrisoned” (186).
Despite the fundamental distrust such actions display, the King, his Administration, 
and Parliament were quick to encourage popular participation (of a kind) in the business of 
government Finding that the Printing Act of 1662 could not effectively control, let alone 
mute the printed expression of public opinion, Sir Roger L’Estrange, the Surveyor (or 
Licenser) o f the Press, resorted to a wholly different strategy: using the press to put the 
Administration’s case before the public. This was the function of the “official” newspapers, 
The Kingdom’s Intelligencer (1660), The Oxford (later London) Gazette (1665), and 
L’Estrange’s own Observator (1679). Though the success of these papers and their design 
was limited, their appearance marked a shrewd and socially significant shift in policy. 
Shrewd, because it made use of an explosive trend of the previous decade, the rise of 
coffeehouses as loci of political discussion and organization. Here the newspapers, 
pamphlets, and satires provided by the proprietors passed through many hands; thus, a 
single copy of a newspaper or political tract could be read and debated by dozens. 
According to The Companion to the Diary o f Samuel Pepys (Ed. Robert Latham), by 1663
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there were 82 coffeehouses in the city (and 500 by L702) (70). Following the return of 
Charles II, the Companion observes, “clubs for political debate were closed or went 
underground; coffee-houses in a sense replaced them, becoming centres for the political 
malcontents in Restoration London” (71). At first, Clarendon favored shutting them down, 
then discovered that they could be used to promote his policies: “Pepys himself was in 
1665 asked by Batten [the Surveyor of the Navy] to use the coffee-houses to put about 
stories of Dutch maltreatment of our seamen. They would there [Batten thought] "spread 
like the leprosy’” (Companion 71). The social significance of the shift from trying to 
proscribe newspapers (or coffeehouses) to employing them to popularize government 
policies lies in what it reveals about the Administration’s tacit acknowledgement of the role 
of “the people” in political affairs. Whether Whitehall liked it or not, popular opinion 
mattered: the days when Elizabeth or James I or Charles I could hope to awe the public 
with absolutist iconography were long over; as we shall see, during the middle decades of 
the seventeenth century political and economic power had drifted down the social ladder 
sufficiently to oblige the government to reason or cajole its subjects into compliance with its 
aims and means.
Increasingly, however, Whitehall was obliged not only to promote but to defend its 
policies against the competing, often antagonistic viewpoints of rival political groups, 
which in their turn had to make their positions clear and convincing to an ever more 
politically savvy public. Even at the zenith of Restoration euphoria the new government had 
not been a monolithic entity. Ollard, for example, cites the loathing o f the Queen Mother 
and many royalists for Clarendon, slated to become Charles’ Lord Chancellor (219); the 
Cavalier Parliament had successfully opposed Charles and Clarendon’s general policies of 
political and religious toleration; Clarendon’s opponents in Parliament engineered his 
downfall and exile in 1667; and Parliament forced Charles to make first war then peace 
with the Dutch 1672-74. Yet it was the Exclusion Crisis of 1678-81 that occasioned the 
unambiguous appearance on the public stage of the political parties that had been nascent
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since the fractious year of 1667. Mo longer were feuding politicians content to work behind 
the scenes at court or within Parliamentary parameters; increasingly, they sought to 
vindicate their positions with power o f  popular support. Opponents in both houses o f 
Parliament to the Catholic James’s likely inheritance of the throne had long tried to pressure 
the King to exclude his brother from the succession. When in 1678 there came to light a 
supposed plot to assassinate Charles and make England a Catholic state—the famed Popish 
Plot—Shaftesbury’s so-called Country Party (later the Whigs, opposed by the Court 
Party—later the Tories—which supported James’s succession) brought successive 
Exclusion Bills before Parliament (1679-81). Each was defeated, either by vote or by 
prorogation of Parliament, but the fact that the Country Party dared to bring in these bills at 
all can be accounted for only by its being able to tap the public’s strong aversion to the 
prospect o f a  Catholic sovereign and its virulent bias against Catholics in general, which 
Shaftesbury tried to inflame as much as possible. Not only did he encourage a series o f 
dubious witnesses to the ever-widening scope o f the Plot (the Duke and Duchess of York 
were its masterminds; the Papists were planning wholesale massacres of Protestants), he 
engineered a  number of “progresses” through the countryside of the Duke of Monmouth, 
Charles’ illegitimate though personable and Protestant son, whom Shaftesbury styled as a 
plausible alternative to James. Though the Plot would be exposed as largely fraudulent, 
Shaftesbury imprisoned and ultimately exiled, and the Whigs disgraced and made to suffer 
for their disloyalty to Charles during the Tory Reaction of 1680-1683, the Exclusion Crisis 
had three important consequences for politics and political expression in England. First, as 
Haley points out, the issues it raised and the passions it excited involved unprecedented 
numbers o f people in political processes (especially at the local level, as in the elections of 
1679) and established “the principle that politics was a matter o f widespread public 
concern” (45; 48). Second, it made political parties a permanent feature of English life. 
Since parties by nature derive their power from comparatively broad constituencies, it only 
follows that the forum for social and political debate would no longer be circumscribed
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within the Whitehall-Westminster orbit Third, with the Tories’ inability (together with 
Charles’ unwillingness) to silence Whig dissent even at the nadir of the latter’s fortunes, it 
became apparent that an Opposition of some sort would probably be inevitable. And after 
all it might not be such a bad thing to have about: those in power would have a ready foil 
for their own policies, and, should they ever fall from power, they would have a platform 
from which to voice their own dissent As Feather says, “Within a surprisingly short time 
[following the Exclusion Crisis), the idea o f the legitimacy of opposition within the 
framework of the law was to be accepted as a part of the constitution” (Feather 54).
The rise o f political parties and, more generally, the increasingly widespread 
interest and involvement in politics, had profound consequences for poetry during this 
period. For one thing, even as popular publications helped to create political awareness, 
broader public involvement in political and social debates created in its turn more 
opportunities and a greater audience for political statement and analysis. Much of this 
occurred in periodical publications, such as newspapers and newsbooks (both licensed and 
illicit). But even these, ubiquitous as they were, did not satisfy the public appetite for news 
and commentary, and they could not hope to quench its taste for spectacle, scandal, and wit 
after the culturally “grey” years o f  the Interregnum. This taste in fact worked to the 
advantage of political apologists for the Administration and its opponents, for people are 
more easily delighted than reasoned into belief. Thus following the Restoration both drama 
and poetry not only had unprecedented opportunities for direct public participation in 
political and social debates, but in fact were encouraged to take advantage o f them. 
Consequently, playwrights and poets quickly became associated with the ideological 
affiliations of their political patrons: Dryden, Lee, Behn, and Tate generally wrote in 
support of the politics of the Court Party (later the Tories); Marvell, Shadwell, Settle, and 
Ravenscroft tended toward Country and later Whiggish circles. It would be wrong, 
however, to portray party loyalties in these days as either stable or dogmatic; personal 
connections rather than allegiance to abstract political doctrines (which in any case did not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
exist, policy being much more situational than theoretical) determined party platform and 
membership. We should not be surprised, therefore, by Shadwell’s frequent switches in 
allegiance, or by the Whiggish Earl of Dorset’s long patronage and protection o f Dry den. 
Of course, changes in loyalty and affiliation were seized upon as fit subjects for scorn: at 
the Restoration, for example, the impossibility of finding anyone who had ever been loyal 
to the Commonwealth and Cromwell was the frequent object of sardonic comment, as were 
those who defected from Whiggism during the Tory Reaction of the 1680’s. But such 
attacks only throw into relief another effect of party or oppositional politics upon 
contemporary literature, the chance it gave poets and playwrights to establish distinct public 
persona. Not only were men of letters political beings in themselves, they served as 
convenient targets for those who did not wish to risk attacking their political patrons 
directly. Why be so foolish as to express one’s doubts about the King’s Protestant 
orthodoxy when one could safely attack the religious constituency of the Tory Party—or 
safer still, the religious views o f its literary spokesmen? In this way writers’ lives, 
characters, talents, and opinions became subtly detached from those of their patrons, and 
they emerged as figures in their own right on the sociopolitical stage. Further, the public, 
oppositional politics of the age gave poetry and poets two things that they needed to stake a 
claim to public attention—issues and targets—and thereby encouraged poetry to become 
topical and satirical. A populace craving the latest news about its latest concerns well 
rewarded the efforts of balladists and other writers of occasional poetry. So popular was 
such poetry, Feather observes, that the demand for it in London and in the provinces 
helped create “what were to be some of the most notable characteristics of the [book] trade 
in the eighteenth century: national distribution, complex multiple ownership of copyrights, 
and joint production and wholesaling” (60); and AX. Wiley argues that the prologues and 
epilogues written for the theatre in this period were “chronicles of the times with an 
editorial tone, hectoring comments upon parties and audiences, critical reviews of events 
and art in relation to the theatre, and discourses upon [political and religious] recantation”
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(xxxvii). The hectoring Wiley cites constitutes but one manifestation o f the Restoration cult 
of wit, and it was wit in the form o f satire that made poetry politically useful and publicly 
fashionable. Directed at political enemies, poetic rivals, current events, or popular taste and 
trends, well-executed satire could skewer an opponent far more effectively than 
prohibition, violence, or even reasoned response. Moreover, the satirist himself could set 
up for “a man o f parts.” Wiley says, “Scribblers took up the trade, and many a gallant 
sought a place in the society o f wits because he had composed a  prologue” (xxviii). This 
points to the final but by no means least significant consequence o f public politics for 
poetry, that it encouraged more people—and people of more widely varying social 
origins—to take up the pen. Indeed, it would not be overstating the matter to say that the 
post-Restoration political scene called for a class of poets yet to be seen in England, one by 
nature antithetical to the interests, loyalties, and worldviews of the aristocratic amateur.
The emergence of party politics signalled that a new historical moment was at hand, 
requiring a new poetic response. But the forces behind and unleashed by party politics 
tended, moreover, to insure that this new response could be achieved: on one hand the new 
pressures they exerted upon England’s upper classes tended to undermine the traditional 
structures of patronage; on the other, their consequences for the middling classes changed 
the way the upper classes—their role in national affairs, their cultural authority, and their 
aesthetic values—were seen by their social inferiors. Taken together, these political and 
social pressures would superintend the professionalization of politics and (indirectly) of 
poetry as well, resulting in the eclipse of the aristocratic amateur in both fields in late 
seventeenth-century England.
We have already seen that the terms of the Restoration and the precarious position 
of the King—Fraser notes that the Court was suffused with “the implicit fear o f another 
revolution” (186)— forced Charles II and his Administration to proceed with great 
circumspection as they moved to consolidate the Crown’s position in English politics and 
society, and further, that this caution, together with the tactic of taking their case to “the
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people” in order to foster support for the Crown, created a political atmosphere in which 
party (as opposed to merely factional) politics could thrive. If the relation o f Crown to 
Parliament and People was not quite what it had been, neither were the relations o f the 
nobility and gentry to national politics, nor that o f the several social tiers to one another. At 
the Restoration the upper classes resumed their political role, but that role had changed, for 
the nature of politics itself had changed, inasmuch as the Restoration Settlement pushed 
Charles and Clarendon toward constitutional rather than absolutist government The Court 
was again the center of political culture, but with this difference, that this culture was no 
longer self-contained, for the expansion of political involvement in the I660’s and 1670’s 
meant that the devising and implementation of policy now involved a good deal of personal 
and public politicking. The complexities of party politics required its practitioners to devote 
ever-increasing amounts of personal wealth and time to stand for elections and promote the 
policies they favored; in addition, rhetorical, organizational, and procedural skill and 
expertise were now more useful to the politician than title, family, or wealth. One 
consequence of this shift was the rise o f what J.R. Jones calls “a new synthetic oligarchy,” 
that is “an upper class with the capacity to absorb and assimilate the most successful 
elements and individuals” (71). The success of this new “synthetic” class was often at the 
expense of the aristocracy’s traditional influence on political affairs; in fact, Jones 
observes, “the greatest political careers of the period were all o f men who did not originally 
belong to the topmost social section” (83). What is more, this new class o f politicians 
(among them Clarendon, Savile, Osborne, and Clifford) consisted of what Kenyon terms 
“careerists” (204)— that is, o f men who practiced politics as professionals, as advocates for 
particular policies, rather than as representatives of any single social class, and this is true 
even for those, like Buckingham, who did belong to the topmost level of society.
Apart from the expansion o f political involvement brought about by the rise of 
parties (and perhaps at the back of this rise), two relatively new developments facilitated the 
professionalization of politics. The first was England’s increasing role in world affairs. At
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the beginning of the seventeenth century, England was, compared to the great powers on 
the Continent—particularly Spain, Italy, and France—a very minor power indeed, a 
political and cultural backwater; by the century’s end, however, England’s influence on 
Continental affairs had substantially increased; she had emerged, with France, as a major 
new colonial power, and had eclipsed Holland as the premier maritime and trading power 
in Europe. England’s ruling classes, and especially its politicians and diplomats could no 
longer be provincial in outlook, could no longer view their estates, let alone their counties, 
as economically autonomous, self-contained entities. The world had become too politically 
and economically interconnected. Nor could high-level diplomacy or the administration of 
trade be left to dilettantes. Whatever their social origins, England’s politicians came by 
necessity to emerge as a  professional class and to see themselves as such.
This trend was underscored by a second major development, the accelerating social 
and political importance of commerce and those who financed and managed i t  As a group, 
Jones says, “the mercantile and urban retailing interests increased in importance, and an 
entirely new social class, the ‘monied interest,’ gained in prominence, wealth and 
influence” (71). Their success came at the expense of the lesser nobility and minor landed 
gentry, whose property kept them well fed, but comparatively impoverished: because of a 
depressed land market and a drop in tenants and (therefore) in rents, they could not raise 
the capital needed to improve their holdings or to increase their local spheres of influence; 
they could not afford the London houses, the grand tours for their sons, hefty dowries for 
their daughters, or to stand for Parliamentary elections (Jones 73-75). They would become 
increasingly disaffected and their disaffection, Jones reports, would make them politically 
active and, taken collectively, a force to be reckoned with during local elections (73). But 
they could not hope to compete in influence with the merchants and traders who were the 
mainstay of English commerce and colonialism, or, especially, with the financiers and 
bankers—lately emerged from the ranks o f the goldsmiths, merchants, and scriveners— 
whose underwriting of the national debt made their interests a major factor in the shaping of
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the professionalization o f politics in several ways. Most generally, the “new” ethic of 
getting and spending fostered an atmosphere of economic and occupational careerism. 
Government itself was becoming a  business. Not only was the acquisition, holding, and 
transfer o f political offices a commercial proposition in itself—many offices and 
appointments could be made obscenely lucrative and were bought and sold at great expense 
and profit; with the founding of the Bank of England, which encouraged investment in the 
national debt, the government in effect became a grand public stock company. There was a 
consequent shift in its theory of how its subjects might be governed. Whereas heretofore 
men might be expected to obey either in deference to the divine right of kings or out of fear 
of the sovereign’s power to compel obedience, the commercial ethic now made obedience 
largely a matter of economic self-interest. What Jones calls the new “morality of interest” 
(81) meant that “the traditional values o f honour and loyalty, appropriate to castes 
determined by birth, implicit obedience to legitimate authority, acceptance of an overriding 
divine providential dispensation o f human affairs, could no longer be relied upon” (80). 
Put another way, politicians were becoming identified with and answerable for the success 
or failure of the policies they promoted, rather than with (and for) their social class, for 
politics now turned upon the axis of pragmatism rather than the perquisites of privilege.
The upshot of these developments is that though in theory the professionalization of 
politics in the decades following the Restoration should have left the upper classes with 
more time to enjoy the pleasures of rank and to patronize the arts, in practice the lesser 
nobility and gentry were unable to do this, and those classes which could were by necessity 
and temperament preoccupied with the business of government and with the governing of 
their business. Among the ruling classes there was comparatively little time and money for 
literary patronage of the sort practiced by the Court and the great noble families (such as the 
Sidneys) in the first half of the century. It is significant, after all, that the most active 
patrons of poetry following the Restoration were, with the exception of Buckingham (and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
perhaps Shaftesbury, if he was ever more than a passive patron), bit players in the political 
drama unfolding with the Restoration, though as a group they did attempt to play a part as 
arbiters of literary sensibility. Literary patronage in England had never been fully realized 
as an institution, as it had been (and still was) in France, where, Rykwert notes, Louis XTV 
had established an academy for the training of artists (4), and where poets such as the great 
Boileau were heavily subsidized by the Court Bush with good reason calls Charles I “the 
last English sovereign who was a real patron of letters" (29), yet during the reigns of the 
first two Stuarts, Burner points ou t the poet in search of a patron often went begging. The 
nobleman's “often half-hearted bequest appointment gift, or offer of room and board to 
the author" was not enough to make the wooing of gentle patrons a gainful pastime; nor did 
the new gentry recruited from the commerce-generated nouveaux riches provide a more 
stable living—such patrons might commemorate their social ascent by paying poets for 
one-time dedications, but they seldom patronized one poet over a long period of time 
(Burner x). Jonson, who secured steady patronage from James I and William Cavendish, 
Duke o f Newcastle, is an exception that proves the rule of literature’s haphazard 
subsidization before the Puritan revolution.
The political and commercial preoccupations of the patron classes after the 
Restoration merely matte patronage still more haphazard. Charles II was, as we have seen, 
a friend to the arts and sciences, yet his enthusiasm could not overcome his empty pockets 
or the distractions of governing a land made restive by plague, fire, war, dissent, and an 
explosive exclusion crisis. His Laureate, John Dryden, was the leading poet o f the day, yet 
the latter's pension was frequently in arrears, forcing Dryden not only to seek other sources 
of income but to postpone and finally abandon the undertaking of an epic that might have 
been a serious rival to Milton’s Paradise Lost. Dryden grouses in A Discourse Upon Satire 
(1692) that “being encourag’d only with fair words by King Charles II, my little salary ill 
paid, and no prospect of a future subsistence, I was then discourag’d in the beginning of 
my attempt; and now age has overtaken me, and want, a more insufferable evil, thro’ the
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change of the times, has wholly disenabled me” (29 lb). Only one of Charles’ commissions 
was paid promptly—the £100 he gave Dryden for “The Medal” (1682). Moreover, though 
the restored upper classes might have liked to fancy themselves the guardians of arts and 
culture against Puritan philistinism, Dryden received only one noble commission during his 
long career from the Earl of Abingdon, for an elegy, Eleonora (1692), commemorating his 
deceased wife. Compounding the political, commercial, and (for the lesser nobility and 
gentry) financial distractions of potential patrons was the sheer volume of publication in 
this period. Bush relates that by 1640 some 600 individual works were being published 
yearly, and that these numbers “greatly increased” between 1640 and 1660 (27)—as the 
23,000 ballads, newsbooks, and pamphlets collected during those two decades by George 
Thomason (apart from all other publication) would indicate. Even when the numbers of 
such ephemera declined following the Restoration, the number of plays and poems being 
written still exceeded the capacity of the patron classes to support them. Given the political 
nature of many of these plays, it is possible, even probable that the expansion of political 
interest and the rise o f party politics served to glut the patronage “market,” thus 
undermining the traditional relationship between the individual patron and poet Now the 
party, or, more broadly, the public at large would be a more reliable source of income and 
influence.
This is not to say that literary patronage was dead in England. Far from it; it would 
in fact survive into the Romantic era: Wordsworth himself was supported by a series of 
benefactors and even received public assistance as well under the Civil List Act (1837). But 
the nature o f patronage had changed with the temper o f the times. It, too, had become 
almost a wholly pragmatic affair. There was far less inclination now to subsidize literature 
and art for their own sakes (or rather, for the patron’s second-hand glory of basking in the 
genius of the writer or painter) or even for the aggrandizement of the patron’s family. In the 
field of painting, Murdoch observes, there was after the Restoration, particularly after the 
founding of the Royal Society in 1662, an emphasis on authenticity in the portrayal of the
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natural and human worlds (261). The empirical method, applied to drawing and painting, 
was indispensable for recording “the physical appearance of places, of their flora and 
fauna," for “communicatfing] knowledge about the face and resources o f the country," and 
for reducing confusion and doubt to order: “The pandemonium o f London, the mystery or 
taint of superstition clinging to the ruined aisle of abbey, the Medusa-like power of the 
Knaresborough Dropping Well, became accessible to the light o f reason when presented 
with such calm and analytical intelligence" (258-259). Such realism and rationalism were 
not necessarily the aim o f post-Restoration dramatists and poets and their patrons, but their 
ends—often, the touting of a political figure or policy or the vilification of such—were no 
less practical. In this age of occasional politics, it only made sense to patronize poetry (or 
drama) that would serve the cause at hand. Poets were quick to adapt to this new ethic: 
whereas the patron-poetry of Ben Jonson’s day (for instance, To Penshurst) might praise a 
noble family’s lineage, character (especially its liberality), and wise management of its 
holdings, the corresponding poems o f our period might praise such things, but make a 
particular point of lauding the political acumen of their subjects, as Marvell does for 
Cromwell in “The First Anniversary of the Government Under His Highness the Lord 
Protector” (1655), Denham for Monck in “A Panegyric on His Excellency, the Lord 
General George Monck” (1659), and Dryden for Clarendon in “To My Lord Chancellor” 
(1662). In defamatory poems, on the other hand, the subject’s politics become the poet’s 
butt, as does the Duchess of York’s unscrupulous machinations in Marvell’s The Last 
Instructions to a Painter (1667, published 1689), or the Trimmers’ supposed equivocation 
in Dryden’s first epilogue to The Duke o f Guise (1683). Such praise and blame cannot be 
dismissed as mere sycophancy or malice, for one must remember that poets were 
themselves increasingly involved in current social and political debates; as such, it was their 
business to articulate political values and policies they themselves supported. In this sphere 
as in those of government and commerce, deference to bloodlines and the aristocratic 
character became subordinate to political and economic self-interest
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We might be justified in raising an eyebrow at the apparent cynicism of such 
motives were it not for a further consideration that served to alter the traditional attitudes of 
patron and poet toward one another—the craft o f poetry itself. Here, too, the political and 
social consequences o f the “popularization” of politics played an important, if less evident 
role. In Sidney’s day, a  nobleman such as himself could write a treatise on the discipline of 
poetry with seeming insouciance because the circles of poetry, patronage, and politics more 
or less coincided with that o f the Court. That is, these things were the aristocrat’s 
prerogative either to practice or support Sidney himself was proficient in all three, but the 
fact that his class set the rules for these disciplines meant that he could move with 
confidence among them without risking his authority as poet patron, or states-man. And in 
any case, since he did not style himself a poet exclusively, but as a humanist soldier, and 
courtier as well, he could pronounce upon aesthetics with the assured nonchalance of the 
gentlemanly amateur. Following the Restoration, however, the complexities of 
professionalized and popularized politics left the relationship between poetry and patronage 
in something of a muddle. As I have noted above, the business of government increasingly 
fell to specialists, careerists; in practice, this meant that those among the upper classes who 
were most active as patrons tended to have relatively minor political roles, for a minor role 
in government meant that one would have the time and money to devote oneself to the arts. 
Rochester, for instance, fought bravely in the Second Dutch War and in 1667 took his seat 
in the House of Lords. But he sought no career in either soldiering or statecraft; Vieth is 
right to argue that after 1670 “the real story o f Rochester’s life becomes increasingly the 
story of his gradual development as a poet” (xxvi). He was a friend of Buckingham and 
Shaftesbury and aligned himself with their Country Party, but he never distinguished 
himself as a forceful spokesman for their ideals (though as a courtier and favorite of 
Charles II he had no peer.) Much the same might be observed of the circle of courtly wits 
in Rochester’s orbit: Sedley, Dorset, Mulgrave, and Killigrew among them. Thus there 
was a good deal at stake for the aristocrat, such as Rochester, who identified himself
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primarily as a patron and poet when the rise of party politics encouraged, as we have seen, 
the greater participation of poets—and of the untitled poets at that—in public affairs. For 
the matter came down to this: Who now had the authority to define and defend the “proper” 
mode, manner, and matter of poetry, the aristocratic amateurs whose province poetry had 
been since the time of Wyatt, or the emerging class of professionals who wrote for the 
public?
I shall detail the clash of poetic amateur and professional in the final section of this
chapter; at this point I wish only to draw attention to this struggle’s consequences for the
patron-poet relationship, particularly its consequences for public poetry. Perhaps most
important was an estrangement between aristocrat and professional that had its origins in an
oblique conflict of class occasioned by the expansion of political involvement. Perhaps
threatened by the encroachment of professional poets upon their prerogative, the circle of
wits at the court of Charles II turned its back on the “new” mode of public poetry and upon
public poets as well. The case of Dry den is especially instructive. Though Dry den enjoyed
the patronage of Dorset and Mulgrave and for a time courted Rochester as a patron, when
he himself attempted to employ the bawdy mode of courtly wit in his prologues, plays, and
conversation, he was rebuked for his presumption. In Rochester’s “An Allusion to Horace”
(1675-6), for example, the Court’s leading wit sneers:
Dry den in vain tried this nice way of wit,
For he to be a tearing blade thought fit
But when he would be sharp, he still was blunt:
To frisk his frolic fancy, he’d cry, “Cunt!”
Would give the ladies a dry bawdy bob,
And thus he got the name of Poet Squab (11.71-76).
Even Dorset, whom Dry den cherished as a true friend and who several times saved the poet
from poverty and the Whig backlash of 1688-89, was not above lampooning his loyal
dependent An anonymous poem attributed to Dorset “To Mr. Bays” (1686), viciously
assaults Dryden’s recent conversion to Roman Catholicism, labelling the poet a “mercenary
renegade,” “slave,” “changeling,” and “knave”—in just the first two lines. Like many
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others at the time, Dorset apparently thought that Dry den had converted on the accession of 
James II in order to ingratiate himself with the new, openly Catholic king. It is not 
surprising, then, that Dorset questions the sincerity of Dryden’s conversion; it is somewhat 
startling that Dorset would link this presumed insincerity with flawed poetic invention: he 
goes on to assert that Dryden’s new faith “suits with thy poetic genius best” (1. 12), for, 
immersed in the mysteries o f Catholicism he may, “[His] mind disused to truth may’st 
entertain / With tales more monstrous, fanciful, and vain /  Than e ’en thy poetry could ever 
feign” (11.14-16). In his biography of Dry den, James Anderson Winn provides a plausible 
explanation for such attacks on Dryden’s wit, arguing in the case of Rochester’s squib that 
it is “likely to be a  complex example of the class prejudice his friend Buckingham held for 
both Arlington and Dry den.” He continues,
Buckingham, Sedley, and Rochester engaged in acts of public violence, 
drunkenness, and obscenity and wrote verses that were not merely 
suggestive but deliberately disgusting. At some level, they evidently 
believed that they were above the law, which rarely punished them for their 
excesses, above ordinary morality, above literary criticism. What they may 
actually have resented in Dry den, then, was not his failure to emulate their 
literary style but his success. If a plainspoken Northamptonshire squire 
could write such courtly lyrics as those in Marriage A-la-M ode, the claim 
that the ability to write such lyrics was a matter o f  aristocratic birth was 
clearly damaged (226).
These two brief examples demonstrate, I think, that whatever the personal relationship
between Dry den and Rochester or Dry den and Dorset, for the two noblemen there were
important social distinctions to be maintained between themselves and the poets they
patronized. The effect of such rebuffs—certainly in Dryden’s case, but probably more
generally as well—was to impel the professional poet away from the tight exclusivity o f the
Court and toward the public sphere. There at least the poet, whatever his condition, could
expect to be judged on his merits and his message, rather than his social origins alone.
This estrangement had two other notable consequences for public poetry. For one
thing, it hastened the divorce between the Courtly and public modes. Taking Rochester as
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an emblem for the former, we can trace in his erotic lyrics a lineage o f sensibility that goes 
back to Wyatt Much had happened to the erotic lyric since Wyatt’s time; that poet’s scorn 
of love’s trappings gave way in the sonnets of Sidney and to a lesser extent Spenser to an 
idealization of love and the loved one. Shakespeare had little truck with neo-Platonism; the 
tone of his sonnets to his “dark lady” marks a shift toward the erotic pragmatism that 
would, with the exception of Donne, become characteristic of the Courtly lyric from 
Jonson onward. This pragmatism could encompass both the warm familiarity of Herrick 
and the flippancy of Carew. When the Courtly lyric, in eclipse during the Commonwealth 
and Protectorate years, resurfaced after the Restoration it had become decadent, not so 
much in form (the fate o f the poetry of Donne’s imitators) as in its hyperbolic posturing. 
For Rochester, the pose of extreme erotic cynicism has become an end in itself. Thus in his 
song, “Love a woman? You’re an ass!,” Rochester embroiders the traditional lover’s 
farewell to love with a self-destructive resolve that would not have occurred to Wyatt: 
“Farewell, woman! I intend /  Henceforth every night to sit /  With my lewd, well-natured 
friend, / Drinking to engender wit” (11.9-12). Wyatt protested that he was weary of love; 
Rochester’s persona has no quarrel with either love or lover, but with the tedium of life 
itself; once carnal love has become “a most insipid passion” (1. 2), a  new pleasure—the 
mirth of sleepless, drunken men—must be sought out and exhausted. And whereas 
Wyatt’s retreat from woman’s love occasioned the embracing o f a stoic virtue or the 
“manly” pleasures of mind, Rochester’s only leads him to another fleshly extreme, though 
it is but the logical end of the Renaissance idealization of masculine friendship: “There’s a 
sweet, soft page of mine,” he boasts, “Does the trick worth forty wenches” (15-16). It is 
rather more than ironic that Rochester’s marriage to Elizabeth Malet was a happy one, and 
his poems to her are touching examples of simple, unequivocal affection. But Rochester’s 
great satires are veined with the disgusted hopelessness of his erotic lyrics. “A Ramble in 
St. James Park” (March 1672/3; published 1680), for example, reduces the bustle of 
London to a single wearily predictable motive: “Much wine had passed, with grave
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discourse / Of who fucks who, and who does worse” (11. 1-2); and Rochester’s best- 
known satire, “A Satyr Against Reason and Mankind” (1675/6; 1679), posits worldly 
pleasure as humanity’s end—“Our sphere of action is life’s happiness, /  And he who thinks 
beyond, thinks like an ass” (11. 96-7)—concluding with the shrewd but dead-end 
observation that “Man differs more from man, than man from beast” 0- 221). Though 
Restoration playwrights fed a  general public appetite for sexual cynicism and naughtiness, 
in its caustic worldliness and coarse diction Rochester’s poetry is really contrary to the 
ethos of Restoration society at large—not in kind, perhaps, but in degree. It is entirely in 
synch, however, with the atmosphere of the Court, and in fact its extremities might be 
accounted for by the audience Rochester intended for it, the closed circle of wits, rakes, 
and risque ladies in waiting. As such his poetry is, as I have pointed out above, at most 
only semi-public in mode. The wit, irony, and keenness o f  observation that might have 
been unleashed upon the public realm to devastating effect are thus circumscribed, kept 
from the public eye, by the aristocratic impulse toward cohesion and withdrawal.
A second consequence o f the Wits’ inward turning follows closely upon this one— 
the acceleration of the public’s loss o f esteem for Courtly refinements. What Jones terms 
“the cosmopolitan court” and the “unfashionable country” (71) had long been distrustful of 
another, and at least on the side o f the country this distrust deepened as the lot of the lesser 
nobility and gentry worsened and the excesses of Charles II’s court became known. The 
Court scandalized even the more worldly Londoners. Admirer of Charles II though he was, 
John Evelyn could not refrain from commenting that although Charles had “brought in a 
politer way of living,” refinement soon “passed to Luxurie and intollerable expense,” 
though he graciously ascribes the decadence of Charles’ life to the influence of “crafty men, 
and some abandoned and prophane wretches, who corrupted his otherwise sufficient parts” 
(318-19). Certainly the drunken antics of Rochester, Sedley, and the rest did nothing to 
endear the Courtly circle to commercial, middle-class London: the debauched fop became 
perhaps the favorite target of scorn and derision for Restoration play-goers. The Anglican
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Church, trying mightily to make itself once again relevant to the lives of its congregations, 
“promoted,” says Rykwert, “a great distaste for court life among the the upright and 
squires, however loyal they were to the crown” (35). This moral disaffection without doubt 
dim in ished  what appetite for and emulation of the Courtly mode yet remained. Left over 
from the Interregnum and the middle-class Puritan impulse to reform education, “to replace 
the old, abstract, aristocratic, and ‘useless’ studies with the modem, concrete, popular, and 
useful” (Bush 21), was a pragmatism that revelled at the promises of the New Science and 
its methods, which might, many believed, be “applied to the study of society and 
government” (Jones 81). The nobleman’s education, which, Burner claims, emphasized 
the acquisition of cultural polish over that of “practical” knowledge (9), seemed irrelevant, 
even antithetical, to a society increasingly preoccupied with the empirical and theoretical 
knowledge that would help solve the real-world problems arising from the growth of trade, 
commerce, and empire. In such an atmosphere a decline in the public’s estimation of 
Courtly poetry was more than likely. Miscellanies of poems by “gentle hands” had been 
popular since Tottel published his first collection in 1557; it is telling, however, that the 
series of six miscellanies Jacob Tonson published 1684-1709 tended to feature occasional 
poetry and translations of the Greek and Roman poets rendered by professional men and 
women of letters rather than lyrics in the courtly mode, the one major exception being 
several of Matthew Prior’s love poems. The Courtly mode still rankled, apparently, when 
Pope wrote An Essay on Criticism  (1711), for he characterizes the days of Charles II as 
“the fat Age of Pleasure, Wealth, and Ease”: “Jilts rul’d the State, and Statesmen Farces 
writ; / Nay W its had Pensions, and young Lords had Wit: /  The Fair sate panting at a 
Courtier’s Play, / And not a Mask went un-improv'd away” (11.538-41).
As a result, then, of the continued decline of the institution o f patronage, or rather, 
its reconstitution along political lines, and the growing estrangement between noble and 
professional poets, the latter were given a strong incentive to turn away from the Courtly 
mode and master the public; further, the disaffection between the Court and the Church and
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“people,” undermined the cultural authority o f the class that had long defined and 
superintended the craft of poetry. Perhaps in no way is this shift, and the parallel shifts in 
political and economic authority, more evident than in the oft-cited replacement of the noble 
patron by the commercial publisher as the author’s primary means o f support One classic 
statement describing the patron-to-publisher transition is found in Watt’s The Rise o f the 
Novel (1957). Watt has the novel in mind here, but his words apply to the business of 
literature in general in this period:
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the booksellers, especially those 
in London, had achieved a financial standing, a social prominence, and a 
literary importance considerably greater than that of either their forebears or 
their counterparts abroad. They had among their number several knights 
(Sir James Hodges, Sir Francis Gosling, Sir Charles Corbett), High 
Sheriffs (Henry Lin tot) and Members of Parliament (William Strahan); and 
many of them, such as the Tonsons, Bernard Lintot, Robert Dodsley and 
Andrew Millar, consorted with the great figures of London life. Together 
with some o f the printers they owned or controlled all the main channels of 
opinion, newspapers, magazines and critical reviews, and were thus well 
placed to secure advertising and favourable reviewing for their wares. This 
virtual monopoly of the channels o f opinion also brought with it a 
monopoly of writers. For, despite the efforts to allow independent access of 
authors to the public made by the Society for the Encouragement of 
Learning, ‘The Trade’ remained the only fruitful form o f publication for the 
author (53).
It was the booksellers, Watts concludes, who “[removed] literature from the control of 
patronage and [brought] it under the control o f the laws o f the market-place” (55-6). The 
growth o f the book trade in the second half o f the seventeenth century was indeed 
pronounced, as John Feather’s A History o f British Publishing (1988) makes clear, and as 
an alternative to the systems of patronage it was to prove, as I have already hinted, a major 
factor in the rise of public poetry. But it is also important to observe that throughout this 
century the book trade (and its commercial ethos) was in one way or another at the back of 
the political and social forces that, coming together when and as they did, created the 
opportunity for the public mode in poetry to take hold.
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To step back for a moment into the sixteenth century, the broad dissemination of 
printed matter at the time o f the English Reformation, the subsequent spread of “practical” 
literature (such as almanacs, prognostications, and technical manuals), and the Tudor 
dynasty’s use o f printing to promote its policies not only created a  perpetually broader 
reading public (the availability of books and pamphlets reinforcing existing literacy while 
fostering its expansion as well as the demand for yet more printed matter), but over time 
made literacy itself necessary and desirable in a nation that, as Feather notes (24), was yet 
primarily oral in nature. The extent of literacy in the sixteenth and seventeenth (and for that 
matter the eighteenth) centuries is widely contested, since the definition of “literacy” itself is 
in question. It has been variously described as the ability to write one’s name, to participate 
in literate culture (for instance, by comprehending, considering, and acting upon the written 
word read aloud), to read and write “simple continuous prose,”2 or, for the educated in this 
time, the ability to read and write Latin and Greek. But it seems to me that arguments over 
percentages or broad theoretical definitions of literacy are rather beside the point Friedman 
takes the right approach, I think, when he observes of the years 1640-1660 that “the great 
volume of such publications [broadsides, pamphlets, newsbooks] certainly indicates a 
larger readership than the smaller amount o f  fine poetry, drama, and prose published, all of 
which reached very few people,. . .  but which are often used as mirrors of the age” (xiii). 
For regardless of the exact numbers o f  men and women who could be considered 
sophisticated readers, it occurs to me that the heart of the matter lies in the general impact of 
the published word across the spectrum o f a given society. As much as anything, literacy 
may be considered a habit o f mind, a way of recording and organizing one’s perceptions 
about the world. Literate or generally literate societies differ in this respect from oral ones. 
In the former it is the printed word rather than the spoken that has authority as a 
documenting medium, and it is in the middle of the seventeenth century that the sheer
2 This is Feather’s phrase (95), but not his definition.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
volume of published matter suggests that England had “turned the comer” and become a 
predominantly liter-ate society. Predominantly literate—if Friedman’s study of the pulp 
press during the 1640’s and 1650’s demonstrates anything, it is the truth of Walter Ong’s 
observation that members of “functionally oral cultures” do not “feel themselves situated at 
every moment of their lives in abstract computed time of any sort” (97), nor do they regard 
the past (or present) “as an itemized terrain, peppered with verifiable and disputed ‘facts’ or 
bits of information” (98). Hence it was easy for the average Englishman alive during the 
Civil War and Interregnum years to believe in the veracity of “ancient” prophecies, or 
reports of the appearance of monsters or prodigies of nature, or more generally that in 
allowing the murder of one king and the ecstatic restoration of another Providence was 
fulfilling its special design for England. The habits of belief fostered by centuries o f oral 
tradition die hard. But what we must realize is that for the first time on a large scale, the 
printed word and image—in ballads, newsbooks, and pamphlets—were used to describe 
and explain the disturbing, confounding events that were roiling the nation; for the first 
time, the mass-replicated word put in its bid for historical and interpretational authority; 
more important, such authority was at last believed to reside in the published account
This was to have important practical consequences. MacLean is right to underscore 
the anxiety of the Jacobean and Caroline courts about the levelling power of print (xii), for 
as Ong argues, one of the many social effects o f print is that it “eventually reduce[s] the 
appeal of iconography in the management o f knowledge, despite the fact that the early ages 
of print put iconographic illustrations into circulation as they had never been before” (130). 
For all the heroic and absolutist imagery with which Court poets and portraitists garnished 
the early Stuart monarchs, the printed word (and image) itself was, ironically, to undercut 
the mysteries of royal power and glory without which absolutism cannot gain acceptance in 
the popular imagination. “Print,” says Ong, “create[sl a new sense of private ownership of 
words” (131), particularly after the emergence of a sizable reading public (as in this period) 
grown sufficiently sophisticated to be able to “deal with certain more or less established
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
125
points of view” (Ong 135). In short order this sense of ownership displaces authority from 
the sovereign to the word itself, meaning that those who write, read, and reflect upon the 
words before them become in a real sense politically empowered. Surely it is not simply 
coincidence that the rise of a sizable reading public in the middle decades of the seventeenth 
century was followed at the Restoration by the general shift o f political and economic 
power away from an “iconographic" sovereign and aristocracy toward, as we have seen, 
Kenyon’s “careerist” ministers, Jones’s “new synthetic oligarchy,” and the new magnates 
created by the expansion of finance and trade, from the notion o f  politics and administration 
being the prerogative of the Court to their being the product o f debate conducted in public 
via the pamphlet, play, and poem. This shift was probably aided after the Restoration by 
the New Science, which in effect if not in intention challenged the authority of the Church, 
thereby eroding in turn much of the authority upon which claims of divine right had long 
rested. Ong argues that the technology permitting “the new exactly repeatable visual 
statement” (i.e. printed pictures replicating the natural world in realistically minute detail) 
was responsible for modern science: “What is distinctive o f modem science is the 
conjuncture of exact observation and exact verbalization: exactly worded descriptions of 
carefully observed complex objects and processes” (127). He places the perfection of this 
technology after the Romantic age (127-8), but if we recall Murdoch’s point about the 
empiricism of drawing following the Restoration or take a moment to review the 
topographical prints and cityscapes of, say, Hollar, dating from the mid-seventeenth 
century, we know that this technology and the way of seeing it encourages were well 
developed by that century’s end. If, as Bacon asserted, knowledge is power, the 
popularization of the printed word and image gave the ordinary Englishman unprecedented 
access to knowledge, and thereby the potential for a social and political influence to which 
he had been wholly unaccustomed.
So much for the general effects of print Among its more specific consequences are 
the possibilities it creates for the rise of a vigorous trade in published matter. “Alphabet
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letter-press print, in which each letter was cast in a separate piece of metal, or type, marked 
a psychological breakthrough of the first order,” says Ong. “It embedded the word itself 
deeply in the manufacturing process and made it into a  kind of commodity” (118). Indeed, 
as Feather reminds us, publication is only possible if  relatively large runs o f any single title 
are undertaken, and large editions are unlikely to be produced unless the publisher can be 
reasonably assured o f a market and o f the means o f supplying it (15). Put simply, 
publication means mass production; it means making an author’s work broadly available 
for purchase by people he or she does not know and will never meet; it means writing for 
the express purpose o f publication, of putting one’s words before as many people as 
possible; it comes to mean creating a  public persona (or public persons) quite distinct from 
that one puts on among familiar company, for we are never in our words what we seem 
when actually present; and it means that the public learns to read an author according to the 
persons he or she creates, for we read acquaintances by the light of shared experience, and 
strangers by their words alone. When literature becomes a commodity, authors as well as 
their works are brought to market—as, to a large extent, are the tastes and expectations of 
the audience. This is the power of commerce, its ability to shape, satisfy, and perpetuate 
the tastes and expectations of its clientele, in whom resides final authority over what sells 
and what does not, whether the product in question is clothing, furniture—or the words of 
a poet The writer therefore must learn to “read” his audience (no longer a nobleman or 
group of noblemen, but the anonymous ranks of those who buy or read published works), 
must respond to it even as he teaches its members to read both him and the world about 
them. In sum, as the spread of print tends to displace (or at least diffuse) political and social 
power, so does the marketing of literature shift aesthetic authority from narrow aristocratic 
cliques to the authors themselves, and, more generally, to those who buy and read their 
works. Such “marketplace democracy” may be obvious to us, but it was not as obvious in 
the late seventeenth century, well before the advent of consumer culture. Nor was it 
necessarily the desirable thing, so far as the writers themselves were concerned. None
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would have wanted to see himself as a  “producer” of a “commodity,” and none would have 
cherished the notion of writing “for the people”—let alone acknowledge that the book- 
buying, play-going public had any say in his practice of the poetic craft Thus Rochester in 
“An Allusion to Horace” is able to slight Dry den and Crowne with their own popularity: 
“'Tis therefore not enough when your false sense / Hits the false judgement of an audience 
/ Of clapping fools” (11. 12-14). In his preface to The Spanish Fryar (1681), Dryden 
himself looks back on some of the bombastic passages o f his heroic dramas and says (not 
quite convincingly), “I knew they were bad enough to please, even when I writ them. But I 
repent of them amongst my sin s. . .  and am resolved 1 will settle myself no reputation by 
the applause o f fools” (276-77). As Kathleen Lynch observes in her biography of the 
publisher Jacob Tonson, “In Tonson’s lifetime there was an aristocracy o f taste as well as 
an aristocracy of blood” (138). But this aristocracy, unlike its blood counterpart, learned at 
length that to survive it had to suffer the scrutiny and judgement of “the people.”
The link between author and audience was supplied by the publishers and book 
dealers (who at this time were usually one and the same, selling books directly to the public 
from their shops). Watt (above) and others are right to observe that publishers came to 
replace noble patrons as the mainstay of men and women of letters, and that in this 
transition the commercial contract between publisher and poet succeeded the personal bond 
between a poet and his patron. But these observations need to be fleshed out a bit We are 
likely at this time o f day, when international conglomerates control an overwhelming 
percentage of the communications industry and publishing houses are mere subsidiaries of 
subsidiaries, to regard the profit motive with suspicion. It is the lust for profits, after all, 
that justifies the corporate cynicism behind the “blockbuster” movies and “bestseller" books 
marketed to our basest appetites. But if we cannot put aside our suspicions when dealing 
with the publishers o f the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, we must at least 
qualify them somewhat, for though profit was indeed their motive, their role in shaping 
their society and its literature was more complex—and vastly greater—than that of their
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modern-day counterparts. The problem of distributing the comparatively large editions that 
printing forced on them (because of the cost and labor involved in publishing a work it was 
simply not feasible to produce only a  few copies), required them to develop trade networks 
and markets throughout London and from London to the provinces. Their success in this is 
seen in the wide distribution o f broadsides and pamphlets throughout the 1640's and 
1650's and in the nationwide interest aroused by the Exclusion Crisis. Moreover, their 
success in disseminating the literature o f political controversy, from the crudest, most 
sensationalistic broadside or news-pamphlet to the most sophisticated formal verse satire, 
points them up as agents in shifting the scene of political debate from Whitehall and 
Westminster to the public fora o f the coffee-house, ale-house, and theatre. One need not 
ascribe their efforts to high-minded motives of political and social reform or of freedom of 
speech: the Stationers' Company had been a de facto  agent of governmental censorship 
since its inception in 1557. Nonetheless, the distribution of proscribed or politically 
controversial material continued and was often undertaken at no small risk to publishers’ 
liberty, lives, and personal fortunes. Puritan legislation failed to silence the Royalist 
opposition because for every balladist and pamphleteer willing to risk imprisonment there 
was also a publisher who dared to print and sell his work; Court censorship failed during 
the Exclusion Crisis for much the same reason. The seeming inevitability o f there being an 
opposition press meant that when the Licensing Act lapsed in 1695 there was no real 
likelihood of its being renewed: Parliament realized that it was not in its members’ best 
interest to quell free speech, since today’s Ministry might be tomorrow’s Opposition. It 
might also have taken note of one consequence of Puritan proscription, the emergence of 
the balladist / pamphleteer as well as the opposition publisher as popular heroes—a status 
enjoyed, respectively, by Martin Parker and Sir John Birkenhead.
The activities of the oppositionist press during the Civil War and Interregnum were 
likely to bring literature and its practitioners into public prominence, but the contributions 
of publishers to the shaping of public poetry after the Restoration may be more particularly
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enumerated. First, they provided an alternative to a reliance upon noble patronage. Lynch 
notes that poets and playwrights continued to write fulsome dedications out of a need to 
augment the meagre incomes they received from their publishers (151), but Feather 
counters that even the Grub Street authors who “wrote to order" were generally well paid 
and well treated (103-104)—and Lynch herself makes much of the fact that among his 
services to his authors Jacob Tonson “circulated manuscripts, wrote complimentary verses, 
waited upon writers when summoned, gave them gifts of food and wine, loaned them 
money, collected rents (for Dryden), and forwarded mail" (96). In any event it soon 
became clear enough that booksellers provided a  more reliable source of income to a greater 
range of writers than any patron or set of patrons ever could. Poets during this time may 
have liked to see themselves as craftsmen pursuing an ancient and honored vocation, but 
few, it is safe to say, regretted the fact that they could make a living with their pens. 
Second, the fact that publishers were able to keep authors’ names and works before the 
public eye meant that not only those works but the names superscribing them became 
marketable “commodities," ensuring future sales—and also that the author himself would 
acquire a certain cultural “weight" in the public’s imagination. In fact, as writers became 
recognizable public figures, their aesthetic and financial independence grew, for both writer 
and publisher came to recognize that without the former the latter would have nothing to 
sell (Feather 75-6; 111). Third, the resources o f publishers enabled them to influence the 
context and corpus of literature and to some degree its reception. They encouraged (or at 
least fed) literary controversy when they could, for then as now controversy breeds 
interest, and interest, sales. But more constructively, they also fostered the formation of a 
working literary sensibility, either directly, by encouraging collaboration, or indirectly, by 
establishing contacts between writers, their shops serving as places for rendezvous and 
discussion. Tonson would go further and found the influential Kit-Kat Gub (c. 1700), the 
ethos of which seems closely modelled on that of Dryden’s four spokesmen in his O f 
Dramatic Poesy (1667): “As a man of wit, or at least a pretender to wit, one must embark
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on literary conversation. One must have literary opinions and be able to support them with 
references to recognized classical authorities” (Lynch 139). In addition, bookmen created 
and sustained literary fashions, for historical works for example, or for translations of 
classical texts (favorites were Virgil, Horace, and Ovid), and retrieved from obscurity 
authors of m erit From Lynch’s perspective, it was the stubborn efforts of Tonson that 
brought Milton to posthumous public esteem, both by incessant publication of his works 
and arranging for Addison to discuss their merits over several issues o f  The Spectator (a 
Tonson vehicle) (142ff.). In addition, Tonson published a  six-volume edition of the works 
of Spenser (1715) at a time when that poet was held in low regard, and from 1709 to 1712 
turned out collected editions of Denham, Suckling, Cowley, Congreve, Beaumont and 
Fletcher, Waller, and Otway, wishing “to persuade English readers,” argues Lynch, “that 
their own literary heritage was as valuable to them as the masterpieces of classical 
antiquity” (141). Publishers were able to take the risk of publishing out-of-vogue writers in 
part because they had begun to discover the power o f advertising and could attempt to 
create interest where none had been apparent Fourth, having aroused public interest say, 
in histories or translations or occasional poems (or in particular genres, such as the heroic 
drama, the prologue and the epilogue, or in particular forms, such as the heroic couplet), 
they could perpetuate the public’s appetite (and of course their own profits) by discovering 
and encouraging new talent to feed it, as Tonson “discovered” Prior, Congreve, and 
Addison. Such practices certainly had the effect of expanding the scope of public writing, 
the more so since Tonson and other publishers regularly solicited the public at large for 
submissions for their miscellanies. Publishers in the early days of the modem book trade 
were, therefore, far more than reliable alternatives to intermittent patronage; whatever their 
motives, they provided a secure social forum for the authors they published, thereby 
encouraging the rise of the professional poet—answerable to the public’s tastes and 
attentions—and in the bargain accustomed that public and its government to the advantages 
of a free press. Feather states the case nicely: “It was no longer assumed that the crown had
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sole rights over information, or that the crown or its representatives should involve 
themselves in every sphere of economic life” (90).
2. The Advent of John Drvden 
By April 1655 the twenty-five-year-old John Dryden, B.A., had ridden off from 
Cambridge to London. The ostensible purpose of his journey was to take a position in the 
Protectorate administration under his cousin Sir Gilbert Pickering, Cromwell’s Lord 
Chamberlain, and he seems to have ended up as a secretary o f French and Latin, serving 
under Milton and alongside Marvell. The young Dryden’s true object, however, was, 
according to Dryden’s Cambridge contemporary Robert Creighton, to find “gayer 
company, & set up for a Poet” (qtd. in Winn, 68). Dryden’s timing was fortuitous, for 
himself and for public poetry. Although at the time he set out for London no one suspected 
it, circumstances were already moving toward an alignment that would favor the emergence 
of a new poetic mode and a new type o f poet. The Civil Wars had put in motion the larger 
forces that were to sustain the emergence of the public mode in the coming decades, 
particularly the expansion of political involvement and comment (and thus political power) 
throughout the ranks of society and a consequent shift from a semi-literate to a mostly liter­
ate culture, at least in the capital. These forces would gain momentum with the Restoration 
Settlement, already imminent shortly after Cromwell’s death in 1658. The logistics of 
reconciling King to Parliament and both to the People forced a  reconstitution of the power 
balance among the three, which in turn occasioned the rise of oppositional (party) politics 
as well as of the professional political and bureaucratic classes. The continued expansion of 
England as a colonial and commercial power and the rise of a monied class that was to rival 
the political, economic, and social authority of the landed aristocracy only accelerated 
acceptance of the fact that (whatever politicians and political theorists might argue) the 
debate over administrative policy had its proper forum in the public sphere—if only for the
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very cynical motives of gaining popular endorsement for policies already in practice or 
popular support for ambitious politicians who otherwise held “the people” in contempt.
The political and social controversies of the 1640’s and 1650’s also pointed toward 
the future commercial footing of poetry. I am willing to concede to Winn that at the exact 
moment of the Restoration there was no “sustaining public” upon which professional poets 
could depend (96); prospects were centered at Court, upon “gentlemen who amused 
themselves by writing verses” (97). But certainly the enormous traffic in ballads and 
newsbooks throughout the Civil Wars and Interregnum had demonstrated the potentially 
extensive, lucrative market for enterprising writers and publishers. And in any case, 
between his arrival in London and the loss of his position with the collapse o f the 
Protectorate, Dryden augmented his official salary by writing prefaces for Henry 
Herringman (who would remain Dryden’s publisher until 1678), as well as occasional 
poetry— Heroic Stanzas (1658), Astrcea Redux (1660), and To H is Sacred M ajesty 
(1661)—that in the case of the last poem sold well enough to be reprinted and translated 
into French before the end o f 1661. Winn himself argues that Dryden was motivated to 
pursue his vocation because of his “belief that the Restoration would increase opportunities 
for a professional man of letters” (118). As for literature itself, Winn points out that the 
great disruption of the arts in England during the 1640’s and 1650’s left playwrights and 
poets at the Restoration with the feeling that the continuity o f English letters, especially 
theatre, had been interrupted (136). Drama, after an absence of twenty years, had to be 
made anew, though at first audiences would have to be satisfied with revivals of Jacobean 
and Carolinian plays. Nondramatic poetry, too, required extensive recasting. “The Caroline 
definitions of poetry as hazy mythic propaganda or brain teasing intellectual conceit,” Winn 
says, as well as “effete Cavalier nostalgia” were moribund, no longer answering society’s 
need for a “manly, urbane, public, persuasive” poetry, “drawing principally upon the real 
world and aiming to affect moral and political decisions in that world” (74). As much as 
anything, then, the growing opportunities for the professional poet and the widespread
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sense that poetry itself could and should be reordered set the stage for the emergence of 
public poetry after the Restoration.
But the stage was only set; there was nothing inevitable about what was to unfold 
once the curtain was raised upon the next two decades. At least from the vantage of 
retrospect, public poetry needed something more than bare opportunity for it to take root 
and become the dominant nondramatic mode o f the next eighty years—an advocate, 
perhaps, a forceful personage who could, to use the words o f  George Parfitt, impose his 
“coercive vision” o f a new role for poetry and the poet upon a society (143), or, less 
dramatically, a figure about whom the swirl of larger social, political, economic, and 
aesthetic forces could cohere and take definite shape. The chance to play such a role does 
not come in every age. World literature would have been immeasurably poorer, for 
instance, had Shakespeare never existed, yet an Elizabethan and Stuart theatre comprising 
Kyd, Marlowe, Dekker, Jonson, Webster, and Beaumont and Fletcher would still be one 
of the wonders of English letters. But had there been no Dryden, the laurel for poetry after 
1660, Milton and his great epics aside, would have been contested by Marvell and 
Rochester; that for drama, by Behn, Etherege, and Shadwell. Whatever the merits of his 
contemporaries, and they were by no means inconsiderable, without Dryden’s presence 
English literature would have evolved far differently than it did, and its poetry, drama, and 
criticism would have been left sickly indeed, their deficiencies manifest through the age of 
Johnson—at least Dryden did not possess the genius or facility of a Shakespeare; he had 
to work hard to make himself a playwright and poet. Nor did Dryden possess the 
painstaking diligence of a Pope; Dr. Johnson characterizes him as a hasty writer whose 
disinclination to bestir himself obliged him to make do with what inspiration and material 
lay at hand (187; 229), and in any event his chronic financial worries did not often allow 
him to labor lovingly over a poem until it was as perfect as he could make i t  But if native 
genius, a bent for meticulous composition and incessant revision, or the leisure that might 
have favored either had not fallen to Dryden’s lot. talent and opportunity had. When
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Dryden rode into London in 1655 the playhouses were closed; when they opened in 1660, 
dramatists who had been alive to witness the Armada had to serve as models for the 
restored theatre. Nondramatic poetry lay largely within the purview of Denham, Waller, 
and Cowley. Cowley was the leading remaining exponent of the Donne “school” of 
conceit-ridden poetry that Denham and Waller, making “some advances towards nature and 
harmony” (Johnson 231), had begun to overturn. Johnson observes further that “[Denham 
and Waller] had shown that long discourses in rhyme grew more pleasing when they were 
broken into couplets, and that verse consisted not only in the number but the arrangement 
of syllables” (231). Nonetheless, by 1660 Waller and Denham's best work was clearly 
behind them. The way was thus clear for an ambitious young fellow to put his own stamp 
on contemporary drama and poetry: by 1670 Dryden had established himself as the leading 
playwright as well as the most considerable dramatic theorist of his day; by 1682 he had 
made himself the greatest satirist o f the age. He had also become a personage of immense 
cultural authority, though an object o f vilification as much as of veneration. But if Dryden 
had made the most o f his opportunity, one could say as well that opportunity made the 
most of him, for the match between his circumstances, temperament, talents was a close 
and fruitful one, allowing him to become an icon in his own time and a model for the next 
Johnson, seldom extravagant and never mercenary in his praise, says of him:
Perhaps no nation ever produced a writer that enriched his language with 
such variety of models. To him we owe the improvement, perhaps the 
completion of our metre, the refinement of our language and much of the 
correctness o f our sentiments. By him we were taught ‘sapere et fan,’ to 
think naturally and express forcibly. Though Davies has reasoned in rhyme 
before him, it may perhaps be maintained that he was the first who joined 
argument with poetry.. . .  What was said of Rome, adorned by Augustus, 
may be applied by an easy metaphor to English poetry embellished by 
Dryden, ‘lateritiam invenit, marmoream reliquit' He found it brick, and he 
left it marble (262).
However, just as the violins swell to bursting and the timpani roll forward to the 
inevitable cymbal-clash, reality intrudes and we remember that here again nothing was
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inevitable; for Dryden as for public poetry itself, between opportunity and triumph lay 
countless individual moments filled with the decisions and revisions that a moment might 
have reversed. If, at the time o f his death in 1700 Dryden was esteemed as the Great Man 
of Letters and public poetry was firmly established as a dominant mode, it was because of 
the many “decisions and revisions” Dryden had made between 1660 and 1680—less 
figuratively, the many personal, poetic, and political battles he had fought and won during 
that time. If, as I argue, the emergence of public poetry in this period found its catalyst in 
the presence and career of John Dryden himself, the rise o f both mode and man depended 
in large part upon the latter’s unseating of incumbent literary and cultural authorities and the 
establishment of his own.
As Dryden embarked in earnest upon his literary career after the Restoration, the 
most immediate and by far the most important impediment to his progress.was what might 
be called the aristocratic prerogative over literature: literary culture still had its center at 
Court, and gentleman-amateurs presided over both the theory (scant as it was) and practice 
of drama and poetry. Winn points out the startling fact that during the 1660’s Dryden was 
the only professional playwright at work: Shadwell’s first play did not appear until 1668; 
Behn’s first play debuted in 1670; Crowne and Settle’s, in 1671; and Ravenscroft’s, in 
1672 (138). The other playwrights o f the time, the Howard brothers (Sir Robert and Sir 
Edward), Killigrew, Davenant, Etherege, Sir George Tuke, and the Earl o f Orrery, were all 
gentlemen who generally wrote for reputation rather than receipts, though as managers of 
playhouses Killigrew and Davenant were certainly interested in turning a profit. 
Nondramatic poetry, too, lacking the forceful public presence of a Ben Jonson, had during 
the 1640’s and 1650’s fallen within the orbit o f gentlemen amateurs whose successors, 
whatever the experiments of Denham and Waller, were naturally the wits at the Restoration 
Court, among them Dorset, Sedley, and Buckingham.
I am not arguing that Dryden set out with the design to displace aristocratic 
authority over literature, but this certainly was what his literary activities helped to effect
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136
Dryden’s talent and his sense of current tastes had as much as anything to do with this. His 
poems on the death of Cromwell and on the restoration and coronation o f Charles, for 
instance, had shown him to be an occasional poet of considerable power, his The Rival 
Ladies (1663), The Indian Queen (1664), and The Indian Emperor (1665), though not his 
best work, had caught the Court’s attention and demonstrated the young playwright’s 
popular promise. But apart from the fact of his own skill and success, Dryden’s career 
served to undermine the preeminence of the gentleman-amateur in three ways. First. 
Dryden uses the theatre itself as a forum in which to attack the tastes and morals of the 
play-going patron classes, employing the direct address of his many prologues and 
epilogues to undermine their claims to ssthetic and social authority; second, Dryden— 
again mainly in his prologues and epilogues—conflates the literary opinions he attributes to 
his aristocratic opponents with largely discredited political positions, thereby making both 
their public and poetic values seem dangerous and absurd; and third, Dryden isolates his 
own patrons within a paradoxical “prison of praise,” making them estimable for their 
support of professionals (such as himself)—but little else. Taking advantage of the 
opportunities presented him by the theatre, Dryden was thus able to develop the fully and 
directly public medium of the dramatic prologue and epilogue into a vehicle for the 
refashioning o f literary sensibilities as well as for commentary upon social and political 
affairs; that is, he was able to use these poems to establish a  cultural “space” for public 
poetry and the public poet, adding momentum not only to his own literary career but also to 
the larger political and social forces (described above) already eroding the traditional 
relationship between poet and patron and with it the ssthetic dominance of the patron class 
itself.
Dryden’s assault upon his audiences' tastes, manners, and morals begins 
innocuously enough in his early prologues and epilogues. Even if this choice of platform 
had not been made necessary by Dryden’s lack of public stature at the outset of his career,
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it would have been entirely logical and appropriate, given the genre's endless flexibility in 
terms of form, content, and theme and its wholly public mode. Through the Prologue or 
Epilogue, the poet speaks directly to his audience; his speakers look straight into their 
faces, speak specifically to them. Since the days of Jonson the prologue and epilogue had 
offered an occasion for the author to coax playgoers into applauding what was put before 
them, or to banter them with bawdy innuendo or preemptive admonitions not to be too 
critical. And here it is worth remembering that Restoration audiences were not what they 
had been in Shakespeare’s day, comprised of groundlings in the pit and the gentlefolk in 
the gallery and side boxes. Burner notes that seventeenth-century playgoers were a more 
“socially cohesive” audience than Shakespeare’s had been (xi); the boxes were still 
occupied by the fashionable and wealthy, says AUardyce Nicoll, but the pit was now the 
place of “minor gentlemen and intellectuals,” the middle gallery, of would-be fashionable 
“tradesmen and their wives” (81-82). In the upper galleries, farthest from the stage—and 
farthest from the playwright’s direct address—crowded “a motley assemblage embracing 
all ranks from servants to impecunious professionals” (82). Dryden does not, therefore, 
address his critiques to the tastes of some rude, unlettered “rabble,” but to their social 
betters, the gentries of trade and blood. It is worth noting here as well that Dryden would 
soon emerge, as Wiley and others point out, as the period’s acknowledged master of the 
prologue and epilogue (xxx), fashioning the precedents of Jonson, Cowley, Denham, and 
others into a finished vehicle for trenchant aesthetic and social criticism. By the end of the 
1670’s his prologues and epilogues had attained such a stature in the public estimation that 
actors fought for the privilege to deliver them (Wiley xxxi-xxxv) and many of Dryden’s 
fellow playwrights courted him for them. Even if such pieces had little or nothing to do 
with the play itself, Dryden’s name was enough to recommend the work and its author. 
Johnson observes, “His prologues had such reputation, that for some time a play was 
considered as less likely to be well received, if some of his verses did not introduce it” 
(201). Wiley quotes Charles Saunders’ preface to his play, Tamerlane the Great {1681), in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
138
which the author actually boasts that his work had little chance of pleasing “untill it had 
received some Rules for Correction from Mr. Dryden himself, who was also pleased to 
Grace it with an Epilogue, to which it owes no small part of its success" (xxx). Dryden 
was thus able to realize fully the potential of the prologue-epilogue form to fashion, 
address, and retain an audience, in the process establishing himself as an authoritative 
public persona.
Dryden's first sally against his audience is, however, rather modest. In the epilogue 
to The Wild Gallant (1663), he has the Epilogue distinguish between the tendentious critics 
of the pit, for whom the author “has shown today / That which they only like, a wretched 
play" (11. 7-8), and his better judges, “true English gentlemen,” to whom “he these ladies 
joins, /  To judge that language their converse refines” (11. 19-20). Dryden’s deference here 
may perhaps be attributed to his naivete as a young playwright and an ingenuous 
idealization of his audience’s gentility. In future prologues and epilogues, however, 
Dryden is far less deferential toward his audiences; indeed, his sparring becomes ever more 
aggressive. I am not sure, despite the recurrence and increasing virulence of these attacks, 
that Dryden’s design is purposeful enough to properly constitute a strategy, but its effect is 
to call into question the skill of his noble competitors and the discernment and tastes of his 
polite audience, to separate both from their traditional pretense to critical sovereignty. In the 
prologue to The Rival Ladies (1663), for example, he has his speaker declare that the 
“reforming poets of our age” (1. 7) have foisted upon audiences “habits, dances, scenes, 
and rhymes; / High language often; aye, and sense, sometimes” (11. 11-12). He is more 
acerbic in his epilogue to The Indian Emperor (1664), a sequel to the Howard-Dryden 
collaboration, The Indian Queen. Here Dryden scornfully enumerates both his critics—the 
sons of Phoebus (i.e. would-be writers), “by whate’er title known, /  Whether o f court, of 
coffee-house, or town” (11. 3-4)— and their dubious qualifications to render any critical 
verdict One of Dryden’s frequent assertions is that only those who write well themselves 
may judge the efforts of others. Accordingly, those “whose confidence / Is plac'd in lofty
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sound, and humble sense” (11. 5-6) or those “little infants of the time, / Who write new 
songs, and trust in tune and rhyme” (1. 7-8) are ill-credentialled to pronounce upon the 
productions of true dramatists (i.e. Dryden himself). What critical liberties Dryden allows 
them are so meagre as to be damning indeed: the sonnetter may only judge of “song or 
dance” (1.14); the writer of burlesque, “all dogg’rel rhyme” (1.16); the coffeehouse wit, no 
poetry at all, though he may “damn the Dutch” (1- 20): “For the great dons of wit— / 
Phoebus gives them full privilege alone, / To damn all others, and cry up their own” (11. 
21-23). However tongue-in-cheek these last lines may be, the timing of this epilogue gives 
them a quite unironic significance, coming as it does at the moment when Dryden began to 
remove himself from the influence of his friend, brother-in-law, collaborator, and patron 
Sir Robert Howard. The Indian Emperor, Winn notes, was “written as Dryden broke free 
from his dependence on Howard” and had begun to establish his own literary principles 
(153). This epilogue, therefore, while not attacking Howard explicitly or even obliquely— 
though Dryden may have written it with Howard’s Poems (1660) and his contributions to 
their collaborations in mind—nevertheless aggressively distinguishes between the “great 
dons of wit” and those amateurs who now and then offer up a feeble, ephemeral effort3 
Dryden renews his attack on untalented amateurs in the epilogue to his recasting of 
Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida (1678), differentiating true poets from those “to whom 
the stage does not belong, / Such whose vocation is only to song; / At most to prologue, 
when, for want of time, / Poets take in for journey work in rhyme” (11. 15-18). When we 
recall Wiley’s observation that gallants, falling in with literary fashion, took to composing 
prologues and epilogues in order to pass for wits, we gain a clear notion of Dryden’s
3 Four years later, however, Dryden would scald Howard in his “A Defence of An Essay o f Dramatic 
Poesf' (1668), an answer to Howard’s attack upon Dryden and Dryden’s championing of rhymed drama. 
In his "Defence,'’ Dryden sneers at Howard’s "reputation of understanding all things” (111), and 
mercilessly ridicules the flaccidity of Howard's prose and critical principles, puncturing the amateur's 
presumption to pronounce upon literary matters.
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targets in these lines—though here Dryden has the would-be poets fanning out the work to 
hack-writers, thus denying them even the paltry triumph of a well-turned prologue.
Such pronouncements on stage only reinforce Dryden’s prose assaults upon the 
poetic efforts o f the gentleman-amateur. In one of his earliest critical pieces, a 1664 letter to 
Roger Boyle, Earl of Orrery (one o f the first proponents o f the heroic drama Dryden was 
shortly to make fashionable) prefacing the first edition of The Rival Ladies, Dryden claims 
that Orrery’s “excellent poems" have given the lie to the critics who have proclaimed it “a 
crime for a man of business4 to write so well” (3). This is an odd defense of the earl’s 
poetry, for Dryden seems to assume, with Orrery’s curiously unnamed critics, that it is 
indeed unusual to find talent and nobility happily conjoined; phrased as it is, it implies that 
Orrery is the exception that proves the rule, turning his praise for the man into a slight upon 
the class. But if Dryden has true esteem for Orrery, he takes less care to spare other 
aristocrats from his ridicule. In an address to Sir Charles Sedley prefacing his play, The 
Assignation, or Love in a Nunnery (acted, late 1672; published, 1673), Dryden defends 
Sedley, himself a gentleman-amateur poet, from “the ignorant and ridiculous descriptions 
which some pedants have given of the [Courtl Wits” (186). It is not true, Dryden says, that 
these wits are guilty o f the “lewdness, atheism, folly, ill-reasoning, and all manner of 
extravagances” (186) with which they are charged. In 1673, however, such an assertion 
would have been absurd, for the antics o f Rochester and his circle were already becoming 
notorious and noxious to London society. Once again speaking in the voice of his 
ostensible opponents, Dryden (already at odds with Buckingham and Howard and 
increasingly frustrated in his attempts to court Rochester as a patron) here deftly applies the 
labels the “pedants” have been too clumsy to make stick. But he goes further “The wits 
they describe are the fops we banish: for blasphemy and atheism, if they were neither sin
4 That is, a gentleman with an administrational appointment. Under Charles II, Orrery held a military 
appointment in Ireland.
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nor ill manners, are subjects so very common, and worn so threadbare, that people who
have sense avoid them, for fear of being suspected to have none” (187). This is a subtle
twist of the knife indeed, for though it seems only to make a disinterested distinction
between true wits and fops, the fops just happen to be guilty of the very things of which
the Courtly Wits (Sedley among them) stood accused. The true wit, on the other hand,
shuns such antics, not so much because they are sinful and ill-mannered, but because they
expose a lack of invention, a juvenile boorishness at the heart o f their practitioners ’
sensibilities—a damning accusation to level at a group priding itself on the exclusive
refinement and sophistication of its taste. Dryden’s most explicit denouncement, however,
comes in the preface to A ll For Love (1678): “We who write, if we want the talent, yet
have the excuse that we do it for a poor subsistence; but what can be urged in their defence
who, not having the vocation of poverty to scribble, out of mere wantonness take pains to
make themselves ridiculous?” (226). It is true, Dryden says, that Roman tyrants
“proclaimed themselves poets by sound of trumpet; and poets they were, upon pain of
death to any man who durst call them otherwise,” but “[i]n the meantime the true poets
were they who made the best markets” (227), that is, who put their poetry and not merely
their rank before the public eye and had their efforts vindicated by general acclamation.
Poetry, Dryden insists, is rightly the province of the professionals for whom it provides “a
poor subsistence,” for these have the greatest incentive and likelihood to perfect the
principles and practices of their craft. “Dulness,” Dryden says in the prologue to Troilus
and Cressida (1668), “might thrive in any trade but this [poetry]” (1.23):
Dulness, that in a playhouse meets disgrace,
Might meet with reverence in its proper place.
The fulsome clench [pun], that nauseates the town,
Would from a judge or alderman go down,
Such virtue is there in a robe or gown!
And that insipid stuff which here you hate,
Might somewhere else be call'd a grave debate;
Dulness is decent in the Church and State (11. 25-32).
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In these few lines, Dryden both separates amateurs from professionals (imposing 
humiliatingly low standards upon the wit o f the former), and casts doubt upon even the 
administrative competence of the ruling classes. For the most part, however, Dryden 
devotes his energies in his prologues and epilogues to belaboring his audience with his 
sense of its deficiencies. In “A Defence o f An Essay o f Dramatic Poesy" Dryden confesses 
that “my chief endeavors are to the delight the age in which I live” (116): tf[t]o please the 
people ought to be the poet’s aim, because plays are made for their delight” (120). The 
audience, from whom true poets make their markets, seems for Dryden to have the final 
say about what will or will not pass upon the stage. Far from forfeiting his authorial or 
critical prerogative, however, Dryden adds that “it does not follow that they [the people] are 
always pleased with good plays, or that the plays which please them are always good” 
(120). In fact, we find (not surprisingly) that playgoers’ esthetic sense is dreadful, and is 
ultimately responsible for the dullness and empty extravagance that have lately taken 
possession of the stage. Thus Dryden declares in the prologue to The Rival Ladies his 
audience has only itself to blame for the subordination of substance to mere style in the play 
they are about to see: “Such deep intrigues you’re welcome to this day: / But blame 
yourselves, not him who wrote the play; / Tho’ his plot’s dull, as can be well desir’d /  Wit 
stiff as any you have e’er admired: / He’s bound to please, not to write well” (U. 17-21). 
One infers from Dryden’s “Defence” that dramatic acumen may be nurtured, but his 
prologues and epilogues make clear that polite taste must first be chastised, made to doubt 
itself so that the professional poet might prescribe as he pleases. Aside from the fact that 
Dryden himself wrote comedies and farces to “delight the age,” the great irony o f  the 
prescriptions he delivers from the stage is that they are almost wholly negative, leaving the 
audience to infer “proper” dramatic values from the catalogue of theatrical prohibitions put 
before i t  This gives the authoritative advantage to the playwright: though Dryden eagerly 
put his literary principles before the public eye in treatises such as An Essay o f Dramatic 
Poesy (1667) and A Discourse Upon Satire (1692) and in prefaces to his published plays.
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his playhouse prescriptions afford no opportunity for contradiction, and, by forcing his 
auditors to deduce the unstated characteristics o f good drama, he teases them into 
formulating notions sympathetic to his own even as he withholds the particulars that 
underpin his presumed authority as a professional. For the time being, then, the audience 
has no choice but to accept the dramatist’s word for what is properly to be applauded or 
scorned.
Instances from the 1660’s and 1670’s of Dryden’s scorn for the faddishness of 
Restoration audiences might be supplied almost endlessly, so a  few major examples must 
here suffice. In the epilogue to the revived Wild Gallant (1667), Dryden’s speaker declares 
that “our dull poet” (1.37) would gladly offer them better fare, “Would you but change, for 
serious plot and verse, /  This motley garniture of fool and farce” (11.41-42), as “tradesmen, 
by the change of fashions, lose, / With some content, their fripperies of France, / In hope it 
may their staple trade advance” (11.46-48). If the failure of the present farce—apparently 
revived, despite its early failure, to appease current tastes—means the survival o f “serious 
plot and verse,” then so be it, for such a trade off would, Dryden presumes, indicate that 
the survival o f serious drama, his “staple trade,” would be ensured. That his hopes have 
been disappointed is made clear in subsequent prologues and epilogues, in which he taxes 
his audience with its supposedly inordinate delight in gimmicks, visual stimulation, farcical 
nonsense, and the cheap exoticism of foreign troupes. Enchanted with the show before 
them, they seem to give no thought to thematic substance so long as their immediate 
appetites are indulged. And how easily those appetites are sated: In delivering the prologue 
to the first part of The Conquest o f Granada (1670), Nell Gwyn appears on stage “in a 
broad-brimm’d hat, and waistbelt” (stage direction) and proceeds to rail against the rival 
Duke’s Company for its recent practice of designing plays around costumes: “T ’U write a 
play,’ says one, ‘for I have got / A broad-brimm’d hat, and waist-belt tow’rds a plot’” (11. 
9-10). A second playwright replies that he has a larger one: “Thus they out-write each other 
with a hat,” until at last the brims “cover’d all the wit” (1. 14): “Hat was the play; ’twas
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language, wit, and tale: / Like them that find meat, drink, and cloth in ale” (U. 15-16). 
Gwyn then shifts the target of “her” critique from the Duke's Company to the spectators 
themselves and their fascination with theatrical gewgaws. “They [the dramatists of the 
Duke’s Company] thought you lik’d, what only you forgave; / And brought you more dull 
sense, dull sense much worse / Than brisk gay nonsense” (11.24-26), she declares, adding, 
“They bring old ir’n and glass upon the stage, /  To barter with the Indians of our age” (11. 
27-28).
Like the “Indians of our age,” enchanted by the glitter o f the worthless baubles 
foisted upon them by European traders and colonizers, the audience accepts as valuable the 
fashionable gimmicks that hold the stage to the detriment of “serious plot and verse.” It is 
true that worth is subjective, both individually and culturally—a mere bauble to one might 
be priceless to another; still, one wonders if the critical and ethical faculties of a society can 
long sustain themselves upon the exhibition of large hats—or upon songs, dances, special 
effects, and scenery. In the prologue delivered at the 1673 Oxford performance of Jonson’s 
The Silent Woman, Dryden assures his academic audience (with questionable sincerity5) 
that their judgement is as sound as that o f those ancient Athenian judges who awarded 
prizes at the “annual rites of Pallas” (1. 3): “Here they, who long have known the useful 
stage, / Come to be taught themselves to teach the age” (11. 10-11). The situation, he tells 
them, is far otherwise in London:
There haught dunces, whose unlearned pen
Could ne’er spell grammar, would be reading men.
Such build their poems the Lucretian way;
So many huddled atoms make a  p lay. . .
To such a fame let mere town-wits aspire,
And their gay nonsense their own cits admire (U. 30-33; 36-37).
5 Both Winn and George Noyes point out that in a 1673 letter to the Earl of Rochester Dryden says of 
this prologue, “I have sent your lordship a prologue and epilogue which I made for our players, when 
they went down to Oxford. I hear they have succeeded; and by the event your lordship will judge how 
easy ’tis to pass any thing upon an university, and how gross flattery the learned will endure” (Winn 
252).
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These atoms of “gay nonsense,” Dryden explains in the accompanying epilogue, include 
the French troupe of “hot Monsieurs” (1. 7) that has “left their itch of novelty behind” (1. 
10), and the “Italian merry-andrews” (1. 11) who succeeded them: “Instead of wit and 
humors, your [the audience’s] delight /  Was there to see two hobby-horses fight”; “For 
love you heard how amorous asses bray’d / And cats in gutters gave their serenade” (11.13- 
14; 17-18). “Nature,” the Epilogue declares, now swelling with indignation, has been “put 
out of countenance, and each day / Some new-born monster shewn you for a play” (19-
20). But contemporary audiences have been particularly enchanted (as they are in our own 
day) by “those wicked engines call’d machines” (1.22)—that is, by special effects, which 
replace dramatic skill with technical tricks: “Thunder and lightning now for wit are play’d. 
/. . . Fletcher’s despis’d, your Jonson out of fashion, / And wit the only drug6 in all the 
nation” (11. 23; 31-32). The attack on the mania for playhouse gauderies continues in the 
prologue delivered at the 1674 opening of the King’s Company’s new playhouse in Drury 
Lane. If in a prologue delivered in 1672, just after the company’s first theatre had burned to 
the ground, Dryden’s tone had been hopeful— “But as our new-built city rises higher, / So 
from old theatres may new aspire, /  Since Fate contrives magnificence by fire” (11. 20- 
22)— he is now far less sanguine: “’Twere folly now a stately pile to raise, /  To build a 
playhouse while you throw down plays, /  Whilst scenes, machines, and empty operas 
reign, / And for the pencil you the pen disdain” (II. 34-7). He concludes this piece with a 
gloomy prediction: “’Tis to be feared— / That as a fire the former house o’erthrew, / 
Machines and tempests will destroy the new” (11.51-53). True wit died, Dryden says in the 
prologue to his comedy, The Kind Keeper (1678), “When sense in dog’rel rhymes and 
clouds was lost, / And dulness flourish’d at the actor’s cost / Nor stopp’d it here; when 
tragedy was done, / Satire and humor the same fate have run, / And comedy is sunk to trick 
and pun” (11. 3-7).
6 As used here, “a thing without worth or value," according to Johnson’s Dictionary.
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It must be noted that Dryden is not quite the disinterested upholder of standards he 
would be taken for. Peter Holland observes that though the King’s Company (the one for 
which Dryden wrote) had the better repertoire and the better actors, the rival Duke’s 
Company had the better playhouse of the two, and the better scenery and technical expertise 
as well (434ff). The Duke’s Company was thus better able to put on the farces, operas, and 
spectacles for which its director, Sir William Davenant, was able to fashion a popular 
appetite. Initially at a  disadvantage, Davenant’s company soon was the stronger of the two 
licensed theatres. Certainly, therefore, professional competition partly accounts for 
Dryden’s attack on the bedeviling novelties that his own company was slow to adopt and 
profit by. In his autobiography, An Apology fo r  the L ife o f Colly Cibber, Comedian 
(1740), Cibber (1671-1757) gives a brief history of the Restoration stage, commenting, 
“This sensual supply o f sight and sound, coming in to the assistance o f the weaker party, it 
was no wonder they should grow too hard for sense and simple nature, when it is 
consider’d how many more people there are that can see and hear than think and judge” 
(54). It would be easy to ascribe Dryden’s hostility toward Davenant’s innovations to mere 
self-interest—or to mere peevishness. In the prologue given at a  King’s Company 
performance at Oxford in 1674, Dryden declares, “Poets must stoop, when they would 
please our pit, / Debas’d even to the level of their wit; / Disdaining that which yet they 
know will take, / Hating themselves what their applause must make” (11. 32-5). It is 
difficult not to take these despairing lines as a statement of personal disillusionment; 
however, at first glance it would seem that Dryden’s successful career as a playwright, 
poet, and critic belies his bitterness. By 1674 Dryden had been made Poet Laureate (1667) 
and Historiographer Royal (1670); his plays were well attended and sold well once they 
were printed: so profitable were the successive reprints of Dryden’s works for Henry 
Herringman, his publisher during the 1670’s, that they helped to establish what Feather 
calls “a new kind o f publishing, in which the publisher was seeking out works which 
would be fashionably successful, but would also, he hoped, have a long-term existence”
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(57). Put another way, Dryden was being groomed as one of the living greats o f English 
drama. If this was a publisher’s cynical attempt to increase sales, it was hardly necessary: 
Dryden’s stature was such that he could usually command the attention and esteem of his 
audiences. That he did not leave o ff chastising their follies during the 1660’s and 1670’s 
might seem therefore die product o f self-pity, affectation, or perversity.
That is, until we remember that for Dryden aesthetic decadence had more than 
literary consequences; it betokened larger intellectual, social, moral, and even political 
deficiencies. Cibber inadvertently hints at what these may be when he observes that 
Davenant’s recourse to stage-gimmicks ultimately—and ironically—backfired on him:
Taste and fashion, with us, have always had wings, and fly from one 
publick spectacle to another so wantonly, that I have been inform’d, by those 
who remember it, that a famous puppet-shew in Salisbury Change. . .  so for 
distrest [the theatrical companies] that they were reduced to petition the king 
for relief against it (54).
Having eroded the taste o f playgoers, Davenant’s company had to face the consequences of
a public predisposed to enjoy only the gaudy and trivial. In nearly every discipline, the
decline of aesthetic expectations leads almost inevitably to the loss o f standards. For an age
that ostensibly believed that poetry could inculcate a love of virtue and am abhorrence of
vice in its audience, the subordination of well-crafted, “serious plot and verse” to the easy
and intellectually empty pleasures derived from broad-brimmed hats, thunder-machines,
dazzling scenery, and puppet shows indicates a loss or forfeiture of critical sophistication.
It would perhaps be unfair to expect anything else but critical ignorance in the greater public
following a twenty-year absence o f  drama from the stage. In his overview o f Samuel
Pepys’ dramatic sensibilities, Richard Luckett makes clear that even for such an intelligent,
reflective fellow as Pepys, sureness of dramatic judgement was a “random phenomenon”
(341); for him as for his contemporaries, dramatic principles were amorphous, almost
situational: “[M]any o f his waverings of opinion come directly out of the conflict between a
theoretical notion of what the drama ought to be, and a lively appreciation of what it was”
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(340). Like his fellows, Pepys often judged with his senses rather than his mind. Most 
playgoers, however, were entirely unaware “o f what the drama ought to be.” Certainly 
Dryden did not count upon such awareness: in his preface to Secret Love (1668), for 
instance, he observes of the dramatic unities that they comprise “a beauty which our 
common audiences do not easily discern” (IQS). But this ignorance cannot be redressed so 
long as its appetites are unconditionally appeased. Left unchallenged, those appetites will 
soon replace higher standards, and those who might be expected to know better will cease 
to sense that anything is amiss, that they might ask for something better.
Dryden continually reminds his audiences o f their extreme vulnerability to literary 
impostures and impostors. In his prologue to The Indian Emperor (1664), he tells his 
audience to suspend its sharp scrutiny of the play, “For ’tis your business to be cozen’d 
here” (1. 17). This line recurs at least twice more in these ancillary pieces (and the theme, 
innumerably), with a range o f connotations. Here, Dryden is simply asserting his 
prescriptive authority at the expense of “these wretched spies of wit” (1. 18): they have no 
choice but to be “cozened”—that is, accept Dryden’s word that his play suffers only from 
“light faults” (1.14)—because they lack the critical principles to arrive at a right judgement 
of what is set before them. Not much is at stake here, and even when, as we have seen, 
Dryden refers to his audience as “the Indians o f our age,” their uninformed appetites 
cheated and debased by the sharpers of the stage, the significance of their being deceived is 
apparently confined to the playhouse. The importance of other cozenings, however, clearly 
resonates far beyond the world o f  the theatre. In the prologue he provided for the 1668 
revival of Thomas Tomkis’ Albumazar (1668), Dryden begins by praising Jonson as “the 
best” of those who wrote in the previous age, not least because even when working with 
another’s material, “Ben made nobly his what he did mold; / What was another’s lead 
becomes his gold” (11. 11-12). By contrast, “this our age such authors does afford, / As 
make whole plays, and yet scarce write one word; / Who, in this anarchy o f wit, rob all, / 
And what’s their plunder, their possession call (11. 15-18). Winn notes that this lengthy
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attack on plagiarism (11. 15-40) was brought about by Howard’s publishing as his own a 
play (The Duke ofLerm a) that was the work of another author, the late John Ford, and had 
been partly revised by Dryden himself (190). Apart from the implications for the by-now 
rapidly disintegrating relationship between Dryden the professional and Howard the 
gentleman-amateur, what is most suggestive in this passage is the phrase “anarchy of w it” 
It would have been a loaded one in 1668, “anarchy” bringing to mind the political and 
social confusion of the Civil War and Commonwealth, and, when linked to the next line, 
“their plunder, their possession call,” the theologically suspect Hobbes’s notion of the state 
of nature, in which all have right to all. This conflation of literary with political antagonism 
foreshadows Dryden’s later attacks on his opponents; in its present context, however, it 
allows Dryden to shift the focus from plagiarists to the audience itself: “But, gentleman, 
you’re all concern’d in this; /  You are in fault few what they do amiss: / For they their thefts 
still undiscover’d think, / And durst not steal, unless you please to wink” (11. 41-44). 
Dryden’s “gentlemen” are “all concern’d in this” because in the theatre as in the “real” 
world there is a  proprietary order that must be observed: should gentlemen, at least the 
nominal keepers o f that order, “wink” at literary theft, they undermine the capacity of the 
law to protect their own property. More figuratively, by allowing themselves to be put 
upon by literary frauds these gentlemen of the playhouse demonstrate that they have 
likewise effectively forfeited their prerogative to decide matters of literary merit and 
propriety. That prerogative should derive from learning and sound judgement; when those 
who enjoy its authority lack these qualities, the rules of art break down and nonsense 
reigns.
Of course, the audience might find itself cozened to its advantage—much as a child 
may be tricked into taking medicine it would otherwise reject For instance, Dryden casts 
his play, The Conquest o f  Granada, P an II  (1672), as a vizarded woman. It was 
understood in Dryden’s day that masked women at the playhouse were either courtesans or 
women of fashionable society looking for sexual adventure. Whether courtesan or
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countess, their masks lent them an air of mystery that almost obliged self-styled gallants to
pay them their court. Analogously, this, the concluding half of Dryden’s most famous
heroic play, is the mask that forces those failed-wits-tumed-critics to forego damning the
entire work out of hand, as they otherwise would, and instead now play the fawning suitor
and “[bear] up to th’ prize, and [view] each limb, f To know her by her rigging and her
trim” (11. 17-18):
And as those vizard-masks maintain that fashion,
To soothe and tickle sweet imagination;
So our dull poet keeps you on with masking,
To make you think there’s something worth your asking (11.25-28).
But the playwright, says the Prologue, will have the last laugh: by the time the playhouse
wits discover that the play, a serious drama, does not dissolve into bawdy farce, it will be
too late to deny its worth, even though “that which (toes now delight you / Will prove a
dowdy, with a face to fright you” (11.29-30). Dryden calls attention to another bit o f sexual
cozening in the epilogue to The Assignation or, Love in a Nunnery (1672). Dryden has his
speaker remark that those coming to see a vile anti-Catholic lampoon instead of a legitimate
comedy with serious psychological and political themes will no doubt leave disappointed:
“Our poet should in some close cell have shown / Some sister, playing at content alone. /
This they [the Protestant “zealots” 0- 3)] did hope; the other side [the Catholics] did fear; /
And both you see alike are cozen’d here” (11.10-13).
Such authorial cozenings obliquely reinforce Dryden’s overt point that the audience
has no reliable critical faculties, and therefore must leave the determination and maintenance
of poetic principles to those who do, professionals like himself. In the cases o f The
Conquest o f Granada, Part 11 and The Assignation, Dryden insinuates that his audiences’
judgement is only as lively as its libido—and as narrowly self-interested. If in these
instances their appetites have made them susceptible to being beneficially cozened, they are
far more likely to mislead and debilitate, as Dryden makes clear in the epilogue given before
the King and Queen at the first performance of the now-united King’s and Duke’s
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companies (1682). Again using the image o f a vizarded woman in “the mid gallery” (1. 12) 
attracting “the flutt’ring sparks” (1.13), Dryden this time warns that the attainment of their 
object will give the sparks short pleasure, but lasting pain: “Fine love no doubt, but e ’er 
two days are o ’er ye, /  The surgeon will be told a woful story. / Let vizard-mask her naked 
face expose, /  On pain o f  being thought to want a  nose” (11. 17-20). Only the all-seeing 
playwright, it seems, can tell which masks hide the dowdy faces o f sound bodies and 
which, the syphilis-ravaged visages of the diseased and depraved.
The painted face, the painted set—both may entice even as they corrupt But aside 
from this analogy, Dryden achieves two things with his use of sexual innuendo and 
imagery by way of open acknowledgement of what Winn calls “an increasing fascination 
with sex in the theatre” (183). On one level, he establishes the ethical consequences of 
deficient aesthetic values: such a deficiency constitutes for Dryden no mere peccadillo, but 
is symptomatic o f moral blindness and o f  a decayed national character—especially among 
the patron classes. Dryden, notoriously “aware of his audience” (Winn 192). was not 
above dispensing the risque banter it wanted in his prologues and epilogues and in bawdy 
scenes in the plays themselves. However, granting that such fare would have made good 
business sense, I would counter that Dryden, solidly middle class himself, in fact uses 
such banter in his prologues and epilogues to turn his audiences’ appetites against them, to 
call into question—as his middle-class counterparts in trade, Church, and government were 
beginning to do—the moral soundness o f the aristocracy and Court For Dryden is always 
careful to draw attention to the fact that he is simply accommodating his audiences’ tastes, 
implying that they are in no way his own; and over time it becomes clear that he identifies 
sexual irregularity, immoderate carnal appetites, and boorish behavior almost exclusively 
with the theatre’s gentle patrons.
In his prologue to Secret Love (1667), for example, he tells his auditors, “A civil 
prologue is approv’d by no man; / You hate it as you do a civil woman” (11. 37-38); the 
audience needs its fancy “quicken’d” (1.40), “Just as old sinners, worn from their delight,
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/ Give money to be whipp’d to appetite” (11.41-42). At one stroke he assumes and justifies 
his aggressive posture toward the assembled playgoers, claiming to give them what any 
sophisticated roue would crave: stimulating abuse. The progress from “raw squire” to rake 
to roue Dryden traces in the opening lines of the prologue for the revival of The Wild 
Gallant (1667). Here an archetypical “raw squire” graduates from furtive masturbation— 
“(Pleas’d with some sport, which he alone does find, /  And thinks a secret to all 
humankind)” (11. 3-4)—to the easy seduction of “the gentle dairy-maid” (1. 6), to “the 
renown / of Whetstone’s Park” (11. 7-8) (i.e., its prostitutes), and so on to other acts of 
destructive self-indulgence upon his arrival in London: “He grows to break glass windows 
in the end: / His valor too, which with the watch began, / Proceeds to duel, and he kills his 
man” (11. 10-12). It is the influence o f such rakes, the Prologue says, that has corrupted 
“our unfletch’d author” (L 14), though he might yet still be too virtuous to please the town. 
Winn says that this prologue “ultimately reflects upon the attitudes and actions of such 
courtiers as Buckingham, who had been conducting an adulterous affair with the Duchess 
of Shrewsbury for several years, and would soon kill her husband in a duel” (184). 
Dryden could not see so far into the future, but he and his audience would have been well 
aware of the noblemen—Rochester among them—comprising what Vieth refers to as “the 
notorious group of young blades known as the ‘Bailers’” (xxiii-xxiv), whose whoring, 
duelling, and vandalism had made them odious to City and Court alike. Dryden’s prologue 
to Thomas Southeme’s The Disappointment (1684) is another “squire’s progress” piece. In 
this poem the young lad, whose “sucking bottles were well stor’d with brandy” (1.27), and 
whose years at school have taught him little more than the “Latin names” 0- 33) for “certain 
parts of man and woman” (1.32), comes to town, learns “the virtues of the high dice, and 
the low” (1. 38), and allows his sexual promiscuity to lead him to marry a broken-down 
actress, her portion “a twillet, dressing box, and half a crown” (1. 50): “He hires some 
homely room, love’s fruits to gather, /  And garret-high rebels against his father” (11. 46- 
47). The rebel at last receives his inheritance, only to run through it playing the fine
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gentleman: “But while abroad so liberal the dolt is, / Poor spouse at home as ragged as a 
colt is” (11.54-55). Predictably, self-indulgence leads at length to self-consumption. And it 
was recognized in Dryden’s day that such self-destruction was far from a merely personal 
affair. J.R. Jones notes that, at least among the minor gentry, the wastrel squire was fast 
becoming a hated symbol of the bleeding of England’s material and moral substance; to 
them, he was to the traditional social order what London was to the nation as a whole: a 
cancer, a parasite draining away vitality and virtue while “corrupting all classes by the 
peculiar temptations of metropolitan life” (75-77). The most reviled of these “peculiar 
temptations” is specifically ascribed to young play-going dandies in a suppressed epilogue 
to Lee and Dryden’s already controversial The Duke o f Guise (1682). The female speaker 
delivering this piece declares that London’s gallants have taken to railing at women instead 
of courting them for lovers:
Nay, and I fear they worse designs advance;
There’s a damn’d love-trick new brought o’er from France.
We charm in vain, and dress, and keep a pother,
While these false rogues are ogling one another.
All sins beside admit some expiation,
But this against our sex is plain damnation (11.23-28).
Dryden is not suggesting that social rank inevitably corrupts, let alone that an 
undeveloped aesthetic sense is the first step toward real viciousness—though in pieces such 
as the prologue to An Evening’s Love (1668) he associates sexual promiscuity with a lack 
of fidelity to proper dramatic values: “Each writing M onsieur is a fresh gallant” (1. 12). He 
is no Roundhead railing against the sinfulness of the theatre or the depravity and parasitism 
of the aristocracy.7 But when he taxes his audiences with want of discernment or 
immoderate appetites for novelty and sexual innuendo, the likely consequences for a 
society that cannot distinguish merit from nonsense or the substantial from the spurious
7 [n fact, when the playhouse of the King’s Company burned down in 1672. Dryden’s next prologue 
labels those who attributed the fire to God's anger as “blind unmanner’d zealots’* (1. 17).
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even in the playhouse are not far from his mind. Eyes that are pleased with “all naked 
beauties but a play,”8 stomachs that “with long disease oppress’d, /  Cannot the cordials of 
strong wit digest,”9 cannot be trusted to separate truth from falsehood in the greater chaos 
of the larger world. “Tell me, you powers,” Dryden’s speaker apostrophizes in the 
prologue to John Banks’s The Unhappy Favorite (1681), “why should vain man pursue, / 
With endless toil, each object that is new, / And for seeming substance leave the true? / 
Why should he quit for hopes his certain good, /  And loathe the manna of his daily food?” 
(II. 13-17). The Prologue for the anti-Dutch Amboyna (1672) had declared, “Religion 
wheedled you [the audience] to civil war, / Drew English blood, and Dutchmen’s now 
would spare” (U. 15-16); now, at the height of the Exclusion Crisis, when it seems that 
Shaftesbury will likely beguile the nation into another civil war, supplanting the nation’s 
loyalty to James, the rightful heir, with the affection aroused by the handsome and 
charming Duke of Monmouth, the inability of the English to discern their proper good once 
more stands forth, threatening to wreak a new Fall upon Charles H’s new-made “Eden” (1. 
27): “What civil broils have cost we knew too well; / O let it be enough that once we fell, / 
And every heart conspire with every tongue, / Still to have such a  king, and this king long” 
(11. 31-34).
Dryden’s likening of hierarchical social stability to wholesome “manna” in The 
Unhappy Favorite prologue is such a near parallel to that o f  sound dramatic practice to 
proper nourishment10 in the prologue to The Loyal General, that his own intellectual and
8 Epilogue to Aureng-Zebe (1675; 1. 16)
9 Prologue to Nahum Tate’s The Loyal General (1680; 11. 22-23)
10 The full passage runs as follows:
They talk of fevers that infect the brains.
But nonsense is the new disease that reigns.
Weak stomachs, with a long disease oppress'd.
Cannot the cordials of strong wit digest.
Therefore thin nourishment of farce ye choose.
Decoctions of a barley-water Muse:
A meal of tragedy would make ye sick.
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rhetorical conflation of the political and poetic spheres and their values becomes clear. 
However, though Dryden might have used such a conflation to hint at the public 
consequences of the patron class’s lack o f judgement and self-restraint, I am not at all sure 
that he meant for the noblemen and -women in the playhouse to reform themselves 
absolutely, any more than he meant for them to assimilate fully his principles for “serious 
plot and verse.” A debauched aristocracy makes a reliable butt for the professional poet of 
the middle-class. But I think that Dryden has something more cunning—and effectively 
more baneful—in mind for his fashionable auditors. Johnson observes in his Life of 
Dryden that in the poet’s day “the drama was very far from that universal approbation it 
has now obtained. The playhouse was abhorred by the Puritans, and avoided by those who 
desired the character of seriousness or decency. A grave lawyer would have debased his 
dignity, and a young trader, would have impaired his credit, by appearing in those 
mansions of dissolute licentiousness” (201). His opinion seems altogether in line with the 
verdict of John Evelyn, Dryden’s contemporary, who in a diary entry for October 18, 
1666, remarks that he seldom goes to the theatre, “for many reasons, now as they were 
abused, to an atheisticall liberty, fowle and undecent”:
Women now (and never ’til now) permitted to appeare and act, which 
inflaming severall young noble-men and gallants, became their whores, and 
to some their Wives, wittnesse the Earle of Oxford, Sir R: Howard, Pr:
Rupert, the E: o f Dorset, and another greater person than any o f these,11 
who fell into their snares, to the reproch of their noble families, and ruine of 
both body and Soule (216).
But after all Evelyn did occasionally go to the public playhouses, and seems to have
allowed his daughter Mary to attend the plays she wished to see. Moreover, as Holland
Unless it were a very tender chick.
Some scenes in sippets would be worth our time;
Those would go down; some love that’s poach’d in rhyme (11.20-29).
11 Evelyn no doubt refers to Charles II himself, whose affair with the actress Nell Gwyn was an open 
secret. In his Royal Mistresses (1990), Charles Carlton notes, “Before meeting the king, she had 
numerous lovers, supposedly seducing the poet John Dryden.. . .  Nell became mistress first to [the 
actor] Charles Hart, and second to Charles, Lord Buckhurst [later the Earl of Dorset]—which prompted 
her to teasingly call the king ‘My Charles the Third”’ (75).
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points out, not only were the solidly respectable middle classes regular playgoers (though 
they preferred the spectacles of Davenant’s company to the more intellectually demanding 
fare at the King’s Company), but women frequently attended plays with their husbands, 
and, if the example of the Pepyses is representative, often attended plays alone (443-444). 
Though not as morally fastidious as his friend Evelyn, Samuel Pepys was a government 
official with a reputation to consider; yet, Holland observes, “At no time does Pepys give 
even the slightest hint that the theatre was a dangerously immoral place for his wife to 
attend. His own scruples over the frequency of his visits to the theatre arose from his fear 
of wasting money and of neglecting work. More than once he expresses fear of being seen 
at the theatre in wartime” (444). I have no intention of attempting to resolve these opposing 
portrayals of the Restoration stage; rather, I would suggest that when we consider the 
insistence with which Dryden suggests to his audience that it is sexually obsessed, ill- 
mannered, violent, and crudely outspoken, it seems likely that he not only seeks to effect 
an almost reflexive association between the patron classes and moral profligacy in the 
public mind, but also uses the ambiguous reputation of the theatre to cozen his polite 
auditors into accepting an identity that will undermine their cultural and critical credibility. 
In short, Dryden’s prologues and epilogues help to make fashionable a well-recognized 
role that has no claim upon literary authority.
Dryden is not the only popular writer in this period to associate moral dissolution 
specifically with the upper classes. Samuel Butler, whose Hudibras (1662, 1663, and 
1677), says Winn, was Charles II’s favorite book (126), in his Characters (composed 
1667-1669; published 1759) portrays several social types that might have been drawn from 
the occupants of the King’s Company’s pits and galleries, among them “A Duke of 
Bucks,” “A Degenerate Noble,” “A Huffing Courtier,” “A Squire of Dames,” “A City 
Wit,” “A Court Wit,” and “A Dueller.” John Bunyan, as a Puritan Dryden’s temperamental 
and ideological opposite, includes in The Pilgrim ’s Progress a description of Vanity Fair
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that seems to draw directly upon popular perceptions of the Restoration Court and its 
proclivities:
Therefore at this fair are all such merchandise sold, as houses, lands, 
trades, places, honours, preferments, titles, countries, kingdoms, lusts, 
pleasures, and delights o f all sorts, as whores, bawds, wives, husbands, 
children, masters, servants, lives, blood, bodies, souls, silver, gold, pearls, 
precious stones, and what not And moreover, at this fair there is at all times 
to be seen jugglings, cheats, games, plays, fools, apes, knaves, and 
rogues, and that of all sorts (84-85).
And with particular regard to prologues and epilogues, Wiley notes that the gallant-critic
had been an occasional object o f satire at least since Jonson’s Cynthia’s Revels (1616),
adding, “After 1660 no less than fifty-six per cent of the characterizations in prologues and
epilogues referred to the dress o f the man of fashion, forty-two per cent to his conduct”
(173). But if Dryden is very much in tune with his times in his association of dissolution
and rank, his portraiture is more detailed than Jonson’s, more fully reified than Bunyan’s
allegorical renderings, and more precisely contextualized than Butler’s universal types.
Moreover, though he seldom neglects an opportunity to impute to his audiences an
unhealthy appetite for sexual titillation, his tone is generally more bantering than scornful,
making his indictments seem the result of envy or thwarted desire instead of disgust and
contempt, making his depictions of the boorish rake seem slightly more glorious than
grotesque. Winn observes of the seventeenth century that “The sexual activities o f the
aristocracy were a subject of universal fascination” (125), for then, as now, two separate
standards of morality prevailed, one for the upper classes and one for the middling rank
and below. Among the fashionable and those who would be thought so, who would not
secretly bask in an enviable notoriety?
Thus (to add a few brief examples to those given above), when the actresses of
King’s Company put on a play at the Duke’s Company’s old playhouse in 1672, the
Prologue declares that the theatre is the ideal place for the rendezvous of sophisticated
lovers: “Here’s good accommodation in the pit; /  The grave demurely in the midst may sit. /
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And so the hot Burgundian on either side / Ply vizard-mask, and o ’er the benches stride” 
(11. 11-14). The speaker observes further that gazing from the stage into the upper boxes, 
“We, who look up, can your addresses mark, / And see the creatures coupled in the ark” 
(11.20-21). Dryden goes still further in making illicit promiscuity seem chic in his prologue 
to Marriage A la Mode (1672). Here the speaker promises that in addition to adopting all 
the fripperies o f the rival theatre, the King’s Company will go them one better and turn the 
playhouse into a  brothel: “We’ll follow the new mode which they begin, / And treat ’em 
with a room, and couch within; / For that’s one way, howe’er the play fall short, /  T ’ 
oblige the town, the city, and the court” (11. 36-9). The prologue to A ll For Love or, The 
World Well Lost (1677) entices the men in the audience to identify with the tragedy’s hero, 
who is “somewhat lewd, but a well-meaning mind; / Weeps much, fights little, but is 
wondrous kind. / In short, a pattern, and companion fit, / For all the [mistress-] keeping 
Tonies of the pit” (1L 12-15). Buried in the seemingly flattering epithet “keeping Tonies” is 
the fate of the “pattern” for all the gallants of the p it ignoble death and lasting infamy. One 
miscellaneous prologue, evidently written (c. 1681) for a first-time playwright, casts the 
audience in a more specific and supposedly desirable role, likening the young author to a 
blushing virgin awaiting what he hopes will be a gentle debauching: “E'er you deflow’r his 
Muse, he hopes the pit /  Will make some settlement upon his w it / Promise him well, 
before the play begin, / For he would fain be cozen’d into sin” (11. 7-10). But he is meant 
for the women as well as the men, for “To both he would contribute some delight / A mere 
poetical hermaphrodite” / . . .  . With arms offensive and defensive too: / ’Tis hard, he 
thinks, if neither part will do” (11.34-35; 37-38). Dryden repeats the virgin-poet analogy in 
his epilogue to Thomas Southerne’s first play, a tragedy, The Loyal Brother (1682), and as 
in the earlier prologue, seems to hint that the author’s favors (and figurative genitalia) are 
exotically amphibious: “He’s neither yet a Whig nor Tory boy; /  But like a girl whom
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several would enjoy, / Begs leave to make the best o f  his own natural toy” (11. 3-5).12 
These hints at an ambiguous physique and sexuality seem designed to appeal to the jaded 
sexual sophisticates o f the belle monde, those for whom carnal adventure of the 
Roches ten an sort has made the passion of domestic—or even heroic—love distastefully 
bland. In his prologue to Lee’s M ithridates (1678), Dryden notes that “no man dies for 
love, but on the stage: /  And ev’n those martyrs are but rare in plays; /  A cursed sign of 
how much true faith decays” (11.5-7); instead, “rich cullies” (1.20) and women who “fight, 
like Swizzers, for their pay” (1.25) have corrupted love itself into “sophisticated ware” (1.
21), that is, prostitution. At the very least, love in polite society has been reduced to a game 
of cold calculation. Noting “the custom among Restoration aristocrats of keeping a 
mistress, which should perhaps be regarded as polygyny or concubinage rather than 
adultery” (xxiii), Vieth recounts a contemporary anecdote that neatly demonstrates the 
psychological, physical, and social consequences of passionless, chess-match promiscuity. 
The third Earl of Southesk, believing his wife Anne, daughter of the Duke o f Hamilton and 
“one of the most promiscuous women of the Restoration Court,” to be having an affair 
with James, the heir presumptive, “took revenge by deliberately contracting a case o f 
venereal disease and passing it onto his wife, who then unknowingly infected the Duke” 
(55n). Southesk’s revenge may have exceeded his most extravagant expectations: Maurice 
Ashley suggests that James’s narrow-minded obstinacy as king might be attributable to “a 
premature mental decline” resulting from “his excesses” (167).
But we need not conjure up images o f a syphilis-maddened James H presiding over 
the Bloody Assizes or skulking into exile to understand that for Dryden those who are dead
12 In his article, “The Discourse on Sex—or Sex as Discourse: Eighteenth-Century Medical and 
Paramedical Erotica" (1988), Peter Wagner notes that early in the following the century widespread 
public interest in the sexually irregular—hermaphrodites, eunuchs, and homosexuals—allowed outright 
quacks as well as medical men with an eye to profits and fame to publish shoals of semi-pornographic 
treatises in the name of science. Dryden’s “poetical hermaphrodites" might constitute an early 
recognition of a fashionable but superficial curiosity that dared acknowledge itself only later under the 
aegis of Enlightenment medicine.
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to everyday human feelings, who instead seek out the bizarre and deviant for their own 
sakes, are lost to nature and to moral truth—and certainly cannot presume to prescribe for 
the theatre, for they cannot be expected to recognize and advance the wholesome plainness 
of poetry’s ethical imperative. Dryden declares in his “Defence” that “moral truth is the 
mistress of the poet as much as o f the philosopher poesy must resemble natural truth, but it 
must be ethical. Indeed, the poet dresses truth, and adorns nature, but does not alter them” 
(120). The true poet does not put freaks o f morality or nature on the stage, and the 
discerning audience does not applaud them should they appear there. Thus Dryden 
chastises his audiences for their “unnatural” prurience, as well as for their taste for 
hypertrophic fashions—“But only fools, and they of vast estate, / Th’ extremity of modes 
will imitate, / The dangling knee-fringe, and the bib-cravat”13—and their demand that 
“fools out of the common road”14 be made a staple of the stage. Though Dryden escapes 
the charge of hypocrisy by dissociating himself absolutely from the appetites of his 
playhouse patrons, he does entice them into adopting what he later reveals to be 
indefensible judgements, attitudes, and behavior.
The following example reveals the technique in brief. Throughout the 1660’s and 
1670’s Dryden’s prologues and epilogues attack the outlandishness and effeminacy of the 
traipsing “Monsieurs,” the travelling French troupes that periodically diverted the crowds 
from the King’s and Duke’s companies, encouraging their auditors to show themselves to 
be hearty Britons by adopting the boisterousness and toughmindedness that purportedly 
characterize their race. However, Dryden’s depictions o f the hearty Briton almost always 
end up emphasizing the boorishness among the gallants and dandies o f the pits, though 
these descriptions seem more bantering than damning, as if  such behavior were de rigueur 
for the would-be gentleman-playgoer, as if, together with sexual incontinence, such
13 Prologue delivered at the opening of the King’s Company's new playhouse, March 26, 1674 (11. 25-27)
14 Prologue to The Assignation (1672; I. 23)
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behavior were merely part o f the role of fashionable rake. Having thus conditioned his
audiences over the years to expect certain attitudes from him as well as a certain playhouse
comportment from themselves, Dryden suddenly “reverses polarity” in the epilogue to his
tragedy Aureng-Zebe (1675). At first his speaker appears to lead the audience into familiar
pro-British, anti-French territory:
True English hate your Monsieurs’ paltry arts,
For you all are silk-weavers in your hearts.
Bold Britons, at a brave Bear Garden fray,
Are rous’d, and, clatt’ring sticks, cry: ‘Play, play, play!’
Meantime, your filthy foreigner will stare 
And mutter to himself: “Ha, gens barbate 
And, gad, ’tis well he mutters; well for him;
Our butchers else would tear him limb from limb (U. 20-27).
But just as our Francophobia is about to climax, Dryden gives the rug beneath us a  good
yank: “’Tis true, the time may come, your sons may be / Infected with this French civility”
(11. 28-29). “Infected” matches ill with “civility,” so one of the words must bear some
ironic weight. But which, and how much? That “civility” seems to refer to “your
Monsieurs’ paltry arts,” and these arts are contrasted with bear-baiting, provides a good
clue that “infected” rather than “civility” is meant to raise an eyebrow, but the next few lines
clinch the matter. “But this in after-ages will be done: / Our poet writes a hundred years too
soon. / This age comes on too slow, or he too fast; / And early springs are subject to a
blast!” (11. 30-33). And what does “our poet” write so far ahead o f its time? The Epilogue
has already told us in the opening lines to the piece:
A pretty task! and so I told the fool,
Who needs would undertake to please by rule:
He thought that, if his characters were good,
The series entire, and freed from noise and blood,
The action great, yet circumscrib’d by time,
The words not forc’d, but sliding into rhyme,
The passions rais’d and calm’d by just degrees,
As tides are swell’d, and then retire to seas:
He thought, in hitting these, his bus’ness done,
Tho’ he, perhaps, has fail’d in ev’ry one (11. I -10).
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That is, the poet has delivered a play constructed according to the principles o f French 
neoclassical drama, and he means for it to be taken as an advance upon not only the “brave 
Bear Garden fray,” but, given the setting, upon the generic chaos typical o f the English 
theatre. The “true English,” Dryden implies, cannot distinguish between the Frenchman’s 
“paltry arts” and his sober dramatic prescriptions, and prefer to remain immune from the 
“infection” of advanced dramaturgy. And so the “true English gentlemen” Dryden had so 
long ago declared his best judges remain barbarous, ignorant, intellectually backward—and 
utterly debarred from pronouncing upon literary matters. The professional poet not only 
sees the difference between sense and nonsense but may, according to the rules he knows 
and has mastered,15 “undertake to please” those “who can discern the tinsel from the gold” 
(I. 39): “To these he writes; and, if by them allow’d, / ’Tis their prerogative to rule the 
crowd. / For he more fears, like a presuming man, / Their votes who cannot judge, than 
theirs who can” (11.40-41).
Those who possess the “prerogative to rule the crowd” comprise an aristocracy of 
wit, judgement, and talent with which Dryden would supplant the cultural authority of the 
aristocracy of blood. Though Dryden never abandons his habit of impugning the taste and 
morality of the latter, after 1678 he adds another weapon in his assault upon the nobility’s 
aesthetic credibility: closely conflating his opponents’ poetic values with the politics that 
once “wheedled” England into Civil War, regicide, and anarchy—and threaten, Dryden 
believes, to do so again. Whereas the “programme” I have described in the foregoing pages 
might after all be incidental, however substantial its cumulative effects upon the public 
mind, this new strategy of conflation is obviously the product of premeditation, calculated 
to achieve a definite rhetorical end, namely that those who would overthrow poetry’s
15 Incidentally, this is the one place in 95 prologues and epilogues written over 40 years wherein Dryden 
sets forth any constructive rules for good drama.
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aristocracy of talent are but one step away from betraying their king and his rightful heir. 
By associating his poetical opponents with the King’s political foes, and both with those 
responsible for the deposition and execution o f Charles I and the establishment of the 
Commonwealth, Dryden does more than solidify his own position and identification with 
the popularly restored and therefore legitimate order that has made him Laureate; he taints 
his rivals and critics—whether noble, like Howard, Buckingham, Shaftesbury, Rochester, 
and the gallants of the pit and upper boxes, or common, like Shadwell and Settle—with the 
evocation of an image still widely feared and despised, that of the rebellious, regicidal, 
philistine Puritan. linking their literary and critical credibility to largely exploded political 
and social opinions, Dryden manages to make his opponents seem by turns treasonous, 
dangerous, and (once their defeat has been assured) abjectly ridiculous—but in any case ill- 
qualified to assume any measure of public or poetic authority.
Thomas Shadwell, Dryden’s rival, antagonist, and occasional butt, claims in “A 
Lenten Prologue Refus’d by the Players” (but subsequently published as a broadside in 
1682 or 1683), that “Our Prologue-Wit grows flat” (1. 1), forcing voguish poets to write 
explicitly political pieces: “But Plots, and Parties give new matter birth; / And State 
Distractions serve you here for mirth!” (11. 5-6). Yet as subsequent lines make clear, 
Shadwell is less bored with current prologue and epilogue fare than chagrined at the 
success of Dryden and the Tories in their recent political triumph over the Whigs and their 
continuing vilification and suppression of the Whig Opposition: “Baye’s [Dryden’s] 
crown’d Muse, by sovereign Right o f Satyre, /  Without desert, can dubb a man a Traitor. /  
And Toryes, without troubling Law, or Reason, / By loyal Instinct can find Plots and 
Treason” (11. 36-39). Shadwell goes on to deride the Tory assertions that the Whigs were 
behind the Rye House Plot against the King, that Shaftesbury’s Protestant Association in 
fact existed and was a  vehicle for sedition, and that London’s defense of its charter 
constituted treason. The political events to which Shadwell alludes had their ultimate origin 
in the alleged Popish Plot, with which the Opposition had tried to bolster its position during
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the Exclusion Crisis (1678-1681); Dryden’s claim of the “sovereign Right o f Satyre” had 
its origin in a sinister incident occurring on the evening of December 19,1679. That night, 
as the Laureate walked along the narrow Rose Alley, he was confronted by three men 
bearing cudgels and savagely beaten. The identity o f his assailants and the motives for the 
assault have never been established, but the fact that Dryden was not robbed suggests that 
the attack was meant to redress some real or imagined offense he had committed against a 
person of “quality.” As Winn observes, “In the violent world o f seventeenth-century 
London, having someone cudgelled by hired bullies was not uncommon; it provided a way 
for powerful people to deal with their social inferiors, men not sufficiently ’honorable' to 
be challenged to a  duel” (326). Thus in addition to its ferocity, the attack may have carried 
with it a crude social snub.16 But whether the Rose Lane beating was arranged by a noble 
personage or, as some have suggested, by a Whig Opposition hoping to stifle an articulate 
Administration spokesman, Dryden emerged from that December night with a new energy 
and purpose. Says Winn,
(T]f those responsible hoped to silence him, they failed. Indeed, the literary 
and political caution we have noticed in Dryden’s work in 1679 vanished in 
his inventive and partisan work of the early 1680s, in which he responded 
to the most serious political crisis since the Civil War with an outburst of 
creative vigor. . . . The final irony thus returned upon those behind the 
beating: whoever they were, they evidently intended to discourage Dryden’s 
satiric pen by breaking his bones; instead, they unleashed the true powers of 
the century’s greatest satirist (328-329).
Though Dryden’s prologues and epilogues turn overtly political only in 1679 and 
after, a few of his earlier pieces anticipate his later, more explicit conflation of his 
opponents’ poetical and political values. In his prologue for The Rival Ladies (1663), for 
instance, when Dryden refers to the “reforming poets of our age” (L 7), “reforming” would
16 Winn dismisses traditional suggestions that the Earl of Rochester was behind the beating and suggests 
that the Duchess of Portsmouth might have ordered the ambush through "her violent brother-in-law, 
Philip, Earl of Pembroke” (326), in response to Dryden’s supposed authorship of “An Essay on 
Satire,” which lampooned the royal mistresses.
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have brought to mind recent Puritan experiments with the organization of the English 
Church and Crown. Dryden evokes similar unhappy national memories when, in “A 
Defence of An Essay o f Dramatic P oesyf he mocks Howard’s lament that he (Howard) 
must now turn from poetry and devote his attention to government business: “the Muses 
have lost him,” Dryden sneers, “but the Commonwealth gains by it; the corruption of a 
poet is the generation of a statesman” (118). Again Dryden’s language is loaded: in 1668 
“commonwealth” referred not abstractly to a national body, but specifically to the 
Parliamentary government established after the execution of Charles I; “statesman” might 
be neutral, but “state” was usually understood to refer pejoratively to a republic such as 
Holland.17 Having ridiculed Howard’s poetic ability in the foregoing paragraph— “his 
thoughts [are] elevated, sometimes above common comprehension; his notions politic and 
grave, and tending to the instruction of princes, and reformation o f states" (emphasis 
added)—Dryden means to imply that the integrity of Howard’s statecraft is as suspect It 
was Howard, after all, who the year before had turned against Clarendon, his former 
benefactor and one of Dryden’s patrons, and joined with those who sought and obtained 
his resignation as Charles II’s Lord Chancellor. This was a betrayal that Dryden seems to 
have interpreted as a dangerous circumscription of royal authority, associating it with the 
abandonment of Lord Strafford to the Long Parliament’s death warrant in 1641—itself a 
first step along the road toward Civil War and regicide. The consequences of 
circumscription and outright usurpation of the rightful monarch are given in Dryden’s 
prologue to The Kind Keeper or, Air. Limberham  (1678). Written just months before the 
Popish Plot was “discovered,” it seems in its phrasing an uncanny “fore-echo” of the 
prologues and epilogues he wrote when the Plot and the Whigs were at their height, though 
it also recalls his prologue for The Rival Ladies. Repeating the now familiar assertion that
17 Consider Dryden’s assertion in his prologue to his anti-Dutch tragedy, Amboyna (1672): “Well 
monarchies may own religion’s name, / But states are atheists in their very frame" (II- 21-22).
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“True wit has seen its best days long ago; /  It ne’er looked up, since we were dipp’d in 
show” (11.1-2), Dry den attributes the death o f wit and the audience’s insatiable appetite for 
novelty to those “reforming poets” he seemed to mention in passing in 1663: “Let them, 
who the rebellion began /  To wit, restore the monarch, if  they can” (11. 11-12). Similarly, 
the prologue to Dryden and Lee’s recasting o f Oedipus (August 1678) admonishes its 
auditors not to abandon the rules of dramatic poetry in favor of mere inspiration, for “when 
you lay tradition wholly by, /  And on the private spirit alone rely, / You turn fanatics in 
your poetry” (11. 29-31). That is, they will become like those radical Puritans who would 
overthrow the authority and structure o f Church and State and obey instead only the 
promptings o f their consciences, creating social and moral anarchy.
But if these early topical references are generally aimed and obliquely rather than 
overtly damning, Dryden leaves little room for misconstruction in his prologue to The 
Loyal General (1679)—in fact, Winn suggests that the Rose Alley beating might have been 
provoked by this piece (325). Dryden scolds the “apostate pit” (1. 8) for neglecting “that 
which reasonable men should write” (1. 2) (i.e. serious, well-crafted plays) in favor of 
scandalous “city gazettes,” “factious speech” (1. 5), and “whate’er libel, for the public 
good, / Stirs up the Shrovetide crew to fire and blood!” (11. 6-7). We have seen such 
scolding before, but the specific distractions Dryden cites here make possible a more 
politically charged and controversial association than when audiences were accused of 
“apostasy” merely because they patronized the Duke’s Company. This time the 
“entertainments” drawing off the attention of playgoers—the sensationalist pulp journalism, 
the oppositional scheming against the Duke of York, the slurs cast against members of the 
Royal family and household, the Pope-bumings and crude anti-Catholic plays inflaming 
Protestant bigotry—are far more sinister and are likely to have immediate consequences for 
social stability; they might, Dryden hints, foreshadow a return to civil w ar.
The plays that take on our corrupted stage,
Methinks, resemble the distracted age;
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Noise, madness, ail unreasonable things,
That strike at sense, as rebels do at kings!
The style o f forty-one our poets write,
And you are grown to judge like forty-eight (11.12-17).
The final two lines are particularly significant “[Their] meaning," says Sir W alts' Scott “is
that the poets rebel against sense and criticism, as the parliament in 1641, did against the
king: and that the audience judge as ill as those who, in 1648, condemned Charles to the
block" (qtd. in Noyes, 954n). The Popish Plot had yet to be fully exposed for what it was,
but even at this early date Dryden seems to have discerned that its prosecution was largely a
screen for the political maneuverings o f the Opposition. “Despite ample reasons for
discretion," Winn says, “he now dared to compare the Opposition explicitly to the ‘Rebels’
of the 1640s; like those earlier ‘Rebels,’ Shaftesbury’s men were besieging the crown with
petitions requesting a meeting of the Parliament" (325). Important in this passage is the
twofold conflation, of the “rebels” against wit with would-be usurpers, and o f those
usurpers with the Parliamentarians who overthrew and executed Charles I. Such
associations may excite in the modern reader an intellectual appreciation of Dryden’s
rhetorical strategy, but in the poet’s day they were explosive indeed, for not only was
treason a capital offense, images of the regicidal Puritan and of the “martyred" Charles I
remained searingly alive in public memory and allusions to them had considerable power to
excite and disgust Butler’s Hudibras, the zealous, intolerant and hypocritical Presbyterian
Quixote who was one of those “Still so perverse and opposite, / As if they worshipped
God for spite” (I, i, 11.215-216), is a classic composite of all that was seen as hateful in the
“typical" Puritan. But his character of “A Fanatic,” is equally pertinent here. The fanatic,
says Butler, “chooses himself one of the Elect" using scripture to justify his own sins; his
religion “tends only to Faction and Sedition,” and for his faith he would rather be thought
to suffer than to perform good works, for these are “no better than Encroachments upon the
Merits of free believing"; and naturally he is above civil and religious ordinance, “and being
a Freeman supposes him-self at Liberty to set up what Religion he pleases” (127). For
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Dryden there is not much in principle or motive to choose between those who would 
disregard the laws of playhouse church, and kingdom, willfully sacrificing dramatic, 
ecclesiastical, or political order to satisfy and justify their own individual appetites and 
ambitions.
Dryden is not alone in making this association. Thomas Durfey’s prologue to The 
Royalist (1681), for instance, has its speaker express surprise to find “the House full! and 
at a Royal Playl” (1. 1), though “th’ Pit (methinks) looks like a Commonweal; / Where 
Monarch Wit’s bafl’d by ev’ry Drudge, / And each pert Railing Brimigham’s a Judge” (11. 
4-6). And Thomas Otway’s epilogue to Venice Preserved or, The Plot Discovered (1681) 
identifies those who (literally) defaced a portrait of James, Duke of York with those who 
killed his father “A Face [James’s], in which such Lineaments they [the vandals] Read, / 
Of that Great Martyr, whose Rich Blood they Shed, / That their Rebellious Hate they still 
maintain, /  And, in his Son, would Murder Him again” (11. 31-34). Such associations do 
double work. In Dryden’s case, two old literary adversaries, Shaftesbury and 
Buckingham, were prominent among the Opposition leaders; Howard and Rochester had 
Whiggish leanings; and two of his particular literary antagonists, Shadwell and Settle, were 
spokesmen for the Opposition cause. It is true that in the prologues and epilogues he wrote 
during the Exclusion Crisis Dryden does not name his targets; and perhaps his intention is 
not to undermine the Opposition leaders specifically as literary figures. Nonetheless, by 
appropriating the most incendiary social imagery for his own and his party’s purposes he is 
able to make literary theory largely recapitulate royalist political theory. In poetry as in the 
kingdom itself order and stability depend upon the existence of a single figure to whose 
authority all others, whatever their rank, defer; this authority is neither absolute nor 
tyrannically autocratic, but must not be capriciously subverted lest, as Dryden asserts in 
Absalom and Achitophel (1681), the people lose the security of their “private right” (1.779) 
and “are left defenseless to the sword / Of each unbounded, arbitrary lord” (11. 761-762). 
His argument recalls the appeal he made to proprietary order in the prologue to Albumazar
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(1668): without laws and executives to uphold them, society dissolves into Hobbesian 
anarchy. Thus when Dryden declares in the prologue to Southeme’s The Loyal Brother 
(1681), that “Poets, like lawful monarchs, rul’d the stage, / Till critics, like damn’d Whigs, 
debauch’d our age" (11.1-2), he means to evoke in an audience made uneasy by the present 
turmoil a  reflexive acknowledgement not only of the rightness o f royalist doctrine in the 
poetry as well as politics, but, conversely, of the fundamental wrongness of rebellion in 
either sphere. If the penchant for novelty with which Dryden so often taxes his audiences 
exposes in them a predisposition to more serious social lapses, so does the constitutional 
experimentation advocated by the Opposition and its literary spokesmen disqualify from 
prescribing in the moral world of the theatre.
At the same time, Dryden’s conflation of the poetical and political helps to solidify 
his position as one of poetry’s “lawful monarchs." For one thing, he is able to put himself 
forward as a defender o f poetry’s right to exist at all, and of its necessary role in the 
formation of the nation’s moral and ethical sensibilities. In a prologue delivered at the 
Oxford performance o f Lee’s tragedy, Sophonisba in 1680, Dryden lets himself imagine 
the consequences of an Exclusionist victory. By now the association o f the Whigs with the 
Long Parliament has become so well established as to be a cliche: “But 'tis the talent of our 
English nation, / Still to be plotting some new reformation; / And few years hence, if 
anarchy goes on, / Jack Presbyter shall here [at Oxford] erect his throne” (11. 9-12). If and 
when this happens, Dryden muses, “Your poets shall be us’d like infidels” (I. 17); 
“Religion, learning, wit, would be suppress’d, / Rags of the whore, and trappings of the 
beast” (11. 23-24). The suppression of poetry and poets is a new twist to the association of 
the past and present enemies o f the King, and provides another justification for the 
disbarment of his Whiggish opponents from literary authority. But in presenting them as 
foes to religion, learning, and wit, Dryden can style himself, as a poet and as Poet 
Laureate, the latest in a long line of apologists, including Sidney and Jonson, who also had 
to defend poetry against Puritan attacks. Linking wit with religion and learning, Dryden
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largely recapitulates the argument of his two great predecessors, that poetry is a necessary 
complement to one’s spiritual and intellectual training. That it is not a frivolous or 
impractical acquirement is underscored in his epilogue to Banks’s The Unhappy Favorite 
(1681). Here, amidst much anti-Whig flak, Dryden attributes low playhouse attendance to 
the distractions provided by the Opposition press: “’Tis not our want o f wit that keeps us 
poor; / For then the printer’s press would suffer more. /  Their pamphleteers each day their 
venom spit; /  They thrive by treason, and we starve by wit” (11. 16-19). He declares the 
parties’ rival newspapers, the Whigs’ Democritus and the Tories’ Heraclitus Ridens, to be 
worse than pulp press sensationalism, but far superior to “your lampooning rhymes, / Y’ 
abuse yourselves more dully than the times. /  Scandal, the glory of the English nation, /  Is 
worn to rags, and scribbled out o f fashion” (11.26-29). In addition to scolding his audience 
for its participation in “the farce o f your own age,”18 Dryden seeks to counteract the 
encroachment of competing media upon the domain of the formal prologue and epilogue to 
comment upon and prescribe for the times; at the least, Dryden seeks to maintain his own 
influence upon public opinion at the expense of other professional writers in other public 
media. Either way, Dryden’s performance here is a practical example o f the role of the poet 
and poetry in public affairs.
But let us assume for the moment that Dryden’s motivation in making such 
statements and in conflating poetic and political values is entirely self-serving, an 
outgrowth of his ambition and o f his loyalty to his royal master. When, for instance, 
Dryden all but dares his critics to dislike a play and reveal themselves as traitorous Whigs 
in his epilogue to The Loyal Brother—“’Tis faction buys the votes of half the pit; / Theirs is 
the pension-parliament of wit” (11. 24-25)—we might suspect that Dryden is merely 
providing cover for himself while bullying the Administration’s critics into silence. And we 
might find our suspicion confirmed by the increasingly virulent abuse he will heap on the
18 Prologue to The Loyal General (1679; I. 34)
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Whigs in his prologues and epilogues of 1682, when they have been beaten utterly and the 
Tory reaction is in full swing. (See, for instance, his prologues to the King and Queen at 
the opening of the United Theatre and to The Duke o f Guise.) However, the fact that 
Dryden is not at odds with his king does not mean that he is any the less a  pioneer o f very 
important public “space.” For he has stepped forward and claimed for the public poet— 
perhaps reclaimed from the classical past—the right to pronounce upon political affairs. 
The right to claim such a space provides him not only with a safe place to stand when he 
disagrees with the Administration, but a reasonably secure right to speak out when, as an 
old man, weary, poor, and disillusioned, he finds himself in opposition to the 
Administration of William HI. Poor and politically powerless—but nonetheless revered as a 
great man of letters, and serving as an honored precedent for future poets, such as Pope, 
who find themselves at odds with their government and society. Moreover, the true 
significance of the territory Dryden has so laboriously carved out for himself is that it once 
belonged indisputably to the gentleman-poet and was enclosed by the walls o f Court It is 
Dryden, the consummate insider, who devises in his prologues and epilogues a journal of 
the times, making a practical case not only for the possibilities o f public poetry, but for the 
necessity of formal public poetry as an alternative to the sensationalist pulp press as a 
forum and framer o f political and social debate, and to the inward-looking lyrics o f the 
Courtly Wits as an arbiter o f literary sensibilities.
Against the proposition that Dryden by effect and design subverted aristocratic 
authority it may be argued that seldom was any writer more eager to boast o f his royal and 
aristocratic connections, more cloying in his courtship of new patrons, or more sycophantic 
in his praise of those whose favor he had obtained. Johnson, who famously defined 
“patron” as “one who looks with unconcern on a man struggling for life in the water, and,
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when he has reached ground, encumbers him with help,”19 speaks contemptuously of 
Dryden’s undignified address o f the great: “|T|n the meanness and servility of hyperbolical 
adulation, I know not whether, since the the days in which the Roman emperors were 
deified, he has ever been equalled” (219). Johnson might have had in mind Dryden’s 
address to the Earl o f Orrery, prefixed to the first edition o f The Rival Ladies (1664). 
Having praised Orrery’s writing at length, Dryden extols the Earl as a universal paragon
and belittles his own understanding:
I can only say, in general, that the souls o f other men shine out at little 
crannies; they understand some one thing, perhaps, to admiration, while 
they are darkened on all other parts. But your Lordship’s soul is an entire 
globe of light, breaking out on every side; and if I have only discovered one 
beam of it, ’tis not that the light falls unequally, but because the body which 
receives it is o f unequal parts (5).
Or Johnson might have been thinking of Dryden’s poem, “To the Earl of Roscommon, on
His Excellent Essay on Translated Verse” 1684). Declares Dryden, “The Muses’ empire is
restor’d again, /  In Charles his reign, and by Roscommon’s pen” (U. 28-29). This is
excessive, but worse follows: Roscommon is hereafter to be the model of all translators,
Britain and Ireland will quarrel over the privilege of being declared his native land, and his
example will bring perfection to the English tongue, ensuring that English letters will now
“on equal terms with ancient wit ingage, / Nor mighty Homer fear, nor sacred Virgil’s
page” (11. 75-76). In his life o f Roscommon, Johnson asserts that he “is perhaps the only
correct writer in verse before Addison” (137), but soberly argues that despite the “elegance
of the poetry,” Roscommon’s verse treatise is a hardly a  work for the ages, “for when the
sum of Lord Roscommon’s precepts is collected, it will not be easy to discover how they
can qualify their reader for a better performance of translation than might have been attained
by his [the reader’s] own reflections” (138). But surely Dryden’s most embarrassing
performance occurs in his Discourse Concerning the O riginal and Progress o f Satire,
19 Letter to the Earl of Chesterfield, February 7, 1755 (2-3)
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prefixed to his translation of the satires of Persius and Juvenal (1692) and dedicated to the 
Earl of Dorset Here the author o f MacFlecknoe, Absalom and Achitophel, and The Medal, 
three of the great satirical poems in the language, surrenders the laurel for satire to his 
patron in the most fulsome terms: “I never attempted anything in satire, wherein I have, not 
studied your writings as the most perfect model. I have continually laid them before me; 
and the greatest commendation which my own partiality can give to my productions, is, 
that they are copies, and no further to be allow’d, than as they have something more or less 
of the original” (76). After pages of such stuff, Dryden goes on to describe Dorset as “the 
king of poets” and the undisputed arbiter o f wit (78-79), concluding, “Your Lordship’s 
only fault is, that you have not written more; unless I could add another,. . .  that you have 
written, and out of a vicious modesty will not publish” (80).
Such public deference to the great would seem to solidify rather than undermine the 
prerogative o f aristocratic amateurs to supervise the shape and content o f literature as well 
as oversee the formulation and application of critical standards. But Johnson’s charge of 
“mean and servile hyperbolical adulation” can and should be challenged. Johnson, a rigidly 
honest man himself, often seems unable to take others at less than their word, and it may be 
that there is a significant gap between what Dryden appears to say and what he means to 
say—or what he ends up saying. In fact, a second look at the passages given above makes 
one suspect that this gap is more than a mere quibble. For instance, in Dryden’s praise of 
Roscommon, we should discern beneath the appearance of exuberant, unconditional 
commendation several problematic particulars. He asserts that “all the needful rules [for 
translation! are scatter’d  here” (1.32, emphasis added), implying that though the truth has 
been “smoothly told” (1.33), and the poet’s “art disguis’d” (1.34), the poem as a treatise is 
less than successful—an inference justified by Dryden’s subsequent assertion that we really 
have no need of Roscommon’s rules “to give translation light: /  His own example is a flame 
so bright, / That he who but arrives to copy well, / Unguided will advance, unknowing will 
excell” (11. 35-38). These lines are meant to be taken as praise, but one wonders why
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Dryden phrased them so ambiguously. Roscommon’s guide to translation is said to be 
inferior to his example, but oddly enough his translations o f Horace and Virgil leave 
readers “unguided” and “unknowing.’’ Dryden’s opinion o f  Roscommon’s work seems 
largely to concur with Johnson’s, and when we remember that four years earlier Dryden 
had, in the preface to his translation (with others) of Ovid’s Epistles (1680), set forth his 
own principles o f translation, we begin to suspect that the Earl’s verse essay is but an 
ornament to the real work o f the professional poet.20 Dryden’s later, more general praise of 
gentlemen-amateurs confirms their wholly auxiliary status. “When authors nobly bom will 
bear their part, /  And not disdain the glorious praise o f art!” (11.55-56), Dryden promises, 
English as a language will be perfected and “invention and translation [will] thrive” 0- 54). 
Yet the analogy that follows, of generals who “[descend] from command” and “with their 
own toil provoke the soldier’s hand” (11.56-57), makes clear that the exertions of “authors 
nobly bom” might be helpful, but are rather an afterthought to the main effort. They are 
extra, and essentially extraneous. Referring to the Earl of Mulgrave’s translation of Ovid’s 
heroic epistle, “Helen to Paris,” Dryden says that the Roman’s ghost is “pleas’d to hear / 
His fame augmented by an English peer; / How he em bellishes his Helen’s loves, / 
Outdoes his softness, and his sense improves" (11. 59-62, emphasis added). Lines 59-61 
suggest that Mulgrave has prettified Ovid; line 62, that he has exceeded his authority as a 
translator, for Dryden had declared in his preface to Ovid’s Epistles, “The sense of an 
author, generally speaking, is to be sacred and inviolable. If the fancy of Ovid be luxuriant, 
’tis his character to be so; and if I retrench it, he is no longer Ovid” (272). Mulgrave, like 
Roscommon, may have produced some enjoyable poetry, but both seemingly lack the
-° The following year Dryden observed in the preface to Tonson’s second miscellany, Sylvtr ( 1685), “For 
this last half-year I have been troubled with the disease (as I may call it) of translation’' (18). It seems 
that despite the great quality of his translations (especially his Virgil) and the money they brought him, 
Dryden held the craft to be an art inferior to original composition.
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learning, the theoretical sophistication, and the continual practice that distinguish the true 
proficient from the amateur.21
Much of Dryden’s fawning, hyperbolic praise ultimately calls itself into question. 
His encomia upon Dorset in A Discourse Upon Satire at length come to very little. Not only 
is it inherently absurd, to the point of irony, for Dryden to declare Dorset the pattern for 
satirists, but reading closely we find that Dorset is king of poets because o f his position as 
Lord Chamberlain in the administration o f William EH. Dorset is the bureaucrat responsible 
for maintaining “the decency and good manners of the stage” against “the petulant 
scribblers of this age” (79)— he is, in other words, the government’s censor, and happens 
to be the man who had been cozened by Shadweil (whom he appointed Laureate in 1689) 
into banning Dryden’s prologue to the 1690 revival of Fletcher’s The Prophetess. Censor- 
by-appointment is hardly the same thing as monarch-by-merit, and though Dryden later 
claims that “your Lordship is form’d by nature for this [officiall supremacy” (79), he has 
already made the crucial distinction. But it is with Dryden’s two “complimentary criticisms” 
of Dorset, that the Earl writes little and publishes nothing, that the distinction is driven 
home. An infrequent writer of competent satires unscrutinized by the public eye, Dorset can 
hardly claim that he owes his position to his poetry’s emerging triumphant from the lists of 
competitors and critics, as Dryden’s own has. Indeed, Dryden’s praise of Dorset is 
followed by Dryden’s account of his own career as a dramatist, beleaguered satirist, and 
would-be writer of epics frustrated by poverty and the need to write to survive. The upshot 
of the juxtaposition is this: if Dryden claims to be the English Boileau, he has after all paid 
his dues; Dorset, the courtly wit and sometime poet, owes both his appointment and the 
praise of professionals entirely to his social rank.
21 In his explication of Dryden’s commendatory verses upon Sir Robert Howard’s Poems (1660), Winn 
explains Dryden’s bias against aristocratic amateurs and his consistently problematic praise of them 
thus, ’ Because these licentious Cavalier poets foiled [during the 1630’s and 1640’s] to guard ’Poesie’ 
responsibly, the nation has had to endure the corrective rhetoric of the millenarian Independent 
preachers” (103).
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But since Orrery, Roscommon, and Dorset were Dryden’s friends as well as his 
patrons, let us suppose that he praises them with absolute sincerity. The charge of 
sycophancy might then stand—but the position of the aristocratic amateur is no less 
undermined. It seems paradoxical, but one may be praised out of credibility. However 
pleasing it may be, praise is innately problematic for its receiver. Perhaps all declarative 
speech entails an active speaker and a more or less passive auditor, but praise intensifies the 
passivity of its object in two ways peculiar to itself. First, it enforces an absolute division 
between the one acting and the one acted upon. Other declarative speech involves, perhaps 
requires, a certain amount of speaker-auditor cooperation; when we listen we usually do so 
actively, our faces and gestures giving clues to the speaker about our reactions and how he 
or she should proceed. Praise, on the other hand, removes the ability of its object to act on 
his or her own behalf or on behalf of the speaker, for we cannot participate in someone 
else’s commendation of us. Doing so would be a faux pas—it would also be extremely 
difficult, given that praise is, secondly, invasive and transmutative, occupying and 
reshaping its object once it has rendered it inert Like other speech that represents or 
assesses its object praise figuratively ‘‘commandeers” that object for its own ends, holding 
up certain characteristics of it as emblematic or definitive o f the whole. But unlike such 
speech, praise defines toward a particular effect or end, for as it defines it rarifies, 
idealizes, makes its object iconographic. This is what makes praise, especially excessive 
praise of the sort Dryden offers his patrons, so problematic for its recipient. As a pictorial 
icon can accommodate only two of its subject’s three physical dimensions, so must the 
verbal or textual icon radically simplify its subject’s moral, intellectual, and temperamental 
complexities. To be made an icon is to be reduced as a human being: even as one is raised 
above the imperfections of everyday humanity and the niggling circumstances of the 
everyday reality, one is likewise removed from one’s capacity for existing credibly as a 
physical and moral being. For should one try to step out of one’s frame and vivify the icon 
one has become, one almost inevitably ends up giving the lie to the very characteristics that
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had comprised the idealized portrait, for the flaws and ambiguities o f a living human being 
must shatter the illusion of perfection. This is the conundrum o f much love poetry, 
Sidney's Astrophil and Stella sequence providing a ready example. Astrophil's praise of 
Stella’s beauty and virtue remakes her—bodily and spiritually—into a  neo-platonic ideal of 
Woman, o f the perfected feminine soul. Stella is lovable because she is good, but her 
absolute goodness prevents her from requiting Astrophil’s love: were she to exhibit the 
affections and desires o f a corporeal woman for a corporeal man, her carnality would 
negate the basis of Astrophil’s praise. Perversely, the lover may love only so long as his 
beloved’s beatific perfection makes her incapable o f returning love to so mean a creature as 
himself. As an object o f veneration, Stella becomes so isolated from the world of 
sensation, emotion, and action that she is made merely an object o f praise, capable of little 
more than receiving another’s abject devotion. Such is the power o f praise to nullify with 
superlatives.
Dryden writes no love poetry, but his “hyperbolical” praise of Orrery, 
Roscommon, Dorset, and many others is no less effective in negating them as men of 
letters. On one level, to praise is to assume some superiority with regard to one’s object 
Otherwise one could not pretend to the authority to assess and commend. But much of 
Dryden’s praise of his noble friends as noblemen and amateur writers recalls the lover’s 
ostensible exaltation of the beloved. Consider, for instance, Dryden’s assertion that 
Orrery’s soul is “an entire globe o f light breaking out on every side,” or that Roscommon 
is “first in fields of honor known, /  First in the peaceful triumphs o f his gown, / Who both 
Minervas justly makes his own” (11.70-72), or that of Dorset
I can say, you neither have enemies, nor can scarce have any; for they who 
have never heard of you, can neither love or hate you; and they who have, 
can have no other notion of you, than that which they receive from the 
public, that you are the best of men. After this, my testimony can be of no 
farther use, than to declare it to be daylight at high noon; and all who have 
the benefit of sight, can look up as well, and see the sun (73).
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The globe of light, the paragon of arms and wisdom, the man so exemplary it is impossible 
for him to have enemies—the hyperbole of these epithets creates a gap between what is 
claimed and what we know must be true, for we are human beings ourselves, and know 
that there can be no greater oxymoron in the language than “human perfection-” This gap 
forces us to make a decision problematic for the object of praise. We can either doubt 
Dryden’s judgement (these were his friends) or sincerity (he sought favors and protection 
from them), or else accept the terms of his praise and forfeit any possible belief in the 
essential humanity of his subjects. For the witness o f such praise, these recipients cease to 
be living, acting men; indeed, Dryden can celebrate their virtues only by reducing them to 
or associating them with inanimate objects. Orrery and Dorset become suns; Roscommon is 
epitomized by a field and a gown—and by the abstractions of puissance and sagacity 
vaguely embodied by a classical goddess. As with the beloved, these objects of praise seem 
to have become for the one praising an excuse to exercise his linguistic and rhetorical 
proficiency. I am not suggesting that Dryden is being ironic, but that once he has translated 
Orrery, Roscommon and Dorset above the merely human world he effectively severs his 
human relationship with them, and his words cease to have any truly human resonances. 
Dryden can only compound phrase with mellifluous phrase ad nauseam, until at length we 
dare to suspect that the language of high praise has come to exist for its own sake, has 
become an end in itself, each additional word obscuring our view o f its putative object, 
walling that object within a  prison of praise.
Thus entombed, the recipients of Dryden’s extravagance find, with us, that it is not 
only they that have become isolated from the fray of the real world: once an agent has been 
rendered inert and obscure, the actions or productions with which he or she has been 
commonly identified are likewise nullified, and in much the same manner. The act or work 
itself (heroism or brilliant statecraft, for example, or a building or symphony) becomes a 
sublime thing, each characteristic associated with some aspect of its already rarified 
executor or creator. (Of course, an act or work may become an icon independent of its
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human agent, or through its effectiveness or beauty set that agent above the plane of 
ordinary humanity. One thinks o f Lindbergh’s flight, for example, or the epics o f Homer.) 
This observation extends as well to literary endeavors, particularly to those whose rank is 
likely to elicit the admiration and acclaim o f their social inferiors. Dryden’s praise o f 
Orrery, Roscommon, and Dorset thus has perhaps unexpected consequences for our 
assessment of their talents and works. As an extension of himself, the gentleman-amateur’s 
poetry becomes a thing set above the mundane standards and controversies o f the literary 
world. Isolated from the fray, it cannot hope to “pay its dues,” to win approval entirely on 
its own merits. This is made particularly clear when Dryden’s compounds his praise of his 
patrons with hyperbolic praise o f  their works. Comparing Orrery to Xenophon and 
Augustus, soldiers who gave the world examples o f romance and tragedy, respectively, 
Dryden continues, “The Muses have seldom employed your thoughts, but when some 
violent fit of gout has snatched you from the affairs o f state; and, like the priestess of 
Apollo, you never come to deliver his oracles, but unwillingly and in torment” (3). 
Dryden’s reminder to Orrery that he is but a part-time writer who finds his inspiration in 
gout aside, the general is here figured forth as a vatic poet, a medium of divine revelation. 
This foreshadows Dryden’s praise of Roscommon’s artless treatise, which will bring 
perfection to the language, and make “invention and translation thrive” (1.54). No wonder 
England and Ireland will contend for the glory o f being Roscommon’s native land, “a 
nobler quarrel for his native earth, /  Than what divided Greece for Homer’s birth” (11. 51- 
52). Inner inspiration and comparison with the giants of literature figure in Dryden’s praise 
of Dorset as well, of whom Dryden makes especial note of “those heights that you possess, 
from a happy, abundant, and native genius: which are as inborn to you, as they were to 
Shakespeare; and, for aught I know, to Homer; in either of whom we find all arts and 
sciences, all moral and natural philosophy, without knowing that they ever studied them” 
(74). We might notice here that the foundation of each earl’s poetry is an inspiration lacking 
principle and discipline, unaided by art or study. This is how the amateur proceeds—and
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the method, if it is that, is also exactly that of the radical Protestants who “on the private 
spirit alone rely.” Thus these men, like Dryden’s other noble adversaries, seem to have 
“turn[ed] fanatics in [their] poetry.” But we should also notice that in addition to the wild 
extravagance of Dryden’s praise, the regularity o f its pattern makes it seem almost entirely 
ritualistic, a matter of form. Their poetry thereby becomes less vital as poetry, is rendered 
inanimate—it may as well be a stylish cravat, or a  shapely wig, which one may praise 
without cost to oneself or any ascription o f real merit either to it or its owner.
Dryden’s praise of those such as Orrery, Roscommon, and Dorset, allows him to 
strengthen his own cultural authority through his association with the great while calling 
their literary credibility into question. His praise thus complements the habitual criticism of 
the patron classes’ tastes, morals, and manners we saw in his prologues and epilogues, 
completing a “programme” of condemnation and commendation that effectively undermines 
the literary prerogative of society’s upper ranks and their more prominent individual 
members. Laughter or hissing or both would have greeted the delivery of Dryden’s 
prologues and epilogues. But it is impossible to know, except in a few cases, the lasting 
effects of Dryden’s blame and praise in the minds o f his auditors and readers. Was he able 
to effect a permanent self-conscious awareness of the amateur’s weaknesses, the 
professional’s strength, discrediting the former and establishing the latter absolutely? That 
would doubtless be claiming too much. But surely the same few rhetorical points, reiterated 
in prologue after prologue, performance after performance, play after play, year after year, 
did indeed effect three important manipulations o f public perception: that there were 
distinctions to be made between the amateur and professional writer, that the appetites, 
behavior, and opinions of the upper classes are suspect enough to disqualify them from 
exercising real authority in literary matters; and that between the audience and the 
playwright there exist such qualitative differences in taste and judgement that the former 
must defer to the latter and acknowledge (at least in principle) the right of the learned, 
practiced professional poet to define and maintain the aesthetic values of society.
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In fact, Dryden’s prologues and epilogues (and the critical prefaces that reinforce 
them), exactly recapitulate the larger forces that brought public poetry to the fore during this 
period, and in form and content might be said to embody its triumph. For the prologue and 
epilogue—composed to be delivered in public, looked to by the public for news and 
commentary, used by the poet to establish himself as a authoritative public persona—is in 
these and other ways a continuation of the topical ballads and broadsides written during the 
Interregnum. In fact it was not uncommon for such pieces to be published as broadsides, 
either to advertise the play for which they had been written, to reawaken interest in a play, 
or, when their content had been deemed scandalous or seditious, to escape the official 
proscription of the Lord Chamberlain. I think that Wiley is right to imply that the 
proficiency of Dryden and others in writing them had much to do with their success, but 
we should remember, too, that by the Restoration the public had become accustomed to 
receive information and opinion via verse. Thus along with broadsides and ballads (and 
news-pamphlets), prologues and epilogues comprised a running journal o f the times. 
Indeed, Wiley claims, prologues and epilogues helped to perpetuate and enlarge the 
widespread “avidity for news” (172) that was one o f the symptoms of the increase of 
popular interest in and influence upon the affairs o f state brought about by the Civil War 
and its aftermath. Whether they concern themselves specifically with the theatre, with 
manners or morals, or with current events and governmental policy, these pieces reflect 
both the tone and scope of Restoration politics. They make little pretense to objectivity, but 
their biases tend to be situational rather than narrowly doctrinal; moreover, their concern is 
with society at large: the theatre in this period became an acknowledged extension o f the 
party debate beyond the walls o f Whitehall and Westminster, and Dryden’s playhouse 
pieces—their example widely imitated—played their part in giving the social and political 
debate a public “shape.”
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These pieces reflect as well the middle-class reaction against the excesses of upper 
class and demonstrate in miniature the displacement of noble prerogative in government and 
society at large. At the same time that the Church was “[promoting] a great distaste for 
court life among the upright and squires, however loyal they were to the crown” (Rykwert 
35), an “aristocracy” of ministerial careerists was replacing the influence o f the aristocracy 
of blood upon the administration o f the kingdom, much as an “aristocracy” of the monied 
interests was supplanting the blooded aristocracy economically. Dryden’s challenge to 
aristocratic superintendence o f literature is arguably an extension of this society-wide 
reaction, and is undertaken on much the same terms, for it is essentially an ethical one. Are 
the patron classes fit overseers of the arts, particularly drama? Merely raising the question 
is significant, but Dryden (with others) goes further, “creating” a fashionable, but 
effectively powerless and easily despised social type, the debauched, profligate gentleman. 
In this, Dryden was perhaps more effective than earlier or contemporaneous portrayals of 
the type, for his Prologues and Epilogues could exhibit before the assembled playgoers 
living examples of the character, while helping to define that character and making it seem a 
fashionable, even enviable manner o f comportment However, Dryden’s moral critique 
was not an end in itself, but a means o f levering the patron classes out of their traditional 
aesthetic authority. Dryden’s prologues and epilogues were not his first forays into public 
poetry, but because of their frequent appearance and their recurrent themes were probably 
more effective toward this end—and toward establishing Dryden’s own authority as a 
public poet.
The stage in fact gave Dryden the chance to establish himself as an easily 
recognizable public persona. We must remember that as a professional playwright he had 
the stage to himself during much o f the 1660’s. This gave him a decade to learn and refine 
his craft before he met with any serious competition from younger playwrights; it also 
allowed him to emerge as readily marketable writer for his publishers, first Herringman 
then Tonson. Dryden’s commercial viability, on the stage and in print, in mm helped to
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accelerate the development o f publishing as a proper business, making writing itself a 
profession rather than an avocation for the amateur.
But to account fully for the particulars of Dryden’s rise to cultural authority and of 
his later fashioning into a cultural emblem for his age, we need to do more than recount his 
public displacement of existing social and literary authorities and his equally public 
assertion of his own aesthetic principles. For there is more involved here than the bare facts 
of Dryden’s life, and more at stake than one poet’s career. If as I have argued, Dryden’s 
rise as a public poet coincides with the rise of public poetry itself in England, we must 
examine how the medium, having emerged and found a powerful practitioner, operated 
upon public perception and imagination. In examining the uses to which that medium was 
put, we must examine likewise their ends and consequences. For in this instance ends and 
consequences are not at all equivalent Dryden and his contemporaries might have had 
nothing more in mind than promoting and justifying their personal and political ambitions, 
but what emerges from their poetry are competing patterns for the definition o f the age. 
This shows us how the public mode of poetry came to seize and shape social memory, but 
it shows us as well how that memory worked, demonstrates the possibilities o f a mode of 
memory that would soon split against itself and establish two rival modes, one emblematic, 
allusive, and collective, the other realistic, immediate, and in its individualism recognizably 
modern.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER m
POETRY AND MEMORY IN AUGUSTAN ENGLAND
1. Classical and Seventeenth-Centurv “Impact” Models o f Consciousness 
The preceding chapters have, I hope, set the groundwork for an examination of 
how, in practice, the hard-won cultural prominence of public poetry and public poets in the 
decades after the Restoration was turned to the shaping o f specific perceptions and 
definitions of the historical present Such an examination must, given the terms I have set 
forth in the Introduction of the present study, account for the literal and figurative 
mnemonic elements and techniques such poetry employs and their likely effects upon the 
collective consciousness. The middle sections of this chapter, accordingly, shall look into 
the uses to which imagery o f the Civil War (and Puritanism in particular) and of epic 
heroism are put in fashioning perceptions o f the Exclusion Crisis and the accession of 
James H, respectively. However, in order to account for the specific manner and matter of 
public poetry’s attempts to frame definitively the dynastic and constitutional struggles that, 
as it happened, continued to shape English national self-perception for the next century and 
a half, we must first understand something of how memory was thought to work in the 
latter half of the seventeenth century. We must give our attention to contemporary theories 
of memory, for whether they were conscious of it or not, Dryden and his fellow poets 
drew heavily upon these theories as they crafted their verse. Indeed, they could hardly 
avoid doing so: the historically self-conscious, essentially persuasive nature of Augustan 
public poetry forced it of necessity to incorporate much of both classical and current 
notions of the processes of memory and of the rhetorical ends toward which the creation of 
memory via these processes might be directed. And if the public poetry o f this period is in 
fact an apt medium for studying the development of social memory (particularly the divorce
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of the figurative and literal mnemonic modes), it is in part because this poetry shrewdly 
adapts existing models of human physiology, psychology, and intellection to the (esthetics 
of memory—that is, to those principles governing the configuring of imagery, rhythm, 
diction, and allusion, as well as narrative, thematic, and moral structures in the manner 
most likely to give a  definitive and easily retained “shape” to one’s experience both of the 
poem itself and of the moment in which the poem is read. Put another way, contemporary 
theories o f memory, based as they were upon little-understood operations of sensation and 
reflection and upon the still more obscure interactions between them, posited memory as at 
once a mechanistic process and an act of emblematic intellection, originating in physical and 
mental processes but a by-product of neither exclusively. Public poetry neatly embodies 
and exploits this seeming paradox; it would be fitting, therefore, to begin this chapter with 
an inquiry into the physiological and psychological components of memory: classical and 
contemporary models of their operations, their relation to the aesthetics of memory, and the 
practical consequences for public poetry of the seventeenth century.
We might expect to encounter a conundrum such as a mnemonic theory based 
simultaneously upon sensation and reflection during a period of such vast political, social, 
intellectual, and ecclesiastical transitions as transpired in seventeenth-century England. But 
in fact the seventeenth century inherited the paradox from the classical world with its 
rediscovery and “rehabilitation” of Greco-Roman models of the workings of perception and 
thought Of particular importance for the mechanistic explanations of human psychology 
characteristic of the seventeenth century were the materialist doctrines of Epicurus (341-271 
BC) as they were set forth in Lucretius’ On the Nature o f The Universe (c. 55 BC). That 
Lucretius’ cosmological poem enjoyed a second life during the century owed little to mere 
chance; the Middle Ages might have had little use for a philosophy that denied the existence 
of God, the immortality o f the soul, and the possibility of an afterlife, but Epicureanism’s 
rejection of metaphysics and superstition and its assertion that the senses and direct 
observation were the only sound foundation for knowledge and speculation were exactly
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attuned to the temperament of the new age of methodical scientific inquiry. This is not to 
argue that seventeenth-century materialism is precisely that variety expounded by Lucretius. 
Lucretian materialism holds, for instance, that it is through the senses alone that we acquire 
the most accurate, reliable knowledge of the world around us; reason, Lucretius declared, 
is more likely to be a source of misconstruction and error than of true understanding. 
Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke each rejected this notion, and gave reflection at least 
equal weight with perception. But Lucretius’ exposition o f the physiological basis of 
mental processes (including memory) seems to have been sufficiently compelling to have 
encouraged the development of similar models o f human thought and understanding during 
the seventeenth century: Hobbes and Locke retained Lucretius’ argument that reflection 
depended directly upon physical sensation, that thought was a mechanical operation. In 
Book IV of On the Nature o f Things Lucretius argues that our senses are triggered by “a 
sort of outer skin perpetually peeled off the outer surface of objects and flying about this 
way and that through the air” (131); the atoms o f these surface films incessantly strike our 
organs o f sense, conveying to us images, sounds, smells, and tastes. Each sense, 
Lucretius argues, operates much as does touch: what registers upon the eye, ear, nose and 
palate is the force, texture, and shape of the atoms that strike them. He demonstrates this by 
observing that when we handle a square object in the dark its squareness is conveyed to us 
by the impression of its shape upon our fingers; analogously, when we see the object in the 
light, the film that (supposedly) emanates from its surface retains its squareness and 
consequently strikes our eye “squarely.”1
Once the atoms of the surface films o f external objects have made impact with our 
organs of sense, they “set in motion the delicate substance of the mind within and there
1 By this reasoning we should, of course, be able to see in the dark, though it seems that visual films
need light to travel. Lucretius’ notion is not as far-fetched as it might seem, however, if we remember 
that though we see not the film  of an object, we neither see the object itself but the light reflected from 
its surface.
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provoke sensation” (153). Lucretius is vague about precisely how the mind is set in 
motion, but does assert that over time, the paths followed by these atoms as they make their 
way through to “the delicate substance of the mind” become established channels 
facilitating the entry of the particles of those films to which we are most regularly exposed. 
We are thus quite literally the products of our perceptions, o f our primary occupations and 
regular experiences, for sensation and the processes of mind it instigates physically alter the 
perceiver, predisposing him to the apprehension of certain images and hence certain 
patterns of thought and action. Thus, explains Lucretius, “Whatever employment has the 
strongest hold on our interest or has last filled our waking hours, so as to engage the 
mind’s attention, that is what seems most often to keep us occupied in sleep. Lawyers 
argue cases and frame contracts. Generals lead their troops into action. Sailors continue 
their pitched battle with the winds” (160). We are not mere automatons, slaves to our 
senses; as Lucretius delights in pointing out, we all too often recklessly ignore or 
misconstrue the information that our senses bring us. Yet it would be accurate to conclude 
that for Lucretius memory largely consists of those well-wom paths made by atoms as they 
make their way through to “the delicate substance of the mind.” For him, memory is very 
much a function of human physiology, as organic, as responsive to and as easily inscribed 
by the physical world as, say, our skin, the living parchment upon which are etched the 
stories of our years.
Lucretius’ seventeenth-century counterparts put more emphasis than he upon the 
mind’s ability to organize and reflect upon the perceptions it receives, but their materialism 
is strikingly similar to his own. Bacon, for instance, was highly doubtful o f the reliability 
of the senses, yet in De Dignitate et Augmemis Sciemiarum  (1623) calls it “the door of the 
intellect,” and with Lucretius asserts that “the images” o f the objects about us “fix 
themselves in the memory, and pass into it in the first instance entire as it were, just as they 
come. These the human mind proceeds to review and ruminate, and thereupon either 
simply rehearses them, or makes fanciful imitations of them, or analyzes and classifies
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them” (395). Bacon argues elsewhere that it is upon the methodical analysis and 
classification of these sensual impressions that our understanding depends, but note that, as 
in Lucretius' system, individual sensations directly impress themselves upon the memory, 
and, because the “images” themselves are impressed upon us “just as they come,” their 
particular shapes will in turn, it seems, physically shape our memories. In Bacon's system, 
as in Lucretius’, we are materially altered by experience. For Descartes, however, physical 
sensations have but a mediated access to our reflective faculties, and instead of impressing 
themselves directly upon them, they rather trigger the distinct mechanisms making up “the 
machine of our body” (27). In Articles 12, 13, and 16 of The Passions o f the Soul (1649), 
Descartes proposes that our nervous system consists of a spider’s web of tubes running 
from the brain throughout the body. These tubes contain the “animal spirits, which, carried 
by these same tubes from the brain to the muscles, cause the filaments therein to remain 
completely free and extended, in a such a way that the least thing that moves the part o f the 
body where the end of any of them is attached thereby makes the part of the brain it comes 
from move, in the same way in which, when we pull one end of a cord, we make the other 
move” (25). When the objects of our “external senses and of our internal appetites” excite 
these filaments, this occasions “some movement in our nerves, which passes to the brain 
by means of them” (26). What then registers on the brain is not the object itself or its 
image, but a replication of the motion it causes along our nerves. Sensation is thus the 
neurological analogue of its catalyst, etched upon the brain much as sound is registered 
upon the surface of a record by the pressure o f a phonograph needle.
Hobbes seems to have taken from Descartes the cues for his model of mechanical 
Man as well as his definition of sensation as nervous motion. In his introduction to 
Leviathan (1651), Hobbes asks rhetorically, “For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the 
Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the 
whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer?” (81). Whereas Lucretius is content to 
let the specific workings of his itinerant atoms upon the mind remain obscure, and
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Descartes’ system has recourse to the oblique workings of “animal spirits” Hobbes insists
upon explicating the precise operation of physical perception in purely mechanical terms:
The cause o f Sense, is the Extemall Body, or Object, which presseth the 
organ proper to each Sense, either immediatly, as in the Tast and Touch; or 
mediately, as in Seeing, Hearing, and Smelling: which pressure, by the 
mediation o f Nerves, and other strings, and membranes o f the body, 
continued inwards to the Brain, and Heart, causeth there a resistance, or 
counter-pressure, or endeavour of the heart, to deliver it self: which 
endeavour because Outward, seemeth to be some matter without And this 
seeming, or fancy, is that which men call Sense; and consisteth, as to the 
Eye, in a  Light, or Colour figured; To the Eare, in a Sound; To the Nostrill, 
in an Odour, To the Tongue and Palat, in a Savour, And to the rest of the 
body, in Heat, Cold, Hardnesse, Softnesse, and such other qualities, as we 
discern by Feeling. All which qualities called Sensible, are in the object that 
cause th them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it 
presseth our organs diversely (1,85-6).
As the last sentence o f this passage suggests, for Hobbes as for Descartes we apprehend
not the object in itself, but only those motions in our own organs of sense that its properties
trigger. The images created in our minds by these motions constitute Hobbes’s notion of
the imagination: “For after the object is removed, or the eye shut, wee still retain an image
of the thing seen, though more obscure than when we see i t  And this is it, the Latines call
Imagination, from the image made in seeing; and apply the same, though improperly, to all
the other senses” (2, 88). Because we apprehend not the object in itself, but its image, and
because that image is a record, not o f what we sense at precisely the present instant, but
what we have sensed (though but a fraction of a second ago), it follows that imagination is
an impression (again, quite literally) of what once was but is no longer, that is, of the past
Thus Hobbes may declare that imagination is memory, though he draws this distinction in
terminology: “This decaying sense, when wee would express the thing it self, (I mean
fancy it selfe,) wee call Imagination, as I said before: But when we would express the
decay, and signifie that the Sense is fading, old, and past, it is called Memory. So that
Imagination and Memory, are but one thing, which for divers considerations hath divers
names” (2, 89). Memory, then, is decaying sense (or sensation). Whatever we
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remember—in fact, whatever we can conceive of, however seemingly unprecedented or 
outlandish—has at some point been conveyed to our minds, in whole or compositely, by 
physical sensation. This assertion is important, for it allows Hobbes to distinguish his 
physiology from that o f the word-bound Schoolmen he attacks so frequently and with such 
gusto. These purveyors of received wisdom, Hobbes sneers, are so foolish as to suppose 
either “that Imaginations rise of themselves, and have no cause”; or that they are created by 
the will alone, independent of the senses; or are the implantations of good or evil spiritual 
beings (2, 93). Such explanations o f imagination and memory leave their processes 
obscure, presupposing that each is an unaccountable and ungovernable phenomenon. The 
importance for Hobbes of the distinction he makes is that the mind itself may be 
demystified and made an object of methodical inquiry. But we may observe as well that 
Hobbes’s mechanistic model, accounting for imagination and memory in a wholly 
physiological way, implies that the mechanisms of perception, and hence the formation of 
images and of memory, may be manipulated, which in turn makes possible the 
development of an art or science of shaping perception, and therefore of inducing certain 
patterns of imagining and remembering programmatically.
Hobbes leaves this only implied, but Locke, who likewise subscribes to a 
mechanistic model of perception, thought, and memory2, makes the point more overtly. In 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), Locke observes that it is by 
experience that the mind is able to translate bare perception of appearances into a 
understanding of what it really beholds. When, for instance, we are presented with “a 
round Globe, of any uniform colour,. . .  ’tis certain, that the Idea thereby imprinted in our 
Mind, is of a flat Circle variously shadow’d, with several degrees of Light and Brightness 
coming to our Eyes.” However, “the Judgment,” by “an habitual custom,” is able to alter
- In Book II. Chapter I of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ‘Of Ideas in General, and Their 
Original" (especially sections 3-4, 8, IS, and 22-25), Locke offers a less detailed version of Hobbes’s 
model.
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“the Appearances into their Causes.” That is, “having by use been accustomed to perceive,
what kind of appearance convex Bodies are wont to make in us; what alterations are made
in the reflections of Light, by the difference o f the sensible Figures of Bodies” (145), we
know the object to be a sphere and not a simple circle. Practice has so shaped our habits of
perception that we are able to distinguish an object of three dimensions from one o f only
two—and even to see in three dimensions when, as in a painting, we are shown only a
two-dimensional surface variously colored and shaded. To reinforce the point, Locke cites
“a jocose problem”3 posed him by his friend, the philosopher William Molyneux:
Suppose a Man bom blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to 
distinguish between a Cube, and a Sphere of the same metal, and nighly of 
the same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt one and t’ other, which is the 
Cube, which the Sphere. Suppose then the Cube and Sphere placed on a 
Table, and the Blind Man to be made to see. Quaere, Whether by his sight, 
before he touch’d them, he could now distinguish, and tell, which is the 
Globe, which the Cube (146).
Molyneux puts it to Locke that the man could not, having had no occasion to become
familiar with the interplay of light and color with distance, shape, perspective, and motion
that sighted people almost instinctively resolve into intelligible visual patterns. In other
words, before the newly sighted man can visually distinguish between the sphere and the
cube, he must learn how to see. And so must we all, throughout our lives. As Locke
concludes, “This [illustration] I have set down, and leave with my Reader, as an occasion
for him to consider, how much he may be beholding to experience, improvement, and
acquired notions, where he thinks, he has not the least use of, or help from them” (146).
Indeed, it is the possibility of manipulating perception and the ideas drawn from them that
underlies Locke's pedagogical theories, expounded in the highly influential Some Thoughts
Concerning Education (1690). Given the proper regimen, he declares there, the minds of
children, “as easily turned, this or that way, as water itself” (7), may be set “right, that on
3 William Molyneux to John Locke, March 2, 1692/3.
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all occasions it may be disposed to consent to nothing but what may be suitable to the 
dignity and excellency of a rational creature” (27).
2. Poetry and Physiological Memory in the Classical World 
We shall shortly return to Locke and explore more fully his particular notions of 
memory and their relation to the psychological (or intellectual) aspects of literary 
mnemonics. For the present, however, I would like to point out the significance of the 
“impact” or mechanical model of consciousness for the physiological aspects of what I 
have termed the aesthetics of memory. We may conclude, for instance, that if, as Lucretius 
and Hobbes imply and Locke openly asserts, perception in general is a  physical process 
subject to one’s physical circumstances, and as such may (through incidental stimuli, 
personal habit or occupation, or even deliberate method) take on distinctive patterns in its 
operations, it follows that an artist or author may with design so fashion his or her work as 
to achieve certain perceptual effects and thereby influence an audience’s memory of an 
event, personage, or the work itself. In short, theories of human physiology and its relation 
to memory can and in fact did find their way into principles governing poetic practice, both 
in the classical and early modem worlds. For though both ancients and modems commonly 
describe memory as a simple repository of images, experiences, and information,4 they 
acknowledge at least implicitly that memory is in fact an active agent in our moment-by- 
moment responses to the external world, constituting an assertive patterning of present 
physiological experience based on perceptual precedents and the expectations they instilled. 
Lucretius, for example, attributes optical illusions to “the mental assumptions which we
4 In his monumental The Anatomy o f Melancholy (1621; successive editions thereafter until 1651), 
Robert Burton even presumes to have found the locus of memory; “The fourth creek behind the head is 
common to the cerebel, or little brain, and the marrow of the backbone, the last and most solid of all 
the rest, which receives the animal spirits from the other ventricles, and conveys them to the marrow in 
the back, and is the place where they say the memory is seated" (I, 154). (Significantly, even here 
memory is held to reside at the conjunction of the areas of intellection and instinct.)
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ourselves superimpose, so that things not perceived by the senses pass for perceptions’' 
(144), and argues that when presented with a multitude o f images the mind prepares itself 
to see what it is used to seeing: “You must have noticed how even our eyes, when they set 
out to look at inconspicuous objects, make an effort and prepare themselves; otherwise it is 
not possible for us to perceive distinctly” (155). Hobbes, who declares of sense and 
memory that they “are but knowledge o f Fact, which is a thing past, and irrevocable” (5, 
115), nevertheless defines the active faculty of prudence as a reliance upon past experience 
(5, 117). And Locke, describing memory as “the Store-house o f our Ideas” (II, x, 150), a 
bit later says that “in an intellectual Creature, [it] is necessary in the next degree to 
Perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our Faculties 
are in a great measure useless” (153). Indeed, if memory were not acknowledged to be an 
operative rather than merely passive agent, it would have been impossible to devise many 
of the precepts of poetic theory that classical authors and their seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
century inheritors accepted as commonplaces.
To speak first o f the classical world, the Greeks and Romans derived three sets of 
such precepts from the “impact” model’s principle that the greater the force with which 
physical stimuli strike the organs of sense the greater and more lasting the impression made 
upon the mind. Conveniently, each set may be related to particular sensations. The first has 
to do with sound and movement, of all physical sensations the best conveyed in poetry 
because poetry itself has sonance and rhythm. Unlike other tools of poetic effect, such as 
imagery or metaphor or allusion, the effect of sound and rhythm upon the audience is truly 
physiological. The spoken word is a composite of distinctly physical properties: volume, of 
course, but also pitch, duration, and speed; when words are strung together in a poetic line, 
these properties combine to create rhythms which, whether simple and regular or complex 
and variable, are readily assimilated into the body’s own. The poet thus has at least a 
chance of sufficiently replicating, say, the ringing of sword upon shield or the roar of 
winds at storm, the tramping of a marching army or the pitch and roll of ships at sea, to
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give us the illusion that their noise and motion are what we are actually experiencing as the 
poet’s voice rises and halls and our bodies sway this way and that, go rigid or give way in 
response to the intonations of his verse. For Lucretius, the speaker (or poet) could expect 
to closely approximate a one-to-one correspondence of sound to the action it represents. 
When he calls the tongue “the craftsman o f words” (147), he means for us to take him 
literally: the tongue in speech carves up the air into a  succession of discrete, distinct shapes 
that strike the ear and impress meaning upon the mind according to their particular 
configuration.
It is important, therefore, that the poet strive for harmony of sound and rhythm to 
action. But the mechanical operation of aural and kinesthetic stimuli upon the human 
physique also compels the poet to achieve a similar harmony of sound to sound and motion 
to motion within the descriptive or dramatic passage itself. As Horace observes o f the 
psyche in his On the Art o f Poetry (1st century BC), “[N jature has so formed us that we 
first fee l inwardly any change in ourfortunes; it is she that cheers us or rouses us to anger, 
she that torments us and bows us to the ground with a heavy burden of sorrow, and it is 
only afterwards that she expresses these feelings in us by means of the tongue” (83; 
emphasis added). We feel, says Horace, and feel fully, before we achieve that slight 
psychological distance that allows us to express what we feel. Therefore, the poet who 
would, like a skillful musician, modulate our affective responses according to his 
inflections of sound and rhythm, must take care not to disrupt the overall continuity of 
effect by varying the sensory effects of his verse too abruptly or by yoking together 
elements that call forth essentially antithetical responses. This resulting clash of affections 
allows the audience to reflect on what it hears before the sounds and rhythm can insinuate 
themselves into the sensibilities of its members—exposing the poet’s craft, destroying the 
sought-after effect, and leaving the audience suspicious both of the poet’s skill and his 
trustworthiness. Such, says Cicero in De Oratore, is the fate of the rhetorician, musician, 
or poet who, neglecting “the science of numbers and measures,” makes a sound “too short
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by contraction, or too long by extension”: “For all men, by a kind of tacit sense, without 
any art or reasoning, can form a judgement o f what is right and wrong in art and reasoning; 
and as they do this with regard to pictures, statues, and other works,. . .  so they display 
this faculty much more in criticising words, numbers, and sounds of languages, because 
these powers are inherent in our common senses” (III, 1,250). As easily as we are moved 
“not only by words artfully arranged, but also by numbers and the sounds of the voice,” 
the more easily still will the mismanagement o f these make “whole theatres burst into 
exclamations” (250). For much the same reason, argues Longinus in On the Sublime (mid- 
lst century BC), low-sounding words must not be suddenly inteijected into swelling 
phrases or elevated passages; the ear would be as offended by the incongruity as would the 
eye if, as it surveyed a room filled with a vast array of glittering treasures, suddenly fell 
upon “paltry bags and sacks”: “Well, in the same way the untimely introduction of [low 
diction] as it were disfigures and debases the description” (155). And if the metrical sway 
of a passage does not suit its material, or if it is so crudely managed as to conflict with 
those rhythms to which an audience has become accustomed, the result, notes Longinus, is 
disastrous: “Where the sublime is concerned,” he declares, “nothing has so debasing an 
effect as broken or agitated rhythms, such as pyrrhics, trochees, and dichorees, which drop 
right down to the level of dance-music. For all over-rhythmical styles are at once felt to be 
cheap and affected; the monotonous jingle seems superficial, and does not penetrate our 
feelings” (153; emphasis added).
That a writer on the sublime would descend to proscribing certain metrical patterns 
out of hand, or that Horace, without a trace of irony, could endorse the use of spondee in 
the first foot of a line but not in the second or fourth foot (88), might strike us as quaintly 
fastidious or simply absurd. But we must remember that as the final phrase of the 
preceding paragraph suggests, for classical sstheticians our physical experience of a poem 
must fully possess us if we are to arrive at an emotional, intellectual, and moral 
appreciation of its passions, beauties, and tuition. As Longinus explains in Chapter 39 of
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On the Sublime, “Composition, or Disposition of Material,” “[Mien find in a harmonious
arrangement of sounds, not only a natural medium o f persuasion and pleasure, but also a
marvellous instrument of grandeur and passion” (ISO). This being the case, the poet during
composition simply cannot afford to neglect even the minutest, most esoteric considerations
of sound and meter that might bear upon the impact of a line upon the senses o f his
auditors, or that might allow him to better match the disposition of his poem's aural and
kinesthetic properties to their physiological constitution:
Now composition [Longinus admonishes] is a kind of harmony of the 
words which are implanted in man a t his birth, and which affect not his 
hearing alone, but his very soul, and it is my belief that it brings out 
manifold patterns of words, thoughts, deeds, beauty, and melody, all of 
them originally bom and bred in us; moreover, by the blending of its myriad 
tones it brings into the hearts of the bystanders the actual emotion of its 
speaker, and always induces them to share it; and finally it builds up an 
accumulation of phrases into a grand and harmonious structure (150-151).
Longinus takes it for granted that the speaker should seem to have an emotional
stake in the poem and that the audience should partake of the poet’s passion, but he stands
upon good authority. Some three centuries earlier, Aristotle had declared in his Poetics that
“those who can actually make themselves feel the relevant emotions will be the most
convincing—agitation or rage will be most vividly reproduced by one who is himself
agitated or in a passion” (55)5. Such a poet will be most convincing because by “[keeping 1
the scene before his eyes” and “seeing everything very vividly, as though he were himself
an eyewitness o f the events, he will find what is appropriate, and will be least likely to
overlook inconsistencies” (54). That is, the poet who can match his emotions to the scenes
he relates will be able to recognize and discard those elements that might detract from an
audience’s sense that it, too, beholds what it hears. But he will be convincing as well
because by keeping the scene before his eyes he will be the better able to re-create for
5 Cf. Horace: “ff you want to move us to tears, you must first feel grief yourself” (On the Art ofPoetrv, 
82).
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himself an immediate experience of the poem’s settings, events, and personages—that is, 
o f the circumstances of physical perception that, according to the impact model, underlie 
his own emotional involvement in the poem’s action. The more complete this re-creation is, 
the greater the poet’s chances to resolve the central difficulty in any work of literature (or 
for that matter, of any effort at verbal communication), namely, rendering in the sounds 
and rhythms o f language sensations and experiences that are neither aural nor rhythmic— 
translating, one might say, from certain modes of perception into others. For one of the 
great ironies of poetry as a vehicle of communication, tuition, or delight is that though its 
physical medium is sound, its appeal is primarily visual, and it is upon his ability to 
translate sound into image that the poet’s success in making the audience believe itself to be 
firsthand witnesses to the poem’s world largely depends.6 As Aristotle’s admonishment 
that the poet “keep the scene before his eyes” and “[see] everything very vividly, as though 
he were himself an eyewitness of the events” would suggest, the classical world accepted 
as truistic the affective primacy of visual perception, whether actual or imagined. The mind.
6 This is true whether a poem is rendered orally or in print, read aloud or silently to oneself, though as 
we might expect, it is easier to “[bring] into the hearts of the bystanders the actual emotion of its 
speaker” when a poem is recited, composed impromptu, or read aloud. For one thing, spoken poetry is 
communal. A living audience gives its attention to a living speaker, and because of this the speaker’s 
choice of topic and supporting detail, his manner of delivery, and the persona he seeks to establish are 
subject to what he imagines to be the collective knowledge, expectations, and disposition of those 
gathered before him. Further, the conventions of certain genres may require an audience to answer or aid 
the speaker, as in responsive prayers, or ballads with regular refrains—or an audience may participate 
spontaneously, as when, for instance, the speaker arrives at a familiar passage in the narrative. 
Performance in itself, therefore, tends to draw speaker and audience together, and thereby is the more 
likely to allow an audience to experience the emotional state of the performer. As Longinus observes in 
Chapter 26 of On the Sublime, Variations of Person, or Personal Address,” “When you seem to be 
addressing, not the whole audience, but a single member of it . . . you will affect him more 
profoundly, and make him more attentive and full of active interest, if you rouse him by these appeals 
to him personally” (135). But if we allow that performance enhances an audience’s experience of a 
poem by encouraging an identification with its performer, we must observe as well that it is mainly 
the visual element of live performance that brings this about. During performance, the speaker’s facial 
expressions and body movements almost inevitably reinforce the intonations of his voice and often 
mimic the action his words describe, helping an audience form a succession of mental images apropos 
of the poem’s storyline and characters. This may be merely an advantage of performance: for even when 
we read silently and in solitude, we find that the words before us escape the narrow confines of their 
bare significations to sound in the mind's ear and move before the mind’s eye. But even so, the 
advantage provided by performance demonstrates the general rule that the more completely an audience 
believes itself immersed in the world of the poem, the more likely it will be to share “the actual 
emotion of its speaker.'’
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says Horace, “is less actively stimulated by what it takes in through the ear than by what is 
presented to it through the trustworthy agency of the eyes” (85). Or even, one might add, 
the agency of the mind's eye. Ironically, though an audience really does hear the sounds 
that reach its ear from the poet's lips, and only thinks it sees those images the poet himself 
only pretends to see, even this imagined or figurative sight leaves such deep, vivid 
impressions upon our consciousness that for the purposes o f rhetoric and memory no other 
sense can be employed with greater efficiency or to greater effect This may be because 
visual apprehension, even when a product o f the mind’s suggestibility, is seemingly 
immediate and complete, whereas the truly physical properties of language embody 
abstractions that must be “decoded” to be understood. Whatever the reason, for the Greeks 
and Romans visual rather than aural or rhythmic cues provided the most expedient means 
of merging the actual world of the poet and audience with the fictional one they seek to 
share.
When we note, therefore, that the second set of poetic principles derived from the 
impact model has to do with re-creating as fully as possible for the audience an immediate 
physical experience of the world of the poem, we should note as well that these principles 
are primarily concerned with the poet’s management of the poem’s “visual” elements.
We might observe further the close theoretical parallels between the poet’s craft in 
managing these visual elements and that o f the practitioners of the so-called art of memory, 
believed to have been invented by the Greek poet Simonides (556-468 BC). As its name 
implies, the art of memory as practiced from classical antiquity through the Middle Ages 
consisted of methodizing recollection in order to facilitate the retention and retrieval of large 
amounts o f information. Used primarily by rhetoricians and scholars, the discipline of 
“mnemotechnics” consisted of assigning what one wished to remember—facts, ideas, even 
individual sentences and words—to certain emblematic figures (or images), then 
associating each of these figures to a particular place (or loci) within a larger spatial 
arrangement (buildings and public areas were popular). Once the information had been
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assigned its images, and these images their places, one could then at any time retrieve the
facts or ideas one had committed to memory by merely “walking” from site to site in one’s
imagined building or common. “We have to think o f the ancient orator as moving in
imagination through his memory building whilst he is making his speech,” observes
Frances Yates, describing the process in The A n  o f Memory (1966), “drawing from the
memorised places the images he has placed on them” (3). In effect, one “read” the layout of
the emblems as one might read a page of text The method might strike us as cumbersome,
requiring us to remember as it were in triplicate, but those adept at it could with ease
commit to memory any amount o f information, even lengthy speeches and exhaustive
taxonomies. And though the method concerned itself at least as much with fashioning
fictional places and scenarios within which to couch memory as it did with preserving in
the mind what one had actually experienced, it could be successfully employed only so
long as one could revivify the actual or likely physical sensations of being personally
present Here again, the ability to re-create one’s visual perceptions was held by the
classical framers o f the art o f memory—among them, the anonymous author of Ad
Herennium (c. 86-82 BC), Cicero, and Quintilian—to be particularly important As Cicero
explains in De oratore (46 BC),
Simonides, or whoever else invented the ait, wisely saw, that those things 
are the most strongly fixed in our minds, which are communicated to them, 
and imprinted upon them, by the senses; that o f all the senses that o f seeing 
is the most acute; and that, accordingly, those things are most easily retained 
in our minds which we have received from the hearing or the 
understanding, if they are also recommended to the imagination by means of 
the mental eye; so that a kind of form, resemblance, and representation 
might denote invisible objects, and such as are in their nature withdrawn 
from the cognizance of the sight, in such a manner, that we are scarcely 
capable of comprehending by thought we may retain as it were by the aid of 
the visual faculty (187-8).
Significantly, Cicero’s near-contemporary, Longinus, makes a similar point in Chapter 15
of On the Sublime, “Imagery and the Power of the Imagination.” For the purposes of
rhetoric or poetry, he claims, so superior is the image to the word that though the latter may
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convince the hearer, the former “actually masters him”; when, for instance, images are used 
to dress out argument, “in all such cases our ears always, by some natural law, seize upon 
the stronger element, so that we are attracted away from the demonstration of fact to the 
startling image, and the argument lies below the surface o f  the accompanying brilliance" 
(124). If the assumptions about human cognition underlying the art of memory roughly 
correspond to those informing the craft o f  poetic composition, it is because both 
rhetoricians and poets work toward analogous ends: imposing upon their minds and the 
minds o f their audiences the images of things unseen or unseeable for the purpose of 
shaping understanding—that is, working memory—or o f fashioning it wholesale, 'from 
scratch.” After all, argues Longinus, the aim of the poet is to produce a work that will 
please “all men at all times": “For a piece is truly great only if it can stand up to repeated 
examination, and if it is difficult, or, rather, impossible to resist its appeal, and it remains 
firmly and ineffaceably in the memory” (107).
The rules governing the use of images in the art o f memory, then, provide us with a 
useful backdrop for examining similar rules guiding the poet during composition. Though 
we might note any number o f minute likenesses between rhetorical and poetic prescriptions 
regarding imagery, three are o f particular note. The first derives directly from the familiar 
notion that the greater the (literal) impact o f the image upon the eye, the greater the 
impression made upon the mind, and, consequently, the more likely the image and its 
associations will be retained. The best images, therefore, are those that startle by reason of 
their intensity and their marked deviation from the commonplace. As the author of Ad 
Herennium , the earliest surviving Latin treatise on the art of memory, explains to his 
pupils, “ordinary things easily slip from the memory while the striking and the novel stay 
longer in the mind”: we foil to remember the “petty, ordinary, and banal” experiences of 
everyday existence “because the mind is not being stirred by anything novel or marvellous. 
But if we see or hear something exceptionally base, dishonourable, unusual, great, 
unbelievable, or ridiculous, that we are likely to remember for a long time” (qtd. in Yates.
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9). The images we choose to represent the ideas we would remember may be easily 
retained, the author of Ad Herennium  continues, “if  we establish similitudes [between idea 
and image] as striking as possible; if we set up images that are not many or vague but active 
[that is, figures engaged in some physical activity]; if we assign to them exceptional beauty 
or singular ugliness,” provide them with distinct ornamentation, or, in contrast, “if  we 
somehow disfigure them” or assign to them “certain comic effects” (qtd. in Yates, 10). Of 
these instructions Yates observes, “Our author has clearly got hold of the idea of helping 
memory by arousing emotional affects through these striking and unusual images, beautiful 
or hideous, comic or obscene” (10). The affective power of the vivid image lies in its 
immediacy, its ability to trigger in us instinctive responses to what is pleasing, painful, or 
ridiculous. In this respect, the operation of images upon our sensibilities is similar to that of 
the sounds and rhythms of speech: all three engage us bodily, provoke us viscerally, 
prompt in us feelings of repulsion or attraction that for the moment escape rational scrutiny. 
Noting that the aim of imagery [in poetry] is “to work upon the feelings,” Longinus 
unapologetically advises poets to exploit the provocative power of imagery. In fact, he 
defines “image” not as we usually define things, by comparing it to something similar, but 
according to its effects. Thus for Longinus “image” denotes not merely “the representation 
of mental pictures,” but the sum of its effects: “the word is applied to passages in which, 
carried away by your feelings, you imagine you are actually seeing the subject of your 
description, and enable your audience as well to see it” (121). Such a passage, he says, 
might be found in Book Fifteen of The Iliad, when Homer compares Hector’s ferocious 
assault on the Greek lines to a tempest about to rend a hapless ship: “And he fell upon them 
like a wave which, swollen by the stormwinds beneath the lowering clouds, bursts 
furiously over a hurrying ship. And the ship is all lost in foam, and the terrifying blast 
roars in the sail, and the souls of the crew are seized with a fearful shuddering, for barely
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can they slip out from under the clutch o f death.”7 Homer has not only captured in his 
images the terror of the Greeks, but conveys their terror to his audience by giving it the 
picture o f what it knows well and most dreads; he has, says Longinus, ‘ supremely well 
pictured the disaster and all but stamped on the diction the very image o f the danger* (116; 
emphasis added).
Longinus’ reflexive yoking of image and diction demonstrates yet again the poet’s 
need to render what is visual in terms o f  sound and rhythm. But it also points up an 
important difference in the use of imagery in the art o f memory and in the composition of 
effective poetry. The mnemotechnician, after all, does not concern himself with diction, for 
he has no need to articulate publicly the images he fashions. They are, rather, personal 
means to a public end, and though used to keep ideas coming to mind and words rolling off 
the tongue, need not be—and probably should not be—exhibited to the orator’s audience. 
The images the rhetorician employs, therefore, may be bizaire, extravagant, and darkly 
arcane, so long as they serve their purpose. Consider, for example, the mnemonic image 
the author of Ad Herennium suggests might be used by a  defense lawyer to remember the 
facts of a case in which one man is accused of poisoning another in order to come into an 
inheritance:
We shall imagine the man [the victim] in question as lying ill in bed, if we 
know him personally. If we do not know him, we shall yet take some one 
to be our invalid, but not a man of the lowest class, so that he may come to 
mind at once. And we shall place the defendant at the bedside, holding in 
his right hand a cup, in his left, tablets, and on the fourth finger, a ram’s 
testicles. In this way we can have in memory the man who was poisoned, 
the witnesses, and the inheritance (qtd. in Yates, 11).
As Yates explains, “The cup would remind of the poisoning, the tablets, o f the will or the
inheritance, and the testicles o f the ram through verbal similarity with testes—of the
7 Cf. Robert Fitzgerald’s translation (1974) of these lines: “[H]e plunged / the way a billow whipped up 
by a gale / beneath dark scud descends upon a ship, / and she is hidden stem to stem in foam, /  as a 
great gust of wind howls in the sail and sailors shake in dread; by a hair's breadth / are they delivered 
from their death at sea." I use Dorsch’s prose rendering of this passage because it is the more visually 
vivid of the two, and thus gives us a better sense of what Longinus claims to admire in it.
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witnesses” (11). It is difficult to imagine the circumstances under which a poet might 
cobble together such an image for the instruction or delight of his audience. In fact, in Ars 
Poetica Horace explicitly warns against using outlandish imagery—and for the very 
reasons that the author of Ad Herennium recommends it: its deviation from the ordinary 
and reliance on personal association. “Supposing,” Horace begins, “a painter chose to put a 
human head on a horse’s neck, or to spread feathers o f various colours over the limbs of 
several creatures, or to make what in the upper part is a beautiful woman tail off into a 
hideous fish, could you help laughing when he showed you his efforts? You may take it 
from me, my friends, that a  book will have very much the same effect as these pictures if, 
like a sick man’s dreams, the author’s idle fancies assume such a shape that it is impossible 
to make head or tail of what he is driving at” (79). The poet, unlike the mnemotechnician, 
must render his images publicly, for an audience that has no access to his thoughts or the 
experiences they emblematize; consequently, the poet must fashion a poem’s images from a 
pool of communally shared notions, impressions, and experiences; the poem’s images 
must recall to the audience what it is already likely to know; therefore, though they must be 
vivid and evocative, they must also be drawn from life and readily intelligible, their 
signification self-evident
Keeping in mind this distinction between the private and public uses of imagery, we 
might observe that artificial memory and poetry share a  second principle in its governance. 
If an image is to be perceived as if  it were experienced personally, it must (as we have 
seen) be made to have an immediate visceral impact upon the viewer; if it is also to be 
invested with meaning, it must distort everyday experience in a way that transports the 
perceiver into what is in effect a new world, a world whose contrasts with the old throw 
the characteristics of both into greater relief and allow for intuitive, potentially instructive 
comparisons between the two. The power of the distorting image relies not so much upon 
an overt attempt to persuade or to appeal to the reason, as upon its ability to circumscribe 
and focus the attention of the viewer upon certain complexes of visual sensations suddenly
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intensified. In Homer’s description of Hector’s assault on the Greek lines, for example, the 
swelling sea, the angry clouds, the sails stretched to bursting with the roaring winds, the 
waves clutching at the sailors as if  to crush them, only just thwarted by the slender, 
battered gunwales—these images are affective enough in combination, capable of instilling 
real terror in the minds o f a sea-faring people (or anyone who has seen the ocean when it is 
restless). Homer’s careful selection of visual detail makes us feel what it is to be at the 
mercy of a tempest, but after a  moment we remember that this composite of images depicts 
not a storm, but a man raging at the utter limits of human fury. Hector is no longer a mortal 
warrior, but a  force o f nature infinitely more powerful than any human agent, even an 
entire army, could ever be: the puissance of the Greeks is diminished at least as much as 
Hector’s is magnified; the Greek lines are as helpless before the Trojan hero as a low-slung 
barque before the wrath of Neptune. The concentrated intensification of visual impressions 
thus leads us to extend our belief in the “reality” o f what we think we see (the storm’s 
imminent destruction o f our ship) to what is patently fantastic (an entire army cowering 
before the rush of a single man), giving us access to a world very different from our own, 
one whose heroes we may emulate—but only so long as we believe in them.
Not surprisingly, the disciplines o f artificial memory and poetry emphasize different 
aspects of this distortion. If Homer’s images, vivid as they are, use our own experiences of 
storms to excite our suggestibility, to “fill out” the likeness he draws, those offered us by 
the author o f Ad Herrenium  startle by their narrow specificity: “[W|e shall place the 
defendant at the [murdered man’s] bedside, holding in his right hand a cup, in his left, 
tablets, and on the fourth finger, a ram’s testicles.” Vivid as the image is, there is little here 
to work upon the imagination, for the combination of images defies our everyday 
experience. But whereas the mnemotechnician uses the fantastic to recall the banal, the poet 
must slightly distort the everyday to suggest the extraordinary. It is a  difficult thing to 
attempt, for one must strike a fine balance between making a strong impression and 
remaining intelligible, between exciting surprise and delight and lapsing into the
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extravagant and ridiculous. When the balance has been struck, we say with Horace that that 
poet has been “true to life” (91), has “as an imitative artist” looked “to human life and 
character for his models” (90). In other words, the poet has held the mirror up to nature, 
achieved an oft-prescribed mimetic ideal8. Yet at the same time we know the poet has 
achieved no such thing: once human or physical nature is distorted (whether exalted or 
debased), made figurative for the purposes o f representation, not it but something other 
than absolute realism becomes the poet’s model. This might lead us to view the mimetic 
ideal as self-contradictory or even hypocritical, or tease us into embracing a self-indulgent 
expressivism o f the kind that Horace deplored9. But if the world we know is to be 
apprehended, it must be distorted, if ever-so-slightly, as when our attention is directed 
toward certain parts of it and away from others; and if the poet is to conduct us to worlds 
far different from our own, we must be made capable of seeing and accepting the figurative 
truth of emblematic reality, of what might be and what the possible points to beyond itself. 
For in poetry, the truth is what we are prepared to believe, and mimeticism, rightly 
conceived, has more to do with affect than representation. When the poet makes us believe 
in the images imposed upon us, our belief is genuine enough, and our visceral and 
emotional reactions to what we think we see are no less real or true than they would be if 
we were actually seeing it. The truly mimetic image is that which calls forth physiological 
and psychological responses that match the context of its presentation. It is therefore beside
8 Longinus: “For art is perfect only when it looks like nature, and again, nature hits the mark only when 
she conceals the art that is within her” (Chapter 22, “Hyperbaton, or Inversion,” 131).
9 Of those who neglect the rules of poetry, Horace writes, “If I have not the ability and skill to adhere to 
these well-defined functions and styles of poetic forms, why should I be hailed as a poet? Why out of 
false shame should I prefer to remain ignorant rather than to learn my craft?” (82). Unfortunately, lack 
of real skill does not discourage the impertinent amateur from competing with the professional poet: 
“A man who does not understand the games keeps away from the weapons of the Campus Martins, and 
if he has no skill with the ball or quoit or hoop, he stands quietly aside so that the crowds round the 
side-lines will not roar with laughter at his expense; yet the man who knows nothing about poetry has 
the audacity to write it  And why not? he says. He is his own master, a man of good family, and above 
all he is rated as a knight in wealth and there is nothing against him” (92).
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the point to ask if the poet has captured reality raw and whole; to demand as much would 
soon lead us to a sterile literalism that would leave unsated what Longinus terms an innate 
appetite for “the extraordinary, the great, and the beautiful,” the fulfillment of which 
constitutes “the purpose of our creation”! 146). If, as Longinus says, “the poets display a 
good deal of romantic exaggeration, and everywhere exceed the bounds of credibility” 
(123), it is because “in literature, as I have said, we look for something transcending the 
human” (148); if “men hold cheap what is useful and necessary, and always reserve their 
admiration for what is out of the ordinary” (147), it is because nature “has implanted in our 
souls an inconquerable passion for all that is more divine than ourselves” (146).
Dependent as they are upon context, the arrangement of images in a poem, their 
“spatial” relation to one another and their thematic relation to their narrative setting, is 
nearly as important as their individual capacity to stimulate us visually and (thereby) excite 
our sensibilities. For as the practitioners of artificial memory discovered, we remember 
more reliably, more completely when our images make up a pattern than when they exist 
singly, independent of a  larger configuration. Quintilian makes this point when he explains 
the need to locate one’s mnemonic images within a spatial scheme, such as a house, public 
building, roadway, city scape, or picture, sufficiently familiar and stable in its features to be 
easily retained, recalled, and mentally negotiated at any given time. Describing the 
placement of images in a house, for instance, he recommends, “The first thought is placed, 
as it were, in the forecourt; the second, let us say, in the living-room; the remainder are 
placed in due order all round the impluvium, and entrusted not merely to bedrooms and 
parlours, but even to the care of statues and the like. This done, as soon as the memory of 
the facts requires to be revived, all these places are visited in turn and the various deposits 
are demanded from their custodians, as the sight o f  each recalls the respective details” (XI, 
ii, 20; 223). The successful arrangement of images, moreover, heightens the sensation that 
we have actually returned in person to a certain place. What Quintilian observes of actual 
locales—“[W|hen we return to a place after a considerable absence, we not merely
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recognise the place itself, but remember things that we did there, and recall the persons 
whom we met and even the uttered thoughts which passed through our minds when we 
were there before" (XI, ii, 17; 221)—might also be said of well-realized mental lo c i, and 
in fact is the very rationale underlying the use o f memory houses. The foregoing 
discussion, however, should encourage us to note as well that a skillful disposition of the 
architecture of memory might allow us to intensify or in some way manipulate our 
experience of the place, thus making the figurative place itself, as Quintilian observes of the 
literal place, emblematic of a larger complex of feelings and associations, enabling it 
thereby to bear not just mnemonic but iconographic weight as well.
The third ssthetic principle relating to vision, then, requires that the arrangement of 
images in a  poem be sufficiently striking, coherent, and durable as an arrangement to make 
it readily retrievable and reviewable over an indefinite period of time.
In this, the poet is aided by a quality almost unique to visual impressions: the ability 
to be recalled and reconstituted in the mind long after the initial sensation has passed. We 
cannot smell, taste, or touch in the imagination; we cannot reimpose upon the mind the 
initial impressions made by scents, tastes, and textures. A random smell may trigger vivid, 
specific memories, but none o f these senses is properly figurative, because as none may be 
excited in the absence of actual, immediate sensation, none may be conveyed from one 
person to another, from poet to audience; it is impossible therefore for what we smell, 
taste, or touch to represent in any practical way something beyond itself. In short, these 
senses have no language and thus cannot express abstractions. Sound can not only convey 
the abstractions of speech but approximate those of vision as well. Thus it is that we can 
only hear and see what we are not at the moment experiencing. In our imaginations we may 
replay a speaker’s harangue or a movement from a Mozart symphony, walk through the 
rooms of our childhood homes, conjure up the faces of those long absent, or even see what 
we could never expea to see in nature: according to Lucretius, the films shed by the famil­
iar objects about us remain in the mind and may combine there, producing “the composite
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shapes of Centaurs and Mermaids and dogs with as many heads as Cerberus, and 
phantoms of the dead whose bones lie in the embrace of earth (153).10 But though both 
hearing and sight may be produced in the mind long after the initial sensation has passed or 
even in the total absence of visual or aural sensation, that which we have seen is more 
easily and more fully recoverable in the imagination than what we have heard. As Ong 
observes, “All sensation takes place in time, but sound has a  special relationship to time 
unlike that of the other fields that register in human sensation. Sound exists only when it is 
going out of existence. It is not simply perishable but essentially evanescent, and it is 
sensed as evanescent When I pronounce the word ‘permanence,’ by the time I get to the 
nence,’ the ‘perma-’ is gone, and has to be gone” (31-32). Sight by contrast having light 
as its medium, registers not merely degrees o f brightness and dimness but those physical 
properties that exist independently o f light: space, dimension, motion, and (consequently) 
time. Thus as persons, landscapes, and events pass before the mind’s eye in our 
imaginations or dreams, we are aware that time is passing, even though mental and actual 
time often have no close correlation. The properties of visual perception thus give visual 
memory an advantage over the merely aural, for they allow us to insert ourselves more 
fully into what our minds have retained, into what the practitioners of artificial memory 
conceived of as a living, panoramic train of past experiences.
The properties of visual memory in fact prompted mnemotechnicians to compare 
their art to painting, and apply to it some of the same standards. In one place o f his De 
or at ore, Cicero compares the placement of mnemonic images in the mind to the inscription 
of characters or symbols upon a blank tablet or canvas; in another, he likens the orator’s 
practice of committing speeches to memory by “transfenfing] from particulars to generals,
10 Hobbes terms this “compounded imagination": “as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a 
horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure. So when a man compoundeth the image of his 
own person, with the image of the actions of an other man; as when a man imagins himself a 
Hercules, or an Alexander. . .  it is a compounded imagination, and properly but a Fiction of the mind" 
(I, u, 89).
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and [taking] the idea of an entire sentence from the symbol of a single word, to “the manner 
and method of any skillful painter, who distinguishes spaces by the variety of what he 
depicts” (188). The disposition of die materials of memory must be as considered as that of 
shapes and figures in a graphic work if they are to be as useful, as coherently emblematic 
and as unified in effect The same principle was applied to the fashioning and arrangement 
of poetic images in the classical world, based upon a similar analogy with painting. Indeed, 
so closely was poetry identified with its sister art in the classical world that literary theorists 
were all but incapable of discussing their discipline without resorting to the language of 
painting and even applying to poetry the criteria by which one would assess its equivalent 
in paint, whether a landscape, portrait, or historical subject. The most famous and 
influential likening of poetry to painting (but only the most famous and influential) is 
Horace’s declaration in Ars Poerica, “Ut pictura poesis”: “A poem is like a painting: the 
closer you stand to this one the more it will impress you, whereas you have to stand a good 
distance from that one; this one demands a  rather dark corner, but that one needs to be seen 
in full light, and will stand up to the keen-eyed scrutiny of the art-critic; this one only 
pleased you the first time you saw it, but that one will go on giving pleasure however often 
it is looked at” (91).
From the terms of Horace’s comparison we can observe that painting is more aptly 
likened to poetry than to artificial memory. As I have noted above, painting and poetry are 
both primarily public in nature, whereas the art o f memory is a personal tool for private 
retention and recollection. Thus what Horace takes to be the shared characteristics of the 
best painting and poetry—that both make an immediate impression upon the viewer; that 
both may withstand, even in “full light,” the close scrutiny of informed critics; and that 
both please indefinitely—are largely a function of the public audience he assumes for both. 
But they are also a logical result of a more basic and potentially problematic assumption, 
that the visual element of poetry must be the near equivalent of that in painting. If we may 
judge from the number of visual metaphors in Ars Poetica, for Horace the poet’s “eye”
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must be as developed as his “ear," and the equal o f any painter’s. Consider, for example, 
his observation in this passage that certain paintings impress11 one when viewed close-up, 
in full light, while others must be seen from a distance or in shadow. We should note first 
that the painting must impress us—a seemingly obvious thing for a work of art to do, but if 
a painting is to have a real chance o f making a pleasing (literal) impression upon our 
senses, we must be able to see it in sharp detail and see it fully. That is, the better painting 
does not work upon us by intimation or reveal its secrets by degrees, but provides an 
impression that derives its force from its immediacy (our proximity to the painting gives us 
a clear, instantaneous apprehension o f its details) and comprehensiveness (the “full light" 
reveals the painting in its entirety). Similarly, the better poem, according to Horace, will 
not dilute its affective power with excessive ornamentation, but will be “singleminded" and 
“keep to the point" (79); if dramatic, it will not merely relate the action to the audience, but 
play it out on stage, that the audience may be more “actively stimulated" by what each 
spectator “can see for himself” (85); and the really good poem will “be trimmed into shape 
by many a day’s toil and much rubbing out, and corrected down to the smallest detail” 
(89). The minutest particulars deserve such attention not only because each in itself creates 
a separate impression upon the reader or spectator, but because each also contributes to the 
total impression made by a poem. To achieve the desired totality of effect, the poet must 
make sure that the details of a poem be not only well drawn, but complement one another in 
the respective emphasis of their delineation: the poet must not be like a certain craftsman in 
bronze Horace knows “who will mould fingernails and reproduce wavy hair to the life, but 
the total effect o f his work is unsatisfactory because he cannot put together a complete 
figure. Now if I set out to write a poem, I would no more want to be like him than to have 
a crooked nose" (80; emphasis added).
11 Other translators render the Latin as “please."
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As it is from the immediacy and comprehensiveness o f its images that a painting or
poem achieves its totality o f effect (and thus its force), so it is from the internal
coordination of the work that we derive pleasure. The impression a painting makes upon us
may be powerful, but it will not please us—and certainly will not endure “the keen-eyed
scrutiny of the art critic”—if it its elements do not cohere. A painting must not present us
with what we have seen Horace ridicule elsewhere: a  horse with a human head, a woman
with a fish’s tail; neither may the poet, “to vary the monotony of his subject with something
out of the ordinary, introduce a dolphin into his woods, or put a boar among his waves”
(79-80). “Either follow the beaten track,” he advises, following Aristotle, “or invent
something that is consistent within itself”:
If in your play you happen to be representing the illustrious Achilles, let him 
be energetic, passionate, ruthless, and implacable; let him say that laws are 
not for him, and think that everything must yield to the force of arms. See to 
it that Medea is fierce and indomitable, Ino fearful, Ixion faithless, lo a 
wanderer, and Orestes sorrowful. If you introduce an untired subject to the 
stage, or are so bold as to invent a new character, be sure that it remains the 
same all the way through as it was at the beginning, and is entirely 
consistent (83).
When Horace declares a bit later that “your play should not demand belief for just anything 
that catches your fancy” (91), he does not only mean that images seemingly drawn from “a 
sick man’s dreams” will confuse an audience, but that the composition as a whole will be 
unintelligible because its lack of inner consistency will prevent us from judging its aesthetic 
integrity. We simply will be unable to say what a  poem is showing us and when it should 
be showing it to us at any given time. In the absence o f such aesthetic intelligibility, 
standards o f poetic expression collapse, and poetry loses its public function. No wonder, 
then, that Horace in the “Ut pictura poesis” passage and throughout Ars Poetica emphasizes 
the need for the would-be poet to conform to established standards regarding the 
management of genre, structure, characterization, tone, diction, meter, and representation.
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But despite Horace’s admonition that the poet keep in mind “the keen-eyed scrutiny 
of the art critic,” the emphasis in this passage is not upon theoretical appraisal but upon 
visceral response. At the end of the passage he cannot help returning to the notion of 
pleasure: “this [painting] only pleased you the first time you saw it, but that one will go on 
giving pleasure however often it is looked a t ” Note that the pleasure given by the best 
painting or poem, though complete at any single viewing or reading, is not then exhausted 
once for all, but seems able to renew itself indefinitely. We may return to the work again 
and again and derive delight from it; put another way, as the best mnemonic scheme will 
endure and give us access to what we would remember at any time we wish it, so does the 
ideal painting or poem give us pleasure, transport us, regularly. It is timeless. And because 
poems and paintings are public works, they must also please universally. Ambitious, 
certainly—but for Horace timeless universality is the only ambition worthy of a poet 
Poetry, he says, is “begotten and created for the soul’s delight”; the mediocre performance 
has no place, can-not be justified: “|T|f it falls short of the top, by ever so little, it sinks 
right down to the bottom” (92). The power of a poem to transport us, to translate the 
known into the new, the unknown into the familiar, if allowed to falter, is wholly forfeited, 
and our admiration turns to ridicule. Though Horace does not say so epigrammatically, a 
poem may be said to belong to the first rank because it delights universally, and delights 
universally because it regularly translates us to that figurative world beyond the close- 
drawn screen of everyday realities.
Longinus, however, is not so oblique in linking the universal to the sublime: “As a 
generalization, you may take it that sublimity in all its truth and beauty exists in such works 
as please all men at all times” (107). Conditioned as we are to think of truth and beauty as 
particularly appreciable by the intellect and spirit, we might easily overlook the 
physiological basis of the sublime as Longinus conceives of i t  Monroe Beardsley rightly 
points out that Longinus does not to care to distinguish the sublime from its effects (77), 
but Longinus might reply that from his perspective the sublime in fact consists of the sum
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of its effects. As the culmination o f the physical properties of the poem, both literal and 
figurative, the sublime is the poet’s achievement of complete physiological conquest of his 
audience, and accordingly constitutes the third aesthetic ideal to be derived from the impact 
model of consciousness.
From the terms in which Longinus describes the sublime, one might infer that it 
consists largely in the overwhelming physiological affect a work of literature imposes upon 
its audience. One could say that the sublime is achieved when the intensity or duration of 
physical sensation exhausts not only self-conscious reflection, but sensory articulation 
itself. In the throes of the sublime we are beyond thought, beyond even the meaningful 
differentiation of our several perceptions; as the adrenalin of imagination rushes through 
our viscera and limbs, we momentarily lose ourselves in that which we seem to experience. 
The experience of the sublime, says Longinus, holds us in a kind of rapture; its effect, he 
argues in the first chapter of On the Sublime, is to “entrance" listeners, to “transport them 
with wonder.” He continues, “The extent to which we can be persuaded is usually under 
our own control, but these sublime passages exert an irresistible force and mastery, and get 
the upper hand with every hearer" (100). He returns to this point again and again in his 
treatise. In Chapter 7, “The True Sublime,” for example, Longinus declares that, “[B]y 
some innate power the true sublime uplifts our souls; we are filled with a proud exaltation 
and a sense of vaunting joy ,ju st as though we had ourselves produced what we had heard” 
(107; emphasis added). We should note here the supposed effects—the uplift, the proud 
exaltation, the vaunting joy—that attend the audience’s close identification with the speaker 
so close, in fact, that its members seem to be relating the poem to themselves. That it is the 
physical element in the fashioning of the image that produces this emotional affect becomes 
clear somewhat later, in Chapter 22, “Hyperbaton, or Inversion," when Longinus 
describes the effects of a well-feigned spontaneity upon an audience. The speaker’s rush of 
emotion will make it seem that his words are in fact improvised, “inducing in the hearer the 
fear that the whole structure o f the sentence will fall to pieces, and compelling him in his
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agitation to share in the risk the speaker is taking; and then unexpectedly, after a long 
interval, he will bring out the long-awaited phrase just where it is most effective, at the very 
end, and thus, by the very audacity and recklessness of his inversions, he administers a 
much more powerful shock” (132). Certainly the audience’s expectation is in part 
linguistic; “the long-awaited phrase,” after all, completes the grammatical structure of the 
speaker’s thought But it completes aural and rhythmic structures as well, and it is the well- 
timed closure of these, more than the meaning of the words themselves, that accounts for 
the “powerful shock” of the speaker’s apparent escape from imminent disaster.12 Longinus 
underscores this effect at the conclusion of his chapter on composition, when he spells out 
more particularly “how far the harmony of sound chimes in with the [sublime]” (151). 
Taking a sentence from Demosthenes, “This decree caused the peril which at that time 
encompassed the city to pass away just like a cloud,” Longinus points out that the 
transporting power of the likening of peril to cloud is due more to cadence than to the idea 
itself or the syntax in which it is framed: “For ‘just like a  cloud’ starts off with a long 
rhythm, consisting of four metrical beats, and if you remove a single syllable and write 
‘like a cloud,’ by this abbreviation you at once mutilate the affect of grandeur. And again, if 
you stretch the phrase out with ‘caused to pass away just as if a cloud,’ the meaning is the 
same, but it no longer falls on the ear with the same effect because, by the drawing out of 
the final beats, the sheer sublimity of the passage is robbed of its solidity and of its tension” 
(151).
Elsewhere, Longinus advises flooding the audience with words;13 employing 
hyperbole, excited, impassioned speech, or extravagant metaphors;14 and dazzling listeners
12 Everyday experience bears this out The rhythm and intonation of an orator’s address can carry the 
audience when the words themselves are abject nonsense, their syntax a hopeless tangle; the power of a 
punchline depends not upon its literal miming but upon the timing of its delivery: properly prepared, 
we would laugh at almost any group of syllables concluding a joke.
13 Chapter 12, '’Amplification Defined”: “But the right place for the Demosthenean sublimity and 
intensity is in the passage where hyperbole and powerful emotions are involved, and where the audience
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with “high-sounding” phrases.15 And he advises that the speaker augment the “visual”
impact of his words with startling figures of speech16 and direct address: citing an example
from Herodotus, Longinus says,
You see, my friend, how, as he takes you in imagination through the places 
in question, he transforms hearing into sight All such passages, by their 
direct personal form of address, bring the hearer right into the middle of the 
action being described. When you seem to be addressing, not the whole 
audience, but a single member of it . . . you will affect him more 
profoundly, and make him more attentive and full of active interest, if you 
rise him by these appeals to him personally (135).
But whether the techniques Longinus prescribes have to do with sound, rhythm, or sight,
their origins, we notice, are in sensation and the desired end of their combined effect is, as
he expresses it in Chapter 39, “Composition,” to “[castl a  spell” on the audience and
thereby gain “a complete mastery” over the minds of its members (150).
For Longinus the sublime is the overwhelming composite of physiological 
sensation, but it also seems to be an auxiliary sense in itself, an innate psycho-physical 
“organ” for the registering of what he elsewhere calls the soul’s “unconquerable passion 
for all that is more divine than ourselves,”17 which the poet can excite and gratify by the apt
are swept off their feet. On the other hand, profusion [the Ciceronian manner] is in order when it is 
necessary to flood them with words’' (119)
14 Chapter 32, “Metaphor”: “For the onward rush of passion has the property of sweeping everything 
before it . . .  it does not allow the hearer leisure to consider the number of metaphors, since he is 
carried away by the enthusiasm of the speaker” (141).
15 Chapter 30, “The Proper Choice of Diction”: “It is probably superfluous to explain to those who 
already know how wonderfully the choice of appropriate and high-sounding words moves and enchants 
an audience.” The right words “[endow] the facts as it were with a living voice. For words finely used 
are in truth the very light of thought” (139).
16 Chapter 29, “The Dangers of Periphrasis": “They [figures of speech] are all means of increasing the 
animation and the emotional impact of style, and emotional effects play as large a part in the 
production of the sublime as the study of character does in the production of pleasure” (138).
17 Chapter 35, “Plato and Lysias," 146.
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management of the poem’s sensory effects, both literal and figurative. Like Horace, 
Longinus sees the sublime as the means by which the world of the poem may be vivified, 
its audience transported from the everyday to the realm of the fantastic. But for both 
theorists the sublime is important for two further reasons. Most immediately, the poet who 
achieves the sublime will be assured of lasting renown. “It is from this source alone," says 
Longinus, “that the greatest poets and historians have acquired their preeminence and won 
for themselves an eternity of fame” (100). Moreover—and more importantly—the 
attainment of the sublime marks the fullest realization of the aesthetics of memory. When 
the poet has achieved the sublime, he not only creates experience but in doing so imposes 
upon his audience a particular memory of that experience, crystallizing in the poem itself a 
complex of those ideas, emotions, beliefs, values, personages, and events it embodies. The 
poem—and its author—become living icons of cultural memory: living, because the 
elements of memory have been effectively etched upon our active senses and our ever- 
developing understanding. This is what we must bear in mind when Longinus declares that 
“a piece is truly great only if it can stand up to repeated examination, and if it is difficult, 
or, rather, impossible to resist its appeal, and it remains firmly and ineffaceably in the 
memory” (107). Because the poem is impressed indelibly upon us, and because our 
memories are active rather than merely retentive, our experience of the poetic sublime must 
necessarily shape our experience of all other things. This is the all-informing principle o f 
the aesthetics of memory.
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3. The Esthetics of Memory in the Age o f Dryden
The physiological and psychological elements o f the aesthetics o f memory meet in 
the experience o f the sublime. And so closely does the experience o f the sublime 
intermingle physical with emotional excitements that to separate precisely our bodily 
sensations from our perceptions o f them and these perceptions from our reflections upon 
them in turn, would be a task akin to that Venus set Psyche, when she poured together the 
barley, mullet, poppyseed, pease, lentils, and beans and bid her separate them again by 
morning. But we may at least observe that with the passage o f time there occurs a shift in 
emphasis favoring the study of the emotional (and by extension, the psychological and 
intellectual) appeal of poetry at die expense of the purely physical.
Beardsley notes that Longinus’ treatise on the sublime disappeared soon after its 
appearance in the first century AD, to be “rediscovered and published only in the sixteenth 
century” (76). It grew in favor during the seventeenth century, thanks to Boileau’s 
translation and promotion of the work he called “one o f the most precious relics of 
antiquity,”18 and, in England, to the esteem it excited from John Dryden and John Dennis; 
at last, during the first decades of the eighteenth century, it reached “its long-delayed peak 
of popularity and influence” (Beardsley 181). Poets of this time were no less concerned 
than Longinus for the psychological impact of poetry upon their audiences. And as we shall 
see when we examine the poetical treatment of the Exclusion Crisis, they advocated and 
employed many of the same techniques the ancients had used to attain many of the same 
effects, the ultimate aim as before being to transport the audience, though the poets o f the 
latter period were more purposeful about inculcating specific habits o f perception and 
memory. The chart below (see page 218), matching physical sensation to desired affect and 
affect to the appropriate poetic application, summarizes the aesthetic principles of incul­
cating physiological memory derived or derivable from classical and early modem impact
18 “Preface to His Translation of Longinus on the Sublime’* (1674; 44).
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Table 1: Relation of Physical Sensations to Audience Affect, With Poetic Applications







sonic mimesis: the sound re­
plicates that which it describes
continuity of effect: harmony 
o f sound with sound; fluent 
transitions between effects; 
level of diction consistently 





kinetic mimesis: poetic and 
bodily rhythms synchronize; 
both seem to replicate descrip­
tive and narrative movement 
within the poem
♦words placed to maintain 
fluency, pace 
♦meter coincident with action 











strong, cohesive, durable men­
tal images
the mind’s eye sees the image 
instantly, clearly, completely
an image or group of images 
complement and seem to evoke 
one another fluently, inevitably
the image, simple or compos­
ite, stays in the mind
mimetic idealism: the pitch of 
everyday life raised or lowered 
via the strikingly beautiful, 
grotesque, or unusual image to 
make it more easily discerned
the figure or image is matched; 
fluency among the parts of an 
images or among the images of 
a cluster sense of fluency in 
composite figure
an arrangement of images suf­
ficiently striking, coherent, and 
durable to make it retrievable 
and reviewable over an indefi­
nite period of time
Sublimity: 
the sum of 
physiological and 
psychological stimuli
exhaustion of both perceptual 
and reflective faculties, leading 
to complete identification with 
the world of the poem
all of the above in this column, 
plus a delivery (textual or ver­
bal) that heightens the physical 
and emotional sway of a poem
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models of consciousness.19
Indeed, if  anything during the seventeenth century, the artist’s age-old 
preoccupation with observing and replicating human nature, particularly characteristic 
responses to given physical and emotional stimuli, was elevated to something o f a science. 
Beardsley traces the emergence in this period o f minutely elaborate “affect theories” in 
painting and music that sought to assign absolute psychological values to particular 
arrangements of colors, figures, and harmonic relations. As he points out, these affect 
theories had their origin in “Renaissance speculations about die emotional effects of music” 
(155), but such speculations were given a great boost by Descartes’ The Passions o f the 
Soul, in which the philosopher “attempted to give systematic definitions, rational analyses, 
of the emotions” (152). Beardsley describes Descartes’ work as “a theory of expression: an 
account of how light coming from the object ([a painting of) the Crucifixion, for example) 
would strike the sense organs, arousing the ever-restless ‘animal spirits,’ which in turn can 
activate (1) the emotions of the soul (pity), through the pineal gland, and at the same time 
(2) the movements of the body that constitute the expression o f this emotion (weeping, or 
paleness, a drawn face, a drooping mouth, a bent head)” (152). As the preceding section 
has shown, the ancients were well aware that one’s physical experience of a work of art 
greatly affects one’s psychological reaction to i t  But Descartes’ treatise gave impetus to 
attempts throughout the century and into the next to methodize artistic expression according 
to, in Beardsley’s phrase, “theorems rigorously deduced from self-evident truths” (156) 
regarding human cognition. Once abstract speculation discovered the “self-evident” truths 
that informed and harmonized the physical, intellectual, and spiritual worlds, Cartesian 
rationalists believed, the arts—music and painting especially—could be made more 
scientific, mathematical in their purity of structure, their effects perfectly predictable
19 I have not listed rhyme under the characteristics of sound because rhyme was not common to the 
ancients and modems. I discuss rhyme below, starting on page 251.
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because perfectly attuned to their design.
Despite affect theory’s often painstakingly minute classifications of psychological 
response,20 however, it is fairly clear that for the Cartesian, practical application of the 
categories of affections was wholly subordinate to the impulse to arrange them within rigid 
taxonomies subsumed in turn by the exigencies of Rationalist notions of ideal clarity, 
precision, and order. Cartesian Rationalism was at last applied specifically to poetry in the 
first half of the eighteenth century in two works by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, 
Reflections on Poetry (1735) and Aesthetica  (1750, 1758). In these works, says 
Beardsley, “Baumgarten attempted an aesthetic theory. . .  based upon Cartesian principles 
and using the Rationalist deductive method, with formal definitions and derivations’* (156- 
57). Taking the object of aesthetics to be an investigation o f “the kind o f perfection proper 
to perception” (157), Baumgarten defined aesthetics as “the science of sensory cognition” 
(qtd., in Beardsley, 157), establishing ideals for representation before proceeding to 
specific prescriptions for poetic practice.21 The deductive emphasis o f French Rationalism 
was opposed in method and temperament by the induction and practical bent o f English 
empiricism. As Paul Hazard observes, the English did not share the French delight in 
metaphysics or abstract speculation for its own sake (62ff.); he says, for instance, of
20 In addition to detailed descriptions of the causes and manifestations of a seemingly exhaustive range of 
emotions, Descartes’ Passions o f the Soul contains illustrations depicting the subtle differences in 
facial expression exhibiting wonder and astonishment, simple love and desire, joy and laughter, sadness 
and tearhilness, fear and boldness, and different degrees of anger.
21 Baumgarten insisted, for example, that the sense experience that the “discourse of poetry” exists “to 
render and realize” (159) be represented clearly and intensely:
In obscure representations there are not contained as many representations of characteristic 
traits as would suffice for recognizing them and for distinguishing them from others, and 
as, in fact, are contained in clear representations (by definition). Therefore, more elements 
will contribute to the communication of sensate representations if these are clear than if 
they are obscure. A poem, therefore, whose representations are clear is more perfect than 
one whose representations are obscure, and clear representations are more poetic than 
obscure ones (qtd. in Beardsley, 159).
We have gleaned similar admonishments for clarity and intensity from Horace, Longinus and the 
students of artificial memory. But Horace and the rest, as practitioners of their respective arts, clearly 
induce precept from experience, rather than deduce practice from precept.
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Locke, the archetypical empiricist, “His means are urbanity, ease, and an indefinably 
flowing and limpid style. No Sibylline mysteries for him; no excessive esotericism, no 
vertiginous profundities. He will have nothing that is not readily intelligible’’ (243). The 
English empiricists would never go so far as to say with the French Rationalists that 
experience can at best serve “as confirmation and illustration o f [a priori] principles” 
(Beardsley 156), but even among these seventeenth-century counterparts o f Lucretius, we 
may discern a shift from the particulars of sensation and its affects toward, in George 
Watson’s words, “such psychological questions as the nature of the creative ac t By the 
eighteenth century, aesthetics is a mania among the English in an age when, as Boswell 
shows, the theory o f beauty formed part of the small talk of polite London drawing-rooms” 
(14). Watson traces this shift “from Hobbes onwards” (14), but as early as 1620 Francis 
Bacon was declaring in The New Organon that “the sense itself is a thing infirm and erring; 
nor can instruments for enlarging or sharpening the senses do much; but all the truer kind 
of interpretation of nature is affected by instances and experiments fit and apposite, wherein 
the sense decides touching the experiment only, and the experiment touching the point in 
nature and the thing itself” (I, 1, 339). Turned outward, upon creation, the empirical 
method promised, said Bacon, to “[build] in the human understanding a true model of the 
world, such as it is in fact, and not such as a man’s own reason would have it to be” (I, 
cxxiv, 370), thereby allowing us to “endeavour to establish and extend the power and 
dominion of the human race itself over the universe” (I, cxxix, 374). But turned inward, 
focused upon sensation, perception, the passions, and intellectual organization , empirical 
observation could note the effects of physical and mental experience upon the mind and by 
working backward, could arrive inductively at their likely causes, whether interior or 
exterior to the self.
It would be too much to say that empiricism offered the prospect of regularizing 
sensation and experience, but it did offer the prospect that the agents of sensation, emotion, 
and thought, once known, could be used to regularize the organization of the mind and its
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faculties, including memory. This notion, nascent in Bacon, would gain momentum as the 
century wore on, finding its fullest expression in John Locke’s programme of empirical 
tuition, related in Some Thoughts Concerning Education (1690). But the new interest in the 
mind’s ability to order sensation and reflection—and the assumption that doing so was 
possible and in fact desirable—also, though inadvertently, called into question several 
staples of classical literary theory that underlay its idealization of the sublime, leaving the 
seventeenth-century literary inheritors o f Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus in a difficult 
position indeed, forcing them defend their traditional claim for cultural authority even as 
they were compelled to establish new grounds for that authority as well as a new social 
utility for poetry itself. As the preceding chapters should suggest, poetry was able to stay 
relevant by becoming public to a degree unprecedented in English literary history; but, as I 
hope to demonstrate, its relevance depended specifically upon its ability to fashion social 
memory. Having traced the physiological components of memory as they figure in 
“impact” models of cognition, as well as the poetic principles derived from them, it now 
remains for me, before I proceed to practical demonstrations of poetry’s shaping o f the 
historical present, to examine poetry’s response to the new emphasis on the ordering of 
reflection, of intellection, and in particular its aesthetic applications of the psychological 
elements of memory.
To begin, we might consider that however closely observant the classical literary 
theorists were of poetical practice in their own and earlier times, their prescriptive treatises 
were hardly what one would call methodical. Indeed, by the end of Ars Poetica one is left 
guessing at its central organizing principle, so seemingly random is Horace’s arrangement 
of pointers for the would-be poet On the Sublime, though well-ordered within certain 
clusters of headings, is as a treatise only slightly better structured than that of Horace. And 
like Horace, Longinus seems to advocate this or that technique for such-and-such an effect 
as such prescriptions occur to him. When he and Horace say in effect that the precept must 
be made to match present circumstances, we cannot be blamed if their advice strikes us as
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chaotically situational. And we would be in good company. In O f Dramatic Poesy: an 
Essay (1667), Dryden in the person of Eugenius accuses the Ancients lacking in theoretical 
and practical consistency; and after him, Addison, in a number of The Spectator devoted to 
wit,22 asserted that the ancient authors (he names Isocrates, Plato, and Cicero), lacking any 
systematic classification of true, false, and mixed wit—“according as they were founded in 
Truth”—were guilty o f “such little Blemishes as are not to be met with in Authors of a 
much inferior Character, who have written since those several Blemishes were discovered” 
(188).
Such an apparent lack of method would hardly suit well with a temperament, 
emerging at the outset of the seventeenth century in the writings of Francis Bacon, that 
chafed at the very randomness of experience. In his preface to The New Organon (1620), 
Bacon enjoins his reader not to accept or reject a  proposition on its apparent merits or the 
antiquity of its advocates, but to “examine the thing thoroughly,” and to “make some little 
trial for himself" (330). But he also makes clear that conclusions drawn from haphazard 
observation of occasional phenomena are as undesirable as proofs spun by scholastic logic 
or those reached by “the most ordinary method” (still a favorite among graduate students in 
literature): “When a man addresses himself to discover something, he first seeks out and 
sets before him all that has been said about it by others; then he begins to meditate for 
himself, and so by much agitation and working of the wit solicits and as it were evokes his 
own spirit to give him oracles—which method has no foundation at all, but rests only upon 
[received] opinions and is carried about with them” (I, lxxxii, 355). Scarcely less futile, 
Bacon continues, is simple experience—that is, experience unmediated by method. Simple 
experience, Bacon says,
if taken as it comes, is called accident, if  sought for, experiment But this
kind of experience is no better than a broom without its band, as the saying
is, a mere groping, as of men in the dark that feel all round them for the
~  No. 61: Thursday, May 10, 1711.
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chance of finding their way, when they had much better wait for daylight, 
or light a candle, and then go. But the true method of experience on the 
contrary first lights the candle, and then by means of the candle shows the 
way, commencing as it does with experience duly ordered and digested, not 
bungling or erratic, and from  it educing axioms, and from  established 
axioms again new experiments (I, Ixxxii, 355; emphasis added).
For Bacon, experiment cannot be made useful until experience itself is ordered, which
requires in turn the right ordering of our mental faculties. This ordering requires purging
the several causes of intellectual disorder, which Bacon elsewhere in The New Organon
groups under the headings of the Idols of the Cave (individual self-interest), Market Place
(the misuse of language), and Theatre (philosophical dogma). But as insidious as any of
these is the mind's tendency to make hasty conclusions and from them draw untenable
generalizations: “fflndeed through the premature hurry o f the understanding to leap or fly to
universals and principles of things, great danger may be apprehended from [false natural]
philosophies of this kind, against which evil we ought even now to prepare’’ (I, lxiv, 347).
Thus, Bacon admonishes, “The understanding must not therefore be supplied with wings,
but rather hung with weights to keep it from leaping and flying. Now this has never yet
been done; when it is done, we may entertain better hopes of the sciences" (I, civ, 364).
The “weight” with which Bacon would laden the understanding is an exhaustive
cataloguing o f the mind’s faculties, which, as the means by which we frame our
investigations and the most mysterious o f natural processes, are both the primary and
ultimate object of Bacon's empirical method: “For I form a history and tables of discovery
for anger, fear, shame, and the like;. . .  and again for the mental operations of memory,
composition and division, judgement, and the rest” (I, cxxvii, 371).
Though Bacon does not specifically refer here to the experience of poetry and the
mental operations poetry excites, one can easily imagine that the uncertain and seemingly
unquantifiable effects o f the “extremely free and licensed” craft he likens in Chapter 13 o f
De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum  (1623) to a weed among the cultivated flowers of
science—“I can report no other deficiency in Poesy, for being as a plant which come from
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the lust of the earth without a  formal seed, it has sprung up and spread abroad more than 
any other kind of learning” (408; 410)— would arouse his well-known antipathy to the art 
Bacon in this work does credit poetry with “refreshing” the everyday world “by reciting 
things unexpected and various and fid l o f vicissitudes" (407-408; emphasis added), and 
claims that it “conduces not only to delight but also to magnanimity and morality. Whence it 
may be fairly thought to partake somewhat o f a divine nature because it raises the mind and 
carries it aloft, accommodating the shows o f things to the desires of the mind” (408). 
However, as Beardsley rightly points out, Bacon does not so much elevate poetry as 
segregate it and its governing faculty, the imagination, from more legitimate intellectual 
endeavors (170), namely, philosophy (both natural and speculative) and history, governed 
respectively by reason and memory. Unlike poetry, philosophy and history can be turned 
to pragmatic and measurable ends; they can be assessed according to strictly empirical 
criteria. Poetry, partaking “o f somewhat o f a divine nature,” and offering us “the shadows 
of things when the substance cannot be obtained” (407), would seem by nature to be 
beyond the application of such standards: being “divine,” or at least the product of the 
imagination, it owes more to ungovernable and enigmatic inspiration than to science (in its 
larger sense o f a regular method practically applied); trading in the “shadows” of things not 
to be found in nature, it works upon auditors not by analyzable demonstration but by 
raising the mind and carrying it aloft, by “accommodating the shows o f things to the 
desires of the mind” (emphasis added): “Nay, it has been regarded by learned men and 
great philosophers as “a kind of musician’s bow by which men’s mind’s may be played 
upon” (408). In other words, poetry works by rousing in the audience the very passions 
and figures inspiration has roused in the poet Poetry (dramatic poetry especially) might 
incite to virtue, but unlike reason and memory it has an equal capacity to corrupt—and in 
any event, for the good empiricist both its agent and its manner of operation must be 
suspect.
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Consider that in The New Organon Bacon boasts that “my way o f discovering 
sciences goes far to level men’s wits, and leaves but little to individual excellence, because 
it performs everything by the strictest rules and demonstrations’’ (I, cxxii, 369). Among the 
advantages of empirical method is that it liberates society from the authority and 
unreliability of genius, eccentricity, and chance. The acquisition of knowledge henceforth 
could proceed across a comparatively broad swath of the social spectrum, could proceed 
almost at will, via the conscientious application of inductive methods. Longinus and 
Horace had indeed scoffed at the poseurs and madmen pretending to inspiration, but each 
had also declared that true poets are born, not made. As the seventeenth century 
progressed, such pronouncements seemed too reminiscent of the Scholastics’ erstwhile 
mystification of the arts and sciences, their confinement of them within the narrow circuit 
of an esoteric fraternity, hedged about with obscurantist language few laymen could hope 
to penetrate. And in consequence, claims of innate talent and genius were made less and 
less assertively, even when there could be no doubt about the matter. It is telling, for 
instance, that by 1668 Dryden could have Neander declare in O f Dramatic Poesy. 
“Shakespeare was the Homer or father of our dramatic poets; Jonson was the Virgil, the 
pattern o f elaborate writing; I admire him, but I love Shakespeare’’ (70)—then launch into 
an examen of the model English drama: Jonson’s The Silent Woman. When the works of 
the “naturally learned”23 Shakespeare are something of a guilty pleasure and those of more 
methodical but more circumspect design held up for emulation in their place, the very 
desirability of genius seems called into question.
Certainly by mid-century the cultural authority of genius and inspiration, as well as 
their manner of operation upon poet and audience alike, were under increasing attack. We 
might remember Longinus’ insistence that the object of the poet aiming at the sublime was 
to so excite an audience physically and emotionally as to master it, to impose upon it
23 O f Dramatic Poesy, 67.
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howsoever he chooses. “I would confidently maintain,’* he declares in Chapter 8 of On the 
Sublime, “Five Sources of Sublimity,” “that nothing constitutes so decisively to the grand 
style as a noble emotion in the right setting, when it forces its way to the surface in a gust 
of frenzy, and breathes a kind o f divine inspiration into the speaker’s words” (109). 
Hobbes does not have Longinus in mind specifically—or even at all—when he attacks 
Christian poets’ invocation of a  pagan Muse in his “Answer” to Sir William Davenant's 
preface to Gondibert (1650), but the points he makes against the practice constitute a 
refutation of the idealization o f the sublime. Though Hobbes does not forbid modem 
invocations outright, he declares the custom insipid. It is true enough, he says, that “the 
Antiquity of Verse it is greater than the antiquity o f Letters” (46), and that at the dawn o f 
civilization poets were indeed the priests and legislators for their peoples—for which 
reasons religious doctrine and civil laws were encoded in “measured Sounds . .  . easily 
committed to the memory” (47); still, it would be presumptuous of poets to pretend to the 
same authority as their ancestors: “For their Poets were their Divines; had the name o f 
Prophets; Exercised amongst the People a kind of spirituall Authority; would be thought to 
speake by a divine spirit; have their workes which they writte in Verse (the divine stile) 
passe for the word of God, and not of man; and to be hearkened to with reverence” (48). 
But since poets of the Christian era know there is no such thing as an actual Muse, they can 
no longer pretend to speak directly to such divinities. Thus, Hobbes concludes, there are 
now no grounds for using invocations, save “a reasonlesse imitation of custome; of a 
foolish custome; by which a man enabled to speake wisely from the principles of nature, 
and his owne meditation, love rather to to be thought to speake by inspiration, like a 
Bagpipe” (49). Hobbes, writing in exile in Paris in 1650, has Puritan claims to inspiration 
and personal revelation very much in mind, and here uses a critical pronouncement to assail 
the sectarian struggles that have disordered England with civil war, regicide, and the chaos 
of a commonwealth. For when these “unskillfull Conjurers,” these pretenders to 
inspiration, call unseasonably for Zeale there appeares a spirit of Cruelty,; and by the like
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error insteed of Truth they rayse D iscord; insteed o f Wisedom, Fraud; insteed of 
Reformation, Tumulr, and Controversie insteed o f Religion” (48). But the secondary 
implications of Hobbes’s argument do not detract from its primary thrust: the poet’s 
authority for expression and his claim upon the attention and estimation of his audience 
should derive from “the principles o f nature, and his owne meditation’’ upon them. That is, 
as Hobbes explains elsewhere in his “Answer,” from what is observable and demonstrable 
in human and physical nature, and from what one may reasonably infer from such 
observations and demonstrations: “That which giveth a Poeme the true and naturall Colour 
consisteth in two things, which are; To know well, that is, to have images of nature in the 
memory distinct and cleare; and To know much," which allows for “novelty of expression, 
and pleaseth by excitation of the mind,” feeding curiosity, “which is a delightful! appetite of 
knowledge” (52). To feed this appetite, the poet may go “[bjeyond the actuall workes of 
nature. . .  but beyond the conceaved possibility of nature never” (51).
To rightly observe the principles of nature and meditate reasonably upon them, 
however, one must have access to language that at once allows for a minutely particular 
examination of the thing observed and an orderly, logical progression of analytical 
reflection upon it. When lacking such language, one is tempted, says Hobbes in his 
“Answer,” into “the ambitious obscurity of expressing more then is perfectly conceived; or 
perfect conception in fewer words then it requires. Which Expressions, though they have 
had the honor to be called strong lines, are in deed no better then Riddles, and not only to 
the Reader, but also (after a little time) to the Writer himselfe darke and troublesome” (52). 
Hobbes speaks here o f poets, and indeed, after the seeming randomness of experience 
offered by poetry and its reliance upon genius and inspiration and nonrational means to 
excite the passions o f the reader or hearer, the characteristics of poetic language— 
metaphor, allusion, parallel, rhetorical figures—make up the third traditional element of the 
poet’s craft to be called into question during the seventeenth century. Or rather, the 
language of poetry came under attack as the authority of the Schoolmen was challenged by
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proponents o f the New Science, who often argued that it was solely in what Hobbes calls 
the “palpable darkness'* (“Answer," 52) o f esoteric and unsignifying language that the 
power of the Schools truly resided. The Idols o f  the Market Place Bacon assails in The 
New Organon are those linguistic and consequently intellectual chimeras “which have crept 
into the understanding through the alliance o f  words and names. For men believe that their 
reason governs words, but it is also true that words react on the understanding" (I, lix, 
341)—to the extent that among scholastic philosophers “vicious demonstrations are as the 
strongholds and defences of Idols; and those we have in logic do little else than make the 
world the bondslave of human thought, and human thought the bondslave of words” (I. 
box, 348). Hobbes takes up this line of attack in the first part of Leviathan and makes what 
he calls the insignificant, nonsensical speech of scholastic pedants a frequent butt o f his 
scorn. More than mere folly, it is a dangerous form of madness, Hobbes argues, “when 
men speak such words, as put together, have in them no signification at all; but are fallen 
on by some, through misunderstanding o f the words they have received, and repeat by 
rote; by others, from intention to deceive by obscurity. And this is incident to none but 
those, that converse in questions o f matters incomprehensible, as the Schoole-men; or in 
questions o f abstruse Philosophy” (I, viii, 146).24 Such absurdity in learned language is 
dangerous for Hobbes because obscurantism too easily passes for real knowledge in the 
world, and thereby conveys too much power to those “Egregious persons” who fashion its 
terms and account the plain-speaking, “common sort of men” ignorant and vulgar (146); it 
is madness for Hobbes because linguistic imprecision, equivocation, and insignificance 
undermines humanity’s already tenuous understanding of the world about it, leaving it
-4 Should any doubt his point, Hobbes dares him to “take a Schoole-man into his hands, and see if he can 
translate any one chapter concerning any difficult point," such as the Trinity, the nature of Christ, 
transubstantiation, or free will. “What," he challenges the reader, "is the meaning of these words" 
[taken from Suarez' O f the Concourse, Motion, and Help o f God]: ‘The first cause does not necessarily 
inflow any thing into the second, by force of the Essential! subordination of the second causes, by 
which it may help it to worke’ . . . .  When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are they not mad, 
or intend to make others so?" (I, viii, 146-147).
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enmazed in abstractions that correspond to nothing found in the physical or moral spheres.
Consequently, says Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, it is not to
“these learned Disputants,” but to “the unschoiastick Statesman, that the Governments of
the World owed their Peace, Defence, and Liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned
Mechanick, (a Name of Disgrace) that they received the improvements of useful Arts”;
Nevertheless, this artificial Ignorance, and learned Gibberish, prevailed 
mightily in these last Ages, by the Interest and Artifice of those, who found 
no easier way to that pitch o f Authority and Dominion they have attained, 
than by amusing the Men of Business, and Ignorant, with hard words, or 
imploying the Ingenious and Idle in intricate Disputes, about unintelligible 
Terms, and holding them perpetually entangled in that endless Labyrinth. 
Besides, there is no such way to gain admittance, or give defence to strange 
and absurd Doctrines, as to guard them round about with Legions of 
obscure, doubtful, and undefined Words. Which yet makes these Retreats, 
more like the Dens o f Robbers, or Holes of Foxes, than the Fortresses of 
fair Warriours: which if  it be hard to get them out of, it is not for the 
strength that is in them, but the Briars and Thorns, and the Obscurity of the 
Thickets they are beset with. For Untruth being unacceptable to the Mind of 
Man, there is no other defence left for Absurdity, but Obscurity (Book HI,
Chapter X, 495).
For Locke, as for Bacon and Hobbes, the language o f poetry is implicated with 
scholastic disputation and rhetoric insofar as it partakes of, in Locke’s phrase, “the Arts of 
Fallacy” (HI, x, 508); but we can invert this and observe that for these men the integrity of 
disputation and rhetoric is suspect insofar as these disciplines partake of the figurative 
language of poetry, which, says Locke, does “nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, 
move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgement” (508). For this reason Bacon 
scorns all poetry except “feigned history,” referring satires, epigrams, and odes “to 
philosophy and arts of speech” (407); Hobbes admits that “sometimes the understanding 
have need to be opened by some apt similitude,” but repeatedly insists that metaphors have 
no place in the “rigourous search of Truth”: “For seeing they openly professe deceipt; to 
admit them into Councell, or Reasoning, were manifest folly” (I, viii, 136-137). One of the 
better known exclamations against the extravagances of baroque discourse is to be found in
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Thomas Sprat's The History o f the Royal Society (1667). Taking “Nullius in Verba” for its 
motto, the Royal Society (chartered by Charles II in 1662) bad as its declared mission “the 
Advancement o f Experimental Philosophy.” In an eloquent fiilmination against 
eloquence—“the luxury and redundance of Speech” (1 11)—Sprat brings us full circle, back 
to the ancients’ original rationale for the several figures and ornaments of speech: “They 
were at first, no doubt, an admirable Instrument in the hands o f Wise Men: when they were 
onely employ’d to describe Goodness, Honesty, Obedience, in larger, fairer, and more 
moving Images: to represent Truth, cloth'd with Bodies; and to bring Knowledg back again 
to our very senses, from whence it was at first deriv’d to our understandings” (111-112). 
To represent the social virtues “in larger, fairer, and more moving Images”; to represent 
truth “cloth’d with Bodies”; to bring knowledge “back again to our very senses, from 
whence it was at first deriv’d to our understandings”—these, as we have seen, were the 
means by which Aristotle, Horace, Longinus, Cicero, and others sought to translate the 
sounds and rhythms o f poetry and rhetoric into visual terms, the better to convey a 
complete and immediate apprehension of the scene or argument in question. But o f late, 
laments Sprat, the figures and ornaments of eloquence have been put “to worse uses: They 
make the Fancy disgust the best things, if they come found, and unadom’d: they are in 
open defiance against Reason; professing, not to hold much correspondence with that; but 
with its Slaves, the Passions: the give the mind a motion too changeable, and bewitching to 
consist with right practice” (112). Previously agents of clarity and truth, “these specious 
Tropes and Figures” now have obscured knowledge with so many “mists and 
uncertainties” (112), that Sprat wishes heartily he might banish eloquence “out of all civil 
societies, as a thing fatal to Peace and good Manners” (111).
Swift’s account in the third book of G ulliver’s Travels (1726) of a project afoot in 
the Academy of Lagado to abolish language entirely and, replacing words with the actual
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items they represent, require people instead to carry about them “such Things as were 
necessary to express the particular Business they are to discourse on” (159)25, has made 
Sprat’s remedy for the excesses o f eloquence nearly as notorious as the abuses he would 
redress:
[The Royal Society] have therefore been most rigorous in putting in 
execution, the only Remedy, that can be found for this extravagance: and 
that has been, a constant Resolution, to reject all the amplifications, 
digressions, and swellings o f  style: to return back to the primitive purity, 
and shortness, when men deliver’d so many things, almost in an equal 
number of words. They have exacted from their members, a close, naked, 
natural way of speaking; positive expressions; clear sense; a  native easiness: 
bringing all things as near the Mathematicall plainness, as they can: and 
preferring the language of Artizans, Countrymen, and Merchants, before 
that of Wits, or Scholars (113).
Of course, the inhabitants o f late seventeenth-century England—and especially the
professional poets among them—were not reduced, as were the hapless sages of Lagado,
to lugging about great sacks of miscellaneous objects (“like Pedlars among us”) on the
chance of meeting a fellow sage and having to “lay down their loads, open their Sacks, and
hold Conversation [literally] for an hour together” (158). Nevertheless, as the foregoing
enumeration of specific challenges to specific affective elements of the poet’s craft should
make clear, poetry now faced, at least potentially, the stiff intellectual resistance it had
largely side-stepped since Plato’s excoriation o f seer-poets in Ion and his outright
banishment of poets in The Republic. Citing the newly emerging concept that there were
really “two distinct languages, the metaphysical language of poetry and the literal language
of science,” Beardsley neatly expresses the dilemma in which poetry found itself: “The
25 Swift also has the projectors of Lagado devising entirety mechanical methods of generating speech and 
hence ‘‘Books in Philosophy, Poetry, Politicks, Law, Mathematics and Theology, without the least 
Assistance from Genius or Study” (156)—reducing the empiricists’ apparent bias against claims of 
innate individual talent to its logical, if absurd extreme. Regarding Sprat’s resolution, itself, I find it 
somewhat uncanny that 130 years hence Wordsworth will propose a like-sounding solution for the 
reform of poetic diction in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800). I suppose, however, it is almost 
inevitable that would-be reformers frequently begin their efforts with proposals to simplify and thereby 
revivify language, perhaps the easiest and most obvious way of appearing to clear the slate and begin 
afresh.
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Horatian injunctions, that poetry should please and instruct, now for the first time seem in 
danger of being split apart: for if the language that serves one o f these ends best is 
destructive o f the other, it would seem that they cannot both be done (well, at least) by the 
same discourse” (176).
It is usual, among those citing rationalism’s antipathy toward wit, fancy, and 
inspiration, to say, with Clayton Roberts and David Roberts in their textbook, A History o f 
England: Prehistory to 1714 (1980), that the New Science “weakened the appeal of poetry. 
In literature the age o f poetry gave way to the age o f prose, the age of Milton to the age of 
Dryden. . . .  To the Elizabethans the poet was a seer and prophet, and metaphor a 
revelation o f the truth. To Dryden and his contemporaries, metaphors were an adornment to 
language and poetry an entertainment” (388). Paul Hazard likewise declares the late 
seventeenth century in England to be “essentially an age of prose” (335), but his eloquence 
carries him further in a chapter of The European M ind, 1680-1715 appropriately entitled 
“The Muses are Silent.” Here he asserts that the very heart of the nation had lost its 
passion, had become bleakly prosaic: “If poetry is prayer, [the people] they never prayed; if 
it is a reaching out reaching out towards the ineffable, they would not hear of the ineffable; 
if it is to hesitate on the delicate line betwixt music and meaning, they never hesitated; no, 
not they! They aimed at being just so many proofs and theorems. When they did write 
verse, it was merely a vehicle for their ideas on geometry.” We can almost see him 
removing his hat and letting his chin sink into his chest as he concludes, grandly, “And so 
poetry died; or at least seemed to die. Strictly logical and matter-of-fact, machine-made, 
sapless, it lost sight of its true mission” (336). One of the classic studies of the period’s 
poetry, James Sutherland’s A Prrface to Eighteenth-Century Poetry (1948), seems to 
counter such pronouncements, declaring defiantly if  prosaically, that “the prestige of 
literature never stood higher” (43). However, citing several of the same rationalist 
antipathies toward poetry that I have given above, Sutherland essentially agrees with 
Hazard, arguing that to survive poetry made itself appreciably rationalistic, curbing the
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excesses of wit, fancy, and individual eccentricity, as well as the expression of personal 
emotion; in doing so, Sutherland says, poetry became noticeably removed from everyday 
experience, a  thing ratified, elegant, “fundamentally aristocratic” (SO), the equivalent in 
words of the “dignity and restraint of Georgian houses and public buildings” (39): “Why,” 
asks Sutherland, “should the aristocratic taste that produced Bedford Square be so widely 
approved, and the aristocratic taste that produced Pope’s Eloisa to Abelard be so often 
ridiculed and condemned? Have we one set of values for architecture and quite a different 
set for poetry?” (49).
We do, and we should. Buildings and poems both may testify to the sensibility of 
their designers, but poetry is far more revealing of the intellectual and psychological lives 
of those who left it behind: once erected, the building’s static, silent, passive utility quickly 
pushes it into the background o f everyday life; on the other hand, it is all but impossible to 
read a poem and not hear and see and feel the voices, scenes, and rhythms that made up 
that everyday life. To suggest that poetry is just another physical artifact of a given era— 
and especially this era, when poetry was so much a part of public life—is to embalm it in 
quaintness, to wrap it away from the human conditions that gave it existence at all, that 
made it matter. It is to surrender poetry to the past, to make it a period piece, an abstract 
caricature of what it once was to those who wrote and read i t  Consequently, I think it 
rather beside the point to proceed from an account of the intellectual challenge to poetry 
during this time to broad characterizations of what poetry became in response, whether an 
entertainment (Roberts and Roberts), or a machine (Hazard), or a uniform row of elegant 
townhouses (Sutherland 41).
Certainly we might observe in brief that, responding to the temper of the times 
composing and analyzing poetry became more methodical and more practical. A whole 
taxonomy of narrowly defined poetic genres took shape during this time, each genre having 
its own set of conventions governing subject matter, operative mode (heroic, tragic, 
romantic, comedic, etc.), structure, tone, rhyme scheme, meter, diction, verbal locutions
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(the epic simile, for instance, or the cano, dixit, and fitit formulae found in heroic verse), 
meter, and the types of permissible allusions, similes, and metaphors. For the reader aware 
of these rules and conventions, watching them at work in a  given poem, recognizing the 
patterns o f expression and theme they imposed upon the work, marking the patterns of 
emotional and intellectual response they predictably elicited in oneself—the expectations 
they raised would in effect “forearm” one against the affective designs of the poet and lend 
the experience of reading poetry an orderly, rational pleasure that would counteract the 
supposedly debilitating effects of the sporadic sub-rational delights objected to by Bacon, 
Hobbes, Sprat, and Locke. We might further observe, secondly, that this new emphasis on 
compositional and critical method constituted a  leave-taking from the now-suspect cult o f 
genius. On the one hand, the existence of widely discussed and well known rules made the 
successful application of these rules (or the successful deviation from them) more important 
than the poet himself; on the other, it created a new-found sense of poetic decorum among 
poets and readers alike, and in consequence helped turn the poet’s attention more generally 
toward public decorum, and hence the public welfare, which made practical demonstrations 
of and exhortations to right action and thought more relevant than mastering the souls of 
one’s readers. The vaguely distasteful “wildness” of Abraham Cowley’s quest for the 
sublime in his imitation of Pindar’s Odes in his Poems (1656), for instance, seemingly 
ensured that such efforts would give way to works such as John Gay’s Trivia or, The Art 
o f Walking the Streets o f London (1716). And if the poet’s ostensible aim was no longer to 
catch the reader up, ravish his soul, leave him physically and psychologically spent; if the 
end of poetry was no longer the ecstatic sublime but the warm thrill of generic, topical, and 
preceptive recognition, then, thirdly, the poet had no need for the supposed extravagances 
of the last age’s figures, metaphors, and turns o f wit. These could be retrenched, the 
transmutative potential o f poetry foregone, and its design, matter, and end made 
immediately intelligible to the average reader.
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These things being observed, we might take them together and observe of them in
turn, that if they rightly describe characteristics poetry adopted in response to the
emergence of the New Science (and the second and third seem to me especially open to
extensive qualification), the potential challenge of rationalism to the craft o f poetry as
traditionally practiced simply accelerated the emergence o f the art into the public sphere.
But poetry’s hastened emergence left it “schizophrenic,’’ Janus-faced, an irregular bundle
of often contrary impulses, principles, and formal alloys. If any single characteristic may
be said to be truly emblematic of Augustan poetry, it is this one. Consider a private act of
individual imagination, the poem was now expected to leave the drawing room and boudoir
and make the rounds of public thoroughfares and coffee-houses; a public entity, it had to
concern itself with public matters, yet it was often prompted by fierce personal rivalries and
the most virulent pecuniary and political self-interest; its eye on the present and the local, it
sought to voice timeless and universal truths; occasional, journalistic, and topical, it made
use not only of the latest learning and by-words, but of antiquity’s vast store o f myth,
history, and literature.
The language of Augustan poetry neatly demonstrates several of these confluent
oppositions. In the introduction m his translation of Lucretius, Ronald Latham makes the
intriguing observation that the twentieth-century translator of the Roman poet-philosopher,
unlike his seventeenth-century counterpart, must often “choose between an archaic
expression with pleasing associations and a baldly scientific one”:
The distinction was not so clear-cut in the seventeenth century, when the 
adjective ’massy,* for instance, was equally at home in the languages of 
Milton and of Newton. But since then poetry and science have gone 
different ways, and recent attempts to reunite them have not yet been wholly 
successful. So, where Lucretius could so wield his limited vocabulary as to 
combine the Biblical stateliness of ’every beast o f the field after his kind 
eating green herb’ with the scientific precision of ‘every species o f 
herbivorous mammal,’ the [modem] translator often finds it hard not to 
sacrifice one or the other” (16).
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The separation o f scientific and poetic languages, then, was not—at least not yet—as 
absolute as Beardsley, for one, would have it (see above), though certainly, as the natural 
sciences developed a  language that would become so specialized as to be generally 
unsuitable for everyday speech, and poetry, seeking for effects beyond the reach of 
ordinary discourse, would fashion its own distinctive vocabulary (which has since the 
appearance o f Wordsworth’s “Preface” been characterized as stilted, artificial), the terms of 
the two endeavors, as Latham notes, were to become estranged, perhaps permanently. But 
in the meantime, Dryden, an early member o f  the Royal Society, did not hesitate to 
combine the language o f naval warfare, shipbuilding, trade, manufacture, geopolitics, and 
astronomy with the more traditional conventions o f heroic verse—personages of 
superhuman stature, historical and literary allusion, epic locutions, metaphor, and 
“elevated” diction—in Annus M irabilis (1667), which celebrates English valor during the 
Second Dutch War and the Plague and Fire of London. In a preface to Annus M irabilis 
addressed to Sir Robert Howard, “An Account o f the Ensuing Poem,” Dryden declares, “I 
have never yet seen the description of any naval fight in the proper terms which are us’d at 
sea. . . . We hear indeed among our poets, o f the thund’ring o f guns, the smoke, the 
disorder, and the slaughter; but all these are common notions. And certainly as those who, 
in a logical dispute, keep in general terms, would hide a fallacy, so those who do it in any 
poetical description would veil their ignorance” (24a).26 Dryden would have his language 
be precisely descriptive, because the events he describes are recent and well-known to his 
contemporaries; their importance in determining the fate of England in the 1660’s and 
beyond makes them of a kind with the events treated in classical epics (in his preface, 
Dryden cites Virgil as his principal model), but require by reason of their specifically
26 Dr. Johnson, for one, was skeptical about the success of Dry den’s use of technical language:
He descends to display his knowledge with pedantic ostentation; as when, in translating 
Virgil, he says ’tack to the larboard’—and ’veer starboard’; and talks, in another work, of 
‘Virtue spooming before the wind.' His vanity now and then betrays his ignorance: ‘They 
Nature’s king through Nature’s optics viewed: /  Revers’d, they viewed him lessen’d to 
their eyes.’ He had heard of reversing a telescope, and unluckily reverses the object (258).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
238
English significance a  fresh treatment achievable only with the incorporation o f the several 
argots of the statecraft, sciences, and technologies that have made possible England’s 
emergence as a world power and given it its sense o f unique national destiny. Prosaic and 
poetic, fabulous past and heroic present, are thus united in Annus M irabilis—as are 
Dryden’s private and public motives: a celebration o f English character in the face of 
adversity, the poem singles out the King and his brother the Duke of York for especial 
praise, earning Dryden the Laureateship in 1668, when Davenant’s death left the post 
vacant
To remark upon this melding o f patriotism and personal ambition, and more 
generally upon the pronounced duality in Augustan poetry, is hardly to concede that poetry 
has died or been mortally compromised by its acknowledgement of the world beyond the 
Self. To the contrary, the “schizophrenia” of Augustan poetry is analogous to the confluent 
oppositions in our everyday lives. Each morning when we step out of doors we take with 
us into the public sphere our personal histories, our trains of sensations, associations, 
experiences; often we have nothing “in mind” but a succession of mental images 
representing to us our moods, expectations, and impressions of the present moment It is 
only when we have put ourselves in the midst o f other people that we force ourselves to 
order our thoughts, to think in language, to order our demeanor, our facial expressions, 
our movements according to our circumstances. We put on our well-defined public 
persons, accommodate ourselves to the expectations of others in a succession of given 
situations, and try to speak intelligibly in a common tongue. In a word, we become social 
creatures. And yet, beneath—or alongside, or intermingled with—the elements of our 
public selves are all the elements of our inner, private lives. The inner life has not been 
quelled or rendered quaint, self-ironic, but informs the public self, which in turn allows its 
counterpart a practical articulation o f its perceptions, appetites, and reflections. Neither is 
endangered by the other’s existence, but enriched, and perhaps to the degree that we can 
integrate our private and public selves can we be said to fashion a viably human being. For,
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as Bertrand Russell has observed, “Man is not a  solitary animal, and so long as social life 
survives, self-realization cannot be the supreme principle o f ethics” (684).
Neither can it be the supreme principle o f poetry. Indeed, for Augustan poetry as 
for ourselves, the melding of contrary impulses enhances rather than impoverishes. For the 
poetry o f this period, left richly paradoxical by its hastened emergence into the public 
sphere, forced to incorporate and cultivate the sensibilities and languages of two sets of 
selves, the intellectual challenge posed by the New Science proved, not a  death-blow, but a 
valuable catalyst indeed. Not only was the newly public poetry left perfectly equipped—in 
outlook, purpose, and vocabulary—for integrating two opposed modes of social memory, 
the literal and figurative, but it was also provided the means o f going about it, of fashioning 
a social memory combining the ostensibly subjective, emblematic truth o f poetry and the 
objective, tangible truth of science. Put another way, poetry was now able to answer its 
intellectual challengers on their own terms by way of its discovery, development, and 
incorporation (albeit informally: incidentally and incrementally) of a sound philosophical 
foundation for the physical and psychological elements of the aesthetics of memory.
Convenient as it would be for our present purposes, no poet of the period, alas, has 
left behind a cohesive treatise expressly outlining and defending the intellectual—that is. 
philosophical or epistemological—foundation for the aesthetics of memory. It is therefore 
agreeably ironic to find the justification for the affective and figurative truth of poetry best 
delineated and expressed by one who scornfully banishes wit and fancy from the heartier, 
more wholesome realm of “dry Truth and real Knowledge.”
“I confess,” says Locke in section 34 of Book III, Chapter X of An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, “Of the Abuse of Words,” “in Discourses, where we 
seek rather Pleasure and Delight, than Information and Improvement, such Ornaments as 
are borrowed from [wit and fancy], can scarce pass for Faults. But yet, if we would speak 
of Things as they are, we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and 
Clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented, are
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for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the 
Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat” (508). And yet, in the following chapter, “Of 
the Remedies of the Foregoing Imperfections and Abuses [of language],” Locke lays out 
the case for the epistemological legitimacy and unsurpassable utility of those schemes of 
perceptual and intellectual organization he terms “mixed modes” o f thought and (hence) 
speech. Such modes he defines as those “Combinations of simple Ideas, as are not looked 
upon to be the characteristical marks of any real Beings that have a steady existence, but 
scattered and independent Ideas, put together by the Mind”; these include “the Complex 
Ideas, we mark by the names Obligation, Drunkenness, a Lye, etc.” (II, xxii, “Of Mixed 
Modes,” 288), and may in short be thought of as those notions not derived from sensual 
but from reflective experience, from comparing and combining any number of distinct ideas 
already in the mind. The complex idea of drunkenness, for example, might consist in the 
separate ideas of a redness of the face and eyes, slurred speech, imprecise movements of 
the arms and legs, and a marked joviality or querulousness. These have no inevitable 
connection, but when we put with them the further idea of the consumption of much liquor, 
we group them together under the abstract term “drunkenness.” Corresponding to no 
specific things in nature, these compound abstractions are, “as it were, Patterns lodg’d  in 
my Memory, with names annexed to them, to denominate Actions and Relations by, as 
they come to exist” (507; emphasis added). These denominations may be precisely 
established, Locke argues, even when they represent notions of morality: “I am so bold to 
think, that Morality is capable o f Demonstration, as well as Mathematicks: Since the precise 
real Essence of the Things moral Words stand for, may be perfectly known; and so the 
Congruity, or Incongruity of the Things themselves, be certainly discovered, in which 
consists perfect Knowledge” (516). Yet as patterns of human experience, these complex 
ideas, “having no external Beings for Archetypes which they are referr’d to, and must 
correspond with” (517), comprise not rigid absolutes, separate from our consciousness and
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therefore essentially unknowable, but flexible, fluid entities, knowable according to
collectively acknowledged criteria and capable of being purposefully created and revised.
Locke would no doubt wince at our labelling such patterns as figures o f speech or
emblematic images, yet it is in their independence horn the tangible world about us that the
utility of these complex ideas lies. “It is far easier,” Locke declares, “for Men to frame in
their Minds an Idea, which shall be the Standard to which they will give the Name Justice,
with which Pattern so made, all Actions that agree shall pass under that denomination, than
having seen Aristides, to frame an Idea, that shall in all things be exactly like him, who is
as he is, let Men make what Idea, they please of him” (517). Because Aristides is an actual
physical and rational entity distinct from our own self-enclosed systems o f perception and
consciousness, we cannot have more than a superficial sensual impression what Aristides
is; we cannot deduce from our sensual apprehension of him those properties and
characteristics of Aristides that do not appear immediately to view. Because of this,
descriptions of him will likely vary a good deal from person to person, leading to some
confusion about just what it is that is signified by the name “Aristides.” But Locke goes
further, and asserts that we cannot trust our senses to give us accurate, comprehensive
ideas of even simple materials:
Therefore, in the signification of our Names o f Substances, some part o f the 
signification w ill be better made known, by enumerating those sim ple Ideas, 
than in shewing the Substance it se lf For he that, to the yellow shining 
Colour of Gold got by sight, shall, from my enumerating them, have the 
Ideas of great Ductility, Fusibility, Fixedness, and Solubility, in Aqua 
Regia, will have a perfecter Idea o f Gold, than he can have by seeing a piece 
of Gold, and thereby imprinting in his Mind only its obvious Qualities 
(520).
Nearly two millennia earlier, Lucretius, distant forbear o f the seventeenth century 
materialists, had declared that the senses were supreme in creating our knowledge of the 
world external to ourselves; if we did not understand what our senses conveyed to us, the 
fault lay not in our eyes and ears, but in our reason, which either could not or would not
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process our sensual perceptions properly. Locke’s argument turns Lucretius’ doctrine on 
its head. We can never apprehend the external world, fully, in itself, whereas our complex 
ideas of moral or of abstract notions generally, can be demonstrated with a mathematical 
certainty because they originate in our own minds. Our complex ideas are their own 
archetypes; as such, the working patterns o f experience that they subsume have a much 
closer correspondence to their original than our notions of what we think o f as materially 
real.
Though Locke’s argument is open to second-guessing, its (admittedly inadvertent) 
importance for the vindication of poetry and poetry’s claim upon social memory in the 
second half of the seventeenth century is immense. First, and most obviously, it asserts the 
philosophical validity of the intangible, the abstract, the figurative. For Locke, as for Bacon 
and—especially—Hobbes, the practical reality of an object or idea seems proportional to 
the clarity and integrity of its definition, rather than its actual physical existence or capacity 
for such. (It is possible, for example, to see someone drunk yet have no clear notion of 
drunkenness, which, on the other hand, we might understand quite well without having 
seen someone drinking heavily and stumbling about) Second, because our ideas depend 
on their definitions, and these definitions upon the demonstration of innate qualities, those 
who by their efforts add clarity to our ideas either of simple substances or o f complex 
ideas, such as justice  or gratitude, have a powerful claim upon our deference. Locke 
incidentally supposes that spiritual intelligences exceeding our own might very well “have 
as clear Ideas o f the radical Constitution of Substances, as we have o f a Triangle, and so 
perceive how all their Properties and Operations flow from thence”; such understanding, he 
concedes, “exceeds our Conceptions” (520), but he asserts with pride immediately 
afterward that investigations in the natural sciences will greatly add to our ideas of the 
“Properties and Operations” of the animate and inanimate natural bodies being scrutinized. 
The power to define is thus power itself. Power, though, of a moral rather than coercive 
nature. For is it not to be desired, Locke asks, “that the Use of Words were made plain and
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direct; and that Language, which was given us for the improvement of Knowledge, and 
bond of Society, should not be employ’d to darken Truth, and unsettle Peoples Rights; to 
raise Mists, and render unintelligible both Morality and Religion?” (HI, x, 497). And 
finally, as this last passage should suggest, the importance o f precise, collectively 
acknowledged definitions has very little to with satisfying the fastidiousness of word- 
obsessed pedants or vindicating an eccentric metaphysical scheme, but everything to do 
with public utility. Language matters because it is through language that “the precise real 
Essence of the Things” and “the Congruity, or Incongruity of the Things themselves, be 
certainly discovered, in which consists perfect Knowledge”; and language is a  moral matter 
because it is through language that we arrive at stable, workable understandings o f those 
impalpable ethical notions that hold human society together and make it worth holding 
together order, law, justice, virtue, gratitude, obligation.
If we would only trouble ourselves to be clear and consistent in our use of words, 
says Locke at the conclusion of his chapter on redressing the imperfections and abuses of 
language, “many of the Controversies in Dispute would be at an end; several of those great 
Volumes, swollen with ambiguous Words, now used in one sense, and by and by in 
another, would shrink into a very narrow compass; and many o f the Philosophers (to 
mention no other,) as well as Poets Works, might be contained in a Nut-shell” (523). 
Despite this hostility to poetry, and despite the obvious fact that Dryden and his 
contemporaries of the 1660’s and I670’s could have no premonition of what Locke would 
write many years hence, Locke needs to be cited here because he fully and concisely 
expresses the effective case for poetry that Dryden would make by fits and turns as he 
established his own dramatic and critical authority during these decades.
We should first consider Dryden’s rejection o f “realism” in poetry. Locke’s 
assertions that our senses, incapable of giving us sufficiently adequate conceptions o f 
substances, such as gold, or of persons, such as Aristides, are better supplemented with an 
enumeration of the properties of their objects than with exposure to the objects themselves.
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and that moral terms, existing nowhere in physical nature, have necessarily to be 
understood solely by definition—these have their equivalent in Dryden’s first critical 
pieces. In his preface to The Rival Ladies (1664), for example, Dryden declares flatly that 
what transpires upon the stage cannot hope to pass for what we know to be real, “For the 
stage being the representation of the world, and the actions in it, how can it be imagined 
that the picture of human life can be more exact than life itself is?” (2). And in “A Defence 
of An Essay o f Dramatic Poesy” (1668), he says further that the stage should not attempt to 
render everyday experience to the life. “T is true,” Dryden concedes, “that to imitate well is 
a poet’s work; but to affect the soul, and excite the passions, and, above all, to move 
admiration (which is the delight of serious plays), a bare imitation will not serve” (114); 
and a bit later he adds that “one great reason why prose is not to be used in serious plays is 
because it is too near the nature of converse: there may be too great a likeness” (114; 
emphasis added). It might seem that a great likeness is exactly what neoclassical 
mimeticism would require, but one must remember what we have observed above, that 
mimeticism has more to do with affect than with physical similitude. Further, and perhaps 
more to the point here, the true aim of “serious plays” is not an exact reconstruction of 
particular persons, speeches, actions, and events but rather the ideas—in Locke’s sense of 
“whatsoever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks”27—each is made to 
represent, and, ultimately, the controlling idea or theme of the drama that the poet seeks to 
impart to the understanding of the audience. Thus Dryden has Iisideius assert in O f Drama­
tic Poesy: An Essay,
The words o f a  good writer, which describe fa scene] lively, will make a 
deeper impression of belief in us than all the actor can persuade us to when 
he seems to fall dead before us; as a poet in the description o f a beautiful 
garden, or a meadow, will please our imagination more than the place itself 
can please our sight When we see death represented, we are convinced it is
27 “Introduction.” An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 47.
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but fiction; but when we hear it related, our eyes (the strongest witnesses) 
are wanting, which might have undeceived us, and we are willing to favour 
the sleight when the poet does not too grossly impose on us (51).
To this, Neander, Dryden’s alter ego in the discussion and an advocate o f dramatic
representation over mere narration, replies, “For my part, I can with as great ease persuade
myself that the blows which are struck are given in good earnest, as I can that they who
strike them kings or princes, or those persons which they represent” (62). But the
disputants’ arguments are more complementary than mutually opposed: Lisideius rightly
points out that the realism of the stage always calls itself into question, and never more than
when it makes its closest approach to reality;28 Neander, that what is presented to our
senses from the stage is material for the imagination, for our ideas of heroism and battle
and death. The same applies to the representation of particular historical personages. In his
preface to A ll For Love (1678), for instance, Dryden says that he consulted Plutarch,
Appian, and Dion Cassius the better to depict Antony and Cleopatra; yet he makes no claim
of exacting similitude for his portraitures, offering instead “famous patterns o f unlawful
love” (22). To demand an historically accurate depiction of these ill-fated lovers would be
not simply to miss the point, but to diminish the moral power of the play. Distracted by the
task of checking the principals against an exhaustive list of historical and biographical
minutiae, poet and audience alike would soon lose sight of the moral end for which they
have been portrayed.
The authenticity of dramatic portrayals should be sufficient to allow the audience to 
suspend its disbelief and accept the dramatist’s operative premise that what we are shown is 
Alexandria and that the two lovers are Antony and Cleopatra: the particular truths of history
28 In several numbers of The Spectator (nos. 42 and 44 come readily to mind), Addison mocks the attempts 
at hyper-realism made by the stage managers of his day. In Spectator No. 5, Tuesday, March 6, 1711, 
for example, he relates how he recently came upon a man “carrying a Cage hill of little Birds upon his 
Shoulder.” These birds, it turned out, were not destined for the dinner table, but for the opera: “I 
perceived that the Sparrows were to act the part of Singing Birds in a delightful Grove: though upon a 
nearer Enquiry I found the Sparrows put the same Trick upon the Audience, that Sir Martin Mar-all 
practised upon his Mistress; for, though they flew in Sight, the Musick proceeded from a Consort of 
Flagellets and Bird-calls which was planted behind the Scenes” (17).
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present particular moral problems made compelling precisely because they were faced by 
specific personages in specific circumstances. The dramatist aims to impose patterns of 
ethical order and interpretation upon these personages and events, but without the proper 
human context (whether historical, mythological or literary), drama could never do more 
than paint in the broad, rough lines o f  allegory. The balance is a fine one: if the drama 
pretends to stark realism, it invites doubt and distracts from the moral; if it veers too into 
the realm of moral abstractions, it loses its power to move us.
To understand the balance Dryden was to achieve in theory, we might draw an 
analogy between the performance of a  play and that piece of gold Locke uses to show the 
enigmatic nature of material substances. The sets, the costumes, the bodies, movements, 
and speeches of the actors—these correspond to the gold that might rest in our palm: we 
see its color, feel its weight and texture, but can make no guess at its other, less obvious 
properties, its “great Ductility, Fusibility, Fixedness, and Solubility.” Similarly, the 
physical sensations we receive from a  stage performance might hold our attention, excite 
our passions, our sympathy, or our laughter, but in themselves they offer nothing like a 
complete idea of the theme controlling yet beyond the scope of the action. Rather, this 
theme or controlling moral pattern is conveyed by the play’s several characterizations— 
their development, juxtapositioning, and the distinct arcs of their individual fortunes—as 
well as by what is said in the play and how it is said: how the lines are delivered, but also 
those properties (generally figurative in nature) that allow them to suggest more than what 
they say literally and to satisfy more than situational utility. When the playwright has been 
successful, the presentation of “serious plays” suggests more to the reflecting mind than is 
presented to the eye and ear.
Perhaps Dryden’s most explicit statements regarding this optimal balance between 
tangible presentation and intangible pattern, between the real and the ideal, occur in his 
frequent comparisons of painting and poetry. In his ode, “To the Pious Memory of the 
Accomplish’d Young Lady, Mrs. Anne Killigrew” (1685), for example, Dryden cites his
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subject’s ability as a gifted amateur painter to surpass on canvas the representational skill of 
poets in capturing the beauty the pastoral world. Whereas these poets “frequent inroads 
there [in pastoral] had made, / And perfectly could represent / The shape, the face, with 
ev’ry lineament” (11.100-102), Killigrew’s “pencil drew whate’er her soul design’d, / And 
oft the happy draught surpass’d the image of her mind” (11.106-107). Anne Killigrew was 
likewise able in her portraits of James, Dryden says, to see and convey more than what 
merely appeared to view: “For, not content t’ express his outward part, / Her hand call’d 
out the image of his heart: / His warlike mind, his soul devoid of fear, / His high-designing 
thoughts were figur’d there, /  As when, by magic, ghosts are made appear” (11. 129-133). 
Catching the mere likeness of one’s subject in verse or paint is not enough; one must 
capture and convey in the sound, rhythms, and imagery of poetry and in the arrangement, 
colors, and shadings o f painting those intangible qualities of one’s subject that cannot be 
detected readily by the senses; one must suggest to the mind ideas that have no truly 
isolatable or identifiable existence in the sensations or materials used in the representation 
of one’s subject. We cannot say, for instance, that the idea of chastity in Killigrew’s 
painting of two of Diana’s nymphs—“Though Venus we transcend in Form / No wanton 
Flames our Bosomes warm!”29—resides in the hunting posture of one, or in the other’s 
bathing; nor can we say that James’s martial prowess is to be discerned in the shadings of 
his face, or his “high-designing thoughts” in the brush strokes that compose his eyes. 
Dryden offers similar praise on similar grounds to his friend, the fashionable portrait 
painter Sir Godfrey Kneller, in a 1694 verse epistle in which he draws parallels between 
their respective careers. Nature lives in Kneller’s paintings, Dryden says, “and wants but 
words to speak her thought / At least thy pictures look a voice; and we / Imagine sounds, 
deceiv’d to that degree, / We think ’tis somewhat more than just to see” (11.11-13). This is
29 Lines 19-20 of Killigrew’s “On a Picture Painted by her self, representing two Nimphs of Diana's, one 
in a Posture to Hunt, the other Batheing" (1686).
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an eloquent way of saying that Kneller’s work is lifelike, but here again, that lifelikeness is
important for what it suggests beyond itself. As Dryden observes in a later passage of the
mimetic quality of Kneller’s portraits:
Likeness is ever there; but still the best,
Like proper thoughts in lofty language dress’d:
Where light, to shades descending, plays, not strives,
Dies by degrees, and be degrees revives.
Of various parts a  perfect whole is wrought:
Thy pictures think, and we divine their thought (11.65-72).
The likeness, accurate as it is, pleasing as it is, must convey to us the idea that informs it,
that unites its several parts into “a perfect whole”; we must, as it were, see that the
picture—or poem—thinks, and be able to “divine” its thought
That thought (or, keeping Locke in mind, that pattern of moral understanding
lodged in the memory), is, as I have suggested, the poet’s true object as it is the painter’s.
If it is neither possible nor desirable to convey it in through a meticulous realism, neither is
it all necessary to attempt to do so. To stay with “To Sir Godfrey Kneller” for the moment,
Dryden delivers in that poem a thumbnail history of painting that traces in the evolution of
the art the simultaneous advancement of human consciousness: “By slow degrees, the
godlike art advanc’d; / As man grew polish’d, picture was inhanc’d” (11. 35-36). In short,
the increasing regularity and sophistication of the rules of art attended the development of
intellectual order and sophistication. Thus, says Dryden, though crude daubs in coal and
chalk once sufficed for likeness in barbarous times, it was not until “Greece added posture,
shade, and perspective” (1.37) that “the mimic piece began to live” (1.38). Eclipsed (with
poetry) by the violence of the “Goths and Vandals, a rude northern race” (1. 47), painting
was reduced to “Flat faces, such as would disgrace a screen, / . . .  Unrais’d, unrounded,
were the rude delight / Of brutal nations, only born to fight” (U. 53; 55-56). Awaking at last
from their “iron sleep” (1.57) in the age of Raphael, the graphic arts have since seemingly
achieved the apex of coloring and design (both realized in Kneller’s work which, as noted,
seems to think as well). Remarkable in Dryden’s 38-line history is the implicit assumption
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that the more sophisticated the intelligence that views the painting and the greater its 
knowledge and appreciation of the rules o f  artifice, the more subtle its use of the physical 
stimuli it receives and the more understated those stimuli may be. Mot only are Kneller’s 
lines more delicate than their two-dimensional Gothic counterparts, they suggest more to 
the mind that can combine the effects o f  perspective, foreshortening, shading, coloring, 
and the adumbrated figure into an ordered whole that is not merely a near physical likeness, 
but a near likeness to abstract notions and ideals as well. Put simply, with intellectual 
sophistication comes a more highly ordered pattern to perception, a pattern that creates in 
turn the capacity to discern in what is before us that which we do not physically see, to 
acknowledge the literal, yet see in addition the steadier idea held in the mind’s eye.
This outline of the progress of consciousness recaps what Dryden had said years 
earlier in his “Defence of the Epilogue [to the second part o f The Conquest o f Granada], or 
An Essay on the Dramatic Poetry of the Last Age” (1672). In this essay, Dryden makes the 
provocative assertion that if “the language, wit, and conversation of our age are improved 
and refined above the last” (170), it is largely because of a newly heightened degree o f self- 
awareness. If diction in the age of Shakespeare and Jonson was crude and harshly knitted, 
if its wit was often improper, if its conversation was vulgar and superficial, these 
deficiencies are owing to the period’s inability to perform the rather complex mental feat of 
standing outside itself in order to see, assess, and amend its manners and its literature. The 
present age, says Dryden, has its “imperfections and failings. But I may safely conclude in 
the general, that our improprieties are less frequent, and less gross than theirs. One 
testimony of this is undeniable, that we are the fir s t who have observed them. And 
certainly, to observe errors is a great step to the correcting o f them” (171; emphasis added). 
Noting, for instance, that the refinement o f language principally consists in “either rejecting 
such old words or phrases which are ill sounding, or improper, or in admitting new, which 
are more proper, more sounding, and more significant” (171), Dryden remarks that the 
“Well placing of words, for the sweetness o f pronunciation, was not known till Mr. Waller
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introduced it” (175), and that the disciplined introduction o f new words into the poetic 
vocabulary and the “heightening [of the] natural signification” of existing words were 
largely the business o f Suckling and Waller, refining upon the efforts of Shakespeare, 
Fletcher, and Jonson (177). As for wit, that “o f this age is much more courtly,” because 
the age itself is more gallant: “I have always acknowledged the wit of our predecessors, 
with all the veneration which becomes me; but, I am sure, their wit was not that o f 
gentlemen; there was ever somewhat that was clownish in it, and which confessed the 
conversation of the authors” (180). O f this conversation itself, it is owing to the example o f 
the present King, who upon his restoration “found a nation lost as much in barbarism as in 
rebellion” (181), that “the dull and heavy spirits o f the English” have been awakened from 
“their natural reservedness,” making discourse “easy and pliant” (181-182).
If we are to believe Dryden, the English, lately an uncouth, clownish, and 
barbarous people, ignorant of the proprieties o f deportment and of letters, have recently, 
from the example of “so great a pattern” as Charles II (181) and the advancement of poetic 
principle and craft, entered into a  new era of refinement and sophistication. Such a claim 
allows Dryden to claim further that poetry has not “[gone] backward, when all other arts 
and sciences are advancing” (169): given the intellectual and technological progress of the 
present age, “it would be a wonder if  the poets, whose work is imitation, should be the 
only persons in three kingdoms who should not receive advantage by it” (182). Indeed, we 
can infer that what is true for painting is true for poetry: if, as Dryden asserts, the artifices 
have grown more subtle, so too has the understanding that perceives and interprets them. It 
might have been the case in the former age, when “the want of education and learning” 
(172) made audiences “content with acorns before they knew the use of bread” (173), and 
therefore easily imposed upon, such artifices might have been dangerously suggestive. But 
in the present circumstances, poets may without danger avail themselves of those figurative 
techniques inherited from the classical world: Horace, Dryden observes, “had a particular 
happiness: using all the tropes, and particularly metaphors, with that grace which is
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observable in his Odes, where the beauty o f expression is often greater than that of 
thought” (177). Rejecting the false wit o f the last age, which, Dryden maintains in O f 
Dramatic Poesy: An Essay, “perpetually pays us with clenches upon words, a certain 
clownish kind of raillery,” and now and then “offers at a catachresis or Clevelandism, 
wresting and torturing a word into another meaning,” Dryden does indeed insist throughout 
his critical writings upon the contemporary poet’s right to the technical legacy of the 
classical masters, particularly Virgil and Horace, and insists especially upon the poet’s 
recourse to an artifice of comparatively recent origin: rhyme.
This is not the place to recount the seventeenth-century controversy over the 
propriety o f rhyme in heroic drama, one that took up much of Dryden’s critical attention 
and made the poet himself a controversial figure; nor do I intend trace how Dryden’s early 
championing of rhymed drama ultimately gave way to his rejection of it in the late 1670’s. 
But the topic of rhyme does nicely encapsulate the poet’s case for rejecting realism, for 
instead positing and appealing to truths beyond the ken of the material world, and for 
claiming an intellectual and moral authority sufficient to justify prescribing patterns of 
moral knowledge to society at large. Rhyme, says Dryden in his preface to The Rival 
Ladies (1664), is not merely euphonious, but an aid to memory and clear thinking. It “knits 
up” the memory “by the affinity o f sounds that, by remembering the last word in one line, 
we often call to mind both verses” (8). And rather than being an excrescence (“an 
embroidery of sense”), or worse, a means o f cozening the hearer, impeding critical 
reflection with “the affinity of sounds,” rhyme’s value, to the contrary, “is that it bounds 
and circumscribes the fancy”(8): “[Clertainly that which most regulates the fancy, and 
gives the judgement its busiest employment, is like to bring forth the richest and clearest 
thoughts” (9). True enough, no one speaks in rhyme, least of all when he or she is in the 
midst of some great passion or action—but, again, the poet’s object is not realism but the 
presentation of moral truth, and we should remember Dryden’s admonition in “A Defence 
of An Essay o f Dramatic Poesy” that prose is too great a likeness to reality to be appropriate
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for “serious plays.” Given the poet’s moral object, Dryden observes in “Of Heroic Plays: 
An Essay” (1672), the play’s “thoughts may be exalted,” its “images and actions may be 
raised above the life” (157), for “an heroic poet is not tied to a bare representation of what 
is true, or exceeding probable: but. . .  he may let himself loose to visionary objects, and to 
the representation o f such things as depending not on sense, and therefore not to be 
comprehended by knowledge, may give him a freer scope for imagination” (161). Prose or 
blank verse might begin to serve the poet’s ends, but rhyme is “the last perfection of art” 
(157), and as such offers the poet not only the greatest degree of independence from the 
confines o f “realistic” speech and action, but also, by reason of its ability to heighten 
thought and expression, the most efficient way to depict with propriety those ideas that lie 
behind and inform apparent reality. “A play,” says Neander in O f Dramatic Poesy: An 
Essay, “as I have said, to be like nature, is to be set above it; as statues which are placed on 
high are made greater than the life, that they may descend to the sight in their just 
proportion” (88). So it is with rhyme. At a far remove from everyday speech, enchanting 
the soul with its sweetness and cadence {O f Dramatic Poesy, 89) even as it matches sound 
to thought, rhyme can induce in the listener a clearer conception of the poet’s “visionary 
objects,” and, owing to its ability to “knit up” the memory, it helps the hearer to retain these 
objects easily and for a longer period.
The difficulty of rhyming well, of intelligibly yoking sense with sound, certainly 
extends to the poet a large degree of technical authority. But it is in rhyme's ability to 
impose particular patterns upon cognition, thought, and memory that gives the poet the 
more important authority of determining the terms or “shape” of moral definitions. In his 
preface to The Rival Ladies, Dryden observes that in rhymed poetry “the first word in the 
verse seems to beget the second, and that the next, till that becomes the last word in the 
line” (7). Dryden is speaking here of the process by which couplets are stitched together by 
the poet’s pen, but the patterns that circumscribe composition likewise circumscribe 
comprehension. Rhyme thus imposes a seeming inevitability upon the unfolding o f a
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listener’s thought and upon the formation of his or her understanding. For this reason, 
concludes Dryden, “The scenes which in my opinion most commend it, are those of 
argumentation and discourse, on the result of which the doing or not doing some 
considerable action should depend” (9).
Dryden makes no apology for wishing to impose upon the listener. Indeed, even 
before he had discovered Longinus for himself he was declaring, in “Of Heroic Plays: An 
Essay” (1672), “The poet is, then, to endeavour an absolute dominion over the minds of 
the spectators; for, though our fancy will contribute to its own deceit, yet a  writer ought to 
to help its operation” (162). Once he had discovered Longinus, in the mid- to late 1670’s, 
he could assert with complacency, in “The Author’s Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic 
Licence” (prefixed to The State o f Innocence, 1677), that because o f the nobly affective 
power of its figures heroic poetry “has ever been esteemed, and ever will be, the greatest 
work of human nature” (198). “Are all the flights o f heroic poetry to be concluded 
bombast, unnatural, and mere madness, because [its critics] are not affected with their 
excellencies? ’l i s  just as reasonable to conclude there is no day because a blind man cannot 
distinguish o f light and colours” (199); therefore, Dryden resolves, “I will presume for 
once to tell them that the boldest strokes of poetry, when they are managed artfully, are 
those which most delight the reader” (200). Thus he favors “the hardest metaphors” and 
“the strongest hyperboles” used by Virgil and Horace (200), and the “tropes and figures” 
of rhetoric, which have had such a long-lasting currency “because it was observed they had 
such and such effect upon the audience” (201); the poet must even be prepared to “put on 
[feign] the passions he endeavours to represent” (203). Such artifices are to be “placed in 
poetry as heightening and shadows are in painting, to make the figure bolder, and cause it 
to stand off to sight” (200), and, as his comparison with painting suggests, Dryden 
believes with his classical forbears that the (figuratively) visual element of poetry is all- 
important: “Imaging is, in itself the very height and life of poetry. It is, as Longinus 
describes it, a discourse which, by a kind of enthusiasm, or extraordinary emotion of the
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soul, makes it seem to us that we behold those things which the poet paints, so as to be 
pleased with them, and to admire them” (203).
Dryden’s emphasis here on poetry’s capacity to sway us sub-rationally, via “a kind 
of enthusiasm” or an “extraordinary emotion of the soul,” would seem to reinforce the 
philosophical case against it, particularly when he says in addition that “the boldness of the 
figures are to be hidden sometimes by the address of the poet, that they may work their 
effect upon the mind without discovering the art which caused it” (203). A poem’s 
subliminal appeal, after all, is by nature opposed to the open, forthright methods of 
empiricism, and may work to impair the mind’s faculty of purposeful self-reflection. But 
we must observe, first, that Dryden does not endorse every poetic artifice. He remarks in 
this essay that “there are limits to be set betwixt the boldness and rashness of a poet” (199), 
and the previous chapter has given us ample evidence of Dryden’s virulent antipathy 
toward cheap theatricality. Moreover, to use artifice effectively is no simple thing; in 
addition to poetic skill, it demands as much study and knowledge of human nature as the 
most exacting empiricist could expect “It requires philosophy as well poetry,” says 
Dryden, “to sound the depth of all the passions; what they are in themselves, and how they 
are to be provoked; and in this science the best poets have excelled” (200). Second, we 
must consider the distinction Dryden makes between figure and fiction. In heroic poetry, he 
argues, “You are not obliged, as in history, to a literal belief of what the poet says; but you 
are pleased with the image, without being cozened by the fiction” (202). If the image is not 
historically factual, neither is it merely spurious, for it serves the ends of a greater Truth, 
that is, o f the larger pattern of moral verity that informs the work as a whole. Indeed, it is 
the moral aim of the poem that lends its artifices, its figures, its rhetoric their authority. As 
Dryden had argued as early as 1668 in “A Defence of An Essay o f Dramatic Poesy? “I am 
of the opinion that they cannot be good poets who are not accustomed to argue well. False 
reasonings and colours of speech are the certain marks of one who does not understand the 
stage; for moral truth is the mistress of the poet as much as of the philosopher: poetry must
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
255
resemble natural truth, but it must be ethical. Indeed the poet dresses Truth, and adorns
nature, but does not alter them” (120). If  the poet must fashion these moral patterns from
similitudes, it is because “we have notions o f things above us, by describing them like
other beings more within our knowledge,” the sublimest subjects requiring the “sublimest”
and “the most figurative expressions” (“Apology for Heroic Poetry,” 204; 207). When, for
instance, such figurative expressions, are used to frame “patterns o f piety, decently
represented and equally removed from the extremes of superstition and profaneness,”
Dryden argues in his preface to Tyrannic Love (1670), they “may be of excellent use to
second the precepts of our religion”:
By the harmony of words we elevate the mind to a sense of devotion, as our 
solemn music, which is inarticulate poesy, does in churches; and by the 
lively images of piety, adorned by action, through the senses allure the soul; 
which while it is charmed in a silent joy of what it sees and hears, is struck 
at the same time with a secret veneration of things celestial, and is wound up 
insensibly into the practice o f that which it admires (139).
To be sure, the poet’s artifices operate “through the senses” and through our 
emotions to prepare us psychologically for the moral notions we are to be shown. But note 
also in the above passage Dryden’s insistence that when the soul is struck with “secret 
veneration” and brought “into the practice” of the sublimest of sublime truths, it is moved 
by something like direct and total comprehension of the object of its contemplation, in this 
case, “lively images of piety.” The mind, elevated “to a sense of devotion” and shown as 
well as told what it is meant to apprehend, perchance is brought to a better understanding 
than if the moral notion set before it were instead defined hypothetically, or, as Locke 
would have it, demonstrated mathematically. Near the end of his chapter on remedying the 
imperfections and abuses of words, Locke wishes aloud for a dictionary or encyclopedia of 
natural history that would minutely enumerate “those simple Ideas, wherein [scientists] 
observe the Individuals of each sort constantly to agree” (522). Such a volume, he admits, 
would be all but impossible to assemble, and yet, he allows himself to hope, “it is not 
unreasonable to propose, that Words standing for Things, which are known and
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distinguished by the outward shapes, should be expressed by little Draughts and Prints 
made of them. A Vocabulary made after this fashion, would, perhaps with more ease, and 
in less time, teach the true significance o f many Terms,. . .  and settle truer Ideas in Men's 
Minds of several Things, whereof we read the Names in ancient Authors, than all the large 
and laborious Comments of learned Critics” (522-523). The stage serves the playwright for 
the naturalist's “little Draughts and Prints”; the writer o f epic or occasional verse must use 
artifice and figure exclusively. But both dramatic and nondramatic poet alike in effect take 
intangible patterns of moral truth—such as piety, or, more ambitiously, “the highest pattern 
of human life”3Q—and, couching the ineffable in terms we might understand, disclose 
aspects of them that would otherwise remain obscure or inexpressible.
In this, the poet is akin to Locke's “Spirit o f a higher rank” (520) that sees through 
external appearances to the hidden properties of things. But the poet need lay no claim to 
divine inspiration. Rather, the authority o f the poet’s figures and indeed his own derive 
from the practical and public nature o f his calling. If, as Dryden says, the poet’s material— 
his knowledge of the passions and of human nature and psychology—is the product of 
close, extended study of all ranks and conditions of society, then the moral patterns the 
poet fashions must not be pedantic or idiosyncratic, but readily and broadly applicable. For 
as the business of Locke’s ideal naturalist is to investigate and make generally known “the 
Nature and Properties of the Things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, 
our Ideas of their distinct Species” (520-521), so the poet’s business is to give us 
illustrative definitions of moral truths, to establish in our collective memories timeless, 
living patterns of virtue and vice, sense and nonsense, and it is the successful realization of 
this role—of moral investigator, definer, and shaper—that gives the poet his cultural 
authority. For it is with ethical propositions as with physical substances: for all practical 
purposes, the truth is what we know and are prepared to expect of them.
30-o f Heroic Plays: An Essay” (1672; 162).
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Though Dryden’s case for the poet as legislator is made most often on behalf of 
dramatic and epic poetry, it is equally if not especially apropos of occasional poetry, for the 
latter is by nature caught up more than any other poetic genre in the larger society’s 
attempts to define its moral and cultural sensibility and thereby the notions o f reality 
subsuming its ever-unfolding historical present. Insofar, then, as the poet’s object is the 
investigation and explication of historical, social, and moral truths, what Dryden says of 
heroic poetry in his preface to Annus M irabilis, “An Account of the Ensuing Poem, in a 
Letter to the Honourable Sir Robert Howard" (1666), that its “descriptions or images . . .  
beget admiration, which is its proper object” (101), is applicable as well to topical satire. 
For such satire, Dryden would argue late in his career, in A Discourse Concerning the 
Original and Progress o f Satire (1693), is a  species of heroic poetry, and in the hands of a 
modern master such as Boileau, is capable o f achieving “the majesty of the heroic, finely 
mix’d with the venom of [the lampoon]; and raising the delight which otherwise would be 
flat and vulgar, by the sublimity of the expression” (149). Couched in heroic verse, a  meter 
at once “roomy” (147) and elevated enough to accommodate its “sublime and lofty” 
thoughts (130), topical satire has as its object to give the reader “some one precept of moral 
virtue, and to caution him against some one particular vice or folly” (146). When we 
consider that the precepts and cautions found in occasional poetry and topical satire are 
closely linked to broadly observable personages and events and debates, we find that public 
poetry adds not simply a figurative element to the definition of moral concepts, as do 
dramatic and heroic poetry, but, through the ability of its figures to point again to their 
originals in the real, the everyday world, heightens our practical understanding and 
application of such concepts. It is in its power to refer to the immediate and local that public 
poetry attains its superior definitional faculty: the public poem leads us from the actual 
political, social, and cultural backdrops of everyday existence through figurative portrayals 
of the same to a new actuality, one now informed by the moral implications of what might 
otherwise escape our notice or consideration. Melding the actual with the artificial.
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empirical fact with poetic fiction, an individually verifiable picture o f the historical present 
with collective historical mythologies and literary traditions, the public poem achieves an 
alloy of modes that resolves, if anything can or does in this period, the supposedly 
irreconcilable antipathy between the scientific and poetic mindsets, between the literal 
language of the one and the figurative language of the other. And it is in the realization of 
this alloy that poetry was able to answer the potential scientific challenge it faced during this 
period and maintain its cultural relevance and authority.
If this alloy proved an unstable one in practice, it was likewise often as suspect 
among poets themselves as it was among philosophers such as Hobbes and Locke. We 
might, for instance, be brought up short by Dryden’s assertion in his preface to Religio 
L aid  (1682),
The expression of a poem design’d purely for instruction ought to be plain 
and natural, and yet majestic; for hoe  the poet is presum’d to be a kind of 
lawgiver, and those three qualities which I have nam’d are proper to the 
legislative style. The florid, elevated, and figurative way is for the passions; 
for love and hatred, fear and anger, are begotten in the soul by shewing 
their objects out of their true proportions, either greater than the life, or less; 
but instruction is to be given by shewing them what they naturally are. A 
man is to be cheated into passion, but to be reason’d into truth ( 162a).
Winn rightly points out that even early in his career Dryden was suspicious of poetic
figures that passed for truth; he was aware of how the poetic figure fell short of reality, and
often left it impoverished, diminished, through facile and superficial comparisons with
things fundamentally unlike (112). Nonetheless, Dryden is being overly fastidious here in
distinguishing rigidly and absolutely between the plain and natural “legislative style” and
the florid and elevated “figurative style.” Aside from the rather problematic distinction
between the “majestic” and “elevated” styles and the baffling opposition (given Dryden’s
earlier assertion that sublimity of style might lead open our souls to the contemplation of the
divine) of passion and truth, Dryden himself, as we have seen, has been a champion of the
figurative over the literal, arguing that the poet, to convince, must move, and to move.
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must distort his objects, if ever so slightly, to capture and direct our attention. And the 
preceding chapter should remind us that at least so far as the dramatist is concerned we may 
be cheated as well as reasoned into truth. But in any event, whether “cheated into passion" 
or “reason’d into truth" our passions and minds are moved (at least ideally) for the same 
end: a better apprehension o f moral truth. That Dryden makes this distinction between the 
figurative and literal styles here is due, I suspect, to his wish that we read Religio Laid , his 
personal manifesto o f religious belief, as a straight-forward, unambiguous statement of 
fact. Dryden would have us know that he intends to convince us of the reasonableness of 
his pronouncements by means o f the soundness o f his argument, rather than by the 
sublimity of his figures and metaphors. Still, Dryden’s implication that he means to reason 
his readers into truth underscores for us that Religio L aid  is, after all, a rhetorical poem, 
and one has scarcely begun the poem before one realizes that not only has Dryden not 
foregone the figurative—“Dim as the borrow’d beams of moon and stars / To lonely, 
weary, wand’ring travelers, /  Is Reason to the soul” (11. 1-3)—but has designed the poem 
to take its place in the debate over religious orthodoxy and individual conscience that 
preoccupied Augustan England. That the poem was greeted with yawning indifference does 
not change the fact that its disparagement of deists, Catholics, and (especially) Dissenters— 
whom Dryden taxes with despoiling the “tender page" of Scripture with “homy fists": 
“While crowds unlearn’d, with rude devotion warm, /  About the sacred viands buzz and 
swarm, / The fly-blown text creates a crawling brood, / And turns to maggots what was 
meant for food” (11. 404; 417-420)— marks it out as a controversialist piece in which 
Dryden plainly seeks to reason us into passion.
However, more important here than the dissolution of Dryden’s theoretical 
distinctions under the exigencies o f poetic practice, is what that dissolution tells us about 
the figurative-literal alloy forged by public poetry in the mid- to late seventeenth century. Its 
very rapidity tells us, first of all, that in practice it is difficult if not impossible to segregate
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the “plain and natural, yet majestic” legislative style from the “florid, elevated, and 
figurative.” And this tells us in turn that the melding of these two modes is the necessary, 
perhaps inevitable result of the emergence o f poetry into the public sphere during this 
period. For Religio L aid , is a public poem, and if its author truly means for it to be 
“design’d purely for instruction” and himself “presum’d to be a kind of lawgiver,” it must 
offer to its readers a  topic whose terms, whether couched in the literal or figurative mode, 
are readily, broadly, and durably intelligible; must offer them patterns of moral definition 
that enhance their understanding o f the ethical questions the given topic involves; and make 
those patterns socially pragmatic, readily and lastingly applicable, capable o f imposing 
order not only upon current but future experience. It must, in short, partake in the aesthetics 
of public memory.
And in what does the aesthetics o f memory consist during the latter half of the 
seventeenth century? To answer this, we must remind ourselves that memory is not simply 
what we have stored away, but the ways in which we organize our perceptions and 
reflections. Our memories are not simply a record of our experiences, whether, 
physiological, psychological, or intellectual, but operative mental habits that determine the 
ways in which we will experience the world about us. Thus, in addition to the many 
techniques the Augustan poet inherited from his or her Greek and Roman forbears for 
heightening the physio-psychic impressions of a poem (culminating in the sublime) that it 
may remain with us on a physiological level, they found that they must also employ those 
elements of their craft that make a poem or its parts intellectually durable as well. For the 
purposes of making the poem itself memorable, it was enough to establish within the work 
easily recognizable patterns of structure, theme, characterization, and allusion, as well as 
patterns recognizable by the particular genre of a piece, including conventions of narrative, 
prosody, and verbal formulae. Certainly the intellectual appeal of a work, like its 
physiological appeal, might exist for its own sake. We might admire the sound of a phrase, 
for example, or an apt metaphor, or appreciate the sleek thematic structuring of a work,
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without making a conscious mental note to ourselves that we will remember this or that 
detail, or that the experience of physically perceiving a  poem and reflecting upon its form 
and interpretation has necessarily altered our patterns of ordering sensation and thought 
^Esthetics need not involve mnemonics overtly. But the mnemonics of public poetry in the 
Augustan age certainly depend upon the aesthetic impact of a work, and the poets o f this 
period not only sought in general to capture and focus the public's attention upon 
themselves to enhance their personal reputations, but upon the varied features o f the 
historical present as well. Pleasurable as they might be in themselves, the aesthetic features 
of Augustan public poetry became, in the hands o f Dryden and his contemporaries, an 
important part in the formation of working social memory and hence of national identity in 
the final decades of the seventeenth century. The aesthetics of memory, therefore, consists, 
not in the mere existence of its physiological, psychological, and intellectual elements, or in 
their potential power to inculcate in us certain patterns of cognition, experience, and 
reflection, but in their successful application. To their application, then, we must now turn, 
Religio L aid  providing us a ready entry into the subjects of the following “case study,” the 
Exclusion Crisis and images of English Puritanism.
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CHAPTER IV
THE EXCLUSION CRISIS AND IMAGES OF ENGLISH PURITANISM:
A CASE STUDY OF POETRY AND MEMORY IN AUGUSTAN ENGLAND
When we consider that Dryden’s Religio L aid , or A Layman's Faith is intended as 
an explication of the poet’s personal religious convictions, we might expect that Dryden, at 
least a nominal Anglican at the time of the poem’s publication, would throw the principles 
of his private faith into greater relief by contrasting them with what he took to be the 
intellectual errors of deism and the doctrinal errors o f Roman Catholicism and Protestant 
Dissent; and the poem indeed goes two-thirds of the way toward fulfilling our expectations. 
Dryden takes the time (over a third o f the poem) to demonstrate for the deist reason’s 
dependence upon belief—“Reveal’d Religion first inform’d thy sight, /  And Reason saw 
not, till Faith sprung light” (11. 68-69)—and to draw from the examples of Greek and 
Roman civilization and its philosophers, “Those giant wits, in happier ages bom” (1. 80), 
the dangerous materialism and amorality of any philosophical system for which rational 
expediency is the sole source, end, and test of ethical Man. And it is with no small degree 
of professed respect for the learning and piety of the Church Fathers that he sets about to 
counter Rome’s insistence upon the infallibility of its authority and traditions, concluding 
that Scripture alone, though “not everywhere / Free from corruption, or intire, or clear” (11. 
297-298), is sufficiently coherent, complete, and comprehensible “in all things which our 
needful faith require” (1. 300): “For MY salvation must its doom receive, / Not from what 
o t h e r s  but what /  believe” (U. 303-304).
But when he comes to speak o f “that other extreme of our religion,” as he terms it 
in the poem’s preface, “I mean the Fanatics, or Schismatics of the English Church” 
(160B), Dryden expends neither reason nor respect upon his foes, and instead of seriously 
refuting their errors, is content with defaming their adherents. These he describes in his
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preface as a many-headed herd of self-elected, rabble-baiting sectarians determined to 
undermine the established order in religion and government; in the poem itself, his 
treatment o f Dissenters may be far shorter than that of deists and Catholics, but it is perhaps 
all the more savage for the compression o f  its scorn. The triumph of the Protestant 
Reformation, he argues, is that it made the Scriptures broadly available: “The b o o k ’s a 
common largess to mankind, /  Not more for [priests 1 than every man design’d” (11. 364- 
365). But one unfortunate effect of “the book thus put in every vulgar hand” (1.400) was 
that now “[t|he common rule was made the common prey, / And at the mercy of the rabble 
lay” (11 402-403). The consequences for Scripture, religion, social discourse, and the 
stability of English institutions at large as Dryden enumerates them provide us a catalogue 
(U. 404-426)—comprehensive, yet brilliant in its concision—of a century’s worth of anti- 
Puritan iconography, culminating, as we saw near the end of the last chapter, with perhaps 
the most grotesque image of Dryden’s career, that of the Bible’s “fly-blown text” (1.419) 
crawling with maggots. I shall shortly return to the individual brushstrokes of this hostile 
portrait; for the moment, however, I would suggest that we have some reason to be 
surprised at the violence of Dryden’s attack, and on two counts. First, Dryden was raised 
in a Puritan household and was educated at Cambridge by Puritan masters; second, the 
abuses with which he taxes “the Fanatics, or Schismatics o f the English Church” appear to 
have already had their day: the tumult occasioned by religious faction has apparently been 
long since resolved; the Civil War is over; the King has been restored, and, with him, the 
Church of England. This verse paragraph might have been more to the point if  it had 
appeared in the early 1640’s, or, with Butler’s Hudibras, soon after the Restoration, but 
twenty years have passed now since the true blue Protestant Quixote rode out with his 
faithful squire, Ralpho. Our puzzlement, however, should last only as long as it takes us to 
recall the date of the poem’s appearance: November 30,1682.
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In November 1682 England was in the midst o f a major shift in the collective 
national mood, having recently emerged from a brace of controversies that indeed had 
threatened to thrust it once again into the chaos o f open civil war. The Popish Plot to 
assassinate the king and reintroduce Roman Catholicism as the official religion, supposedly 
discovered in October 1678, had been exploited by Shaftesbury and the Whigs for leverage 
during the Exclusion Crisis of 1679-1681, when Parliament had thrice submitted bills to 
exclude the openly Catholic James from the throne. Charles obstinately refused to sacrifice 
his brother to political expediency, and dissolved these exclusionist parliaments in May 
1679, January 1681, and March 1681, but anti-Catholic hysteria among the populace had 
also forced him on three occasions to send James into a Scottish or Continental exile. With 
the dissolution of the Oxford Parliament in March 1681, however, the King and the Tories 
at last felt strong enough to go on the offensive. Shaftesbury was arrested for treason in 
July, and though acquitted in November by a Whig jury packed by a Whiggish London 
Mayor, his acquittal was the catalyst for the Administration’s redoubled effort, Kenyon 
notes, “to secure a Tory Lord Mayor in 1682, and with him Tory sheriffs and Tory juries” 
(236), and to revoke the municipal charter that had underpinned London’s political 
independence of the Crown during the King’s battle with Parliament. London lost its 
charter the next year, but by the time Dryden’s poem appeared the so-called Tory Reaction 
was already nearing the apex of its strength. It had brought with it an especially virulent 
persecution o f Whig leaders, as we would expect—but also of Dissenters. Kenyon 
observes that while “lower-class Dissenters were blamed—probably quite wrongly—for 
the undermining of vested political interests in so many localities” (236), simultaneously 
“the personnel of county government, the Lord Lieutenants, deputy lieutenants and justices 
of the peace, was comprehensively purged [of Dissenters]. With the vigorous support of 
the bishops, these new Tory spokesmen now attempted, arguably for the first time, the full 
enforcement of the [anti-Puritan] Clarendon Code” (237).
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To understand why Dissenters merited the especial wrath o f the momentarily 
triumphant Tories, and why, so late in the day, Dryden would bother to direct at them the 
very aspersions that had been aimed at their Puritan fathers and grandfathers, we must 
consider the terms in which the constitutional struggle between Parliament and King had 
been cast—by politicians, certainly, but also by legions of pamphleteers and (more 
particularly for our purposes) poets who undertook to explicate the episodes of the struggle 
to the public at large. A constitutional battle the Exclusion Crisis was, but those living 
through it could hardly be expected to view it so coolly. Their memories, both individual 
and collective, would not let them. Personal memories of the Civil War and 
Commonwealth were still very much alive during these years, and because memory, as we 
have observed, is active, carrying forward images of the past to explain the present, and 
framing the present in ways that influence one’s perception and interpretation of the future 
as it unfolds, recollections of that earlier contest over executive authority inevitably shaped 
the ways in which the current one was seen and portrayed. The connection was indeed one 
the poets and pamphleteers of both sides sought to exploit in their attempts to reawaken the 
nation’s psychological past by infusing the issues, events, and personages of the present 
day with the images, passions, and prejudices England had inflicted on itself during the 
1640’s and 1650’s—materiel now all the more potent because it was so familiar and came 
ready-laden with decades of conditioned associations. Those writers supporting 
Shaftesbury and the Whigs, for instance, were likely to revive pre-Civil War fears o f Stuart 
absolutism, arbitrary rule, and the perennial bogies of Roman Catholic resurgence and the 
suppression of Protestantism. By doing so, however, they played into the hands of those 
loyal to Charles II and favorable to James’s succession, who tended to cast the Whigs as 
opportunistic Puritans eager to overturn a settled Crown and Church, and who made use of 
the fact that the Puritans opposed to Charles I were equally notorious for their resistance to 
authority and their habit of labelling “papist” any who dared disagree with them. Dryden’s 
point in rehearsing anti-Puritan jibes in the preface to Religio Laid and in the poem itself is
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therefore to recall to his readers the Puritans as they were at the height of their political 
power and social appeal, implying that the current Whig Opposition is nothing other than a 
revisitation of a dangerous national madness. *[T]he seeds were sown,” he reminds his 
readers in the preface, “in the time o f Queen Elizabeth, the bloody harvest ripen’d in the 
reign of King Charles the Martyr; and, because all the sheaves could not be carried off 
without shedding some of the loose grains,” he warns darkly, “another crop is too like to 
follow; nay, I fear ’tis unavoidable if  the conventiclers be permitted still to scatter” (161). 
Reason enough, we are to infer, for vigorously prosecuting the ongoing Tory Reaction 
against Whig leaders and their Non-Conformist allies.
Were Whigs the defenders of traditional liberties and true Protestantism? Were 
Tories truly the keepers of constitutional and civil order, a bulwark against mob-rule? 
Curiously, it was often the case that both parties left their own agendas vaguely defined, to 
be inferred from the particular features of their opponents they chose to attack. And because 
those attacks, as I have hinted, frequently tended to combine the literal (or actual) traits, 
actions, and persons of the opposing side within a figurative framework, the 
controversialist literature of the Exclusion Crisis and its aftermath affords us a rich 
opportunity to examine how during this period these distinct mnemonic modes were in 
practice interwoven to fashion working social memory. So varied and voluminous was the 
literature relating to the Exclusion Crisis that it would be impossible in the relatively few 
pages available to me here to survey the whole of the propaganda war between 1678 and 
1683; it is no less impossible to survey the whole of a single genre or medium; impossible 
even to cover the poetic output of a  single side in the contest Further, it would not do for 
me to imply that poetry was the most prominent the most sizable, or the even most 
respected vehicle of debate. Nonetheless, public poetry did play an appreciable role in 
shaping individual and collective perceptions of and responses to the Crisis, and in the 
following pages I hope to demonstrate how the several elements o f poetic memory
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enumerated in the previous chapter were likely to operate upon English sensibilities to 
create mnemonically viable representations o f the historical present
My decision to examine the Tories' use of anti-Puritan imagery in representing their 
Whiggish opponents may seem wholly arbitrary. Space forces me to be highly selective, 
but my choice will, I hope, be deemed an apposite one if I point out that despite the 
comparatively poor showing those supporting the succession of James made during the 
1678-1681 war of the presses,1 they were after all victorious, at least in the short-run: the 
exclusion bills were defeated, popular opinion turned against the Whigs, the Crown gained 
power at the expense of the party and its sympathizers, and, above all else, James 
succeeded his brother in 1685. Poetry obviously had its share in the general role Tory 
publications played in effecting this triumph and the shift in the national mood that made it 
possible to prosecute the Tory Reaction. But I would suggest that the specific manner or 
terms in which the Opposition was portrayed in loyalist poetry would prove significant in 
readily identifiable ways during the months and years after the Exclusion Crisis had peaked 
and the scales momentarily inclined in the Tories’ favor. For one thing, the summer after 
Religio L aid  appeared saw the discovery of the so-called Rye House plot, an ill-contrived 
(if not wholly apocryphal) scheme of several radical Whigs to assassinate Charles and 
James as they rode from London to the Newmarket races. Precisely the thing Dry den had 
predicted in the preface to Religio Laid  when he warned that another “crop” of bloodthirsty 
“conventiclers” would sprout from this latest rebellion. And as Winn says, news of the plot
1 In his book. Politics and Opinion in Crisis, 1678-1681, Mark Knights observes that “loyalists wrote 
and published less” than the Opposition (166): “Generally, . . . ministers were cautious about 
employing authors to defend the government, and the Court seems to have been more concerned about 
keeping an eye on pamphlets printed by the opposition, than on promoting its own” (165). Not only 
did loyalists writers believe that “their publication were either not bought or not read in the quantities 
achieved by their rivals” (Knights 166), they were reluctant to “be branded with the infamous Names of 
Jesuit, Papist, or Popishly affected” (John Nalson, The True Protestant’s Appeal (1681), qtd. in 
Knights, 165). Furthermore, J.R. Jones points out that “once the whigs had lost control over London 
(September 1682) such activism became unnecessary and undesirable, since it maintained an 
atmosphere of political excitement. For contemporaries, party politics and divisions were abnormal and 
dangerous; the tories, therefore, were now encouraged to assume a more passive role, primarily 
supportive of legally constituted authority" (218-219).
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“neatly confirmed the Tory view of the Whigs as unreconstructed rompers and regicides, 
and completed the destruction of the already weakened Whig party” (389); not surprisingly, 
it also accelerated the growing ferocity of the Tory Reaction. But this was in the near-term. 
In the long run, the Tories would suffer from the very success of their own propaganda. 
Having so closely identified themselves with James’s succession, they could not 
sufficiently distance themselves from him once events had forced him from the throne in 
1688 and brought the Whigs into a new ascendency under William III. Indeed, aside from 
a brief period of favor under Queen Anne, it was not until the decisive defeat of James’s 
grandson, Charles Edward Stuart (the Young Pretender), at Culloden in 1746 that the 
Tories would at last begin to live down suspicions of lingering Jacobitism and emerge from 
the political wilderness.2
1. A Vocabulary of Anti-Puritan Imagery 
Though the parallels Tory propagandists drew between the Whig exclusionists and 
the Puritan regicides of the 1640’s are frequently overt and unambiguous enough, it would 
be useful nevertheless to have in mind a working “vocabulary” of anti-Puritan imagery as 
well as some notion of their “learned” and “popular” manifestations and rhetorical uses 
when they made their first deep impressions upon the national psyche. Our first step, then, 
is to return to Religio L aid  and take stock of the individual images Dry den has composited 
there. The passage describing the causes, manner, and consequences of the Dissenters’ 
promiscuous interpretation of Scripture runs in full as follows:
2 R.C. Richardson’s The Debate on the English Revolution Revisited (1988), a useful survey of Civil 
War historiography from the mid-seventeenth century to the present, demonstrates how easily 
discernible the royalist or parliamentary biases of Civil War historians were—and how politically 
charged they remained—throughout the eighteenth century among a wide swath of the social spectrum. 
That the conflict between Charles 1 and Parliament remained so explosive was due in no small part to 
the continued associations between its principles (and principals) and those of the protracted ideological 
battles between contemporary Whig and Tory partisans. See especially Chapter 2, ’’The Eighteenth 
Century: The Political Uses of History" (36-55).
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The book thus put in every vulgar hand,
Which each presum’d he best could understand,
The common rule was made the common prey.
And at the mercy o f the rabble lay.
The tender page with homy fists was gall’d,
And he was gifted most that loudest bawl’d:
The spirit gave the doctoral degree;
And every member of a company 
Was of his trade and of the Bible free.
Plain truths enough for needful use they found.
But men would still be itching to expound:
Each was ambitious of th’ obscurest place,
No measure ta’en from knowledge, all fro m  g r a c e .
Study and pains were now no more their care;
Texts were explain’d by fasting and by prayer 
This was the fruit the private spirit brought,
Occasion’d by great zeal and little thought 
While crowds unlearn’d, with rude devotion warm.
About the sacred viands buzz and swarm,
The fly-blown text creates a crawling brood,
And turns to maggots what was meant for food.
A thousand daily sects rise up and die;
A thousand more the perish’d race supply:
So all we make of Heaven’s discover’d will 
Is, not to have i t  or to use it ill.
The danger much the same; on several shelves 
If others wreck us, or we wreck ourselves (11.400-426).
The undesirable traits catalogued here may be grouped under five general headings: willful
misinterpretation o f Scripture, the sectarianism and self-election attendant upon it, anti-
intellectualism, and a demagoguery tending toward violence. The first heading actually
comprehends two distinct characteristics: the Puritan tendency to assign to oneself the
authority and wherewithal to interpret Scripture—“the book” being available to all, “each
presum’d he best could understand” it (11. 401-402)—and an eccentric manner of
explicating Scripture once he had claimed it for his own. Either lacking the requisite
common sense to understand the “plain truths” (1. 409) he finds before him, or, more
likely, prompted by his individualist tendencies to impose himself on what he reads, the
Puritan will insist on satisfying the “itch” to “expound,” that is, to impose wholly
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idiosyncratic, wholly unnecessary constructions upon Scripture. It is likely a similarly 
egotistical impulse leads him to explicate the “obscurest places” (1.411) for the comparative 
lack of interpretive tradition attaching to them allows him to presume first, that he and he 
alone has been able to recognize their heretofore unseen significance, and second, that he, 
as their “discoverer,” may interpret them as spirit, bent, or whim inclines him—which 
brings us to the Puritan’s eccentric method of expounding. Lacking (or disdaining) formal 
training in Scriptural exegesis, the Puritan must rely on “GRACE” (1.412), a spiritual state 
to which he is either brought by God or (if the Deity prove backward) by his own efforts: 
“by fasting and by prayer” (1. 414). And once hunger and prolonged supplication have 
caught him up in religious ecstasy, the self-authorized reader of Scripture need now only 
surrender his understanding to the promptings of “the private spirit” (415), subject his 
chosen text to the “great zeal” (L 416) he has induced in himself.
That this enthusiasm is indeed true grace he has no doubt; his reliance on the 
authority of conscience, private revelation, and zeal to the exclusion of all others 
presupposes that he is indeed among God’s elect Of course, when the criteria for election 
are of a kind that makes them obvious only to the Self, others may doubt the veracity of 
one’s protestations of divine favor, or, looking inward, discover that they enjoy an equal 
share of the same. And these others, prompted differently as their differing constitutions or 
revelations may determine, may well find themselves in a like state o f grace. No wonder, 
then, that rampant sectarianism is one consequence o f explication by private spirit, that “A 
thousand daily sects rise up and die; /  A thousand more the perish’d race supply” (11.421-
422). No wonder, that to ensure the continuance of his own sect and his own authority 
within it, each would-be prophet is impelled toward the demagogue’s time-tested tactics. 
Prominent among these (then as now) is the disparagement of formal learning, setting at 
naught the “doctoral degree” (1. 406) earned with “study and pains” (1. 413) and the 
insights “ta’en from [the] knowledge” (1. 412) gained thereby. In doing so, one not only 
calls into question the qualifications of one’s potential critics, implying the foundations of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
271
their authority far inferior to one's own, one also plays shrewdly upon the anti-intellectual 
prejudices of the demagogue's traditional constituencies among “the rabble'' (1- 403) and 
the “crowds unleam’d” (1.417). It is natural that the Puritan demagogue frame his appeal to 
such as these; their inferiority of rank and education makes them particularly vulnerable to 
the brazen, visceral rhetoric—the loud bawling (1. 405)—of one who, despite his own 
membership among only the (lower) trading classes (11.407-408), can yet inspire in them a 
frenzy of “rude devotion” (1. 417) and thereby lay claim to special election. But having 
loosed the coarser passions of an ignorant, unsophisticated rabble, the demagogue. Dry den 
implies, is perforce more an agent o f destruction than of truth. Scripture is the first object 
of the crowd’s violent zeal, “the common prey” 0- 402) of “homy fists” (1. 404), a 
heavenly food reduced to a “fly-blown text” crawling with maggots. A greater violence, 
however, is brought to bear upon a collective understanding led to confound “plainest 
truth,” and a greater still, ultimately, upon social order when “Heaven’s discover’d will” (1.
423) is put to ill use (1.424), and “we wreck ourselves” (1.426) with the effects of extreme 
individualism: the muddle of moral and ethical self-indulgence, the chaos of religious and 
cultural fragmentation.
Dry den could count on his composite of Puritan traits and their consequences to be 
recognized and accepted as accurate and “definitive” by a large proportion of his readership 
because over the previous eight decades precisely these characteristics had through endless 
reiteration and vivid specificity in learned and popular literature alike come to define 
Puritanism in the national imagination.
Since the return o f Protestant exiles from abroad under Elizabeth, quarrels over 
religious doctrine and trappings had brought Puritans to the pass of branding the rituals, 
vestments, and icons o f the Church of England as popish, which afforded the Church and 
its head the opportunity for charging these would-be reformers with a dangerous 
disobedience to ecclesiastic authority, a disobedience ultimately deriving, it seems, from a 
willful aversion to the Church’s traditions and guidelines regarding the reading and
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interpretation of Scripture, a perverse insistence upon an excessively narrow personal 
autonomy in the explication and application o f Biblical texts—an autonomy made truly 
dangerous by being answerable only to itself, its immediate inclinations, appetites, and 
ambitions. In the preface to his Basilikon Doron (1603), for example, King James I 
accuses the Puritans who were even then challenging Anglican orthodoxy o f “leaning to 
their own dreams and revelations,” of “making the Scriptures to be ruled by their own 
conscience, and not their conscience by the Scripture” (220-221), and of “making their 
own imaginations (without any warrant of the word) the square of their conscience” (222). 
This wrong-headed independence and self-serving use of Scripture is remarked upon as 
well by the Cambridge ecclesiast David Owen in Herod and Pilate Reconciled (1610), a 
pamphlet refuting Puritan arguments for the justifiability of regicide. To “maintain their 
late, and lewd opinions,” Puritans must, Owen asserts, “kill the Scripture to serve their 
turns: and pervert the holy word o f the eternal God, by strange interpretation, and wicked 
application against the meaning of the Spirit, by whom it was penned; the doctrine of the 
Church, to whom it was delivered; and the practice of all the G odly,. . .  that did believe, 
understand, and obey it” (258). Such contrariness—against the authorities of State and 
Church, against “the meaning o f the Spirit,” against common sense itself and what would 
apparently tend to their own ease and comfort—is for Sir Thomas Overbury, diplomat and 
courtier under James I, the Puritans’ definitive trait In his character sketch o f “A Puritan” 
(1614), Overbury defines his subject as “a diseased piece of Apocrypha, bind him to the 
Bible, and he corrupts the whole te x t. . .  for he never keeps near his Text: anything that 
the Law allows, but Marriage and March beer, he murmurs at: what it disallows, and holds 
dangerous, makes him a discipline” (276). Then, with an observation anticipating Dryden’s 
remark that the non-conformist intent on his own idiosyncratic expositions will likely 
overlook the “plainest truth,” Overbury continues, “ Where the gate stands open, he is ever 
seeking a stile: and where his Learning ought to climb, he creeps through” (276: emphasis 
added). Indeed, says Overbury, so proud and jealous is the Puritan o f  his personal
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sovereignty, that, against all reason and self-interest, “should the Church enjoin clean 
shirts, he were lousy” (276).3
But then, it is the Puritan's very contrariness and obstinacy that give him his sense 
of vocational identity and mission, for insofar as his deficiencies of character may be made 
to seem the promptings of a conscience uncontaminated and uncompromised, they may be 
cited as evidence of his personal election. Of course, this pretense to election reciprocally 
justifies not only the Puritan’s eccentric readings of Scripture, but the no less eccentric 
manner o f exposition as well: the heretical reliance on “dreams, visions, and revelations” 
(249), for instance, that Oliver Ormerod observes in The Picture o f a Puritane ( 1605), or 
the dubious tendencies, cited by the pseudonymous Antibrownistus Puritanomastix in his 
Three Speeches (1642), to “pray himself four hours with more vehemency, than the best 
Divine in Christendom that prays but a quarter” (305), to work himself into raptures and 
ecstasies via “extemporary preaching and spiritual blasphemy” (306). The pretense to 
election likewise undergirds much of the Puritan’s personal appeal and authority among his 
followers or confederates, not least because it encourages these to recognize in themselves 
and one another the manifestations of grace exhibited by their leader. In The Schysmatical 
Puritan (1630), Giles Widdowes, sometime chaplain to Katherine, Duchess of 
Buckingham, hints that encouraging such self-election is in fact part of a conscious fraud 
perpetuated by the Puritan upon those sufficiently simple or seditious to make themselves 
parties to his “seducing profession” (288). The Puritan is “a kind o f Protestant,” 
Widdowes argues, and so “will be tried by the Scriptures concerning his faith, and his
3 The poet and essayist Owen Felltham notes similarly in his Resolves (1628) that the Puritan's 
erroneously eccentric approach to Scripture, coupled with his seemingly innate spitefulness, inevitably 
leads him to “spurn at the grave Authority of the Church," and in doing so, prove “a Thief to himself, 
of those benefits which GOD hath allowed him: or out of a blind and uncharitable Pride, censure, and 
scorn others, as reprobates: or out of obstinacy, fill the World with brawls, about undeterminable 
Tenets “ (283). Remarking specifically on the Puritan's rejection of the more mundane delights —“to 
eat, and to drink, and to take pleasure in all his labour wherein he travaileth under the Sun"—in spite of 
Scriptural injunctions to the contrary, Felltham concludes, “Methinks the reading of Ecclesiastes, 
should make a Puritan undress his brain, and lay off all those Fanatic toys that jingle about his 
understanding" (283).
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Christian moral life, so far as his Spirit will endure the text”; however, when the “deducible 
sense” o f the text conflicts—as it must—with his tenets, when it “confounds this Professor 
and overthrows his Chairf,). . .  he [being] ashamed to forsake his seducing profession a 
long time vehemently clamorous, taketh fast hold only on the letter, and a chapter of the 
text” (287-288). The Puritan, Widdowes insinuates, is well aware of his deviation from the 
purportedly plain meaning of the Scriptures, but he is also well aware that he may continue 
in his vocation only so long as he can entice others to accept, replicate, and perpetuate his 
error in their own understandings; his charisma—being “vehemently clamorous”—is one 
means to this aid; encouragement to self-election another “The Presuming Predestinatist is 
he, whose pureness is an inspired knowledge, that he shall be saved by God’s absolute 
election. He is so sure of his salvation, as if he were now in heaven: as if there were no life 
in him, but God’s essential glory” (295).
Policy of deliberate fraud or not, this propensity to self-election was one of the 
most cited and probably the most reviled of Puritan traits. James I sets the terms and tone 
of anti-Puritan feeling on this point when in his Basilikon Doron he observes that “as to 
the name of Puritans, I am not ignorant that the style thereof doth properly belong only to 
that vile sect amongst the Anabaptists, called the Family o f love; because they think 
themselves only pure, and in a manner, without sin, the only true Church, and only worthy 
to be participant of the Sacraments; and all the rest o f the world to be but abomination in the 
sight o f God” (219). We should note that James’s objection to the tenet o f election is two­
fold. On the one hand, it angers him that a group would dare claim its members to be 
“without sin, the only true Church”; such a notion not only defies the teachings of the New 
Testament, it would seem to encourage spiritual complacency and hypocrisy. On the other 
hand, the narrow exclusivity of election allows the elect to hold “all the rest of the world to 
be but abomination in the sight o f God.” James well understood what we shall soon see, 
that “all the rest of the world” included the King himself and the established Church, and 
that the upshot of the Puritans’ scorn of it and its institutions was that before they would
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allow “any of their grounds" (or principles) to be “impugned," they would first “let King, 
people, law and all be trod under foot” (220). At first a bid for sectarian legitimacy, self­
election ultimately becomes a justification for seeking and seizing political, religious, 
legislative, and social power.
Though James here initially4 restricts his criticism to the Family of Love, whose 
members, as Christopher Hill notes, “held their property in common, believed that all 
things come by nature, and that only the spirit o f God within the believer can properly 
understand Scripture" (27), other commentators ascribe self-election to other sects, or, like 
James’s semi-official controversialist William Covell, use its distastefulness to impugn 
dissenters generally. Surely, argues Covell in A Modest and Reasonable Examination, o f 
Some Things in Use in the Church o f England (1604), “it is no great error to apply that 
name [of Puritan] to a number amongst us, who are ever ready to boast of their innocency, 
and in respect of themselves, to account all of a contrary faction unholy, and profane” 
(233). Then, going on the offensive, Covell points out the “strange presumption to 
Impropriate Conscience, Holiness, Innocency, and Integrity only to some few, as if all the 
rest who have severed themselves from the Church of Rome, were no better than Atheists, 
time-servers, profane, and irreligious, only in this respect because by their authority and 
learning, they have resisted this unreasonable desire of a new discipline” (234). Though 
Oliver Ormerod’s A Picture o f a Puritane of the following year is levelled mainly against 
the Brownists,5 Ormerod, too, seeks to apply the offending trait of a single group rather 
broadly, that the credibility of all those antipathetic to the Church might be called into 
question. Unlike Covell, however, for Ormerod the presumption necessary for electing 
oneself and condemning all others is not at all strange, but has a Biblical precedent—in the
4 I say '‘initially” because by the end o f his discussion of the “Puritan,” the term for Janies has come to 
connote a member of almost any dissenting sect that seeks to curtail royal and ecclesiastical power 
upon religious grounds.
5 Followers of the separatist Robert Browne (c. 1550-1633).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
276
damning example o f the Pharisees. “And do you not,” he asks his imagined Puritan 
interlocutor, “come near the Pharisees herein, when you despise all those that be not of 
your sect, as polluted, and not worthy to be saluted?” (248); be assured, he concludes, that 
if “we call you Puritans,” it is “not because you are purer than other men are, no more than 
were the Puritans in ancient time [that is, the Pharisees]; but because you think yourselves 
to be purer than others, as the old Puritans did” (254). In The Schysmatical Puritan, Giles 
Widdowes likewise terms the imagined pureness of the Puritan (in this case, the Separatist) 
to be “Pharisiacal. He commends himself in the Temple to be far above all others for 
holiness . . .  His opinion is, that only he is the Elect, the Regenerate, and faithful child of 
God. And that all others are reprobates, the wicked, the unregenerate, and the damned” 
(291). Such an identification is shrewd rhetorically, for it associates dissenters with a 
group easily recognized and for whom it would be easy to excite an intense loathing and 
disgust (foreshadowing the use to which anti-Puritan feeling would be put in later 
decades), and has the further advantage o f turning the very grounds o f Puritan self­
validation against themselves.
James was not alone among contemporary writers in noting the amount of brass 
required to claim election. It is with exasperation, for instance, that John Earle—future 
tutor to Charles I’s eldest son and an adviser to that prince when civil war had driven him 
into exile—observes of a “she-Puritan” or “she precise Hypocrite” in his M icro- 
cosmographie. Or, A Peece o f The World Discovered; in Essayes and Characters {1628), 
that though she “doubts of the Virgin Mary’s Salvation, and dares not Saint her,” she 
“knows her own place in heaven as perfectly, as the Pew she has a key to” (279). Nor was 
James alone in citing the more ominous implications of translating oneself to the celestial 
sphere and damning “all the rest of the world.” As Antibrownistus Puritanomastix, author 
of Three Speeches, understood well, the exigencies of finding oneself among the elect 
demand more than simply reorganizing Heaven, replacing the most hallowed of canonical 
saints with those drawn from the ranks o f one’s fellows: on earth, the elect must be
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advanced and the non-elect made to know their place—and this made for bigotry,
sectarianism, power-lust, and violent demagoguery. Accordingly, the triad of ostensibly
personal, ironically pro-Puritan testimonies that make up his tract—“by Master Warden to
the fellowes o f his Company, touching the Affaires o f the Kingdome” (302), “Mrs.
Wardens Observations Upon Her Husbands Reverend Speech In the Presence o f certaine
Gentlewomen of Ratliffe and Wapping” (309), and “A Speech made by Mistris Wardens
Chambermaid”(313)—hint at self-election’s darker consequences for the world at large. In
the first speech, for example, the boisterous, malaprop-plagued tradesman proposes with
chilling heartiness to raise a  Puritan militia both to seize power and to expedite the desired
“extirpation of the Papists” (304):
Let us heap up so many crosses upon them till they be afraid to cross the 
way on us, or to cross the proverb or to cut any cross Capers, lest we 
interpret every such act to be direct Popish superstition. And to perfect this 
extirpation let all men whosoever that are not directly and absolutely of our 
opinion mind habit, (if it had been possible I would have said wisdom) be 
reputed Papists. (And so they are already) but I mean let them fall within the 
limitation and censures of all laws established against Popery and popish 
innovation (304).
If the resolution to exterminate Catholics en masse can be given a  yet more horrific turn, it 
is by the scope of the promised violence, justified as it is here by the self-sealing premise 
that all who are not Puritans and “absolutely of our opinion mind habit” are in fact Papists, 
necessarily enemies to the state as they are enemies to Protestantism, and therefore subject 
to every sort of persecution: “And therefore let him that honors the name o f Jesus be 
reputed a Jesuit, him that takes degrees at the universities be held a Seminary, and so 
consequently let them both be hanged, drawn, and quartered for high Treason, for that’s 
the doom my charity can afford them” (304). Such habits of mind and the sentiments they 
produce have been thoroughly absorbed by the tract’s third speaker, Mrs. Warden’s 
chambermaid AbigaiL Upbraided by her mistress for using the Romish-sounding oath, “by 
the Mass,” the maid replies in her defense, “I was bred as well as any of the elect Maids
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here in London, so that I had rather you had called me a zealous dissembler (as some of our 
Sisters be) than a Papist For I am so absolutely against them, that if  all Papist's heads 
were on one neck I would cut them all o ff with one blow, that so in Country Towns 1 
might be drawn in the painted cloth like Judith cutting off Holfemes’ head" (314). As the 
necessity o f the maid’s defense implies, Mrs. Warden is particularly fastidious in 
distinguishing between friend and foe—more so, it seems, even than her husband, for she 
declares that “although we cannot endure a  Surplice, or Cross, the Pope’s Bulls, his fiercer 
beasts the Jesuits, yet we hold it lawful by the same virtue of equivocations and mental 
reservations, to cheat, swear, and lie  with any that is not one o f us, nay even among 
ourselves, i f  there be an holy cause” (312; emphasis added).
The author of Three Speeches would have us infer from Mrs. Warden’s declaration 
that the centripetal force o f the Puritan sects’ fervid opposition to royal and ecclesiastical 
authority is woefully insufficient to counteract the fractious centrifugal impulses unleashed 
by self-election’s appeal to a  narrow exclusivity. The observation was a common one 
among anti-Puritan writers o f the period. George Wither’s Abuses Stript, and Whipt, Or 
Satirical Essayes (1613), for instance, makes the connection between self-election and 
sectarian controversy quite clear, citing as it does “our busy-headed sect, /  The hollow 
crew; the counterfeit elect: /  Our Dogmatists, and ever-wrangling spirits, /  That do as well 
contemn good works as merits” (274). Indeed, in its sectarianism Mrs. Warden’s embodies 
much that anti-Puritan tracts portrayed as ridiculous in non-conformity, their authors 
seeming to take a particular delight in enumerating the bewildering number of self­
authorized, self-determined sects that the tendency to self-election had spawned. In The 
Picture o f a Puritane (1605), for instance, Oliver Ormerod offers up a running dialogue 
between an Anglican and a Puritan, the former taking the occasion to match the several 
doctrines of dissenting to those o f a dizzying array of heresies ancient and modern. The 
very title of Giles Widdowes’ The Schysmatical Puritan (1630) implies what Widdowes 
declares in the body of his work, that the Puritan’s religion is nothing but faction (289),
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and foreshadows the taxonomy o f  mutually hostile Puritan sects that makes up a large part 
of his tract Widdowes cites and defines ten—the Perfectist, the factious Sermonist, the 
Separatist the Anabaptist the Brownist the Loves-familist the Precisian, the Sabbatarian, 
the Anti-disciplinarian, and the Presuming Predestinatist (290-295)— while the more 
thoroughgoing anonymous author o f Religion’s Lotterie, or, the Church’s Amazement 
(1642), in addition to these, remarks upon the Arians, Arminians, Adamites, Novolists, 
Time-servers, Canonists, Lutherans, Puritans, Rattle-heads, and Round-heads. Though the 
author o f Religion’s  Lotterie condemns each of these groups according to its particular 
eccentricities, the real criticism here and in similar taxonomies is implicit in the occasion of 
such lists themselves, and may be made out in Religion’s Lotterie's final epigram matical 
plea, “Praying to God the Author o f true peace, /  That truth may flourish and dissension 
cease” (334): sectarianism challenges Divine prerogative to dispose of worldly affairs, 
weakens the Protestant Church, promotes ecclesiastical and civil discord, disturbs the 
peace, and allows self-interest and opportunism to obscure the desire for and the pursuit of 
truth.
Given this, however risible Mrs. Warden, her pretensions, her cynical justification 
of her own ethical lapses may appear, the consequences of self-election and the 
sectarianism it inspired elicited something quite other than mirth among anti-Puritan 
propagandists. For even if her resolution “to cheat, swear, and lie with any that is not one 
of us, nay even among ourselves, if  there be an holy cause,” had not appeared on the eve 
of civil war, one might yet detect in it several agents of social corrosion: scorn for and self­
segregation from the bonds and values of the larger community; an aggressive moral hubris 
answerable only to itself; a willingness to subordinate public to private interest; and, in its 
appeal to an arbitrary and bigoted self-indulgence, a contempt for authority, tolerance, and 
self-restraint. If sectarianism could make non-conformity ridiculous, the violent 
demagoguery sectarianism inspired could likewise make it very dangerous—not least in the 
sort of people it attracted and in the nature of its appeal to them.
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William Covell had hit upon the motives, methods, and menace of the Puritan 
demagogue forty years earlier in A M odest and Reasonable Examination. There he 
observes that religious dissent tends to attract young men “of the meanest sort” who are “in 
themselves naturally” predisposed “to reprove wherein their own innocency is thought 
greatest when they dare in unseemly terms take upon them to control others” and “to seem 
of some account, which, in an ordinary course without great labor is not easily to be 
attained, whereas evil speaking and unseasonable railings (Commonly called Zealous 
preaching) bringeth them (at least among their partial followers) into an opinion of learning, 
innocency, and purified ZeaT  (236). And Covell takes care to remind these would-be 
prophets that “that cause cannot be good which hath not other patrons to support it, than 
those who have learned nothing, but only to speak evil” (236). An easy authority, a  cheap 
celebrity and esteem may be readily elicited from one’s “partial followers” when their ranks 
are made up of those sufficiently unsophisticated and ignorant to be grossly imposed upon.
However, the pretensions and designs of the Puritan-demagogue would seem to 
depend upon attracting and maintaining just such a constituency. Hence, apparently, the 
anti-intellectual strain widely ascribed to non-conformists. As Oliver Ormerod’s true 
Protestant disputant observes in The Picture o f a Puritane (1605), the Puritans, like the 
detested Brownists, argue that “‘degrees in Theology, enforcement to single life in 
Colleges, and the study of heathen Writers, with other like corruptions,’ (as they term 
them) in Schools and Academies, should be removed and redressed” (252). By questioning 
the propriety o f formal training and thereby subverting the authority of the nation’s 
educational institutions, the demagogue at one stroke discredits his establishment critics, 
empowers himself, and deepens his visceral appeal among his followers, exciting both the 
anti-academic prejudices of the minimally educated classes and the anti-aristocratic 
snobbery of society’s lower orders. Secure in the safety of retrospection, we might observe 
that in their antipathy toward “degrees in Theology, enforcement to single life in Colleges, 
and the study o f heathen Writers” the Puritans were exactly in step with the reform-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
281
mindedness o f such figures as Sir Francis Bacon, whose iconoclastic The Advancement o f 
Learning and Novum Organum appeared in 1605 and 1620, respectively. Moreover, 
Douglas Bush points out, the Puritans’ anti-academic impulse could be attributed to “a 
logical if extreme development of Protestantismf’sl hostility to theological, scholastic, and 
classical learning as the corrupter of the simple Gospel and the religion of the spirit” (20). 
Such learning, furthermore, “as a symbol of class privilege, authority, and intolerance, 
could be attacked also from the political and social standpoint by the Levellers [William] 
Walwyn and [Richardl Overton”—and in any event, the trading ranks from which radical 
Protestantism overwhelmingly drew valued a “practical and scientific education on a broad 
basis” (20) far above the humanistic educations the universities furnished the sons of 
gentlemen.
Needless to say, anti-Puritan writers of the day likely could not and in any case did
not treat the matter so dispassionately. For them, Puritan anti-intellectualism was an
encouragement to the willful, self-deluding benightedness that fuels the ambition of self-
serving contrarians. “Ignorance, and fat feed, are his Founders,” declares Sir Thomas
Overbury of his subject in “A Puritan,” “his Nurses, Railings, Rabbis, and round breeches:
his life is but a borrowed blast of wind” (276). And in Three Speeches Antibrownistus
Puritanomastix has Mr. Warden aver that once the Puritans seize power they will be
resourceful in devising “inventions to plague these lukewarm Locusts, these Mercurials of
Religion that stand upon Philosophy, Reason, Sense and /  know not what; as if reason and
sense, and such fooleries, were pertinent to religion and the graces o f the Spirit” (306).
Indeed, as Mrs. Warden “reasons” a bit later to her dissenting sisters, not only is learning
“a mere trouble and vexation to Religion,” ignorance is all but a  precondition of election:
It is nothing what language their [a congregation’s] Liturgy is in, for they 
[the established Church] confess the most unlearned may know enough to 
be saved by: Ergo, Learning is needless, and if needless, why not profane?
Nay I gather further thus: If learning were either necessary or convenient, 
the Scriptures would enjoin it as it doth other things that are so, but the most 
unlearned may be saved, nay are saved; Ergo, Learning is neither necessary
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nor convenient: and so from the major consequently to the m inor, if not 
Learning, neither Reason nor Sense. For as that man of Revelations Mr. 
Greene6 proves it fully, Ignorance and Noise, are marks sufficient enough 
whereby to know our Election (311).
Mrs. Warden’s chambermaid seconds both her views and her curious manner of thought;
in fact, her apologia for ignorance is a  marvel o f unreason. “If Master Warden would but
play the Devil’s part in punishing and plundering, and plaguing these Papists,” Abigail
declares, “I myself when I come amongst any of them am fully resolved to scratch out their
eyes, for it is a proper sign of an elect young man or maid to condemn that we understand
not, and to be furiously obstinate in our zealous anger” (314). We should not be surprised,
then, to learn that her rationale for rejecting learning is (quite fittingly) prompted by the
consequences of her own moral obtuseness and turns on mistaking two very different
meanings of the word ‘sense.’ “I never loved Learning nor learned men,” Abigail
continues, “[for] sir Roger our Curate deceived me in a deep point, therefore learning is no
Religion nor learned men are not always zealously religious, and learning Mistress (as you
say) is profane, and sense and reason in Religion are unnecessary, for though we can have
feeling other ways, yet we can have no sense o f Religion” (315). The entire Warden
household, from master to maid, seems intent upon vindicating an anonymous poet’s “The
Round-Head’s Character,” appearing the same year as Three Speeches (1642): the Puritan
“cries down learning, ’cause the simple spirit /  Doth him inspire with all things against
m erit / Who hates a Papist yet approves this notion, / That ignorance is mother of
devotion” (11.9-12; 326).
But if Puritan anti-intellectualism nurtured an unfortunate self-delusion among the
nonconformist leadership, it left society’s lower orders vulnerable to their own ignorance—
and to the predations of what James I termed “some fiery spirited men in the ministry”
(Basilikon Doron, 221). Thus ignorance, when coupled with an appeal to the basest
instincts and prejudices of the lowest orders o f society, threatened to beget a more
6 A dissenting haberdasher who preached to a London congregation in the I630's and 1640's.
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immediately dangerous progeny: civil unrest; destruction of persons, property, and 
institutions; mob rule; political and moral anarchy. And so the popular element in 
Puritanism would remain suspect—even when harnessed for the praiseworthy task of 
overthrowing “the Popish Church.1’ James l ’s experiences in Scotland had taught him that 
ambitious or unscrupulous leaders might turn a crowd against any established authority; 
hence his observation in Basilikon Dorort that though the Scottish Reformation was 
“extraordinarily wrought by God,” its achievement was accompanied by “many things. . .  
inordinately done by a popular tumult and rebellion, o f such as were blindly doing the 
work of God, but clogged with their own passions and particular respects, as well 
appeared by the destruction o f our policy” (221). And reviewing the Reformation in 
northern Europe at large, James notes that many Protestant zealots “got such a guiding of 
the people at that time o f confusion, as finding the gust of government sweet, they begouth 
to fantasy themselves, a Democratic form o f government,” and “fed themselves with the 
hope to become Tribum plebis: and so in a popular government by leading the people by 
the nose, to bear the sway of all the rule”7 (221-222). If at first monarch and subjects had a 
common enemy in Rome, soon enough (as they had in Scotland) seditious ministers were 
busy “informing the people, that all Kings and Princes were naturally enemies to the liberty 
of the Church, and could never patiently bear the yoke o f Christ,” the “turbulent spirits 
among [these ministers]. . .  m aintaining  their plots, as parity in the Church, whereby the 
ignorants were emboldened (as bayards) to cry the learned, godly and modest out of it:
7 Some twentieth-century historians of the English Civil Wars (Christopher Hill perhaps the most 
prominent among them) have suggested that the struggle between Parliament and King was prompted 
largely by class conflict Such claims are, of course, open to question, and must answer for, among 
other things, the highly problematic relationship of the Puritan rank and the Puritan file. As with 
many “popular” movements today, the leadership seemed to be out of touch with the very people they 
claimed to be representing, and in whose name they had taken up arms. It was an irony not lost upon 
contemporaries and later commentators. In his poem, “Abuses Stript, and Whipt” (1613), George 
Wither takes care to differentiate between what for him are the real puritans—those who “have the 
greatest care / To know, and please their maker” (274)—and those who would display their superior 
piety and moral understanding by pretending to be scandalized at the harmless diversions of their social 
inferiors, “those all whose Religion doth depend, / On this, that they know how to discommend / A 
Maygame, or a Summerpole defy, / Or shake the head or else turn up the eye” (274).
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parity the mother of confusion, and enemy to Unity which is the mother of order” (222).
James’s fears of the disruptive power o f such Puritan demagoguery were echoed
right up to the actual outbreak o f hostilities between Parliament and King, in 1642. In A
M odest and Reasonable Examination (1604), William Covell, for one, faults radical
Protestant reformers—among them Calvin, Knox, and their many English adherents—for
what he describes as
[a] bitterness of speech [not] much inferior to the Heretics of former times, 
and of whose followers I may say, with Saint Chrisostom; ‘In age they are 
younger but in malice Equal; the Brood o f serpents are of less stature, but 
have not less poison. The Whelps o f Wolves, though they cannot hurt so 
cunningly, yet will hurt with biting, and desire to suck Blood’ . . .  [T]he 
Authors of this evil-speaking, made Religion to be a warrant to speak evil; 
and whilst they offended upon this ground, others were desirous to offend, 
that they might not differ, from their example so that a double fault lieth 
upon the first Author; one that they offended in their own person, the 
second that they were examples to others to the like offense” (230).
Examples, that is, of civil as well as ecclesiastical disobedience. Answering the ostensible
scruples of the Puritan conscience regarding adherence to temporal law—“‘We cannot tell
whether we might by the laws and order o f this Realm subscribe, although it were
otherwise lawfully by God’s word,”’—Covell scoffs, “As if the Laws of this Land could
be a restraint for subscribing being warranted in God’s word” (231). Covell here answers
learned, if in his view erroneous, arguments concerning Protestant doctrine and the
autonomy of individual will; however, as we have already seen, for many if not most anti-
Puritan writers the problem with self-authorized departures from civil and religious law
was not primarily an academic one—did not lie in subtle deviations in abstruse points of
theology—but rather a practical matter o f maintaining the most elemental components of
social order. Among these are a recognition o f the many hierarchies giving shape and
definition to society; an acceptance of one’s place within them; deferring to the political,
ecclesiastical, and domestic authorities above one; fulfilling the particular demands of one’s
own station and occupation; and maintaining the all-important trust in the social bonds
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dignifying the mutual dependencies among the several classes, between the rulers and the 
ruled. When Sir Thomas Overbury observes in “A Puritan,” that “women and Lawyers are 
his [the Puritan’s] best Disciples, the one next fruit, longs for forbidden Doctrine, the other 
to maintain forbidden titles, both which he sows amongst them” (277), he seems to treat as 
absurd the unseemly appetites quickened by nonconformist agitation. The consequences of 
disseminating ambition, discontent, and fears of persecution among the middling and lower 
classes are taken more seriously, however, in the Three Speeches o f  Antibrownistus 
Puritanomastix. Concluding his address to his fraternity, Mr. Warden congratulates himself 
upon “my ultimum, my nil ultra, the very Garland o f my good Will to the Public; and that 
is the fears and jealousies which do now possess the Kingdom” (308). These jealousies 
and fears, Warden solemnly assures his listeners, “are of a most dangerous nature and high 
consequence, the greatest that ever was in any Time or Nation,” and yet, he confesses, 
“neither I nor any man living can tell what they are, or from whence they should arise: but 
without all doubt there is great cause, or else there would not be such talking of them” 
(308). In fact they are quite real—but as Warden continues, we see that they are the 
jealousies and fears of everyday life,8 elevated by the knowledge o f his own animosity 
toward and subversion of civil and religious authorities, as well as a not unfounded anxiety 
that his sedition will be discovered and punished, into a shapeless, all-informing 
persecution mania, a  paranoid conviction that he and the members of his company will “be 
hanged for speaking high treason against the King” (308). Rambling and absurd his 
discourse may be, but in resolving that “since there is no remedy; we will fear still, and be 
jealous still” (308-309), Warden lights upon the surest catalyst of social disintegration: 
sustained mutual suspicion between the government and people. We discern in the words 
of one of Mrs. Warden’s partisans, for instance, the prerequisites for just such a
8 As given by Warden, these consist mainly of finding oneself a cuckold or of being taken flagrante 
dilecto in one's own sexual improprieties.
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breakdown: scorn for the prevailing order, the classes upholding it, and the loyal citizen’s 
due allegiance to both it and diem; an implacable, demonizing antipathy toward one’s foes; 
and the self-righteous resignation to one’s harboring such a virulent enmity. Declaring 
herself to be “Religiously angry with the King and a  Malignant party of Nobility, Clergy, 
Judges, Gentry, and Reprobate Cavaliers," the “gentlewoman" from Wapping scoffs 
splenetically that “in truth it is feared. . .  that three parts of the Kingdom have their eyes 
blinded with a kind o f Duty and Conscience, and what is the root of all this 
unrighteousness, but that abominable Profane, Superstitious, Idolatrous, Babylonish, and 
conjuring book of Common [Prayer]" (309).
Suspicion fosters estrangement; estrangement, preemptive hostility; hostility, a 
posture of aggressive self-defense; self-defense, a resort to arms—to civil war.
As it happened, war was to break out the very year Three Speeches appeared. For 
Antibrownistus Puritanomastix and his fellows, it was only the realization of their worst 
fears about the power o f militant Puritan demagoguery and of their long-held suspicions of 
Puritanism’s fundamental and ultimate aims. In feet, so long and so closely had Puritanism 
been identified with political, religious, and social revolt, that is, with revolt generally, that 
despite attempts—sincere and ironic alike—to define the puritan according to strictly 
doctrinal criteria, “Puritan” came to be used more broadly as a synonym for the radical 
iconoclast, and applied to all those who would overturn the ideologies and institutions of 
the established order. Here again, the Basilikon Doron o f James I proved the model for 
other anti-Puritan writers of the early seventeenth century. Though, as we have seen, 
James initially defines the puritan narrowly, as a member of “that vile sect among the 
Anabaptists, called the Family o f love; because they think themselves only pure, and in a 
manner, without sin,” a few lines later he expands his “style” to include those “brainsick 
and heady preachers[,] their disciples and followers" who share with the Familists a 
“contempt for the civil Magistrate,” and like them rely upon “their own dreams and 
fantasies," and hold “all men profane that swears not to all their fantasies” (219). And by
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the end of his discourse he has made it clear that his main apprehension from religious 
dissenters has little to do with theology and very much to do with their political 
programme, which, seemingly, is to traduce kings, encourage their overthrow as enemies 
to the Church, and promise to replace them with “a Democratic form o f  government" At 
present, James warns his son, these “pests in the Church and commonweal: whom no 
deserts can oblige; neither oaths nor promises bind; breathing nothing but sedition and 
calumnies, aspiring without measure, railing without reason," would have it believed they 
desire only a greater voice in Anglican affairs, or, bating that, liberty o f conscience for 
themselves. And ye t he cautions, once these “pests" are “established in the Ecclesiastical 
government, the Politic and civil estate should be drawn into the like," bringing all to “great 
confusion" (222).
Other anti-Puritan writers recognized with James that the main danger of dissenting 
demagoguery lay in its secular rather than its religious appeal: whatever their pretenses of 
defending Protestantism and the sovereignty of the individual conscience, relatively few 
would be moved to revolt by theological arguments alone, unsweetened with the prospect 
of political and material advantage. They also echoed the king’s argument that whatever the 
gains radical Protestantism made within the Church and among the people, the most serious 
consequences would be felt within the “politic and civic estates." For they, too, looked 
upon Puritanism as, fundamentally, a challenge to royal authority, and saw—rightly, as it 
turned out—that left unanswered and unquelled, that challenge would lead to a violent 
confrontation between king and people, perhaps even the displacement of monarchy by 
theocrats, oligarchs, or republicans. In The Picture o f a Puritane, for instance, Oliver 
Ormerod warns that if “the Doctrine of your consistorians and disciplinarians might take 
place, our Kings of England (I fear) would in short time be brought to the like slavery: for 
do not they teach that Princes ought to submit themselves to the Seniors of the Church, and 
that they ought to be ruled and governed, to be punished and corrected, to be 
excommunicated and absolved by their discretion, and at their pleasure?” (244). David
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Owen was another who, as Lawrence Sasek puts it, “saw a grave threat to the monarchy in
much protestant political theory and as early as 1610 suspected the people called puritans of
tending toward regicide” (256); in fact, Sasek notes, Owen had the rather idiosyncratic
notion of a Puritan as “any member o f the reformed churches who will argue for the
disposition of the king upon any grounds or by anyone, especially by the nobility, by
statesmen, or by the general population. And any puritan appears to be a  potential regicide”
(257). Indeed, one gathers from Owen’s depiction o f Puritanism in Herod and Pilate
Reconciled: Or, The Concord o f Papist and Puritan (Against Scripture, Fathers, Councels,
and other Orthodoxall Writers) fo r  the Coercion, Deposition, and K illing o f Kings (1610)
that its doctrinal aberrations are to be quelled for no reason so much as their inevitably
ruinous political consequences. As dangerous as the popishness it pretends to detest, the
presbytery must needs be “quenched by the power of Majesty” lest it “set the Church on
fire, and the state in an uproar” (258). Exciting admiration in the ignorant and
unsophisticated with feigned piety and false learning,
[Puritan demagogues] have not only robbed widows ’ houses under pretense 
of prayer, and ransacked their seduced disciples by show of devotion, but 
also battered the courts o f Princes, by animating die Peers against Kings, 
and the people against the Peers for pretended reformation. And whereas 
God hath inseparably annexed to the crown o f earthly majesty, a supreme 
ecclesiastical sovereignty for the protection of piety; and an absolute 
immunity from judicial sentence, and Martial violence, for the preservation 
of policy'. These sectaries bereave Kings of both these their Princely 
prerogatives, exalting them selves. . .  above all that is called God: Lest they 
might seem sine ratione insanire, to sow the seeds of sedition without show 
of reason (258).
Appearing two years later, The Schysmatical Puritan o f Giles Widdowes is if possible even 
less oblique in conflating the Puritans’ religious and political programmes. After listing at 
length the non-conformists’ deviations from orthodoxy, an exasperated Widdowes 
demands of the reader, “And what then is his religion, but faction?” (289). For, he 
continues, “the eye that beholds their daring opposition in the Church, may very well 
believe, that [political] Rebellions are taught in their Conventicles”: “What Rebellions?
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Their teaching against the King's Supremacy, a  rejecting o f our Reformed faith, a refusing 
of God’s holy worship written, which is the Common Prayer-book; a despising of 
Canonical obedience; a  repugning against our Reformed Church" (290). And thus the 
Puritan only fulfills his essential nature when he “studies Confusion o f Church, and 
Commonwealth" (290): the Brownist pulls down the churches in order to baffle popish 
idolatry (292); the Anti-disciplinarian—“he, whose pureness is above the King’s 
supremacy”—believes nothing so strongly as that “fangs m ust be subject to the Puritan- 
Presbyter’s Censure, submit their Scepters, throw down their Crowns, and lick up the dust 
o f their fe e t” (294). Insisting upon the autonomy of his own conscience and his 
independence of central ecclesiastical authority, the Antidisciplinarian—or rather, 
Puritanism at large— implicitly denies that “Princes in th eir Dominions have supreme 
Authority to gather together General Councils” and that “the King is supreme Governor o f 
Church and Commonwealth next, and immediately under C hrist in his Dominions; in a ll 
causes, and over a ll Persons Ecclesiastical and C ivir (294). A bom rebel breeding 
rebellion, the Puritan may be defined by the ultimate consequences of his beliefs. Hence 
Widdowes’ blunt conclusion: “The Puritan is an Arch-Traitor” (294).
Hence a highly similar conclusion for the anonymous author o f A Puritane Set 
Forth in His Lively Colours (1642), a tract which brings us neatly full-circle: appearing on 
the eve of Civil War, it closely recapitulates the Basilikon Doron—so closely that it often 
appropriates James’s words verbatim. The author is bold enough, however, to risk 
redundancy by recasting his own arguments in prose into a set of verses titled, “The 
Round-Head’s Character.” The Puritan, he argues, is one whose pretense of holiness only 
disguises his worldly ambitions, one who “utterly detests strange innovation, / Yet daily 
schisms doth procreate in our Nation: /Who hates, yet makes division, 'cause the sway / Of 
this our Kingdom should be ruled his way: / Who’s never well employed, yet still in 
action, / Loves outward peace, but inward’s lined with faction: / That is religious, will 
oppose nothing / But what’s authorized by the Church and King” (326-327).
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“For my own part,” declares the royalist and Jonson-satellite Owen Felltham in his 
Resolves or, Excogitations (1628), “I think the World hath not better men, than some, that 
suffer under that name [of Puritan): nor withal, more Scelestic Villainies. For, when they 
are once elated  with that pride, they so contemn others, that they infringe the Laws o f  all 
human society” (283). Two things should strike us about Felltham’s statement The first is 
the sheer elasticity of the term “Puritan.” It could refer to the moral exemplar, one notable 
for his or her goodness, his or her purity of spirit—one, as Felltham notes a bit earlier in 
his tract “that lives religiously, and will not revel it in a shoreless excess” (282). But when 
understood to mean those “men which would be Puritans,” those whose self-ascribed 
moral superiority and aggressive claim o f God’s special favor justified their “sullen 
segregation from all society” (282), the word conveyed only the darkest connotations: “As 
he [the Puritan] is more generally in these times taken,” Felltham tells us, “I suppose we 
may call him a Church-Rebel, or one that would exclude order, that his brain might rule” 
(282). Second, we should note the actual use to which that elasticity allowed the term to be 
put As we have just seen, by the time of the Civil War the association o f Puritanism with 
the violent overthrow o f social authorities and institutions had become so absolute that it 
was supposed inevitable that Puritanism unchecked could only lead to rebellion and chaos. 
Indeed, we might even detect in Felltham’s warning that the Puritan’s militancy will erode 
“the Laws of all human society,” extinguishing order itself “that his brain might rule,” a 
hint of the apocalyptic strain: Puritanism is to be the agent of England’s dissolution. No 
need, however, to search David Owen’s Herod and Pilate Reconciled for mere hints. The 
subtitle of his tract makes it clear that for Owen the ultimate aim o f Puritanism was self- 
evident: “the Coercion, Deposition, and Killing of Kings”; and inasmuch as regicide, the 
murder of God’s anointed proxy and instrument, threatened to throw Providential order 
into confusion, the spread of dissent could—must—be understood as a  harbinger o f the 
world’s final days: “It is most true that as sick men, near their death, have many idle
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
291
fancies, so the world before the end thereof shall be troubled with many errors. In these 
declining days of the world, many countries, Cities, and Cantons, renounced their old 
government, and submitted themselves to such a new government as they best liked: for 
confirmation o f which practices, there wanted not politic Divines. . .  to invest the people 
and Nobles with the power over Kings, to dispose of their kingdoms” (264).
Though Owen is perhaps more explicit, more emphatic than other anti-Puritan 
writers o f the first half o f  the seventeenth century, his vision is that toward which his 
fellows, such as Felltham, tend in their own writings; it is the vision embedded in James’s 
warning to Henry, the Prince of Wales, about those among his subjects who, convinced of 
their exclusive claim to God’s favor, hold “all the rest o f the world to be but abomination in 
the sight o f God,” and for the sake of their own shifting consciences—and ambitions—are 
willing to set at nought all persons besides themselves, all institutions besides their own. It 
is the vision that would come horribly true for James’s second son, who, made heir to the 
throne at the sudden death o f Prince Henry in November 1612, became King in 1625; 
vainly attempted to suppress an ever more sizable, powerful, and restive body o f Puritan 
subjects; fell out with a  Presbyterian Parliament; went to war against an army of 
Independents general led by an erstwhile brewer; was defeated, dethroned, tried, and 
executed by those for whom kings were an “abomination in the sight of God,” and who 
would be ruled instead by an oligarchy of the Elect The fact that the nightmare prophecies 
of Owen and others did in fact come to pass meant that in addition to a flexible anti-Puritan 
vocabulary allowing for the easy conflation o f religious and political, spiritual and secular 
rebellion, and an explicit identification of Puritanism and Puritans with such rebellion, later 
writers were bequeathed a  discernible, reliably predictable pattern o f historical denouement 
into which similar circumstances might be ar-ranged and by which the present moment 
might be explicated and woven into living cultural memory.
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2. The Civil War Figure Artfoilfltffl and Applied. 1678-1681:
The Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis
A little after ten o ’clock on the morning of January 30, 1649, the condemned 
Charles Stuart mounted a scaffold that had been erected “between Whitehall Gate and the 
gate leading into the gallery from S t James’s” (140).9 The king “looked very earnestly on 
the Block” upon which he was shortly to lay his head and asked if a taller one could not be 
found (140). Addressing those about him on the scaffold, he maintained that he had never 
intended to encroach upon the rights of Parliament let alone make war upon i t  For all that 
he declared himself resigned to the will o f Heaven—“God forbid that I should be so ill a 
Christian as not to say that God’s judgements are just upon me”—and vouchsafed that he 
had “forgiven all the world and even those in particular that have been the chief causers of 
my death” (141). He twice admonished those on the platform not to touch the waiting axe, 
lest its edge be blunted and a second stroke be needed to carry out its mortal charge. Then, 
when the moment for speech had passed, “the King called to Dr. [William) Juxon [Bishop 
of London] for his nightcap, and having put it on, he said to the Executioner, ‘Does my 
hair trouble you?’ who desired him to put it all under his cap, which the King did 
accordingly by the help of the Executioner and the Bishop” (143). “I go,” said the King, 
“from a corruptible to an incorruptible crown, where no disturbance can be, no disturbance 
in the world” (143), then took off his cloak and gave the insignia from his Garter to Juxon, 
that it might be conveyed to the young prince Charles. As he did so, the King used his final 
word to lay one last duty upon the Bishop—and the nation.
“Remember.”
England did indeed remember. The public beheading of God’s anointed was
9 Passages quoted in this paragraph are taken from the excerpt of King Charts his Tryal at the High 
Court o f Justice (2nd ed., 1650) given in The Trial o f Charles I: A Documentary History. Eds. David 
Lagomarsino and Charles J. Wood. Hanover: UP of New England, 1989. 138-144.
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horrific enough in itself to be etched indelibly upon the nation’s consciousness and 
conscience. But the execution of Charles I would also give England a particular way of 
remembering die events leading up to and following the spectacle of that January morning. 
As we have seen, royalist writers had warned for half a  century that it was precisely to this 
pass that radical Protestantism, given its head, would bring the nation: the fact of regicide 
was therefore the seemingly inevitable climax to Puritan agitation and defiance, the requisite 
preliminary to the fulfillment of the dissenters* ultimate objective, the establishment of a 
commonwealth. As such, though it would be absurd to see Charles’ death as a mere trope 
for ideological conflict, as Gerald MacLean would have it (25), the sacrifice of the King to 
Parliamentary expediency would serve to crystalize and throw into relief a certain, clearly 
identifiable pattern of political cause, effect, and consequence—a pattern that subsequent 
commentators and controversialists could evoke to perceive, configure, interpret, and fix in 
public memory the events of their own times. In fact, this particular historical pattern would 
prove especially easy to carry forward and impose upon the conflict between King and 
Parliament during the years of the Popish Plot and Exclusion Crisis. For one thing, a civil 
war, revolution, and restoration had done little to resolve the original, fundamental struggle 
for acknowledged political supremacy between Charles I and his Parliamentary adversaries; 
it was likely, therefore, that sooner or later under the restored Charles II Court and 
Commons would again find themselves at daggers drawn. For another, the single group 
most widely identified with and held responsible for the events of the I640’s and 1650’s, 
dissenting radical Protestants,10 remained a prominent presence in English society. Indeed,
10 Despite the political rather than strictly religions origins of the Civil War, the extent to which pre-war 
propaganda of the kind we have seen in the preceding section (as well, of course, as the actual 
establishment of a theocratic Commonwealth after the deposition of Charles) had succeeded in 
identifying Puritanism with sedition, rebellion, and regicide may be judged by the amount of 
Restoration legislation that aimed directly or indirectly at the suppression of dissenters. The 
Corporation Act (1661) required government officials to abjure the Solemn League and Covenant of 
1643 and to take the Anglican Communion; the Uniformity Act (May 1662) obliged the clergy, in 
Kenyon's words, “to accept the Book of Common Prayer and the Thirty-Nine Articles in their entirety, 
plus ordination by a bishop” (198); and the Conventicles Act (1664) and Five Mile Act (1665) were 
designed to limit the popular influence of dissenting ministers. Other legislation, such as the Act to
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as I hope to have intimated in the foregoing section, so closely were the Puritans (or 
nonconformists, as they came to be styled after 1660) associated in the national psyche 
with rebellion, regicide, and England's consequent regression into chaos, that years after 
the Restoration it was all but impossible to employ Puritan imagery without likewise 
bringing to mind die specific sequence of events that made a martyr of the first Charles and 
an exile o f the second.11 In other words, merely to employ Puritan imagery was to impose 
a certain preconfigured pattern upon the events one was describing. For the loyalist 
pamphleteers and poets who would seek to counter and defeat Opposition tactics during the 
critical years of 1678-1681, when the constitutional struggle resurfaced in the guise, first,
Preserve the Person and Government of the King (which forbade any hindrance of or encroachment 
upon the king’s powers) and the Act Against Tumultuous Petitioning (1661) undercut the tactics used 
by Puritans and Republicans to foment unrest against Charles I. As Jones points out,“on the premise 
that the Civil War had been caused by the factious and and seditious practices of [Puritan and 
Parliamentarian John] Pym and his demagogic associates . . .  was expressly intended to prevent any 
repetition of the agitational techniques that had been used in 1640-42” (142). If, as Kenyon argues, 
Puritanism after 1660 was in fact a spent, dispirited force (196-97), it was given no quarter on that 
account Indeed, he says, “the fatal association of Puritanism with regicide in the public mind” was so 
strong that “the idea of a radical Nonconformist plot to overwhelm the establishment continued to be a 
factor in politics at least up to 1688” (200). Just or not association would soon pass from popular 
prejudice into established historical fact: the anti-monarchial zealot figures prominently, A.C. 
Richardson notes, in Hobbes’ Behemoth, or the Long Parliament (written in the 1660’s, published 
1682) as well as in Clarendon’s History o f the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England (1702-04) (23-35).
11 Thus Henry More in his Enthusiasmus Triumphatus (1662) suggests that the Puritan's inner light is 
actually a dangerous madness antipathetic to reason and learning, its high-flown language likely to 
beguile the gullible from their duty to God, their prince, and their society (38-40). Thus in his character 
sketches of the several varieties of dissenters (1667-1669), Samuel Butler says of the Fanatic that he 
"outgrows Ordinances, as a ’Prentice that has served out his Time does his Indenture, and being a 
Freeman supposes himself at Liberty to set up what Religion he pleases,” though his religion "tends 
only to Faction and Sedition” (127); of the Silenc’d Presbyterian, that he is "pernicious to the 
government,” a contagious demagogue whose gifts ought to be "shut up, that they might not infect 
others” (312); and of the Hypocritical Nonconformist, that he is so insensible "of God’s Mercy and the 
King’s, for his Pardon and Restoration to a better Condition than he was in before he rebelled, that his 
Actions make it plainly appear that he accounts it no better than an Apostacy and Backsliding; and he 
expects a Revolution of Rebellion as obstinately, as the Turk does Mahomet’s Coming” (48)—but 
then "he has always appeared true and faith fill to all tyrannical Usurpations, without the least 
Reluctancy of Conscience” (49). (Significantly, there is little to choose between Butler’s political and 
religious grotesques. The Republican, the State-Convert, the Factious Member, the Leader of a 
Faction, the Seditious Man, and the Rebel, like their nonconformist brethren, are a pack of 
demagogues, hypocrites, and shameless opportunists exploiting the gullible and overthrowing social 
order for their own private ends.) Thus, as we have seen in Chapter 2, even before Puritan and Whig 
imagery were being conflated in earnest, Dryden was using the former to discredit those who would 
usurp his dramatic and critical authority. And thus, as we saw at the outset of this chapter, Dryden uses 
the occasion of his Religio Laid to predict that the continued presence of nonconformists means that 
England will again experience unrest—and possibly armed rebellion.
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of thwarting a Catholic conspiracy, and then o f securing protestantism and English liberties 
by excluding James from the succession, it was a shrewd, if obvious move to point to the 
many superficial parallels between the 1640's and the present day and suggest that the 
Good Old Cause had been revived, that the unrest o f the former decade was being revisited 
upon the nation—and hurtling toward the same grisly end. That their ploy was ultimately 
effective—and highly, devastatingly so—demonstrates the power of the historical figure of 
the Civil War to reawaken the past, configure the present, and shape expectations for the 
future.
Given the nation’s lingering distrust o f dissenters, it is not surprising that despite 
the very real, very widespread fear among Protestants that all Titus Oates and Israel Tonge 
had sworn to in the late summer and early fall o f 1678—about a Catholic plot to assassinate 
Charles, invade England with 60,000 troops, slaughter Protestants by the thousand, set 
James upon the throne, and reclaim England for the pope—was true, there was yet a 
strong, if vague identification of the nonconformists with the present unrest If they were 
not yet believed to have cynically engineered the crisis, it was observed nevertheless that 
they were likely to turn it to their advantage. The prologue to John Crowne’s The 
Am bitious Statesm an; or, The Loyal Favourite (March 1679), containing, as Pierre 
Danchin notes, “[some] of the earliest clear references to the disturbances caused by the 
Popish Plot” (148), provides one of the blunter, more explicit statements of Anglican 
suspicions: “But now the Nation in a tempest rowles, /  And Old St. Peters, justles with S t 
Pauls, / And whilst these two great Ladys fight and braule, / Pick pocket Conventicle 
Whore gets all” (11. 5-8). Other popular pieces, such as the ballads “Good Subjects’ 
Delight: Or, True Love in its Proper Colours” and “Unfeigned Friendship” (c. late 1679- 
early 1680), if more temperate, are no less earnest in admonishing their readers to resist 
those unscrupulous zealots who would use the current anti-papist hysteria to foment 
divisions among high- and low-church Protestants, or to advance the nonconformist 
agenda. “Who seeks Division, all that’s good defaces,” declares the epigraph of “Good
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Subjects' Delight,” “And for his pains may he ware Hempen Tresses”; now is not the time, 
asserts the author o f “Unfeigned Friendship” for the “Conventicle to baulk their obedience, 
/ Nor at Ceremonies where decency shown is / Cavell and Carp, and yet give us no reason” 
(stanza 5). Nor, says William Whitaker in the prologue to his The Conspiracy (March
1680), does the present unrest give license to the impertinent, deep-throated murmurings of 
the zealous that the Court’s dilatory prosecution of the Plot prefigured a betrayal of 
Protestantism and liberty. Let these factious men instead “leam all due Allegiance to the 
King," he advises. “Let Politicians too not be so hot I To swear that a Spring-tide’s  a 
Popish-Plot” (11.22-24). Should they “too eagerly that scent persue,” their lust to discover 
“an Old Plot” might well drive the papists to new measures—or beguile the Protestants into 
forming one of their own (11.25-26).
However, despite this early anxiety over the use dissenters might make of the 
Popish Plot, it would take time for the association of religious with political dissent to 
emerge fully, for the identification of latter-day nonconformists with their Puritan forbears 
to become explicit, and, most broadly, for the historical figure of the Civil War and its 
aftermath to become fully articulated and used to configure the events o f present day. 
Before any of this could occur, the distracting belief in the Popish Plot as a  purely Catholic 
conspiracy would have either to play itself out or be actively dispelled, and it was not until 
the late spring of 1679, when the controversy over succession had emerged as a central 
issue dividing Court and Opposition, that the Whigs’ cynical use o f the Plot to justify their 
programme of exclusion was at last becoming evident. Moreover, it was only after 
Parliament’s passage of the first Exclusion Bill (May 1679) was answered first with 
prorogation and then with outright dissolution (May 27 and July 12, respectively) that the 
true nature of the conflict between Crown and Parliament stood forth unmistakably, and 
only then that the life-or-death stakes of their power struggle could be fully appreciated: 
either Charles would forfeit his royal prerogative, or the MPs, their ancient check upon 
arbitrary rule. Accordingly, it was only at this point, during the late summer and early fall
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of 1679, that a compelling occasion for the emergence of the implicit parallels between the 
constitutional crises of the 1630’s and 1670’s presented itself. Now that it had, 
however, these parallels began to suggest themselves forcefully to Whigs and Tories 
alike—so forcefully, in fact, that, as Mark Knights observes, soon both sides were not 
only recycling arguments from pamphlets first published during the earlier crisis but 
sometimes reprinting the very pamphlets themselves, changing only the dates (189-190). 
The Opposition generally took care not to attack Charles directly; however, if it thrice 
sought to exclude James from the succession (in May 1679, November 1680, and March 
1681), if it petitioned the King to call for Parliament to sit or to allow prorogued 
Parliaments to meet (during the winter of 1679-1680 and again before the elections of
1681), if it questioned the doctrine o f divine right and advocated government by consent of 
the governed, if its Parliamentary majorities stinted the King’s requests for money and 
passed provocative, defiant resolutions asserting its prerogatives, it did so, its apologists in 
prose and verse maintained, only in defense of itself and of the subject. That the Court had 
once again grown politically and morally corrupt, that it had once more fallen under the 
sway of popish agents and interests, and that Charles* frequent prorogations and 
dissolutions o f Parliament, his maintenance o f a  standing army, and his ministers’ secret 
dealings with the papist, absolutist French Crown were but a shift to extend his power at 
the expense of traditional English liberties and institutions was merely self-evident The 
Opposition’s recourse to Civil War imagery was necessarily limited, however; to pursue 
the parallels between past and present too closely would mean identifying themselves with 
those who made war upon and finally murdered Charles I—as the Whigs would discover 
periodically throughout the Exclusion Crisis. Loyalist or Tory writers, on the other hand, 
were under no such restraint, though initially fear o f Parliamentary prosecution and a 
reluctance to take their case to the people, to make the broadly popular appeal an effective 
propaganda campaign would entail, inhibited their exploitation of the inherent rhetorical 
advantage the Civil War figure gave them. With increasing deftness and vigor, however,
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they made the most o f the parallels between the old and new Opposition as these became 
apparent roughly from the late spring of 1679 through the spring o f 1681, when Charles’ 
dissolution o f the third Exclusion Parliament at Oxford broke the power o f his opponents 
and brought an end to the succession crisis. For example, during the spring 1679 elections, 
the first in which clergy could vote, it was noted that the nonconformists were becoming 
particularly active politically, and there were vague fears that Parliament would fall under 
the sway of dissenters (Knights 195-6). This nascent identification of religious and political 
opposition was only strengthened during the second general elections of 1679 (August and 
September), when Tory pamphleteers observed that non-conformists tended to back 
opposition candidates, and seemed to make a candidate’s opposition a condition of their 
support. In his newsbook of July 6, 1679, the loyalist publisher Henry Muddiman 
observed uneasily o f the dissenters’ efforts that “No sooner were the writts sealed for 
calling o f a new ParlQiament] than the busy Fanatic had put forth in Print his Directory of 
what maimer of men they ought to be who are sent forth on that great work” (qtd. in 
Knights, 208). The result, as Knights notes, was that “religious division became much 
more evident in the election propaganda” (214)—and slowly the old polarities began to re- 
emerge: “London’s Choice [o f Citizens, 1679) remarked that for the loyalists the dispute 
was ’no longer [between] Papist and Protestant, but Fanaticks and Church of England 
Men’” (215). Nor did Tory propagandists fail to underscore other echoes of the I640’s 
crisis, namely the openly hostile political atmosphere and the opposition's cynical use of 
“crowd politics,” particularly in London (Knights 223). The Opposition’s petitioning 
campaign following Charles’ immediate prorogation of Parliament when it met on October 
1679 provided the Tories with further ammunition. Not only, as Knights observes, would 
petitioning “appear factional to a nation which ’naturally loves a parliamentary cure, but is 
jealous of other methods’”12 (238), but it called to mind Parliament’s militant pre-war
12 Knights quotes from the second volume of Gilbert Burnet's History o f My Own Time (published
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petitioning, particularly the Grand Remonstrance of 1641. In turn, this forceful reminder of 
the late strife made the petitioners’ strong insistence upon exclusion seem not so much a 
safeguard of English Protestantism, but an invasion o f the royal prerogative, an attempt to 
secure the power to remove the present king if  it was deemed necessary, a  turning against 
monarchy itself. And the loyalists were quick to point out that prominent in the petitioning 
campaign were many unrepentant Republicans. The author of An Apostrophe from  the 
Loyal Party (1681), for instance, warned Charles that “those men by whom your Royal 
Father fell, and pursued you to Banishment. . .  are the men, Sir, who strike so boldly at 
your crown” (qtd. in Knights, 240). Thus, says Knights, “Alongside the idea that the 
country was drifting towards civil war came the belief that the good old cause had been 
revived in terms o f personnel as well as tactics and principles” (240). And we might 
emphasize here that through 1680 and into the early months of 1681 the increasingly 
explicit identification of the character and methods of the present Opposition with those of 
the Roundheads served more generally to associate the Whigs with a particular pattern of 
history now believed to be playing itself out inexorably. Sooner or later, dissent would 
become armed insurrection. As the writer of A Letter to a Friend in the Country Touching 
the Present Fears (early 1680) admonished his readers, “I desire you only to peruse the 
records of 40 and 41 and thereby you will plainly see their pretence to religion and 
reformation, and their intention to rebellion” (qtd. in Knights, 262). Nor did the 
Opposition’s seemingly implacable aggression do anything to dispel such fears. 
Shaftesbury’s extreme, single-minded pursuit of exclusion, Parliament’s growing 
solidarity with a City that in July 1680 had elected a brace of radical Whig sheriffs,13 “the
posthumously, 1724-34) (249).
13 Knights observes of one of the sheriffs, Slingsby Bethel, that "with his history of activity under the 
Commonwealth and abjuration of the Stuarts, symbolised the loyalists’ greatest fears of a resurgent 
republican-dissenting alliance that would turn all to confusion” (272).
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resolution of many addressers to support MPs [as opposed to their monarch! with their 
lives and fortunes” (Knights 302), and the arrival o f the Whig MPs at the Oxford 
Parliament (March 1681) in the company o f what Maurice Ashley describes as “armed 
bands” (149) (protection against the King’s troops positioned throughout the city) made it 
seem that “the struggle between Parliament and the King [had] resolved itself into an armed 
contest similar to that of the 1640s” (Knights 303). Indeed, by this point the identification 
of 1681 with 1641 was all but absolute. A Seasonable Address to both Houses (1681) 
“insisted that instead of running into popery and arbitrary government, the country was 
heading for presbytery and a commonwealth” (Knights 311), and in his reply to an 
Opposition pamphlet, Vox Populi, John Nalson described the tract provocatively as 
“merely a compendium of the trial of Charles I ‘beaten a little thinner,’” and concluded that 
“the poysonous dregs and lees of the late horrid and unnatural rebellion begin again to rise” 
(Knights 313).
“Once the loyalists could insist that the opposition aimed not at the security of the 
nation, but at the overthrow of monarchy and at rebellion,” Knights concludes, “they had 
effectively won the argument about the succession” (314). As Knights’s statement 
suggests, the propaganda contest between Whigs and Tories was as important in 
determining the outcome of the succession crisis as any amount of political maneuvering. 
One might even say that rhetorical supremacy made it possible for the Tories to gain and 
retain the upper hand politically, for what Knights says elsewhere of the struggle between 
the opposition petitioners and loyalist abhorrers during the winter of 1679-1680 and the 
early months of 1681—that at root it was a struggle “to represent the national will” (280)— 
is true of the paper scuffle as a  whole. Unless that national will could be plausibly 
articulated, it could never be made manifest But we might observe further that to depict a 
collective sensibility, to portray the national interests and purpose, to set forth and enact 
ideological and bureaucratic agenda, the lay of the nation’s social, political, and (above all) 
historical topography must be made discernible and intelligible. For England to have had
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any notion of what it was to be, it had first to understand what it now was, which became 
clear only by reflecting upon what it once had been. If, in the individual, memory is the 
active patterning of present according to prior experience, at the national level memory 
consists o f the fashioning of an historical present, that is, of configuring the present 
moment according to and setting it against the familiar patterns of the past In both cases, 
we tend to see what we have seen. I would not imply, however, that either the past or the 
present remains inert during this process. As the slow emergence and application of the 
Civil War figure in the Tory-Whig pamphlet war suggests, the ordering of experience is 
refluent as well as progressive: if our perception of the present is shaped by the past, our 
notion of the past is influenced by what we meet with in the present Each configures the 
other. Thus, as it became recognized that the constitutional questions of Charles I’s reign 
had resurfaced in the reign of Charles n, opposition and loyalist writers alike turned to 
historical precedent to explain what was unfolding before them and to foreshadow what the 
likely consequences would be; but in reconstructing the past from those select features that 
seemed to correspond to their current circumstances and anxieties, they gave it a particular 
shape that indentured it to the present. Ultimately at stake, then, in the pamphleteers' 
struggle to represent the national will are the precedents that could throw the historical 
present into clear, meaningful relief, and thereby yield up the materials from which national 
memory could be fashioned.
The struggle and stakes are the same for the Tory poets, and in the relevant works 
appearing from the fall o f 1678 to the early winter of 1681 the articulation of the historical 
figure of the Civil War and application of this figure to the events of the Exclusion Crisis 
generally proceed much as it does in the pamphlets, tracts, and journalism of the period. An 
exposition of the terms of political debate gives way, via the resurrection o f Puritan 
imagery, to an increasingly explicit, increasingly lurid identification of the current Whig 
Opposition with the regicides of 1649. The exigencies of poetic composition and (in the 
case of prologues and epilogues) dramatic presentation sometimes effected delays between
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an event and its depiction in verse. However, what the medium exacted in immediacy it 
more than remitted in its peculiar appeal and strength as a  political weapon, namely, the 
power of its sensual dimension to realize the past and to reify it in the present—an 
indispensable capacity if pertinent elements of the past are to be recovered and revivified 
during this, the first phase of the poetic treatment to the events of 1678-1681 and their 
aftermath. Once articulated, the Civil War figure and its trappings would continue to be 
applied emphatically to the events of the succession crisis. Yet this very boldness, together 
with an ever-so-subtle shift in perspective from anticipation to retrospection, tells us that 
we have entered a second phase of poetic response, one in which the attempt is made to 
speak definitively about the recent past, to establish just what has happened and what it has 
meant. Accordingly, during this second phase the Civil War figure is employed, 
seemingly, not so much to incite as simply to confirm its viability as an operative cultural 
mnemonic, an objective largely achieved by its generally successful application to the 
significant partisan events of 1682-1683: the discovery o f the Protestant Association, the 
battle over London’s Charter, and the Whiggish Rye House Plot to assassinate Charles and 
James. This second phase is reinforced by a parallel, then succeeding third phase. In this 
final phase, a response to the reversal of political fortunes after the dissolution of the 
Oxford Parliament, the figure of the Civil War is extended to accommodate the ultimate 
historical outcome of the war and commonwealth years: the restoration of monarchy and 
the king. Reclaiming the language and imagery that had celebrated the return of Charles II. 
the loyalist poets cast the triumph of their party in analogous terms: with its King once 
more secure in his prerogative, England may now, as then, expect the blessings of a new 
Golden Age. Applied to the present reign and projected for the next, this attempt to give the 
future a  familiar shape would make available to later poets—and particularly the next 
century’s greatest public poet, Alexander Pope—a new or at least revitalized figure, the 
cycle of chaos and order, exile and restoration.
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At the close of the epilogue to his play, The Misery o f Civil War (December 1679 
or January 1680), John Crowne seems unable to contain any longer his bewilderment at the 
religious and political strife that has maddened England, his fear that this strife will soon 
boil over into civil war. Better, he exhorts the audience, to lose your wealth at dice, your 
time at plays, and your health with “punks” (1- 38) than “by damn’d senseless bloudy 
strifes, about / No one knows what, be trod on by the Rout, /  Have your wealth plunder’d, 
and your brains beat out, /  And dye like Jesuites to be thought devout” (11.39-42). We have 
no call to second-guess Crowne’s anxiety; given the events of the winter months o f 1679- 
1680, it was well founded. Parliament had been prorogued in October, and by the 
following January the petitioning and abhorring campaigns had dramatically raised the 
political temperature in the capital; November had witnessed first a raucous display of 
radical Protestant militancy during the Queen Elizabeth's Day celebrations,14 then outraged 
Protestant demonstrations when their hero, the Duke of Monmouth, returning unbidden 
from his exile in Holland, was punished for his brazenness by being stripped o f his offices; 
in December, MPs had indicted the Duchess of Portsmouth, Charles’ favorite mistress and 
an avowed Catholic, for plotting against the King, and had demanded her immediate 
deportation; and on the night of December 19 Dryden had been beaten in Rose Alley, 
possibly at the behest of Whigs upset by his characterization of the Opposition as libelous, 
factious rebels in his prologue to Nahum Tate’s tragedy, The Loyal General (1679).15 All 
the same, it was rather late in the day to throw one’s hands up and declare the “bloudy 
strifes” then roiling London to be about “no one knows what,” or to admonish the town, as 
Edward Ravenscroft would in his epilogue to William Whitaker’s The Conspiracy (March
1680), to “be mute till the whole truth comes out, /  Not like the Rable that at Execution 
shout” (11. 10-11). For the exposition of the issues over which the nation was becoming
14 Observed November 17, the day of her coronation.
15 One of the explanations James Anderson Winn offers for the assault (325-329).
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increasingly polarized had been going on for some time, and was even then proceeding 
with increasing urgency. Between the Whig and Tory controversialists in prose and poetry 
who, as J.R. Jones observes, had flooded the town with political propaganda during the 
fall 1679 elections (210) and the boisterousness of the petitioning and abhorring 
campaigns, it would have been very difficult to remain ignorant of the arguments about 
what was at stake in the debate over succession and the right of Parliament to meet
The loyalist poets’ exposition o f the issue of succession and more generally of the 
new struggle between King and Parliament for political primacy had in fact been underway 
at least since the spring of 1679. In The Character (late January-early March 1679), for 
instance, the anonymous author of this portrait of the so-called Cavalier Parliament which 
had been sitting since the Restoration and had been recently charged with investigating the 
Popish Plot, counters whispers that its dissolution on January 24, 1679, owed to the 
Court’s attempt to hide its members’ complicity in the conspiracy or to Charles’ intent to 
impose arbitrary rule. If anything, he argues, the reverse is the case: “Had you been wise 
and giv’n the King a sum, / Thou might’st have had thy swinge at bloody Rome. / Finding 
no coin, we cannot find the Plot” (11. 36-38). This self-spiting niggardliness, however, has 
done more than derail the inquiry into the Plot; it has exposed in Parliament a willfulness, a 
lust for absolute power that forced the King to dissolve it in self-defense. In effect, 
Parliament has dissolved itself by “Contending with the King, his laws and pow’r, / 
Entrenching on’s prerogative each hour; / Hying in the face of his supremacy / With saucy 
privilege and liberty” (11.29-33). The author goes so far as to liken Parliament’s attempts to 
“assume at once, and at one hour, / The royal office and the supreme pow’r” (11.55-56), to 
reduce the King and peers to mere “ciphers in the state,” and to make the Commons the 
only “pow’rful figures of debate” (11. 59-60) to the actions of “Great Hell’s Long 
Parliament” (I. 44), which sat from November 1640 to March 1660 and made itself 
notorious by warring against Charles I, imposing a commonwealth, then acquiescing in 
Cromwell’s assumption of the Protectorship. The poet does not scruple to invoke the
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spectre of that “black rebellion" (1.45), hint at the recent Parliament’s potentially regicidal 
blood-thirstiness—“Danby’s the first shall to the slaughter go" (1.57; emphasis added) ^ — 
and conclude emphatically that, like its infamous predecessor, “The House of Commons is 
the rabble’s god, / The courtier’s scourge, the bishops’ iron rod, /  The Lords’ vexation, 
and the King’s, by God!" (11.100-102). If, however, the poet claims to take the words 
“parliament” and “traitor” for equivalents (11.61-62), his extended revisitation of the topic 
of the late Parliament’s denial of money to the King (11.62ff), and his obvious pleasure in 
scolding the body at length (11. 86-99) for behaving like “senseless stones and stocks. / 
Flying at each other like to dogs and cocks; / To satisfy your pride” (11. 89-91), show that 
despite the intensity of his exasperation he here evokes the Long Parliament and its 
denizens more to serve an immediate rhetorical end than to establish an essential antipathy 
between the MPs and the Crown. Nonetheless, appearing when it does, the analogy is 
remarkable in its anticipation of the use loyalist poets would make of the Long Parliament 
once succession had emerged as a specific central issue—as it would in a few short weeks, 
when the Commons of the next Parliament, overwhelmingly Whig, would pass the first 
Exclusion Bill.17
By the fall of 1679, loyalist poets, true to the mission of the public mode of poetry, 
had expressly joined the debate over exclusion and were busy explicating its essential 
constitutional significance to their reading and playhouse audiences. The “cheap laurels" 
(Kenyon 230) the Duke of Monmouth had earned in putting down a minor Scottish 
rebellion in June had made him a Protestant hero, and soon the Opposition was promoting 
him as a plausible rival to the Catholic James for the throne. The author of “A Ballad Called 
Perkin’s Figary,” however, will have none of it: “We English will ever be just to the
16 In December 1678 Parliament had voted to impeach Lord High Treasurer Thomas Osborne, Earl of 
Danby for financial mismanagement and for secretly negotiating with Catholic France.
17 The first Exclusion Parliament met on March 6, passed a bill excluding James from the succession 
May 22, was prorogued May 27, and finally dissolved July 12.
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crown, / No bastard succession with us shall go down” (11. 48-49). His indignation at the 
thought even leads him to ascribe the Popish Plot to the cynical machinations of 
Monmouth’s handlers: “Though plot upon plot /  Has kept our brains hot, /  Yet the cheat's 
now discover’d, ’twill serve thy turn not” (11. 50-52). Aphra Behn takes a more oblique, 
but no less effective tack in presenting the loyalist position on succession and hereditary 
right in her epilogue to The Young King; or, The M istake (September 1679), a piece 
provoked by James’s second flight into exile under Whig pressure.18 After a play “of 
mighty Pains” (1. I), the audience is offered by way of antidote a sketch of an idyllic 
pastoral world which knows “no dispute for Empire” (1. 15), no “Rivals . . .  for Crowns” 
(1. 18), “no sedition hatcht, no other Plots” (1. 32). Rather, “the humble Swain his 
Birthright here enjoys, / And fears no danger from the publick Voyce” (U. 16-17); here he 
will meet with “No wrong nor insolence from busie Powers” (1. 18); and from hence the 
swain will not be “forc’d by Arbitrary Votes to fly / To forein Shores for his security” (11. 
22-23). By conflating the just claims of crown prince and cottager, Behn shrewdly turns 
against the Whigs their own frequent assertion that an arbitrary government under James 
would effectively void the subject’s proprietary rights. It would indeed be wrong, Behn 
implies, for an excited mob, or a  malicious conspiracy, or the threat of violence to deprive a 
“humble Swain” of what is his by right of birth; but surely that same right o f inheritance 
prevents the seizure via “Arbitrary Votes” of the lands, powers, and crown that are the 
birthright of a prince. Deny this right in James, and one denies it in the subject But there is 
more at stake in this than rights in property and title. When, in his prologue to The 
Conspiracy, Whitaker advises the *Men of Business in the Nation” (1. 17), “Leave your 
provoking Caesar and his frowns, / Leave crossing Birth-rights and disposing Crowns” (11.
18 James had first been forced into exile in March. He was recalled when Charles suddenly fell ill in late 
August returning September 2, but was asked to leave again near the end of the month. He went first 
to the Low Countries, then, in October, to Scotland, where he served as High Commissioner until 
March 1682.
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27-28), he intimates, as does Behn here, that the people's presumption to interrupt or 
emend at will the established line o f succession—to award or reclaim the crown as it suits 
them—is nothing less than the obviation o f divine right and the subordination of King to 
subject. It is revolution—a point reinforced by loyalist playwrights in drawing their favorite 
analogies of poet and king, audience and populace. In his prologue to The Loving Enemies 
(January 1680), for instance, Lewis Maidwell has the poet's perennial butts, the fop and 
clown, petition against satire and “bold truth” 0-19), the former’s supposed instruments of 
“arbitrary Government” (1.24). Should the dramatist appropriate folly and knavery for his 
own use, they reason, “we lose our property” (I- 22), and so they resolve to “pound the 
Poet up in small extent” 0- 23) to “make him leave his best prerogative” (1. 34). Under 
threat o f violence, the playwright’s only recourse is to emasculate his artistic sovereignty, 
his ethical authority: “So the poor Beaver lest he prove a prey, / Bites off his dearest part, 
and throws away” (11. 35-36). The analogy is pursued more thoroughly in Behn’s epilogue 
to The Second P an o f the Rover (January 1681). “Poets are Kings o f Wit,” the speaker 
(Elizabeth Barry) tells the audience, “and you appear / A Parliament, by Play-Bill, 
summon’d here” (11.1-2). The “scanted Tribute” of the play-goer parliament, however, has 
been so grudgingly and “so slowly paid” (1. 6), that the poets have been forced to “[part] 
with their prerogatives: /  Their Birth-right Satyring, and their just pretence / Of judging, 
even their own Wit and Sense” (11.9-11). Yet, though they have “flatter’d all the Mutineers 
i’ th’ Nation” (1. 14) and “pleas’d your sick Palats with Fantastick Wit” (1. 16), the 
audience will “come but once, unless by stealth. / Except the Author be for 
Commonwealth” (11. 22-23). No wonder, then, that “the King of Poets” and “His Peers 
secur’d beneath his Laurels Shade” (11. 43-44) have been “Driven to the last and worst 
Extremity” (1.46). The public’s encroachment upon the royal prerogative does not merely 
inconvenience the King (whether of poetry or the realm); forcing him to cast away “his 
dearest part,” it renders him a nullity, and at last drives him and the institution of monarchy 
to their respective “last and worst extremities”: death and obsolescence.
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Note that when Behn declares that the playhouse “Parliament” will hardly endure a 
play unless its author “be for Commonwealth,” her metaphorical conceit at once becomes 
an assertion of political divisions in the real world. The spheres of imagination and actuality 
are thus collapsed, as, for their part, are the motive, agency, and aim of the Opposition. 
Here the challenge to the poet’s sovereign authority or prerogative comes from a figurative 
Parliament of spectators whose supposed bias toward playwrights predisposed toward the 
establishment of a literal Commonwealth suggests that in the political theatre beyond the 
playhouse walls the reduction o f  royal prerogative is not simply a consequence or by­
product of the Opposition’s programme of exclusion, but in fact a premeditated means 
toward its ultimate end: representative government This specific identification of the 
institution of Parliament with the political Opposition imposes not merely a doctrinal but a 
constitutional dimension upon the immediate controversy ova- James’s fitness for the 
throne and Charles’ staunch support for his brother either the Crown or Commons will 
emerge the prime political power in England. Such an identification and the absolute, 
essentialist terms in which it was increasingly cast had begun to emerge about a year 
earlier, in response to the petitioning campaign by which the Opposition attempted to 
pressure Charles to allow the Parliament elected the previous October to sit. In The 
W iltshire Ballad (February 1680), for instance, the anonymous author warns his readers 
that despite their protestations that it is “a thing / Which only can preserve the King” (11.18- 
19), those gathering signatures to demand that “the House may sit” (1. 18) know full well 
that “nothing / destroys him more, for should he give / Consent he’d never that retrieve / 
But part with his prerogative, /  A low thing / Make himself by’t, the rabble get into his high 
imperial seat” (11. 20-26). Indeed, Parliament’s supporters secretly “long to see / A 
monarch in effigie” (11. 33-34); they aspire “at the helm. . .  to sit, / There govern without 
fear or wit, / King or unking when they think fit” (11. 37-39). And this the people would 
indeed be able to do if once they gained at the monarch’s expense the “pow’r  to call / 
Parliaments and dissolve them,” for then they would “all / Regalia possess” (11. 65-67); that
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is, their authority would have supplanted the King’s, making them effectively absolute in 
his stead. The prospect naturally appalls the ballad’s hero, loyalist musician and composer 
Michael Wise; resisting the petitioners’ siren song, he offers them instead a loyal madrigal 
“ fetch’t from Forty-One withal” (L 95) and, to complete their consternation, a defiant toast: 
“We’ll leave the rule unto the King, / Pray for his health, a loyal thing. / Let great Charles 
rule! who won’t this sing / ’s lunatic” (11.117-120).
The identification of Parliament with the Opposition and the characterization of its 
conflict with the King as winner-take-all would become more emphatic in the coming 
months, as when it is taken up by Wentworth Dillon, Earl of Roscommon, in The Ghost o f 
the Old House o f Commons to the New One Appointed to M eet at Oxford (February
1681). Between the appearance o f The W iltshire Ballad and Dillon’s poem, the Parliament 
elected in October 1679, having been prorogued seven times in succession, had at last been 
allowed to sit the following October. Before it was prorogued again and finally dissolved in 
late January 1681, it had prosecuted those who had organized abhorring campaigns to 
counter the petitioners; had caused Sir Roger L’Estrange, the Tories’ premier pamphleteer, 
to flee to Scotland lest he be prosecuted for being a papist (October); had presided over the 
trial and execution of William Howard, Viscount Stafford, who had been implicated in the 
Popish Plot by the false testimony of Titus Oates (December); and had passed the Second 
Exclusion Bill (November 11; rejected by the Lords November 15). During the first weeks 
of January 1681, Parliament had responded to Charles’ expressed resolution never to 
consent to exclusion with their own ultimatum: “They warned [the King] that no supply 
would be voted until Exclusion had passed, and on 10 January, having notice of an 
imminent prorogation, they passed a series of intransigent resolutions to show that they 
accepted the king’s challenge, and were ready for a final, all-out offensive in new 
elections” (212-213). This is the Commons personified in Dillon’s poem, dragging itself 
from “deepest dungeons of eternal night, / The seats of horror, sorrow, pains and spite” (11. 
1-2) to warn its successor not to repeat its mistakes. The ghost confesses that it had tried to
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thwart, then eclipse the power of the monarch: “The busy subtle serpents of the law / Did 
first my mind from true obedience draw; /  While I did limits to the King prescribe, /  And 
took for oracles that canting tribe* (11.17-20). Admitting that it “grew seditious for variety” 
(1. 22), the spectre goes on to describe its favorite tactics and agents. As it vindictively 
persecuted those loyal to the King—“All that oppos’d me were to be accus’d, / And by the 
laws illegally abus’d” (11.23-24)— it exploited the fears raised by the Popish Plot, putting 
itself forward as the champion o f true Protestantism even as it pursued its real objective of 
striking at the monarch’s supreme authority: “But while the Triple Mitre [i.e. the Catholic 
Church] bore the blame, / The King’s three crowns were their rebellious aim” (11. 37-38). 
And though it made a great show of professing “to fear the Guards” (1. 39), that is, to 
declare that the King was about to raise a standing army to make war upon the Parliament 
and its members, the legislature was all the while enlisting its own ruffians—“the Bethels 
and the Wards:19 / Anti-monarchic heretics of state, / Immoral atheists, rich and reprobate” 
(11.39-42)—and would-be despots, the “little guide” (1.43) Shaftesbury preeminent among 
them: “None knew so well the old pernicious way / To ruin subjects, and make kings obey; 
/ And my small Jesu, at a furious rate, / Was driving Eighty back to Forty-Eight” (11.45- 
48). Royalist allusions to the Long Parliament are always rhetorically potent, as we saw in 
The Character, but here, with nearly two years’ worth o f intense, usually bitter 
constitutional wrangling in the immediate background, the conflation at last has a real 
chance of success, of characterizing the late Parliament as sufficiently militant to depose 
and kill its sovereign. To draw the analogy now, in February 1681, on the eve of 
Parliament’s sitting at Oxford, when tensions are so high that, as noted above, loyalist and 
opposition MPs would arrive in the city in the company of armed retinues, is to insinuate
19 Slingsby Bethel (1617-1697), whom Noyes describes as “a consistent republican" (961n), was, with 
Henry Cornish, elected sheriff of London in July 1680; “Sir Patience Ward (1629-1696) was Lord 
Mayor of London in 1680. In his election speech he strongly maintained Protestant principles. He sided 
with the opposition, and directed the ultra-Protestantism of the City" (Mengel, 409n).
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unmistakably that the showdown between King and Commons has become very literally a
life-and-death struggle.
For analogies between the present circumstances and the Long Parliament, Civil
War, and Commonwealth to achieve their greatest possible impact, however, one final
element must be incorporated. We find that element in “The Parliament Dissolved at
Oxford” (May 1681), a  poem commemorating, as its title suggests, Charles’ dissolution of
the Oxford Parliament (March 28), but also his subsequent vindication o f  this move in His
M ajesty’s Declaration to A ll H is Loving Subjects Touching the Causes and Reasons That
Moved Him to Dissolve the Two Last Parliaments, issued April 8. As one would expect in
a piece taking its cue from an official account of the recent struggle and its significance (and
in which Charles himself is the putative speaker), “Parliament Dissolved” neatly
encapsulates what we have seen to this point: the exposition of succession as the central
issue separating the Administration and its political opposition; the absolute identification of
Parliament with that Opposition; and the supposition that the present contest between the
institutions of monarchy and parliament would leave England either an absolutist or a
republican state. The first nine lines, for instance, offer perhaps the most concise, forceful
rationale of rule by divine right we have yet encountered, while clearly defining the threat
posed to it by the popular voice as embodied in the House of Commons:
Under 500 kings three kingdoms groan:
Go Finch,20 dissolve them, Charles is in the throne 
And by the grace of God will reign alone
What would the Commons have? The royal line 
Heav’n does dispose of: ’Tis not theirs nor mine,
But His by whom kings rule and are divine.
I represent the King o f Kings, who gave 
The crown, the sword, the scepter, what I have;
I am God’s servant, not the people’s slave (U .1-9).
From this, the patriarchalist perspective, the designs of Parliament’s “500 kings” upon
20 Lewd Chancellor Heneage Finch.
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Charles’ authority are at best simply m oot Charles is king “by the grace of God”: it is the 
manifest will of Heaven that Charles wear the crown, wield the sword, uphold the scepter, 
and, as a representative of “the King o f Kings,” enjoy a sovereignty as absolute and 
unquestioned in its sphere as that God holds over Creation itself. Thus it is to God alone 
that he must answer, though as “the people’s father” (1.28) he must promote and maintain 
the well-being of his subjects. This he does largely by ensuring their recourse to justice, 
ruling according to law instead o f by fia t As “Parliament Dissolved” would have it, 
however, Charles does not merely “govern only by the laws” (1. 23), he is the law’s very 
embodiment: “For where Charles commands there must justice reign” (1. 27). To stand 
against the king, therefore, to dispute or encroach upon his power, or to disobey him 
outright is to place oneself outside both temporal and divine law. The implication here is 
that by their fractiousness, by setting themselves above the law (11.25-26), and by putting 
unlawful proposals (for exclusion, that is) before the King (11. 31-33), the recently 
dissolved opposition Parliaments made themselves extra-legal entities. And worse: “When 
the people’s father does espouse the law,” Charles declares, “All those [who] subjects from 
their duty draw / Do viper-like through the parent’s bosom gnaw” (11.28-30). Putting itself 
in opposition to the King, Parliament has pursued a course tending not only toward 
treason, but toward parricide as well.
Now for the all-important “final element” that would allow (and in fact was 
allowing) the Civil War figure to be fully articulated and effectively applied to the historical 
present: the identification of religious with political dissent With the greatest complacency, 
as if by reflex or instinct as if the point were too self-evident to admit of explanation or 
defense, the Charles of the poem (unlike the actual Charles in His M ajesty’s Declaration) 
ascribes the late Parliament’s “frantic votes and mad resolves” (1. 10) to the efforts of 
Presbyterians, thereby collapsing into a single highly familiar, readily recognizable, and 
widely detested group the Opposition, the Commons, and the nonconformists. “The 
Presbyterians, sick of too much freedom, / Are,” he declares, “ripe for Bethle’m. It’s high
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time to bleed ’em: / The second Charles does neither fear nor need ’em” (11.16-18). It is, 
we are left to suppose, a sign o f his exceeding clemency that instead of “bleeding them” he 
chooses instead merely to “dissipate /  These impolitic mushrooms o f our state” (1.19-20), 
an earlier crop of which proved sufficiently toxic to the fir s t Charles. But if the king’s 
mindfulness o f his father’s fate makes his present restraint somewhat surprising, his 
matter-of-fact indictment of Protestant dissenters is not at all puzzling. Indeed, given the 
loyalist poets’ resurrection of Puritan imagery since the petitioning campaign of the 
previous year, the growing hostility of this imagery, and the increasing association of 
Puritanism with Whiggism, we could hardly expect any other inference to be drawn. It 
was, after all, an inference then being drawn throughout England, an inference whose 
promotion at large via these steps would prove to be quite possibly the shrewdest rhetorical 
move the Tory poets could have made.
We should note for the purpose of contrast that at the outset of unrest in 1678 and 
for some time afterward, the Opposition was generally not treated and characterized as a 
group; instead, poets loyal to the Court tended to attack its major leaders singly, 
caricaturing them as their individual personalities and careers allowed. These caricatures 
proved fairly stable, and would become almost proverbial. The Torys’ depiction of 
Shaftesbury, for instance, may be guessed from the title of John Caryll’s “The Hypocrite” 
(late fall 1678). “Plain band and hair and clothes disguise the man,” Caryll observes, “All 
but his dealing and his heart is plain” (11. 15-16). Responding to the earl’s aggressive anti- 
Catholic posturing in the months immediately after Oates’s revelations, Caryll accuses 
Shaftesbury, “this floating mercury of sin” (1.10), of pursuing self-interest in the guise of 
public service, exploiting Protestant fears of “Pop’ry’s growth” (1. 27) to build a 
constituency and fuel his no doubt dangerous political ambitions. For religion, says Caryll, 
is ever the pretext “when great men fall, or pop’lar men would rise” 0- 44): “Then, like 
Achilles in his fate-proof arms, / They boldly march, guided with holy charms, / And 
brow-beat Caesar, and defy his laws—  / Who dare resist the champion of God’s cause?”
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(11.47-49).21 The Duke of Buckingham, for his part, is typically pilloried as a debauched 
egomaniac, a noxious i f  pathetic figure. In “The Litany of the Duke o f Buckingham,” a 
broadside published in early 1680, the duke is taxed with leading “a sensual, proud, 
atheistical life” (1.1), his desperate, thoroughly dissipated existence consisting of little more 
than wild prodigality and fruitless political scheming. Cheated still “by th’ same 
undertakers, /  . . . Levellers, bawds, saints, chemists and Quakers” (11. 28-29), 
Buckingham's aim of “reform[ing] kingdoms as a  sanctifi'd peer” (1.15), o f being “made 
ducal peer of a new commonwealth” (1.51), can never, given his violence, volatility, and 
vulgarity, be more than a cheat upon himself. He may well have hoped “to be made the 
citizen’s gem” (1. 44), yet as The Cabal (February 1680) tells it, “rather than not be 
popular,” he has chosen to “be base” (1.91); courting the rabble, he has only made himself 
“the City’s cully”: “The City’s minion, now their scorn and sport, /  There more despis’d 
than once ador’d at Court” (11. 80-81). Having “lost himself in infamy,” he can do little 
more now than expose his impotence to the world, “Revile the state and rail at monarchy” 
(II. 84-85). If the Duke o f Monmouth escapes the labels of hypocrite, plotter, and traitor, it 
is largely because Tory writers portrayed him as too stupid to be capable of such offenses. 
“He aims at a crown for his noddle unfit / As Howe22 for a duchess, or he for a w it” Or so
21 Satyr Unmuzzled (1680) likewise portrays Shaftesbury as a shameless opportunist, a ruthless engineer 
of treason, casting him as an Achitophel nearly two years before Dryden would do so. Here as in 
Dry den’s better-known poem, Shaftesbury is a demonic arch-tempter of the hapless young Monmouth: 
"Thou weak Achitophel, to undertake / By thy wise counsels a false king to maker (11. 93-94). 
Shaftesbury is likened to Cataline rather than Achitophel in The Cabal (February 1680), but his 
supposed hypocrisy, duplicity, and treachery are still the targets of the poet’s attack. “’Tis strange,” the 
poet wonders, "that human wisdom ever should / Err most undo- pretense of doing good” (11.43-44); 
but then, possessed of a "double heart” 0.58), as shifting as a “weather-cock” (1.54), Shaftesbury lacks 
the moral and ethical wherewithal to serve anything but his own self-interest. Thus "at the Council 
table” (1.62) he rails "’Gainst Charles and the succession” 0- 63): "Like a vile sculler he abjures the 
realm, I And sinks the bark ’cause he’s not chief at helm” (11.65-66). Let him, the poet advises, retire 
among the rabble and there dwell in "his own element” 0- 74): "There let him plot, and ne’r behold the 
sun, / Till he has through all seas of folly run, / Under pretext of wit to be undone” (11.75-77).
22 “John Grubham Howe or How (1657-1722), commonly known as 'Jack Howe,’ a politician. In 1679 
he brought an accusation against the Duchess of Richmond, which on investigation proved to be false, 
and he was forbidden to attend the Court” (Mengel 123n.)
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claims “Perkin’s Figary”23 (II. 11-12), later asserting that the noddle in question is indeed
quite “empty” (1. 24). And R ochester’s Farew ell (c. summer 1680) commends
Monmouth’s bravery at the siege o f Maestricht (1673), only to observe,
He with that thick impenetrable skull 
(The solid harden’d armor o f a  fool)
Well might himself to all war’s ills expose 
Who (come what will) yet had no brains to lose.
Yet this is he, the dull unthinking he,
Who must (forsooth) our future monarch be (11.76-81)
As for Monmouth’s many handlers, Sir Thomas Player, Sir Robert Peyton, Francis Jenks,
Sir Thomas Armstrong, James Vernon, and Thomas Ross among them, they are but a
“pack of senseless rascals” (1. 85), much of a  kind with their protege. Of such men, sneers
the author o f The Cabal, are the ranks o f the Opposition comprised. These are the self-
styled guardians o f Protestantism, the self-professed champions o f Constitution and
Country; these, the poet concludes sardonically, “are the men that all the bustle make, / And
empire check merely for empire’s sake” (11. 162-163).
Yet it would take more than charges of opportunism, knavery, and dullness to turn
the public against political opposition. If such charges are not potent enough to rouse public
indignation sufficiently, neither are they capable o f harnessing the power of public memory
and bringing it to bear upon the present circumstances. Is Shaftesbury ambitious?
Buckingham profligate? Monmouth obtuse? To label them so is to specify narrowly the
flaw within the man and, rhetorically at least, thereby circumscribe the power of the man
himself to do harm. As events would demonstrate, it was only when the Opposition,
melted down into a faceless amorphous entity, came to be associated with the nation’s most
visceral hatreds and fears, identified with its worst collective nightmare, and fitted with the
fright-mask o f those anxieties that its spectre could be raised to evoke true dread in the
23 Tradition has it that Nell Gwyn gave Monmouth the nickname Perkin, from Perkin Warbeck (c. 1474- 
99), a Fleming who from 1490 claimed to be Richard, Duke of York, the younger son of Edward IV, 
and therefore the rightful king of England. In 1498 he attempted to take “his” throne by force; he was 
taken prisoner and hanged the following year.
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English soul. The summoning of this apparition—the historical figure o f the Civil War—is 
completed, as 1 have hinted in the paragraph before last, with the revival of Puritan 
imagery, a development as requisite for the subsequent conflation of religious and political 
dissent in Tory propaganda as it was inevitable, for, as we saw in the first section of this 
chapter, to no other group did the associations o f rebellion and regicide attach themselves 
so essentially.
Though in “The Hypocrite” Shaftesbury is likened to “a stark Quaker” (1. 20), 
Buckingham linked to the self-elected saints in “The Litany,” and Monmouth made the 
darling of the proverbial “Presbyter John and his fanatic crew” in “Perkin’s Figary” (1.30), 
properly speaking, the revival of Puritan imagery begins in the early months of 1680 
(finally running its course in the late fall of 1681). Perhaps the timing is owing to the 
petitioning and abhorring campaigns, when highflown passions may have induced loyalist 
writers to reach for the next logical rhetorical weapon; or to renewed Tory confidence 
during what Knights calls 1680’s “loyalist spring” (261), when the failure of petitioning 
had become clear. Perhaps the exposition of the current institutional struggle between King 
and Parliament, combined with the perception that nonconformists were becoming 
increasingly involved in the Opposition, suggested to Tory writers that once again radical 
Protestants were the cause of the nation’s intestinal broils. Whatever the case, the revival of 
depictions of the Puritan physique, character, agenda, and constituency dates from this 
period, and, with some notable exceptions, is carried out mainly in dramatic prologues and 
epilogues, the theatrical venue itself playing an important role in the successful 
reintroduction of the cultural archetype into the national psyche.
The resurgence begins by reacquainting audiences with comparatively benign 
stereotypes relating to Puritan appearance, religious mannerisms, and moral hypocrisy. In 
its evocation of the “Phanatic Knave” (1. 18), for example, Nathaniel Lee’s prologue to 
Theodosius; or. The Force o f Love (September 1680 or earlier) bids those assembled to 
call to mind the Roundhead’s characteristic “short hair, large Ears, and small blue Band” (1.
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17). Puritan affectations and pretensions are, however, more frequently held up for 
ridicule. In Thomas Otway’s epilogue to The Orphan; or, The Unhappy Marriage (late 
February 1680), the actress who had played Serena wonders what would become of her if 
she, like Monimia, the tragic title character, should be left an orphan. She could, she 
supposes, “Quit the lewd Stage, and its prophane pollution’’ (L 9), seek out “the Godly,” 
and “go a Conventicling twice a Week” (11.7-8), for like them she could “Affect each Form 
and Saint-like Institution, / [and] So draw the Brethren all to Contribution” (U. 10-11). 
Taking it for granted that she can impose upon “the Godly” by feigning moral indignation 
at the stage’s lewdness and profanity, appearing at their meetings twice weekly, and 
adopting a pious demeanor, the Epilogue implies that the brethren’s devoutness is after all 
no more than the careful observance of “form” and “institution” (or ritual). Moreover, if by 
such behavior she can “draw the Brethren all to Contribution,” the godliness they 
themselves affect is by implication nothing but a shift to profit from hypocrisy. Piety for 
pay is spiritual prostitution—and indeed the hint here is that the brethren’s reward of her 
sanctity is only the remittance of her keeping fee. Otway again draws attention to the very 
earthy appetites of the godly in his (attributed) “Epilogue at the Theatre in Drury-Lane” 
(1680). Lamenting the ill luck that has befallen modem lovers, the speaker there observes 
that soon female “Toyes will not be had for Love nor Money” (1. 28); instead, “The 
Brethren will monopolize the Game, / And th’ ablest Holder-forth shall win the Dame. / 
They will not whore according to the Letter, / But in a Comer mumble Sister better” (11.29- 
32). Inspired oratory, it seems, feeds the body no less than the soul. Lee is more explicit in 
the prologue to Theodosius. Describing a godly brother’s preferred method of seduction, 
the speaker relates that he first fortifies himself with “Possets and Christian Caudles” (1. 
24), then with “groans, and hums, and ha’s, and gogling eyes” (1. 27) he exhorts “each 
Female Saint” (1.26) “To rub him down, and make the Spirit rise” (1.28); at last, “with his 
zeal transported, from the ground / He mounts, and sanctifies the Sisters round” (11. 29- 
30). But if here the guise of holiness disguises (or even excuses) the basest sensual
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appetites, an equally false pretense to ecclesiastical independence is belied by a cynical 
pursuit of material self-interest. Does the godly brother refuse “the wealthiest Livings,” 
“the fattest Bishopricks” (1L 19-20)? He does so not because he cannot reconcile himself to 
the trappings of a corrupt Church or to the trappings o f  this world, but because he has 
found far more profitable “ways of getting” (L 17). And so, as Otway reminds his 
audience, undercutting another Puritan tenet in the process, the short-haired, big-eared, 
blue-banded crew “True Rogues, their own, not Gods Elect, command” (1.22).
This stage in the reintroduction of Puritan imagery gives way to a second, 
somewhat more pugnacious one in which the dissenters' increased involvement in political 
affairs is attacked Nahum Tate observes wryly in his prologue to The History o f King 
Lear (c. New Year 1680/1), that now more than ever the stage must undertake the task of 
moral instruction, “must take the Churches Teaching Trade, / Since Priests their Province 
of Intrigue invade; / But We the worst in this Exchange have got, /  In vain our Poets 
Preach, whilst Church-men Plot” (U. 21-24). This reversal of social roles involves more 
than dilettantism or even patriotic fervor on the part o f the dissenting clergy, a point Behn 
drives home in her prologue to The Second Part o f The Rover (January 1681). There she 
identifies the “Disease o ’ th’ Age” (1.2) with the “Pest” (L 3) now epidemic among “the 
pious Mobily” (7), that “O f not being quiet when they’r Well, / That restless Feaver, in the 
Brethren Zeal: / In publick Spirits c a ll'd  Good o ’ th ’ Commonwear (11. 3-5). Their 
restlessness is not so feverish as to lack method and aim, however, the Prologue notes that 
in presenting a sequel to a  popular play, the playwright now does “as all new Zealots do,” 
and because “the first Project took, is now so vain, / To Attempt to play the old Game o ’re 
again” (11. 10; 12-13). Passing off “old Politics for new and strange” (I. 17), these 
statesmen impose upon “the unthinking Crowd” (1. 19), upon the rabble, “those powerful 
things, / Whose voices can impose even Laws on Kings (11. 20-21). Yet, unlike “the dull 
State-Cullies o f the Pit, /  Who have much Money, and but little Wit” Oh 29-30), the poet is 
not deceived by what she sees and what is shown her. She discerns in the raucous muddle
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of contemporary politics “the old Game” playing itself out again, sees the “new Zealots” 
using the same specious agitprop as their forbears to exhort the same mobs to an 
antimonarchical fervor that, presumably, the same ends may be revisited: the King deposed 
and a theocratic commonwealth established. The author o f the epilogue to the anonymous 
Mr. Turbulent; or, The M elanchollicks (October 1681) likewise declaims against the 
“Fanaricks of this Age, / Who trouble both the Church, the State and Stage” (11. 13-14), 
against the “Lay and Frantick Widgeon[s], /  Who coble, botch, patch, and translate 
Religion” (11.19-20)—and by way o f counteracting crowd politics proposes that good use 
be made of Bedlam, that “Blessed Hospital” (1.9): “Send thither,” he suggests, all “Who 
leave their Awles, their Needles, Hammers, Shears24 / To meddle with, and prate of State 
Affairs” (11. 19; 21-22).
Having revived Puritan stereotypes and inveighed against the nonconformists’ 
participation in politics, the loyalist poets’ next step, logically enough, is to conflate the 
Crown’s political and religious opponents, or, more specifically, to identify the Whigs of 
the present day with the radical Protestant regicides of 1649.25This identification intensifies
24 Accompanying the resurrection of imagery narrowly evocative of militant Puritanism is a resurgence of 
imagery depicting the Roundheads’ popular constituency. Here the mention of awls, needles, hammers, 
and shears implicates tradesmen and laborers of the lowest order. An earlier poem. The Essex Ballad 
(April 1680) has the Presbyterian signers of the Essex petition seconded by the likes of milkmaids, 
“butchers, tinkers, ostlers . . . I  Tapsters and broom-men all a-row” (11. 85-86),” carters, “Scotch-cloth 
men, / Taps, sieves, chairs, and cony-skin, f  Beggars and boys all throng’d, and then / Egyptians" (11. 
88-91). Stanza 12 of A Ballad Upon the Duke o f Monmouth’s Reception [at Oxford] (September 1680) 
has an “ale-inspir’d bargeman” boast that in a fortnight Monmouth will be “Jemmy the Second” (1. 
125). Upon which the balladeer reflects ironically, “Now it was a sad thing / Thus to King our poor 
King /  What he was well as e’er he had been. /  But alas! we must pardon the heat of his zeal, / Thus 
doubly inflam'd with religion and ale” (11.126-130).
The loyalists’ presupposition of die connection was no doubt aided by the curious etymology of the 
term “Whig.” As a political term, “whig” was the loyalists’ answer to the Opposition's “tory,” a 
derisory name derived, according to The Wordsworth Dictionary of Phrase and Fable, from the Irish 
toiridhe or toruide, “a pursuer, plunderer”: “The name applied to the 17th century Irish Roman Catholic 
outlaws and bandits who harassed the English in Ireland. In the reign of Charles II, the name came to 
be applied as an abusive term to the supporters of the Crown and its prerogatives at the time of the 
struggle over the Exclusion Bills” (1093). “Whig” (from whiggamore) had rustic as well as criminal 
associations. A Scottish word, it referred to the concoction of water and sour milk poverty had made a 
staple of the poor, and perhaps because of this came to denote “a yokel, country bumpkin” (OED). At 
some point it came to be “applied to Scottish cattle rustlers and horse thieves” (Phrase and Fable,
1150), and the word’s connotation of poor, outlandish scoundrels seems to be the immediate inspiration
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during the fail of 1681. In his epilogue to The London Cuckolds (October 1681), Edward 
Ravenscroft makes no distinction between Cit, Whig, and Conventicler. Affecting wonder 
at the poet’s arraignment of “the noble City" (1-13) for its cuckoldry, he protests that surely 
“There are many Honest Loyal Witty, /  And be it spoke to their eternal Glory’s, /  There’s 
not one Cuckold amongst all the Tory’s" (11. 14-16). Then, directing his gaze at select 
groups in the audience, he reflects that the “Cloven Foreheads" he sees must belong 
exclusively to the Whigs, “who send / Their Wives a Bulling to their M orefields friend. / 
The Doctrine put into ’em does so tickle / They’r pleas’d with nothing like a Conventicle1' 
(21-24). A bold, crude taunt, but one that “you, the Bully’s of a Commonwealth," fully 
deserve for “breaking Windows for a Loyal Health” (11.19-20): betrayers of the King, they 
are well repaid by the exposure o f their wives’ infidelity with their religious co­
conspirators. The speaker of the prologue to Thomas Durfey’s Sir Bamaby Whigg; or. No 
Wit Like a Womans (late October or November 1681) also addresses the audience directly, 
and like the Epilogue for The London Cuckolds confronts certain of his listeners with their 
complicity in perpetuating “the follies of this Hotting Age” (1- 2):
When shall we see an Audience in the Pit,
Not sway’d by Factions, that will silent sit,
And Mends to th’ Poet, calmly judge his Wit?
Or when a Noble, Royal Party view,
That dare to mighty Caesar give his due,
Spite of the Numerous, Buzzing Crop-ear’d Crew?" (11.7-12)
It is a commonplace of the period that a faction is always the group to which one’s political
opponents belong. Here, as we have seen in other prologues and epilogues, a loyalist poet
characterizes as factional those who hector Tory dramatists and chafe at plays that show
monarchy or the King in a good light But note that Durfey takes the further step of
of the party nickname. However, as reported by the OED, ‘‘whig" had also a quite independent and 
highly specific historical application of “an adherent of the Presbyterian cause in Scotland in the 
seventeenth century; applied originally to the Covenanters in the West of Scotland who in 1648 
wrested the government from the Royalist party and marched as rebels to Edinburgh.’' Owing to its 
revival by loyalist writers during the Exclusion Crisis, by 1682 “whig" had become synonymous with 
“rebel."
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ascribing the existence and maintenance o f faction to the militancy of the “buzzing, crop-
eared crew.” If “Like Lunaricks ye roar and range about; / Frame Plots, then crack your
brains to find ’em out; / Like O liver's Porter, but not so devout” (11. 17-19), it is because
the audience—much like the mob in Behn’s prologue to The Second Pan o f The Rover—
has been duped and intimidated by the religious zealots whose machinations have made the
town “ftantick” (1.15) and “a very Bedlam7' (L 16):
Brumicham-Pmtestant&r6 that rail and grieve ye,
With names of Masquerader and Tantivy.
That, Plagu’d with natural and subtil fears,
Think all the Loyal Party Dogs and Bears,
Run mad with Pious Zeal for th’ good o’ th’ Nation,
And how to fix a godly Reformation (11.22-27).
It would be entirely understandable had the audience thought itself suddenly transported
back in time a full four decades, for concentrated in these few lines are the staples of
prewar anti-Puritan propaganda. The “natural and subtil fears” ascribed to the “Brumicham-
Protestants” recalls the tag-phrase “jealousies and fears,” closely associated with the
Dissenters before the war. The phrase, as we saw in the Three Speeches of Antibrownistus
Puritanomastix (1642), was then emblematic o f the Puritans’ largely self-imposed
misgivings about the designs of the government against them, misgivings that would prove
self-fulfilling as the disaffectation, sedition, and armed resistance they were used to justify
at last brought about the open warfare that seemed their only resolution. In the designation
of their opponents, “the Loyal Party," as “Dogs and Bears” we see another of the Puritans’
justifications for rebellion: since they themselves were the Elect, and all besides were
-6 Danchin, quoting from the NED, reports that “the word ‘Brumicham’ or ‘Brumigham’ meant a 
'counterfeit Protestant (alluding to the counterfeit groats made at Birmingham a few years before). A 
nickname given to supporters of the Exclusion’”; of “tantivy" and “masquerader,” he relates, “The word 
'tantivy' was a nickname given to the High Churchmen and tories. According to NED, it ‘arose 1680- 
81 when a caricature was published in which a number of High Church clergymen were represented as 
mounted upon the Church of England and “riding tantivy” to Rome, behind the Duke of York.' The 
word 'Masquerader'. . .  had obviously a parallel meaning” (333). Johnson defines “tantivy" as “to ride 
at great speed”; the word derives, he says, “from the note of a hunting horn, so expressed in articulate 
sounds.”
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damned, they were right to see their foes as wicked, even, as here, inhuman, as so many 
obstacles to the realization o f their most cherished objective: fixing “a godly Reformation.*’ 
Long before the Civil War, radical Protestants had argued for the necessity of purging 
Popish trappings from the Church of England with a second reformation; note that now, as 
then, the purpose o f political agitation (and of taking up arms against the established 
governmental and religious institutions, if we may suppose they were willing to so exercise 
their “Pious Zeal for th’ good o ’ th’ Nation”) was to effect this ecclesiastical agenda. Thus, 
using decades-old anti-Puritan imagery, Durfey wholly transmogrifies contemporary 
political opposition into the religious opposition of the 1630’s and 1640’s.
Durfey’s prologue is, however, neither the most explicit nor the most forceful 
conflation o f Whigs and Roundheads. That distinction must go to Aphra Behn in her 
prologue and epilogue to The Roundheads; or. The Good Old Cause (December 1681 or 
slightly earlier), for which her prologue to The False Count; or, A New Way to Play an Old 
Game (October 1681) provides an apt preliminary. The premise of the latter piece, as the 
speaker tells the contending factions of the pit—who “for the Cause and crimes of Forty 
one / So furiously maintain the Quarrel on” (11.3-4)—is that the playwright, once “a most 
wicked Tory” (1. 6), has lately converted to the Whig cause: “[N]ow to th’ joy o ’ th’ 
Brethren be it spoken, / Our Sisters vain mistaking eyes are open” (11. 7-8). If Behn’s 
feigning to become a “sister” among the Whig “brethren” somehow leaves the conflation of 
the political and religious in doubt, subsequent lines resolve any remaining difficulty. 
Once, the speaker confesses, Behn the Royalist “charg’d you all with your fore-fathers 
crimes” (1. 14); she “Rais’d horrid scandals on you, hellish stories, / In Conventicles how 
you eat young Tories” (11. 17-18). How misguided she was then! “When this is all malice it 
self can say, / You for the good old Cause devoutly eat and pray” (11. 21-22). Now, 
repentant, she will turn proselytizer and enumerate the advantages of Whiggery. For one 
thing, the Whigs, bounded only by self-interest, are free to “write, invent, and make what 
Plots you please” (1.26); for another, “Your Conventicling miracles out doe / All that the
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Whore of Babylon e’er knew” (11. 30-31). Referring to the Whigs’ response to the Popish
Plot witnesses whose initial perjured testimony had implicated prominent Catholics but
who were now beginning to recant, exposing the Plot itself as the deadly cheat of
dangerously cynical men, the speaker observes ironically:
By wondrous art you make Rogues honest men,
And when you please transform ’em Rogues again.
To day a Saint, if he but hang a Papist,
Peach a true Protestant, your Saint’s turn’d Atheist. . .
Who wou’d not then be for a Common-weal,
To have the Villain cover’d with his Zeal? (U. 32-35; 38-39)
Having here set forth the design and characters of the men who have revisited upon
England “the Cause and crimes of Forty one,” Behn’s prologue and epilogue to The
Roundheads, appearing only weeks after this piece, expose their methods and
consequences. Once more, the identification of political with religious opposition, of
present with past, is absolute—and Behn emphatically underscores the association in the
dedicatory preface appended to the play when it was published in 1682. Addressing the
Duke of Grafton,27 Behn notes that the Whigs,
coming the first day to a new Play with a Loyal Title, and then even the 
sober and tender conscienc’d, throng as to a forbidden Conventicle: fearing 
the Cub of their old Bear of Reformation should be expos’d, to the scorn of 
the wicked, and dreading (tho’ but the hunt shadow of their own deformity) 
their Rebellion, M urders, M assacres and Villanies, from 40 upwards, 
should be Represented for the better undeceiving and informing o f the 
World, flock in a frill Assembly with a pious design to Hisse and Rail it as 
much out o f countenance as they would Monarchy, Religion, Laws, and 
Honesty, throwing the Act o f Oblivion in our Teeths, as if  that (whose 
mercy can not make them forget their Old Rebellion) cou’d hinder honest 
truths from breaking out upon ’em in Edifying Plays, where the Loyal 
hands ever out-do their venom’d H isse.. . .  [The play has] drawn down 
Legions upon its bead, for its Loyalty . . .  as if twere all a libe l, a scandal 
impossible to be prov’d, or that their Rogueries were of so old a Date their 
Reign were past Remembrance or History: when they take such zealous care 
to renew it daily to our memories (qtd. in Danchin, 343-344).
27 Henry Fitz-Roy, Charles' son by Barbara Villiers.
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I think it is clear that in Behn’s mind those “legions” flocking to the theatre to hiss her play 
are not made up exclusively (or at all?) of wizened, grey-bearded Hudibrases, but consist 
almost entirely of the new rebels—the Whigs, of course, whose recent “Rogueries” are 
sufficiently of a kind with the “Rebellion, Murders, Massacres and Villanies” of those 
“from 40 upwards” to “renew [the Civil War] daily to our memories." The implication is 
that if the Whigs recoil with hatred and disgust from this depiction of the “Old Rebellion,” 
it is because they discern in it the visage of the New, and they are loath to see “the Cub of 
their old Bear o f Reformation” thus exposed and “Represented [or delineated] for the better 
undeceiving and informing of the World.” Behn would have us believe, in short, that the 
Whigs are scandalized by the power of her drama to explicate the succession crisis of 1678- 
1681 according to the pattern of events of the 1640’s. The prologue to The Roundheads 
would throw those parallels into relief, first by having its speaker—ostensibly the ghost of 
John Hewson, a sometime shoemaker and prominent regicide— endorse the new 
“Villanies” of the present rebels, then by having “Hewson” conflate the religious ends of 
1642 with the political means of 1681. Introducing himself as “a true Son / Of the late 
GOOD OLD CAUSE” (11. 1-2), Hewson declares with pride that, whatever the Plot might 
suggest, papists cannot “Act mischief equal to Presbittery?” (1. 7), and he looks back 
fondly upon “our success in Forty One[:] / Was ever braver Villanies carryed on / Or new 
ones now more hopefully begun[?]” (11.9-10). As this last line would suggest, for Hewson 
(as for Behn herself in the play’s dedication), the rebellion o f 1641 is but a type of the 
rebellion underway in the present day. And in fact he admonishes his living compatriots not 
let “our unsuccess” o f the earlier campaign dispirit them or “make us [now] quit the Glory 
of Our Cause” (11. 11-12). But if that Cause would would be fully and lastingly realized, 
they must take care to heed his advice:
Hire new Villains, Rogues without remorse
And let no Law Conscience stop your course.
Let Politidans order the Confusion
And let the Saints pay Pious Contribution.
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Pay those that Rail, and those that can delude 
With scribling Nonsence the Loose Multitude.
Pay well your Witnesses. . .
. . .  that they may ne’r  Recant 
And so turn honest meeriy out o f want 
Pay Juries that no formal Laws may harm us 
Let treason be secur’d by Ignoramus.
Pay Bully Whig, who Loyal writers bang 
And honest Tories in Effigie hang. . .
Pay all the Pulpit knaves that Treason brew 
And let the zealous Sisters pay ’em too;. . .
Nor let the Reverend Rabble be forgot
Those Pious hands that crown our hopeful Plott (11.13-19; 21-26; 29-30; 34-35). 
The audience is meant to recognize that Hewson’s prescribed course of future action had 
been pursued by groups within the Opposition for many months. From this, in turn, the 
audience is meant to infer—given that the law is openly flouted, cheated by hand-picked 
juries that will not convict fellow-travellers, disregarded by the ruffians hired to beat Tory 
writers (such as Dryden); that from the pulpit dissenting ministers preach the overthrow of 
Crown and Church; and that the street mobs, stirred by seditious propaganda, now stand 
ready to boil over into full revolt—that the next Great Rebellion (“our hopeful Plott”) 
actually walks abroad in the land. The epilogue to the play does nothing to dispel the 
illusion. There, the speaker (reversing the conceit of the prologue to The False Count) 
claims that she has been converted from the Whig to the Tory cause.28 Having been 
intimate with the aims and methods of the Opposition, she can expose the “pious Cheats” 
(I. 7) of her erstwhile comrades, that “Race of Hypocrites, whose Cloak of Zeal / Covers 
the Knave that cants for Common Weale” (11. 11-12), as well as enumerate the likely 
consequences of their sedition29: the Church and State brought “to ruine” (1. 13), the King
28 I was once, the speaker says, “as true a Whig as most of you, / Cou’d Cant, and Lye, Preach and 
dissemble too” (11.3-4). Now even the habitudes of Whigs and Puritans are identical.
29 On this point the speaker treats as established fact much of what was merely prescribed in the prologue:
You thought to Play the Old Game ore again.
And thus the cheat was put upon the Nation,
First with long Parliaments, next Reformation:
And now you hop’d to make a new invasion.
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held in subjection (L 14), wholesale ruination and destruction throughout the land (1. IS)—
but then, she observes with bitter irony, “all’s good that you decree / By your Infaillible
Presbitery” 01-15-16). And what would the Presbytery deem good? Adopting the character
of an unreconstructed Cromwellian and lapsing, per stage direction, into “a Preaching
Tone,” she looks back to the Puritan heyday in order to make out a dissenter’s best-of-all-
possible futures. When “Sacred Oliver" 0- 29) was “Head” (1. 30) o f the nation, the
“cursed Tories” (1. 25), “those Pimps to Monarchy” (1. 26), dared not, as they do now,
“Exclude the Saints” (L 27) and “introduce the Babylonian Whore” (1.28):
Yet then they rail’d against the Good Old Cause,
Rail’d foolishly for Loyalty and Laws;
But when the Saints had put them to a stand,
We left them Loyalty and took their Land:
Yea, and the Pious work o f Reformation 
Rewarded was with Plunder, Sequestration (11. 31-40).
About just what it is the Opposition has unleashed to regain its lost paradise Nahum 
Tate is unequivocal, though in the prologue to The Ingratitude o f a Commonwealth; or. The 
Fall ofC aius Marius Coriolanus (December 1681) he speaks through the familiar poet- 
king, audience-anarch analogy. The “Wit-dissenters of the Age,” declares the speaker, “in a 
Civil War do still Engage,!  The antient ^ fundamental Laws o’ th’ Stage: / Such who have 
common Places got, by stealth, / From the Sedition of Wits Common-Wealth” (11. 3-7; 
emphasis added).
It is not difficult to discern in Tate’s evocation of armed conflict and the overthrow 
of the kingdom’s “fundamental Laws”; in Behn’s easy conflation of Opposition militancy 
with the “Rebellion, Murders, Massacres and Villanies” of the Roundheads; and in her 
exposition of Whig character, tactics, and objectives according to the example of Hewson
And when you can't prevaile by open force.
To cunning tickling tricks you have recourse.
And raise Sedition forth without remorse’’ (11. 18-24).
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and his ilk, the rhetorical end to which the Tory poets were steering. As Knights makes 
clear in his chapter-by-chapter breakdown of public opinion 1678-1681 (and as other 
historians, such as Kenyon, Jones, and Ashley assert more generally), whenever civil war 
appeared to be imminent, public opinion turned against the Opposition and in favor of the 
Court For at heart it seems, the greatest bloc o f the populace feared the return of civil war 
far more than popish intrigues or even the imposition of arbitrary rule. Therefore, in the 
debate over succession, in the struggle for political primacy between King and Parliament 
and, most broadly, most fundamentally, in the contest to determine the “shape” and 
significance of the historical present it was for the Royalist poets only the obvious thing to 
summon from 1642 and 1649 the twin spectres o f war and regicide, then flesh them out 
with contemporary parallels to make it seem they enjoyed a second reincarnation. The 
identification of Parliament with the Opposition puts in place the first element of this new 
configuration; the images of violence and conquest—of warfare—in these last pieces by 
Durfey, Behn, and Tate intimate the third and final element The second element is what we 
have just seen, the association of political and religious dissent and more specifically, the 
revival of the Puritan as both a social type and the prime agent o f opposition. And if I say 
that the Tory poets’ resurrection of Puritan imagery from early 1680 onward was perhaps 
the shrewdest rhetorical move they could make, I do so because this element does not 
simply occur between the first and third chronologically, but is in fact an active conduit 
between them, making possible the Tory propagandists’ move from one to the other. An 
examination into why and how this should be so will take us a good way toward 
understanding how poetry itself was uniquely able to reify the past in the present, to 
articulate and apply the historical figure o f the Civil War, and thereby to set the terms upon 
which public memory of the Exclusion Crisis would be established.
My analogy of revivifying the past with fleshing out a ghost was not a  random one. 
To reify an element o f the past is to reawaken our memory of it so vividly that it effectively 
lives again, dressed out in what we can actually see and hear and touch in the present
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moment What I have in mind is something very much akin to the effect by which 
Longinus defines “image” in On the Sublime. Recall that for Longinus, poetry’s “powers 
o f persuasion are to a very large degree derived from images . . .  the representation of 
mental pictures,” pictures so vivid that, “carried away by your feelings, you imagine you 
are actually seeing the subject o f your description, and enable your audience as well to see 
it” (121). There is, however, this qualification, that whereas Longinus’ image conjures a 
mental representation for the moment only, the poet who would for political purposes reify 
an element of the past hopes to transfigure our perception o f the everyday world as well. 
To do this, the poet must not only offer us vivid images that strike the mind’s eye, but 
images that provoke a reaction pervading viscera, psyche, and mind alike and at once—a 
diffused, systemic reaction that carries over into our daily affairs, conditioning our 
response to its real-world equivalent Hence the political poet leans more heavily upon 
affective rather than physical mimesis, hoping to achieve not so much a one-to-one 
correspondence of sensible detail as a near alignment of emotional impression and reflex.
Looking back over the foregoing (admittedly selective) survey, we see that in 
general, representative images are used to resurrect the Puritan as a social fixture, while 
affective images are employed to achieve the conflation o f Puritan and Whig. In his 
prologue to Theodosius, for example, Lee offers up three highly concrete characteristics by 
which the Puritan may be known: short hair, large ears, and a  blue band. The details are 
stereotypical, but playgoers might well identify a dissenter by them. More powerful, 
because more suggestive to the imagination, is Otway’s image of a godly brother sitting 
apart in a comer “mumbling” a sister—or Lee’s own depiction o f the Puritan seducer 
enticing his harem of “Female Saints” with “groans and hums and ha’s, and gogling eyes” 
to “rub him down, and make the Spirit rise” that he might achieve the wherewithal to 
“mount” and “sanctify” them. The details here are specific enough to bring certain particular 
scenes explicitly to mind: no doubt many audience members were ogling, pinching, and 
petting one another as these lines were delivered; they would, therefore, have had little
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
329
difficulty visualizing the situation being described. The specification that the persons to be 
imagined are Puritans, reinforced by the depiction of characteristically “Puritan” behaviors 
(orating, preaching, canting) and by diction—saint, brother (for man), sister (for woman), 
spirit, sanctify, zeal—identified almost exclusively with dissenting sects, cues the auditors 
to clothe the human figures before the mind’s eye according to personal and received 
notions of Puritan dress, mannerism, and speech. Individual stereotypes, therefore, are 
quite likely to summon up the stereotypical whole, the Puritan type?0 Something o f the 
kind occurs when the epilogue to Mr. Turbulent characterizes the traditional (or at least 
proverbial) Puritan constituency by assigning to the “Fanaticks of this Age” the tools of 
proletarian craftsmen: “Awles, Needles, Hammers, and Shears.” Images of the tools 
themselves are conjured easily enough, and the tool in turn suggests a fairly complete, 
coherent image of the person likely to use i t  Told that such persons are the very “Lay and 
Frantick Widgeons” who “cobble, botch, patch, translate Religion,” and that these persons 
(to graft an image from Behn’s prologue to The Second Part o f The Rover) make up “the 
unthinking Crowd,” “the Rabble. . .  whose voices can impose even Laws on Kings,” the 
audience (patrons as they were o f the rowdy Restoration playhouse) would have little 
difficulty fashioning mental images of what its members had probably seen for themselves 
several times over the past months: an unruly mob incited by a charismatic “Zealot” to cast 
execrations against the King and Court Once called to mind, such scenarios are readily 
enough entered into; having entered into them, the audience has been “cozened” (to use a 
word prominent in the last chapter) into accepting their (esthetic veracity—and is thus
30 And the type, placed in such scenes as these, gives the audience a clear mental picture of an abstraction 
it could never literally see: hypocrisy—and that of the unmistakably “Puritan” variety. This and similar 
passages might qualify as instances of poetry’s power to define abstract and physical entities as Locke 
would have them defined, i.e., illustrating the complex idea (hypocrisy) with “little Draughts and 
Prints” (the scene of the supposedly godly man seducing his parishioners), and defining the observable 
object (the man known as a Puritan) by enumerating its innate but intangible properties (here, 
hypocrisy).
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prepared to admit the possibility that such scenes actually exist just beyond the walls of the 
theatre.
In resurrecting the Puritan as a social figure and establishing him as a very real 
menace to social order, the Tory dramatists were without doubt greatly aided by the 
playhouse venue and the conventions of the prologue and epilogue. Indeed, it is surely not 
happenstance that (again, with important exceptions) this resurrection is effected largely in 
the theatre, for there the Loyalist poet could make shrewd use o f the performative element 
in the delivery of his or her poem. The speaker of the prologue or epilogue could, for 
instance, appear before the audience as a living embodiment of the very type the writer 
would evoke, as when the prologue to The Roundheads is delivered by the notorious 
regicide “John Hewson,” or when the actress giving the play’s epilogue speaks it in 
character, as Lady Desbro, a one-time supporter of the Whig-dissenter Opposition. Or the 
speaker could be made to speak as if in his or her own words, independently of the 
playwright This device enables the speaker to seem omniscient and absolutely trustworthy: 
the dramatist as well as the dramatic fiction are within the compass of his or her gaze, and 
the intimate knowledge gained by such a perspective allows the speaker to show the 
audience the “real truth” at back of the facades the writer and his or her work present to the 
public. The actor delivering the prologue to The False Count, for example, discloses Aphra 
Behn’s ostensible conversion to the Whig cause, giving an overview of anti-Whig “libels” 
she perpetuated while a Tory, then offers a  number o f ironic reasons (damning to the 
Opposition) for other writers to follow Behn’s lead. Or the speaker can offer the audience 
personal testimony, as in the prologue appended to Durfey’s Sir Bamaby Whigg when that 
play was acted before the King (November 1681). The speaker declares he has come 
directly from “a Coffee-house, just now among the Rabble” (1. I), where he sat at the 
“Treason-Table” (1.2) listening to “two hard’ned Brumicham Rascals prate” (1.4): “[Theyj 
very busie were in Disputation, / And setling with great vehemence the Nation; / Aiming at 
Politicks, though void of Reason, / And Lacing Coffee with large Lumps of Treason” (11.
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4-8). Finally, the very gestures, movements, facial expressions, and vocal intonations 
required to perform  a poem publicly would tend to reinforce the succession of mental 
images suggested by the words themselves. The instance found in Durfey’s epilogue to 
The Virtuous Wife; or, Good Luck at Last (September 1679)— in which the speaker, “Mr. 
[James] Nokes, Representing my Lady BEARDLY," suddenly removes his feminine 
disguise, reveals his true sex, then declares, “Soe State-Fanaticks change to the Party- 
Royal, /  And when they dare Rebell, noe more turn Loyal” (11.21-22)— may be an extreme 
example, but certainly demonstrates the potential of live performance to re-create a 
compelling representative reality for its audience.
The possibilities of the playhouse also aided Royalist dramatists in their use of 
affective imagery. As the aim of such imagery is to elicit a visceral and emotional 
response—a powerful feeling—rather than acute (virtual) perceptions or a vivid mental 
picture, the poet using it seeks to associate a particular person (or type o f person), object, 
or circumstance to a particular psycho-physical state. Whereas the representative image 
objectifies its subject, and by providing a  primarily visual experience invites deliberate, 
even rational scrutiny of its parts, the affective image operates at a sub-rational level, 
relying for its effectiveness upon the force of our instinctive reflexes (as when we wrinkle 
our noses at graphic scatological references) and conditioned responses (as when we are 
confronted with a site upon which a notably shameful or glorious incident has occurred). 
The two categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive; often the same image can operate 
either representationally or affectively. Thus while the reintroduction of the Puritan-as-type 
put a familiar face upon the Opposition and civil unrest, it also (as intended) tapped into the 
great reservoirs o f anti-Puritan feeling built up by decades o f negative Puritan portrayals in 
the learned and popular press before and during the Civil War, by the war itself, and by the 
political, religious, and social reforms carried out under the Commonwealth. The scorn a 
Restoration audience might have for the dissenter’s odd appearance, the disgust it might 
feel at seeing depictions of Puritan moral hypocrisy, its anger at cant and sedition, are.
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however, compounded by imagery that is primarily affective in its appeal. Whereas the 
representative imagery employed by Tory poets tends to render physical detail precisely, 
their affective imagery shows us very little, seeking instead to provoke an intense reaction 
fueled by anxiety over what is left unshown, allowing (where necessary) our personal 
hatreds and fears to add the particulars.
In the prologue to The Second Part o f the Rover, for example, Behn attempts to 
arouse her audience’s fear of contagion by citing only the “Disease o ’ th’ Age,” “that Pest,” 
“that restless Feaver.” She offers no extended sketch or metaphor—but then, an audience 
whose members had lived through the Great Plague would need very little to excite in them 
the horror of those months. Similarly, in the first prologue to Sir Bamaby Whigg, Durfey 
observes that the town has turned “ftantick,” has become “a very Bedlam,” peopled with 
“Lunaticks [that] roar and range about” No graphic depictions of madness, just enough to 
arouse fear of and revulsion at the “terrifying, catastrophic” malady that made its victims 
“familiar figures in the early modem physical and mental landscapes.”31 Consider the chaos 
evoked by Behn’s references to “the Mobily,” “the unthinking Crowd,” and the “Almighty 
Rabble” in her prologue to the second Rover, or the violence suggested by the mention of 
those who “trouble both the Church, the State and Stage” in the epilogue to Mr. Turbulent 
as well as by the allusion to Commonwealth bullies who “[break] Windows for a Loyal 
Health” in the epilogue to Ravenscroft’s The London Cuckolds. But note the pattern at 
work here. Having confronted their audiences with the threats of disease, madness, chaos, 
and violence generally (though for all that no less and perhaps even the more menacingly), 
the writers of these prologues and epilogues take care to provide a specific focal point for 
the vague terrors they have awakened. Behn’s images of illness attach themselves to 
zealous brethren and Commonwealth men; Durfey’s images of madness, to those who
31 Roy Porter. Mind-Forg'd Manacles: A History o f Madness in England from the Restoration to the 
Regency. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1987. 17; 14.
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“Run mad with Pious Zeal for th’ good o ’ th ’ Nation, /  And how to fix a godly 
Reformation” (emphasis added); Behn’s unstable, inflammable “mobily” consists of the 
“pious”; the violent in the Mr. Turbulent epilogue are the “Fanatics of this Age,” those who 
“coble, botch, patch, and translate Religion,” while their brethren in Ravenscroft’s piece 
are “pleas’d with nothing like a Conventicle.” In this way, a group already widely 
suspected and detested is identified explicitly with the most fearsome social ills, is not 
simply invested with the potential to overturn order, stability, and public institutions, but is 
actually made both the First Cause and final embodiment of national dissolution.
This same pattern obtains in our final set of poems, in which, as we saw, an 
unequivocal and unquestionable conflation o f Puritans and Whigs is attempted through 
explicit allusions to the Civil War and the murder of Charles L There is no need to restate at 
length either the relevant imagery or the equation itself as these occur in the prologue to The 
False Count, the prologue and epilogue to The Roundheads, and the prologue to The 
Ingratitude o f a Commonwealth; instead, we may observe generally that as these Tory 
poets reawaken the yet profoundly disturbing memories o f  the Puritans’ “Rebellion, 
Murders, Massacres, and Villanies,” the dissenters ’ late assault upon “Monarchy, Religion, 
Laws, and Honesty,” they mean to project the past designs and deeds of radical 
Protestantism onto the current Opposition, and by doing so, focus the pathos, alarm, and 
wrathful patriotism aroused by recollections o f the Civil War and Commonwealth years 
upon a proximate, visibly manifest group—the Whigs. In this, they are assisted by a 
second element peculiar to the playhouse venue: direct address. Longinus had argued that, 
by seeming to address the reader, the writer “transforms hearing into sight. All such 
passages, by their direct personal form of address, bring the hearer right into the middle of 
the the action being described. When you seem to be addressing, not the whole audience, 
but a single member of i t . . .  you will affect him more profoundly, and make him more 
attentive and full o f active interest, if you rouse him by these appeals to him personally”
(135). Such personal appeals are bound to reinforce the affective power of a poem insofar
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as they establish an essential human bond between speaker and listener, but Tory 
dramatists were able to exploit direct address in another important—and wholly 
contrasting—way.
Consider Durfey’s prologue to Sir Barnaby Whigg. The speaker begins by 
speaking to  the audience, lamenting “the follies o f this Plotting Age" (1. 1) and their 
consequences for the loyal playwright, who now can scarce get a fair hearing from 
playgoers intimidated into factiousness (read, “Whiggishness”) by “the Numerous, 
Buzzing, Crop-ear’d Crew." Any commonality of interest this manner of address might 
have fostered, however, is seemingly forfeited when, midway through the piece, the 
speaker abruptly leaves off speaking of hypothetical audiences and begins to speak to the 
group ranged directly before him about itself, “l ik e  Lunaticks ye roar and range about; / 
Frame plots, then crack your brains to find them out; / Like O liver’s Porter,32 but not so 
devout” (11. 17-19). Suddenly, the audience is confronted with its own complicity, its own 
culpability in promoting the Opposition programme. This strategy of direct indictment is 
employed more emphatically in Behn’s prologue to The False Count. Here the audience is 
absolutely and unremittingly implicated in the Whigs’ ostensible adherence to the Good Old 
Cause, their hypocrisy, subversion o f law, and radical Protestantism. It is you, he insists, 
“who for the Cause and crimes o f Forty one /  So furiously maintain the Quarrel on” (11.3- 
4); it is to you, the “All powerful Whiggs” (1.10), that she who once “charg’d you all with 
your fore-fathers crimes” has been converted; hence the author can now, like you, invent 
what plots she pleases, and like you, can “make Rogues honest men, /  And when [she] 
please[s| transform ’em Rogues again”; and when the Tories “resolve to hiss” (1.52) and 
indict her, “shee’ll throw her self on you, / The grand Inquest of Whiggs, to whom shee’s
32 George de F. Lord offers a straightforward explanation to a similar allusion in “Vox Clero, 
Lilliburlero," a broadside ballad of 1689: “The porter of Oliver Cromwell wait mad and was confined to 
Bedlam" (502n). Yet Galbraith M. Cramp treats references to Oliver’s potter more figuratively: “The 
origin of the character is obscure, but he more than likely signifies the fanatical Puritan" (80n).
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true. / Then let ’em rail and hiss and damn their fill, /  Your verdict will be Ignoramus still” 
(11.53-56; emphasis added). The speakers of the prologue and epilogue to The Roundheads 
likewise assume an audience comprised wholly o f Whig-Dissenters. Hewson’s ghost, 
remember, advises the house as if it were a Parliament of old compatriots; Mrs. Desbro 
confesses that she was “once as true a Whig as most of you, / Cou’d Cant, and Lye, 
Preach and dissemble too,” intimating that, like them, she once wished to ruin the Church 
and State and clip the King’s prerogative, leaving all to be decided by “your Infaillable 
Presbitery.” And the speaker of the prologue to Tate’s The Ingratitude o f a Commonwealth 
charges those in the pit who would cavil with the play to be “Wit-dissenters” engaged in a 
Civil War.
Such finger-pointing might ultimately derive from the long tradition of prologue 
raillery; however, the nature o f these particular accusations and the tone o f their delivery 
make it clear that—unless these playwrights are gratuitously antagonizing their audiences— 
something much more purposeful is going on here. The conclusion to the Sir Bamaby 
Whigg prologue gives us a clue: the speaker declares that the poet shall “know both 
[political] Parties” by their responses to the play—the Whigs will hiss, the Tories will clap 
(11. 33-34). The extortion is admittedly waggish (and fairly common), but the design 
behind it, to identify and isolate the agents and supporters o f an Opposition that only 
minutes before had been charged with faction, treason, and the promotion of a new 
Reformation, is earnest enough. If anyone dares to hiss Durfey’s play, the hateful designs 
ascribed to the Opposition attach to him personally. The free-floating social and political 
anxieties provoked by events within and beyond the playhouse are thus suddenly 
objectified, given flesh as well as focus in the person of this or that distinct individual. And 
if no one hisses? Or if, as in the other pieces just surveyed, the whole house is assumed to 
be in on the Whig conspiracy to inflict a new civil war upon the land? Rhetorically, nothing 
is lost, for the existence of rebel fanatics is still treated as self-evident, a given; and a good 
bit might actually be gained. Indicted with the rest, the loyal, moderate, or only vaguely
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Whiggish playgoer—(Are there ever more than a handful of self-declared extremists?)—  
clears himself mentally from the charges, then lets his suspicions fall upon his neighbors. 
But because he cannot say precisely which o f those at his elbow, or in the pit, or in the 
gallery might harbor rebellion at heart, the anxieties roused as the playwright strikes the 
mournful chords o f memory are given no outlet, and are therefore likely to increase, 
intensify: few things foster phobic dread as readily as the imminent but unrecognizable 
threat, and nothing fuels hatred like fear. Allowed no resolution or catharsis in the theatre, 
the emotions raised by the imagery o f militant Puritanism are the more easily carried over 
into the real world, and directed against those whose actions are most clearly reminiscent of 
the Old Rebellion. The conflation made explicitly on stage is thus bom out in the mind of 
the playgoer as he goes about his everyday life: the Puritan is reborn as a Whig; the Whig 
recast as a latter-day Puritan.
And so whether the “hard’ned Brumicham Rascals” are explicitly identified or not, 
the fact that the supposedly defining images o f the 1640’s come to be projected onto living 
human beings means that the poet has not only returned his or her audience to the past 
psychologically, but has been literally able to reify it for them.
One might object that I have taken too great a liberty in presuming to enter the mind 
of a Restoration playgoer, or, if  my speculation is to be allowed for the sake o f argument, 
that a few prologues and epilogues could hardly have exercised the broad influence I seem 
to ascribe to them. I would answer the first objection by observing that the reintroduction 
of Puritan imagery into controversial poetry corresponds exactly to an increase in the 
virulence of such poetry, suggesting that the revival of the Puritan as a social figure did 
indeed touch off a heretofore unseen depth and violence of feeling. In The W iltshire Ballad 
(February 13,1680), for example, a poem appearing at the very outset of this revival, the 
author’s equation o f religious with political dissent introduces a heightened rhetorical 
urgency, a new ferocity of tone to the poetic exposition of the constitutional implications of
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the Exclusion Crisis. The petitioning campaign, the poem’s stanzaic subtitle insists, is part 
of the Devil’s strategy “to raise a  rebellion,” and his agents, the gatherers of petitions, are, 
we learn soon after, the very religious fanatics who divided Charles I from his 
prerogative—and his head from his shoulders. As before, “the saints” will use the “crop- 
ear’d trick” (1. I l l )  of parlaying “the humble holy guise /  Of the religiously precise” (1L 73- 
74) into a pretext for “steer[ingj” religion 0- 69) and seizing “the power of peace and war” 
(1. 70). But the “saints” of 1680 hunger for more than power. The poet warns that once 
“Geneva Jack” (1- 42) “lord[sl it in our British isle” (1. 43), he will “pulpit cuff us till we 
fight, / Lose our estates and lives outright; / And when all’s done, he gets all by’t” (11.45- 
47). And to the new Puritans’ lust for slaughter, conquest, and despoliation add an 
unslaked thirst for royal blood: having “serv’d his [Charles II’s] father so before, / These 
saints would still increase the store / Of royal martyrs” (11. 29-31). Though The Wiltshire 
Ballad is, as we have seen, essentially concerned with questions of prerogative and 
succession, the overlay of anti-Puritan imagery has so inflamed royalist rhetoric as to 
transform the issue of institutional sovereignty into one of civil war and regicide. Not the 
King’s authority but his life is now at stake.
But even in poems not distinguished by a pronounced anti-Puritan theme, the 
resurrection of the dissenter as national bogey seems to have made the rhetorical 
temperature soar. Take the Duke o f Monmouth’s rivalry to James. If Monmouth and his 
pretensions to the throne had been regarded largely with condescension and ridicule in “A 
Ballad Called Perkin’s Figary,” “Letter of the Duke of Monmouth to the King” (1680), 
“The Obscured Prince, or, The Black Box Boxed” (August 1680) and “A Ballad Upon the 
Duke of Monmouth’s Reception [in London]” (September 1680), among other pieces, both 
are now treated rather more seriously. A Canto on the New Miracle Wrought by the Duke 
o f Monmouth (January-March 1681), citing an episode of the previous August in which
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one Elizabeth Parcet was apparently cured of scrofula33 by touching Monmouth’s wrist, 
ironically takes the young woman’s recovery to mean that the Duke is a true royal, and 
labels him the “Great mountebank o f our sick state" (1. 81). Playful enough, but 
Monmouth’s political quackery—aligning himself with a Parliament that would vote “no 
King, no God” (I. 42), subverting the established succession—promises a cure for 
England worse than any disease. For in touching “a kingdom for King’s evil. / He means 
to make it (for his health) /  A common whore, a commonwealth” (11.66-69). “The Club of 
Royalists”34 (1681) is more explicitly ominous in depicting what Monmouth’s rule would 
mean for England, likening the prospect to Phaeton’s ill-fated trek across the sky in the 
chariot of the sun: “What? Though the world once more were set on fire, / Shall his young 
hero balk his great desire? / No, let the headstrong youth his steeds drive on, /  Tread on his 
father’s councils and his throne” (11. 23-26). The Opposition in general also comes in for 
worse treatment If previously the Tory poets had ascribed any number of damning 
personal flaws to its leaders, those leaders are now crudely demonized, cast as essentially 
evil beings deserving only the most ignominious of deaths. In the present poem, for 
example, Buckingham and Shaftesbury are termed “the only honest men of th’ age: / The 
truest patriots England e ’er did breed, /  Who, viper-like, on their own mother feed; / Tear 
up her bowels with a base pretense / Of feigned piety and conscience” (11. 34-38). 
Alexander Radcliffe’s The Lawyers’ Demurrer Argued (summer 1681; subtitled, “To the 
Tune of Packington’s Pound, or the Roundhead Revived”) characterizes the “parcel of 
Whigs” (1. 2) now challenging the King as the “spawn of some rebels in year Forty-One” 
(1. 3); pursuing the same intrigues (presumably toward the same ends) as “their damn’d 
sires” (1. 4), they deserve being labelled “a Satanical tribe” (1. 57). Given the diabolical
33 Also known as the King’s Evil, so called because it was believed that the monarch's touch could effect 
a cure.
34 The poem is ironically titled, as it is actually a roll-call of the Opposition leaders.
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nature of the King’s political foes, it is no surprise that the author of “A New Ballad of 
London’s Loyalty” (July or August 1681) matter-of-factly recommends that Shaftesbury be 
hanged, or that the author of A Vision in the Tower To the Lord Howard in His 
Contemplation (c. late July 1681) is more than a bit gleeful at the prospect of William 
Howard—a prominent member of the Green Ribbon Gub who had implicated a relative, 
William Howard, Viscount Stafford in the Popish Plot—meeting with the same fate his 
false testimony had imposed upon Stafford. But if the loyalist poets have grown 
bloodthirsty, it is only in response to the sinister and equally sanguinary designs they now 
ascribe to the Opposition. In A Vision, for instance, the Whig-engineered execution of the 
innocent Stafford is held to foreshadow what Howard has in mind for Charles himself (11. 
18-20); Matthew Taubman, author o f “Philander” (c. early August 1680) has “the loud 
Parliament thunder[ing] / Against both miter and crown” (11. 13-14), even as the City sits 
plotting “who next shall reign” (11. 17). This image of London’s impending overthrow of 
the government recurs in “A New Ballad.” Here a London poised on the edge of rebellion 
prompts the poet to exhort Charles, “Rouse up, great monarch of this potent land, / Lest 
traitors once more get the upper hand; / The rebel rout their former tenets own, / And 
treason, worse than plagues, infects the town” (11.1-4). The mayor, for one, “hopes to see 
a Commonwealth again” (11. 10), and the sheriff, Slingsby Bethel, “suppos’d his [Charles 
U’s] father’s murderer to be,” has ominously “abjur’d the King and all his sacred line” (11. 
15; 14).
It would seem that with their resuscitation of the Puritan, the Tory poets have 
prepared the public to accept a  reduction of the Opposition programme to armed 
insurrection and regicide. We have only to review the foregoing survey of prologues and 
epilogues to see that the more closely religious dissenters are identified with the political 
opposition, not only does the anti-Puritan imagery become more malignant, but the more 
closely the Opposition is linked to imminent warfare. In fact, in the last few prologues and
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epilogues, Civil War is taken for granted: Behn and Tate would even have us believe that it 
is going on at the very moment the pieces are being delivered.
This brings me to the second objection. Though I cannot pretend that a  dozen 
prologues and epilogues were alone able to bring about the melding of Whig and Puritan in 
the nation's collective psyche, I can offer them as emblems of this identification as it was 
made at large in the body of Tory poetry. Further, I might observe that as a group they 
demonstrate how the first two major elements o f the Civil War figure—the equation of 
Parliament with political opposition and the conflation o f political and religious 
opposition—suggested the third and final element, the supposition that such a constitutional 
struggle, prosecuted by an Opposition made up ostensibly of reheated or unreconstructed 
religious fanatics answerable only to their own bellicose, self-serving, self-justifying 
consciences, made inevitable a return to open warfare. And, as these pieces are fond of 
pointing out, the two projects most dear to Puritan hearts, reviving the Good Old Cause 
and bringing about a second Protestant Reformation (to purge the Anglican Church of 
popish elements)—both depicted in these prologues and epilogues as being actively afoot— 
could be realized only by a violent overthrow o f the existing governmental and 
ecclesiastical order that is, by civil war.
Further still, I might observe that at almost the very moment the Civil War figure 
had been fused together in these playhouse pieces, the complete historical figure made 
possible by this fusion was being propagated in non-dramatic poetry as well—and on much 
the same terms. We can see an early alignment of the figure’s three major elements in The 
W aking Vision (late March-early July 1681). Using the Shaftesbury-Achitophel, 
Monmouth-Absalom analogy Dry den would make immortal later in the year, the poem 
opens with the “snake-like” (1.18) Achitophel35 addressing the “murm’ring rout” (1.3) that
35 Achitophel’s characterization and the logic of his rhetoric owe more than a little to Satan's address to 
his legions in Book II of Paradise Lost.
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makes up his constituency. The present moment, he explains, is ripe to recapitulate their 
glory days of the 1640’s, when monarchy had been extinguished and Puritan-Parliamen­
tary power was supreme:
I need not tell you of the case betwixt ye,
If you remember Forty-Eght and Sixty.
How happy we were in the first of those,
When no man durst our laws or wills oppose,
Wills as obliging as the Persian laws.
We fought and prosper’d in the Good Old Cause;
None durst oppose our faction, or appear 
In vindication of a Cavalier.
Thor all our Party in one humor stood
To bleed the nation, tap the royal blood (U. 19-28).
“[I]f we could but still have been obey’d,” Achitophel sighs, “No Stuart e’er had England’s
scepter sway’d” (11. 43-44). But if Cromwell’s sudden death allowed General Monck
“[ajgainst our wills” to restore “by force” the King “to that which was his right before” (11.
33-34), neither the rebels’ hatred o f monarchy nor their resolve to overturn it once for all
has abated in the least. In-deed, the crafty demagogue exhorts his listeners to not let slip the
opportunities offered by the immediate circumstances: “Let’s try our wits and plot for to
obtain / And play the Old Game over once again: / Do as our fathers did, come play your
parts . . . .  Eighty-One offers us a mark as fair / As ever Forty did. Come—strike—
prepare!” (11. 47-49; 52-53). Once more, he says, they shall be able to play upon anti-
Catholic bigotry—“Persuade ’em [the mob} that the Pope and Popish train / Are just
returning to the land again” (11. 60-61)—to justify their taking “oaths of secrecy and
covenant / To ease the nations of her groans and want” (11.54-55). Once more, the English
fear of arbitrary rule will aid their nurturing a poisonous mutual distrust between King and
People: “Right and religion, liberties and laws / Will make the rout quickly espouse our
Cause. / Tell ’em if they don’t stir they’re quite undone, /  Religion’s ruin’d, liberties are
gone” (11. 56-59); “Tell them the King’s a tyrant and oppressor, /  And that we have a
damn’d Popish successor. /  The Parliament’s dissolv'd, and we must be / Govern’d by
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arbitrary tyranny" (11.74-77). Cynical as this strategy is, more cynical still is Achitophel’s 
prescribed answer to loyalist challenges of their means and ends: “If any senator against 
you sit, /  Be sure to call him Papist, Jesuit, /  Mac, Tory, Protestant in masquerade / That 
would your liberties and rights invade” (11. 80-83). But then, the defense of liberty and 
conscience is a  mere sham, a guise under which the Opposition may make a play to sate its 
blood- and powerlust by retaking the absolute, tyrannical authority their Puritan fathers 
enjoyed under Cromwell. This, the true design of Achitophel’s programme, is revealed in 
the follow-up speech o f his protege and designated puppet-ruler, Absalom, who not only 
vows that “good old David soon shall know that I /  Will be his heir, or else I’ll bravely die" 
(1L 92-93)— implying that open war will be a matter of course—but hints that, if necessary, 
he will depose his father and seize the throne by force: “I am of royal blood, and will be 
King. / Do you but help me to obtain the crown, / I’ll rule by law, and all your foes put 
down . . .  If once I can but the throne attain, / I’ll grant new charters and the old maintain” 
(11.97-99; 102-103).
As explicated here, the succession issue has been stripped down to its raw essence, 
resolving itself into a contest of armed might, retaining its constitutional trappings only in 
Achitophel’s avowed hatred of kings. Indeed, much like the sectarian implications of the 
supposed Popish Plot, the Exclusion Crisis’ constitutional ramifications (for the right of 
Parliament to meet, the maintenance and defence of the Church, the liberty of the individual 
and his freedom of conscience) are h o e  regarded as so many pretexts for the assertion of a 
political supremacy gained and retained by the exercise of martial force.
This characterization of the design (or agenda) of the Opposition is reinforced by 
the poet’s (by now wholly predictable) conflation of religious with political dissent in his 
characterization of the Opposition’s constituency as a  reincarnation of Cromwell’s 
Roundheads. Once the poet’s vision fades—“suddenly the rout did disappear, / And all the 
coast was in an instant clear” (U. 106-107)—he is left to reflect upon what his fancy has 
shown him. He concludes that though the “Popish curse” may seem on par with the
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“Fanatic blessing” (11.108-109), when put in the scale o f sober consideration, “the balance 
equiponderate” (1. I l l )  o f the two at length gives way as the danger of Protestant 
fanaticism “hoist[sl up” the papist threat while its own gravity makes it “[ltiss| the ground” 
(1. 113). “Then suddenly I found the meaning out: / This [the popish threat] ruins quickly, 
but that [from dissenters] roundabout” (11. 114-115). To ensure that the person most 
concerned in this revelation does not mistake its significance, the poet takes the liberty of 
addressing the final three dozen tines o f the poem to the King himself. If “Rome leads the 
van,” he says, “Geneva brings the rear. /  If you’ll be safe, you must expel them both, / The 
Roman gnat and the Dissenting moth” (11. 123-125). But it is the moths, pretending to 
uphold established institutions even as they gnaw at the civil and religious fabric, that must 
be most vigorously counteracted:
Learn by your father not to trust to those
That in the end will prove confiding foes.
Consider on’t, you’re in a  woeful strait;
Think but on Forty-One and Forty-Eight
I only speak this for a precedent
For Heav’n, I hope, will all such things prevent (11. 132-137).
As the poet’s explicit acknowledgement that his vision takes cue from proximate historical 
precedent would indicate, the allusions to Charles I and to the fateful years 1641 and 1648 
are intended to impose the pattern of the past upon the events o f the present By doing so, 
he more than hints that the events of 1681, paralleling those o f the 1640’s, are building 
toward an identical outcome. You must “ruin the Fanatics,” the poet admonishes his 
sovereign, “For know one nation can’t hold them and you. / Those men I fear against your 
life combine / That strive to cross you in your good design; /  And those men sure would 
yield to put you down / That tell the people you are not their own” (11. 146-153). Indeed, 
the poet all but takes a new civil war for granted: given the design of the Opposition and the 
essential character of its members, either Charles or his regicidal opponents will survive the 
impending clash—survive personally, that is, not just politically. If the king would learn 
from his father’s tragic example, he will “ruin” his foes before their conspiracy against his
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life comes to fruition. Of course, by treating the outbreak of civil war and the execution of 
the monarch—that is, the sequence o f events, 1641-1649—as all but unavoidable in the 
present day, and by encouraging Charles to take the offensive against his foes, the poet 
himself effectively promotes the opening of armed conflict But by overlaying the historical 
present with historical precedent the poet also would lend Charles and the nation the 
comprehensive view and understanding o f  current events necessary if England is to be 
diverted from a second national apocalypse. Perhaps the paradox is inescapable: for the 
past to be forestalled, it must first be realized in the present
The basic rhetorical structure of A Waking Vision—an exposition o f the aims, then 
the character of the Opposition, culminating in a  vision o f the war (or at least widespread 
violence) these make inevitable—recurs in many later renderings of the Civil War figure. 
This is not to imply that these later poems are o f a piece. Far from it: that the same figure 
could be given so many nuances, inflections, distinct shapes says much about the 
imagination and skill of the Tory poets and goes a good way toward accounting for their 
ultimate victory in the propaganda war—and therefore in the struggle over the fashioning of 
national memory. In an ironically elegaic piece, The W higs’ Lamentation fo r  the Death o f 
Their Dear Brother [Stephen] College, the Protestant Joiner36 (August-Nov. 1681), for 
example, the dead man— “Brave College” (1. 1)—is made the epitome o f the Whigs’ 
designs and constituency, his death giving the poem’s persona the occasion to exhort his 
compatriots to redouble their efforts. College, the speaker notes, was “the chief of our 
hopes, / For pulling down bishops and making new popes” (11. 1-2), an exemplary “carver 
of laws, / Who dies undaunted, and stuck to the Cause" (11. 7-8), and a framer of “a new 
model to limit the King, / In hopes the crown and scepter might truckle to him” (11.29-30).
36 In his headnote to the poem Mengel relates that when the Parliament met at Oxford in March 1681, 
College, a dissenter and Whig, “went up on horseback, ostentatiously displaying weapons and wearing 
defensive armor, speaking threateningly against the King and advocating resistance" (448). Arrested in 
June, he was indicted in July “for seditious words and actions" (448), and executed by hanging and 
quartering August 31.
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College’s political activism, we learn, was but an extension of his nonconformist beliefs. 
His dissenting credentials, hinted at by the reference to his zeal for pulling down [Anglican] 
bishops and by the speaker’s boast that “Great Britain ne’er bred such a brother as College, 
/ He made [i.e., burned in effigy] seven popes in his time to our knowledge" (11. 31-32), 
are firmly established by his being labelled “a third savior o f the nation" (1.43)—the other 
two being the false witness Titus Oates and the no less fanatical William Bedloe—and by 
the observation that College was the “head o f oar Church” (1.41; emphasis added). In fact, 
so zealous was College to serve the interests o f “his dear Church” that “he renounced 
salvation” (1. 44), foreswearing his native Presbyterianism (and with it, his claim to 
election) to take Anglican communion, a move that enabled him (so the speaker implies) to 
subvert the Church of England from within. Having “di’d for King Jesus, / Defying church 
idols enough to amaze us” (U. 45-46), College is “a good martyr” (1. 25) of the revived 
Good Old Cause, his memory a catalyst for the Whigs to defy the stiffening royalist 
resistance and undertake all-out pursuit o f their by now familiar political and religious 
agenda;
Our Common Council let’s summon together;
To panel-pack’d juries let’s make’t our endeavor 
For an habeas corpus: insist on our power 
To fetch our great patriots out of the Tower.
And then we 11 dispute the case fo r reformation,
And m ake the proud Tories resign us the nation (1L 67-72; emphasis added).
In his prologue to Thomas Southeme’s The Loyal Brother; or, The Persian Prince 
(published as a broadside in February 1682), by contrast, Dryden evokes and aligns the 
elements of the Civil War figure through images o f Whigs acting en masse. Using an 
extended version of the familiar poet-king, audience-anarch analogy to establish the 
Opposition’s design to invade then nullify the royal prerogative,37 Dryden then merges
37 The passage runs in full:
Poets, like Lawfull Monarchs, rul’d the Stage,
Till Criticks, like Damn’d Whiggs, debauch'd our Age.
Mark bow they jump: Criticks wou'd regulate
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metaphor with a matter of public record,38 characterizing the Opposition and foreshadowing 
the consequences of its militancy by drawing upon the actual events o f November 17, 
1679, when the annual Queen Elizabeth’s Day pope-burning took on ugly, anti-royalist 
overtones. In Dry den’s account, as the crowd o f  radical Protestants—grown rabid from a 
zeal fanned into mad, unthinking hate—pulls the effigy of the “Miter’d Moppet from his 
Chair” (1.36) and falls upon it, one among them “for fashion” cries, “God save the King” 
(1. 40). “A needful Cry,” Dryden reflects, “in midst o f such Alarms: / When Forty 
thousand Men are up in arms” (11.41-42), and particularly when the 40,000 are made up of 
“Praying Saints” (1.50) and “Presbyterians” 0* 53). Having fleshed out a stock playhouse 
analogy with precisely detailed allusions to an episode no doubt still fresh in the minds of 
his audience, Dryden’s intimation that the pope-burning crowd is made up of frenzied 
Puritans allows him to suggest much about the Opposition’s means to its ends. He puts the 
question squarely before his audience: “What if  some one inspir’d with Zeal, shou’d call, / 
‘Come let’s go cry, “God save him” [the King] at White-halH’ / His best friends wou’d not 
like this over-care: I Or think him e’re the safer for that pray’r” (11. 46-49). And why?: 
“Should heav’n all the true Petitions drain /  Of Presbyterians, who wou’d Kings maintain; / 
Of Forty thousand, five wou’d scarce remain” (11. 53-54). The implication is clean so 
strong is the “Church-Militant’s” (I. 51) antipathy toward the person of the monarch and
Our Theatres, and Whiggs reform our State:
Both pretend love, and both (Plague rot ’em) hate.
The Critick humbly seems Advice to bring,
The fawning Whigg Petitions to the King:
But ones advice into a Satyr slides;
T” others Petition a Remonstrance hides.
These will no Taxes give, and those no Pence:
Criticks wou’d starve the Poet, Whiggs the Prince.
The Critick all our troops of friends discards;
Just so the Whigg wou’d fain pull down the Guards.
Guards are illegal, that drive foes away,
As watchfull Shepherds, that fright beasts of prey.
Kings, who disband such needless Aids as these.
Are safe—as long as e'er their Subjects please (11.1-19).
38 Danchin notes that Dryden describes the episode ‘’exactly as it appears in contemporary accounts” (361).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
347
the institution o f monarchy that, left unchallenged, the fanatic crowd now content with 
burning the pope and damning the King's friends (1. 44) would not scruple to turn their 
fury upon Charles himself.
Appearing the same month as Dryden’s prologue is Thomas Durfey’s The W higs’ 
Exaltation: A Pleasant New Song o f 82 to an O ld Tune o f 41. As Howard Schless points 
out, the tune to Durfey’s song is taken from “Cuckolds All A-Row," and its lyrics are 
designed to recall those of Francis Quarles’ famous anti-Puritan ballad o f 1646 (9). 
Fittingly, the Civil War figure is a prominent feature of the piece, and its exposition falls 
roughly as it does in the previous three poems. The design o f the Opposition is given 
straightaway in the first stanza—
Now, now the Tories all shall stoop,
Religion and the laws;
And Whigs on commonwealth get up 
To tap the Good Old Cause.
Tantivy boys shall all go down,
And haughty monarchy;
The leathern cap shall brave the throne;
Then hey boys up go we (11.1-8)
—and in subsequent stanzas the speaker vows that the “anti-Christian crew” (1.9) at court
will be “crush’d and overthrown” 0- 10), that the Whigs will “teach the nobles how to
bow” (1. 11), that they shall make “[t]he name of lord . . .  abhorr’d” (1. 17), overturn
existing political and ecclesiastical authority, and, once they have “pil’d and plunder’d all, /
And Ievell’d each degree” (11.21-22), fall to levelling of another sort: “We’ll make their
plump young daughters fall, / And hey boys up go we” (II. 23-24). Once again the
conflation of Whig and Puritan is absolute. The speaker revels in the “sunshine weather” (1.
28) occasioned by the quarrel between King and Parliament—for if “they should both
agree, / ’Dzowns, who’d be in a Roundhead’s case, / For hey then up go we?” (1. 30-
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32)—expresses the virulent distrust of learning traditionally ascribed to the Puritan,39 
resolves to replace formal education with extemporary preaching “in every grove” (I. 37) 
from tubs-turned-pulpits, and exults at the prospect of smashing stained-glass windows (11. 
57-58), pulling down the Anglican bishops (1.59), and sainting dissenting elders in their 
stead (1.60). The necessary outcome of such designs prosecuted by such a constituency as 
this are spelled out with equal frankness. “The Whigs shall rule” (L 41), the speaker 
declares in the sixth stanza, and shall, in a  move reminiscent of the Long Parliament's 
February 1649 prohibition of monarchy, “such laws invent / As shall exclude the lawful 
heir / By act of parliament” (1L 42-45). Moreover, they shall make sure o f their grip on the 
town they have “enslav’d” (1.61) by “cut[ting] His Royal highness down, / E’en shorter 
by the knee, /  That he shall never reach the throne” (11. 45-47). These lines allude 
immediately to the mutilation—ostensibly by the supporters of Stephen College—of a 
portrait of the Duke of York hanging in the Guild Hall, the vandals having (so reports 
Nathaniel Thompson in his journal, The Loyal Protestant) “cut off [the figure’s! legs a little 
below the knees, and departed” (qtd. in Schless, 13). But they allude more generally, and 
therefore more ominously, to the violence the Opposition is willing to unleash upon the 
nation to achieve its ends, the nature and scope o f  that violence being clearly 
foreshadowed, given the identities of the supposed vandals (sectarian commonwealthmen) 
and of their victim-in-effigy (the heir apparent): civil war, culminating in regicide. 
Precedent would admit of no other signification. The speaker’s vow to “smite the idol in 
Guild Hall” (1. 49) is thus likely meant to suggest to the reader that the days o f open 
warfare between the House of Stuart and the House of Commons have returned—much as 
the act itself brought vividly to Thompson’s mind the execution of Charles I. No doubt, he 
speculates in his journal, the destroyers of James’s portrait left their work “much troubled
39 “We'll down with all the versifies, / Where learning is profess'd; / For they still practice and maintain / 
The language of the beast" (11. 33-36)
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that they had not his person within their power to act as the same malice upon as they did 
upon his royal father of ever blessed memory” (qtd. in Schless, 13).
Durfey’s ballad puts us onto a perhaps unexpected nuance o f the Civil War figure. 
To this point, the poems we have examined have generally either drawn parallels between 
the agents and events of past and present, giving equal weight to each, or have attempted to 
revivify the past in the present, showing the Old Rebels and their Rebellion at work in the 
guise of their latter-day equivalents. By contrast, Durfey—in his music, metrics, lyrics, 
and the explicitness with which his ballad alludes to the historical precedents of the present 
political crisis—makes a greater effort to recreate the past on its own terms for his readers, 
to return them to its circumstances and sensibilities. The Loyal Scot (April 5,1682) seems 
to aim at much the same effect. The premise of this anonymous poem is that a Scot last in 
England in 1643 as part o f the Scottish army then engaging Charles I’s Cavaliers ventures 
south of the border once again in 1682. Wishing “to’l see our gracious King” (1. 6), he 
sees instead only a mad and maddening incarnation of the cause for which he fought so 
long ago, for “nene but knaves and perjur’d loons do rule the roast” (I. 2), and where he 
had hoped to find “mirth and merry glee, / 1 find aud sniveling Presbyter is coming in” (11. 
7-8). The old (“aud”) Presbyter indeed: the old Scot’s impressions o f England having been 
formed by circumstances as he found them forty years ago and held ever since in the 
suspension of expectation, he is dumbfounded to see that matters are almost exactly as he 
left them:
For they talk of horrid Popish Plots, and Heav’n knows what,
When au [all) the wiser world knows well what they’d be at;
For with sike like seeming sanctity the geudest King 
They did to death and ruin bring.
When on the civil broils they first did enter in,
(As well ye ken) with Popery they did begin;
And with Liberty and Public Geud was muckle din,
When the deel a bit they meant the thing (11.9-16).
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What innovations he does see only dishearten him further. In 1643 he and his fellow 
Covenanters pursued a cause o f which they could be justly proud; now Shaftesbury, the 
“voice of all the Geudly rabble mobile” (1.19), “traitor [both] to Commonwealth and King" 
(1. 23), “pimps for au [all} the loose rebellious fops in toon” (25-26), and “with high 
debauchery they carry on the Cause, /  And Geudly Reformation is the sham pretense; /  And 
religiously defy divine and human laws, / With obedience to their rightful prince” (11.29- 
32). Nevertheless, the sham goes largely undetected, for, taking “the laws [or pattern] of 
forty-ene” (1.46) as his master script, each o f the Opposition’s major players “does begin 
to play his part, / And, too, so well he cons [learns] his geer and takes his cue, / [That] they 
learn to play the rebel so by rote of heart, /  That the fictitious story seems as true” (11.57- 
60). The claim that contemporary history is unfolding according to a script drafted by the 
events of forty years earlier reinforces the poem’s admonishment—implicit in its showing 
us the year 1682 through the eyes of one whose perspective is a time-capsule of 1643— that 
to understand the present unrest rightly we must set its elements in their original or native 
context: we must weave our perceptions and understanding of the moment before us 
directly from the text of precedent if  we would prevent its “fictitious story” from becoming 
true once more—that is, if we would forestall the revisitation of Civil War.
Other poems making prominent use o f the Civil War figure take a more direct 
approach in transporting us to the near past. Nahum Tate’s Old England (May 1682; 
published 1685), for instance, is a nostalgic advice-to-the-painter piece that takes as a  given 
that the best days in England are over, the once-heroic English character in rapid decay. If 
once “Britain did another world appear; / Gave laws to all the land, and then with ease / 
Their triumphant flag o’er all the seas” (11. 46-48), now, thanks in no small part to the 
influence of the religious and political Opposition, there is occasion only for disgust and 
disillusionment:
What crowds of pimps and parasites are here!
Ha! what a politic fop drinks coffee there!
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See how th’ apostate plies his trait’rous text,
The Gospel wrack'd, and Church-historians vex'd.
Look, look, the sovereign people here dispense 
The laws of empire to an absolute prince;
Their will is law divine, themselves being own’d 
To the Almighty in the spiritual fund.
Religious rogues! (11.19-27)
Yet despite his contempt for what he sees about him, the poet-painter must neither gloss
over “all that’s stain’d with zealot, villain, Scot” (1.52) nor pretend that England is still at
the zenith of its power and glory, but to “Draw as it is, iFt can’t be as it was” (1. 54).
Significantly, as rendered by Tate, England as it is—“When thus the kingdom’s by
confusion rent” (1. 73)—is a good deal like England as it was during the 1640’s—at the
height of Civil Wan
First let Confusion her dear self display,
To whom th’ unthinking crowd obedience pay;
Next Horror, who the flying standard bears,
Deck’d with this motto, Jealousies and Fears;
Here let the rabble in allegiance meet,
With lives and fortunes at their idol’s feet;
Arm every brigadier with sacred sword,
Inscrib’d, Come fig h t the battle o f the Lordl 
Let trumpets now proclaim immortal hate 
Against all order in the Church and State.
Show not the victim [Charles I] that did lately fall 
By fool or rogues, the sons of Belial;
But let a curtain of black murder bide,
Till time, or kinder fete, shall draw’t aside (11.55-68).
In these lines Tate’s readers—many of whom, remember, had seen and heard such things
for themselves—are thrust into the midst of the Puritans’ clash with the late King. About
them swirls the chaos, the clamor o f warfare: Parliament’s banners blaze before their eyes;
rebellion’s sword rings as its metal and mission are unsheathed; trumpets and battle-cries
fill their ears as Church and State are overturned, toppled onto the dust But perhaps the
most affecting of all these images is the one not shown. Tate’s hand lets the curtain fall
before the doomed Charles is made to ascend the scaffold, to put his neck on the block,
leaving the reader’s imagination—by this time well primed by what it has been shown—to
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horrify itself with what it cannot see but must fashion for itself from the dark terrors
unleashed within it by the phrase “black murder.” Nor does Tate ever fully allay the storm
of 1642’s rebellion and release his readers from their forced return to England’s collective
nightmare. Several hundred lines later, near the poem’s conclusion, the poet admonishes
the present Charles, “Awake, great sir, thy guardian prays thee w ake,. . .  See the globe
reels, the scepter’s tumbling down; / One such another nod may lose a  crown” (11. 293,
295-296). Clearly, the moment of rebellion has yet to pass; England has yet to know a
kinder fate; the tempest rages on—and the curtain must remain drawn.
Old England would not be published until 1685. However, The Second P an o f
Absalom and Achitophel, which Tate wrote with Dryden, would appear November 11,
1682. There, as in Old England, an overview of contemporary circumstances—in this case,
a survey of the events of the Exclusion Crisis down to the end of May 1682—suggests and
gives way to a detailed evocation of the Civil War years. Having cited the fight over
exclusion, the larger constitutional struggle subsuming it, Shaftesbury’s cynical
manipulation of Monmouth and of the crowds that turned out to cheer the Protestant hero’s
semi-royal progresses through the west country, the melding of the political and religious
Opposition, the arc of historical exposition takes us—back to the past, or rather to the
present as it was forty years ago. The speaker warns that, having been seduced by the
Whigs’ “specious cry” (1. 695) of “sacred rights and property” (1.696), “we groundlessly
complain, / And loathe the manna of a gentle reign:
Thus our forefathers’ crooked paths are trod,
We trust our prince no more than they their God.
But all in vain our reasoning prophets preach 
To those whom sad experience ne’er could teach,
Who can commence new broils in bleeding scars,
And fresh remembrance of intestine wars;
When the same household mortal foes did yield,
And brothers stain’d with brothers’ blood the field;
When sons’ curst steel the fathers’ gore did stain,
And mothers mourn’d for sons by fathers slain!
When thick as Egypt’s locusts on the sand,
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Our tribes lay slaughter’d thro’ the promised land,
Whose few survivors with worse fate remain,
To drag the bondage of a tyrant’s reign:
Which scene of woes, unknowing, we renew,
And madly ev’n those ills we fear pursue (11.699-716).
As with the passages taken from The Loyal Scot and Old England (and we might 
include The W higs’ Exaltation as well), these lines from The Second Part o f Absalom and 
Achitophel attempt more than to draw parallels between the present and the past In their 
use of explicit physical detail and in their strong emotional appeal they likewise attempt 
both to reconstruct the pertinent episodes of past and to recreate the affective experience of 
those episodes and, more generally, o f what it meant to have been alive at a particular time 
in history. Such attempts to revivify the past in the imagination o f the reader effectively 
complement their performative counterparts, the dramatic prologues and epilogues. But 
they also impose new demands upon the reader. The playhouse pieces invite us to see in 
the present moment manifestations of the Civil War years— to see the Exclusion 
Parliaments as the Long Parliament, for instance, or the Whigs as Puritans, or exclusion 
itself as regicide. These latter pieces, by contrast, ask us to accept not merely the veracity 
(physical and affective) but the thoroughness of their reconstructions as well, for they 
would explicitly lay before us the historical events and sensibilities upon which the 
historical figure of the Civil War has been based. But once they return us to the past, what 
do these reconstructions show us o f  it? We see rebellious Parliaments, zealous and 
seditious Presbyterians, short-fused crowds under the sway of fiery demagogues, political 
and social levellers, war (sometimes actual, sometimes imminent), and regicide. The 
elements almost constitute an equation. In fact their configuration is most familiar—and if 
the depiction o f the “literal” past has come to resemble closely the Civil War figure used to 
represent it, we are reminded that memory is as refluent as it is progressive. The 
identification of historical precedent is, to an appreciable degree, an act of creation; in their 
recovery of a usable past, the Tory poets projected the circumstances o f the present onto the 
past perhaps as much as the reverse. For if we see according to what we have seen, our
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recollections—individual and collective—likewise bend to accommodate what we are 
seeing. Over time, then, the Civil War figure, pieced together bit by bit from the superficial 
parallels between two distinct constitutional struggles, became something more than a 
partisan expedient during a propaganda war. It effectively became history itself, as it really 
was. Or if this is to claim too much, we might say that by appearing to confirm one 
another, fact and fable between them created a stable, objective historical pattern that could 
be lifted from its immediate contexts and fitted to new circumstances as they seemed to 
warrant, allowing their nature, alignment, end, and import to be readily apprehended and 
acted upon.
3. Phases IT and III: Applying and Extending the Historical Figure 
The test of such a pattern is not so much its historical authenticity as its utility, 
determined in turn by its adaptability and durability. In the event, the Civil War figure did 
prove itself sufficiently flexible to endure and thus remain useful to Tory poets as new 
partisan controversies arose in the aftermath of the Exclusion Crisis. Indeed, Nahum Tate, 
for one, believed so strongly in the permanence of the figure that he makes it the basis for 
assigning immortality to the political verse of his compeer and collaborator John Dryden. In 
his apostrophe to “Asaph” (Dryden) near the end o f The Second P an o f Absalom and 
Achitophel (November 1682), Tate exclaims, “With wonder, late posterity shall dwell / On 
Absalom and false Achitophel” (11.1043-1044), adding that the Laureate's “fierce satire” (1. 
1049) on Charles' behalf exceeds any praise “for such rich strains” (1. 1059) and any 
rewards bestowed by “the grateful crown” (1. 1060). Beyond mere praise and gratitude, 
Dryden’s partisan works have so aptly captured their times for later ages—frequently, as 
we have seen, by making prominent use of the Civil War figure—as to secure for their 
author a glory long-lived as time itself: “While bees in flow’rs rejoice, and flow’rs in dew,
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/ While stars and fountains to their course are true, / While Judah’s throne and Sion’s rock
stand fast, /  The song o f Asaph and the fame shall last” (11. 1061-1064). But perhaps more
compelling testimony to the success o f the Civil War figure comes from a spokesman for
the Whig Opposition, Dryden’s poetic and political rival Thomas Shadwell, who by April
1683 had had enough of the Laureate and his fellow Tories’ exploitation of Civil War
imagery. In A Lenten Prologue Refus'd by the Players, Shadwell ridicules the amazing
(almost Oates-like) ability o f Dryden, “the mad Prophet” (1. 18), to discern against all
sense, evidence, and reason plots, traitors, rebellions, and Whig armies poised to seize and
kill the king. No doubt, he wryly observes, “[The] Toryes, without troubling Law, or
Reason, / By loyal Instinct can find Plots and Treason” (11. 38-39). But as Shadwell
continues, his exasperation rising with each successive line, it becomes clear that the
Tories’ “loyal Instinct” has been roused, shaped, and perpetuated by their favorite
rhetorical weapon, that in fact their “Instinct” consists simply of perceiving and explicating
the political world according to the habits inculcated by the sustained imposition of the Civil
War figure upon the historical present Would the Whigs dare to protest the
Administration’s effectively permanent dissolution of Parliament? “Petitioning disturbs the
Kingdom’s Quiet; I As choosing honest Sheriffs makes a Ryott” (11.55-56). “Then Pray’r,
that Christian Weapon of defence, /  Gratefull to Heaven, at Court is an Offence, / If it dare
speak th’ untamper’d Nations sence” (11.50-52):
To love the King, and Knaves about him hate.
Is a Fanatick Plot against the State.
To Skreen his Person from a Popish Gun 
Has all the mischief in’t o f Forty One.
To save our Faith and keep our Freedom’s Charter,
Is once again to make a Royal Martyr (11.60-65).
Shadwell’s impatience is not only understandable, it is arguably justified, for by the 
time he published his “Lenten Prologue” the Tories’ habitual use of the Civil War figure 
during the Exclusion Crisis and their unremitting application of it upon the discovery of the
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Protestant Association and the struggle between the Crown and City over London’s 
municipal charter40 had made it something of a cliche.
Certainly the figure could still be employed with skill, conviction, even passion, as 
the example of Dryden’s The M edal (March 1682) demonstrates. Composed (perhaps at the 
suggestion of Charles himself) in response to the Earl o f Shaftesbury’s supporters striking 
a medal to commemorate his November 21,1681, acquittal on charges o f treason41 by a 
London jury packed with ideological comrades, Dryden’s poem is prefaced by a lengthy 
and pugnacious “Epistle to the Whigs." Here the poet answers those who have attacked 
him for Absalom and Achitophel (November 1681) and sets forth the royalist case against 
the Whiggish Protestant Association, at that time believed (or purportedly believed) to be a 
dangerously far-flung, highly secretive conspiracy to thwart the legal, political, and 
dynastic order. As it is argued in the preface, much of this case rests upon Dryden’s 
recourse to the Civil War figure, the prose rendering of which closely anticipates its 
manifestation in the poem itself. Remarking upon the essential illegality and innate 
subversiveness of such covert political societies, Dryden gives the lie to the Whigs’ claim 
that “all this while [they have at heart] not only zeal for the public good, but a due 
veneration for the person of the king” (126). He grants that it is in their interest to make 
such claims, “But I would ask you one civil question, what right has any man among you, 
or any association o f men, (to come nearer to you,) who, out of Parliament, cannot be 
consider’d in public capacity, to meet as you daily do in factious clubs, to vilify the 
government in your discourses, and to libel it in all your writings? Who made you judges
40 Shadwell alludes to the Association in lines 53-54: “Nay Paper’s Tumult, when our Senates cease; / 
And some Men's Names alone can break the Peace”; as Antonia Fraser explains, the Association, 
discovered upon Shaftesbury’s arrest for treason in July 1681, was “a list of people who were to be 
invited to protect [that is, secure the person of] the King and prevent the Catholic succession” (409). 
The phrase, “Freedom’s Charter,” just quoted, is an allusion to the latter conflict
41 As Fraser points out, “Shaftesbury was accused of treason because he had conspired to levy war against 
the King at Oxford" [that is, at the Oxford Parliament the preceding March], and more particularly, 
because of his involvement with the Association (409).
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in Israel?” (126). The Whigs would justify their Association by citing the precedent of an
organization formed in Queen Elizabeth’s reign to protect the sovereign and avenge her
death on the Catholics in the event she was murdered by them; but Dryden, echoing the
belief cited by Bishop Gilbert Burnet that “there were many republicans still in the nation,
and many o f Cromwell’s officers were yet alive, who seemed to repent not of what they
had done; so some of these might by this means [the Association] be encouraged to attempt
on the king’s life,”42gives the “true” inspiration for the confederacy as follows:
Anyone who reads Davila43 may trace your practices all along. There were 
[among the Holy League, a secret alliance of French Protestants that 
ultimately assassinated Francis, Second Duke of Guise in 1563] the same 
pretences for reformation and loyalty, the same aspersions of the king, and 
the same grounds of a rebellion. I know not whether you will take the 
historian’s word . . . that it was a  Huguenot minister, otherwise call’d a 
Presbyterian. . .  who first writ a treatise of the lawfulness of deposing and 
murthering kings o f a  different persuasion in religion; but I am able to prove 
from the doctrine o f Calvin, and principles of Buchanan that they set the 
people above the magistrate; which, if I mistake not is your own 
fundamental, and which carries your loyalty no farther than your liking.
When a vote of the House of Commons goes on your side, you are as ready 
to observe it as if  it were pass’d into a  law; but when you are pinch'd with 
any former, and yet unrepeal’d act o f parliament, you declare that in some 
cases you will not be oblig’d by i t . . .  [Sol now, when your affairs are in 
a low condition, you dare not pretend that [Association] to be a legal 
combination, but whensoever you are afloat, I doubt not but it will be 
maintain’d and justify’d to purpose. For indeed there is nothing to defend it 
but the sword; ’tis the proper time to say anything, when men have all 
things in their power” (127).
The Whigs have ostentatiously appointed themselves “the trustees of the public liberty”
against the (illusory) prospect o f arbitrary rule by a future Catholic despot, but this is a
mere cloak for the religious fanaticism that—according to recent French and English
precedents—has set them upon a path of political, social and ecclesiastical sedition that will
42 The History o f My Own Times (1724-34; qttL in Noyes, 965).
43 Enrico Davila (1576-1631), author of Storia delle guerre civili di Francia (1630).
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ultimately make it necessary for the Association to take up a “defensive” sword against their 
present King.
The poem itself is no less elaborate or emphatic. The standard elements of the Civil 
War figure are given early on, with Dryden reiterating the republican arguments ascribed to 
Shaftesbury and the Opposition he leads, that “pow’r is lent, / But not convey’d to kingly 
government; / That claims successive bear no binding force, / That coronation oaths are 
things of course” (11.82-85); depicting the republican programme as one that would “fsetl 
the people in the papal chair” (1.87); characterizing its main prosecutor, Shaftesbury, as an 
unreformed Cromwellian (11. 30-49) who learned his demagoguery and fraud at the hands 
of Puritan masters during “his fanatic years” 0- 59); identifying Shaftesbury’s supporters, 
who willfully misapplied and subverted the law by acquitting him, with those who “rack 
ev’n scripture to confess their cause, /  And plead a call to preach in spite of laws” (11.156- 
157), though obviously “[t]he text inspires not them, but they the text inspire” (1. 166); 
putting it to his readers that in appealing to the power of the “Almighty crowd” (1. 91) to 
overturn the stays against civil war—“inherent right in monarchs” (1. 114), a “secur’d 
succession” (1. 116), and a balance between “property and sovereign sway” (1. 117)— 
Shaftesbury would plunge England down the “headlong steep of anarchy” (1.122)—again. 
“God tri’d us once,” Dryden reminds his audience, “our rebel-fathers fought; / He glutted 
’em with all the pow’r they sought, / Till master’d by their own usurping brave, / The 
ffeebom subject sank into a slave” (11. 127-130). And Civil War is exactly the pass to 
which the Association would bring the nation. “What means their trait’rous combination 
less,” Dryden demands, “Too plain t ’ evade, too shameful to confess!” (11. 205-206). 
“Join’d in a mutual cov’nant o f defense, /  At first without, at last against their prince” (11. 
211-212),
[the conspirators] from pretended grievances. . .  rise,
First to dislike, and after to despise;
Then, Cyclop-like, in human flesh to deal,
Chop up a minister at ev’ry meal;
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Perhaps not wholly to melt down the king,
But clip his regal rights within the ring;
From thence t’ assume the pow’r of peace and war;
And ease him by degrees of public care.
Yet, to consult his dignity and fame,
He should have leave to exercise the name,
And hold the cards, while commons play’d the game (11.224-234).
But the Association would not stop even there. Pretending to “make his [the King’s] cause
their own,” they would “for God’s cause” their monarch dethrone (11. 199-200), and
whether “the plotting Jesuit laid the plan / Of murth’ring kings, or the French Puritan, / Our
sacrilegious sects their guides outgo, / And kings and kingly pow’r would murther too” (U.
201-204). Should “true succession from our island fail, And crowds profane with impious
arms prevail” (11. 289-290), it takes no gift o f prophecy to “foreshow / What all but fools
by common sense may know” (11. 287-288). Victory shall give way to savage infighting
among the triumphant sectarians, until a Cromwellian warlord (Monmouth is likely meant)
emerges to crush his rivals: “The presbyter, puff’d up with spiritual pride, / Shall on the
necks of the lewd nobles ride, / His brethren damn, the civil pow’r defy, /  And parcel out
republic prelacy” (11. 298-301). His “rigid yoke” (I. 302) and “tyrant pow’r” (1. 303),
however, shall at length the “puny sects provoke” (1. 304), and in the resulting turmoil
either the general will dispense with the Commons and “force the crowd to arbitrary sway”
(1. 314) or else the Commons, “suspecting his ambitious aim, / In hate of kings shall cast
anew the frame; / And thrust out Collatine that bore their name" (11. 315-317). More wars
“of exil’d heirs, or foreign rage” (1.319) will follow, until at last God’s “halting vengeance
overftakes] our age” (1.320).
Dryden was not always so painstaking and thoroughgoing in his characterization of
the Association as an incipient Puritan Revolution of the 1642 variety. In his prologue to
The Duke o f Guise (November 1682), he gives a cursory reiteration of the Civil War
figure, to which he merely adds tag phrases relating to the current scandal. Noting, for
example, that “Our play’s a parallel: the Holy League / Begot our Cov’nant: Guisards got
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the Whig” (11. 1-2), he asks incredulously if  “the same trick, twice play’d, [could] our 
Nation gull” 0* 7)— if “[t]wice in one age” (L 21) England could be brought to “Cry 
Freedom up with Popular noisy Votes” (1. 30), “Lop all the rights that fence your 
monarch’s throne” (L 32), “expel the lawful heir” (1- 21), “decide religion by the sword, / 
And purchase for us a new tyrant lord” (1. 22-23). One would think, the speaker 
admonishes the crowd, that the “fulsome Cov’nant . . .  /  Had giv’n us all our Bellys-full o f 
Treason: / And yet, the Name but chang’d, our nasty Nation / Chaws its own Excrement, 
th’ Association” (11. 11-14). Such foreshortening o f the Civil War figure when applying it 
to the Association controversy is typical among Tory poets. Its appearance in Durfey’s 
prologue to The Royalist (January 23,1682) and Behn’s prologue to Like Father, Like Son 
(March 1682), for instance, is even more attenuated. Having observed that “th’ Pit 
(methinks) looks like a Common-weal; / Where Monarch Wit’s bafl’d by ev’ry Drudge, / 
And each pert Railing Brimigham’s a Judge” (11. 4-6), the speaker of Durfey’s prologue 
cautions the “Opposition” critics, “The Dice now give kind chances on our side; / Tories are 
upmost, and the Whigs defy’d  / Your Factious Juries and Associations / Must never think 
to ruine twice Three Nations” (11. 8-11). In Behn’s piece, the speaker (Mrs. Butler) 
remarks upon the paucity of playgoers and likens it to thinness of church attendance “’ere 
Conventicling was put down” 0- 2)—or to the abandonment of “Declining States-men” 
whom “scarce a Heartless Whigg will Visit now: / Who once had Crowds of Mutineers in 
Fashion, /  Fine drawn in Cullies of th’ Association: Sparks, Justices and Jurymen by 
Dozens, /  Whom his perverted [tale]44 betrays and Cozens” (11.4-9).
The Tories’ recourse to the Civil War figure had become habitual, reflexive by the 
time of the contest over the London charter (1682-1683), when Charles, seeking to 
undermine a perennial Opposition stronghold, sought to, in Schless’s words, “rescind the 
franchises and liberties of London” (421). As Schless explains, “the very nature o f
44 Danchin's suggested emendation for the text’s “late.”
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corporation and the body politic was at issue”: on one side, the Crown “saw the municipal 
government both as an extension o f the central monarchy and as an incorporation 
representing and involving all its members by its actions”; on the other, the City “conceived 
of the corporation (though not its real holdings) as immortal, and o f the office (though not 
the officeholder) as unpunishable” (421-422). The struggle could be seen, and was seen, 
as an extension of the earlier contest between royal prerogative and parliamentary right, and 
the fact that London had become identified as the center of Whig and Dissenter activism 
certainly facilitated the application of the Civil War figure to the contest In Old England 
(May 1682), for instance, Nahum Tate argues that “Indentures give no right to shake a 
throne” (L 92), resolving that “If  large concessions from successive kings / Be such 
desirable, such pow’rful things, / Pity that e’er to cities they were made, / Whose charter 
dares prerogative invade” (11.98-101). And he notes that those whose “coffee-drums beat 
Privilege aloud” (1. 104), are the very same who have flown “disgrac’d from Court” (1. 
119) to woo the mob, taking up refuge in the City among the “blackest traitors” (1. 121). 
“Poor loyal hearts,” he intones ironically, “they plot no other thing I Than first to save, then 
make a  glorious king” (11.109-110; emphasis added); surely they would turn the force they 
threaten to use only “against evil counsellors” and “against the Pope” (11. 111,112). But 
then, Tate reminds us, “That was the word, when once, for public good, / Three kingdoms 
innocently flow’d in blood” (109-114). A second instance of the figure’s application, The 
Charter (fall 1682), is singularly explicit To Whig complaints that “We are all grieved with 
extremities, / And Pharaoh’s [Charles’] deaf to all our plaints and cries! / Our wills with 
bridle, and our mouths with bit /  Are held by force: our Sanhedrins [Parliaments] shan’t 
sit" (II. 208-2II), and that “Saints that have right /  To judge the earth are ravish’d of their 
might: / Our hands are fetter’d, and our hearts complain / That free-born spirits should be 
thrall’d in chain” (U. 212-215), the author opposes an appeal to public memory of the Civil 
War. “Have you forgot” he asks the corporation, how once before “you the Queen did 
force, / And high-born issue, to a sad divorce / From their royal father?” (U. 69-71). Have
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you forgotten how “clamor, then petition” (1.73) at last brought “Rebellion, a complete sin-
offering” (1.74)? “Had you,” he demands, “a charter for such tricks as these?” (1.76):
Once more, beloved: Have you forgot when drums 
Beat up for bankrupt and religious thrums?
When hungry Levites and starv’d ’prentices 
Salli’d from their dark cells and penthouses,
And like the plagues of Egypt spread all o'er.
Some for to stench us, all for to devour?
Have you forgot how you did stab the King 
And Church with bodkin, thimble, spoon, and ring,
And like the Indians, prostitute yourselves
For th’ devilish idol of your Cause and elves? (11.77-86)
By all means, he defiantly exhorts the new rebels near the poem’s end, “Keep to your
gods; on damned Bradshaw45 call, / Implore the shades o f Ireton and Noll / To come
improv’d from Hell and be so good / To set crack’d men with plunder up, and blood” (11.
410-413). For in the end, even if they could revisit the very Civil War itself upon the land,
“The rabble shall no longer rule this town; I Rebellion’s Charter now must go down,
down” (11. 414-415).
But if Old England and The Charter offer examples of elaborate, impassioned
applications o f the Civil War figure to the contest between municipal and royal sovereignty,
much more typical of the figure’s application is Dryden’s prologue addressed to the King
and Queen at the opening of the United Theatre (May 1682). Citing the late rebelliousness
of the Whigs and “Saints,” Dryden remarks, almost reflexively now, that such as these are
forever bestirring themselves with “new fears and Jealousies” (I. 17), until, as before,
“topsy-turvy they had turn’d the State” (1. 18). And if “Plain sense, without the talent o f
foretelling, /  Might guess ’twould end in downright knocks and quelling; / For seldom
comes there better of rebelling” (11. 19-21; emphasis added), it manages so well without
prophetic powers because it may look to the precedent of the past to discern the future of
45 John Bradshaw (1602-1659) was president of the trial of Charles I; Henry Ireton (1611-1651), a 
Parliamentary general, was a signatory of the warrant for Charles' execution; Noll is Cromwell.
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the present Then, seemingly put in mind of London’s rebellion in the present Dryden 
allows himself to editorialize, “When men will, needlessly, their Freedom barter / For 
lawless Pow’r, sometimes they catch a Tartar”—adding as an afterthought in an awkward 
parenthesis, “(There’s a damn’d word that rhymes to this call’d Charter)” (11. 22-24). 
However awkward, the minimalism with which Dryden identifies the Charter crisis with 
the English Civil War may be found in any number of such pieces, including the prologue 
spoken by Mr. Powell at Oxford (July 10, 1682), Dryden’s own prologue to The Duke o f 
Guise (11. 41-47), John Crowne’s prologue to City Politiques (January 19, 1683), and 
Ravenscroft’s epilogue to The Cunning Woman (May 31, 1683). It would appear that at 
this point in the life of the Civil War figure, it is necessary only to associate—however 
loosely—the name of the controversy of die day with the most adumbrated rendering of the 
figure’s defining, or at least most frequently drawn features.
There are several reasons for this. For one thing, by the time o f the Charter crisis— 
and probably by the time the Whig Association had been discovered—the figure’s frequent 
use had made it familiar to the popular mind. Though, as we have seen in the last few 
pages, some poets were occasionally willing to do so, there was simply no reason to 
rehash in painstaking detail parallels that had become almost second-nature to the great bloc 
of readers. For another thing, though loyalist poets were quick to make use of the figure as 
partisan conflicts arose in the aftermath of the Exclusion Crisis, it was evident to even the 
most ardent Tories that the period of greatest danger had passed, and that their side had 
emerged from it victorious. Even Aphra Behn herself, at the very climax of her most 
virulent anti-Whig invective in her dedicatory preface to The Roundheads, is yet shrewd 
enough to discern that “The Clouds already begin to disappear, and the face of things to 
change, thanks to Heaven his Majesties infinite Wisdom, and the Over-Zeal of the (falsly 
called) True Protestant Party. Now we may pray for the King and his Royal Brother, 
defend his Cause, and assert his Right, without the fear of a taste of the Old Sequestration 
call’d a Fine” (qtd. in Danchin HI, 344). Similar statements abound in the occasional poetry
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of late 1681 and early 1682. Among the pieces just surveyed, for instance, Behn observes 
in her prologue to Like Fathers, Like Sons that conventicling has “been put down” and that 
the Whigs have abandoned the exploded intrigues of “Declining States-men,” Durfey 
declares in the prologue to The Royalist that “The Dice now give kind chances on our side; 
/ Tories are upmost, and the Whigs defy’d,” Dryden asserts in his prologue to the King and 
Queen at the opening of the United Theatre that “Faction ebbs, and rogues grow out o f 
fashion” (I. 1), and Crowne concurs in his prologue to City Politiques that “the frenzy of 
the Nation / Begins to cure, and Wit to grow in fashion” (II. 1-2).46 In addition to 
inculcating a retrospective rather than anticipatory outlook on the constitutional, partisan, 
religious, and personal conflicts of the day, this sense that the worst was behind them 
inclined the Tory poets—to cite still another thing—to turn the Civil War figure toward a 
wholly new and different use. The graphic imagery of war and regicide in poems such as 
The Medal, Old England, and The Charter might occasionally arouse fear and anger in their 
readers, but the elements o f review and summary of the near past in each ensure that the 
historical pattern itself rather than its consequences for the present moment will be the most 
affective feature o f the work. This is especially true of the foregoing prologues and 
epilogues. Remember that when the figure of the Civil War was first being articulated, such 
playhouse pieces exploited their performative possibilities in order to so excite the passions 
of their auditors as to reify—literally—the most dreaded aspects of the past. By contrast, 
the abbreviated, almost stylized renderings of the figure in these last prologues and 
epilogues cannot be hoped to rouse the same powerful emotions. Indeed, that seems no
46 Elsewhere, Behn declares in her epilogue to Thomas Randolph’s The Jealous Lavers (March 22, 1682) 
that the audience saw in the foregoing play “no Reflections on Damn’d Witnesses” (1. 11), “No 
Salamanca Doctor-ship abus’d, /  Nor a Malicious States-man here accus’d” (11-14-15), but rather “fools 
of every sort and Fashion, / Except State-Fools, the Tools of Reformation" (11. 18-19). As she 
explains, “We scom such out-of-Fash’on'd-things as these” (1.12). Durfey observes in The Whig Feast 
(April 1682) that though London must ever guard against being undone by the Opposition’s treachery, 
the Whigs are sufficiently in eclipse that the Duke of York once more dares to “dine in the City, / And 
muckle they fear his power” (11.7-8)—and Dryden notes in the forbidden second epilogue for The Duke 
o f Guise that “our Discords and Divisions cease” (1.4).
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longer to be their purpose, for the spareness of these poems, assuming in the audience an 
existing knowledge of the figure and the configuration of events it purports to describe, 
makes an essentially intellectual or ssthetic appeal to a newly established convention of 
poetic historiography. That is, audiences are now asked to recognize the figure’s use, 
appreciate the facility o f its application, and remark upon the aptness thereof. Once a 
vehicle by which the past could be realized in the present, the Civil War figure is now 
something o f a rhetorical template according to which events o f the present moment may be 
perceived, organized, understood—and remembered. As such, it has become an emblem of 
the peculiar pattern of history and collective affect traced out during the Exclusion Crisis, a 
concise cultural mnemonic capturing both the events of those years and the nation’s 
experience o f them.
We can observe the fashioning of the historical pattern of the Exclusion Crisis itself 
into a ready cultural mnemonic in an anonymous prologue delivered at Oxford in July
1683. Opening with an image of Deucalion breasting the “wide Deluge” (1. I)47 and at last 
grounding his boat on Mount Parnassus, “above the vain attempts of the insulting flood” (1. 
4), the poet then offers a capsule history o f Britain’s own near apocalypse during the 
succession struggle, when “wild Faction all our Land alarm’d, / Our Land by the prevailing 
Jugglers charm’d. / When pregnant with dire seeds the Gouds did rise, /  Presaging Civil 
Tempests in our Skies” (11. 7-10). Menaced then by “threats of daring sin” (1. 12), “the 
popular Deluge as it came rowling in” (1. 13), “perjur’d Bog-trotters” (1. 14), “Meal-tub 
Plots & Annies under-ground” (I. 15), it was here at Oxford, the poet relates, alluding to 
Charles’ abrupt dismissal o f the Parliament that met there in March 1681 (and, by 
extension, to the King’s subsequent seizure of the political initiative as well), that “God­
like Charles did a safe Harbour win” (1. 11). Against this familiar exposition o f a highly
47 In a Greek myth closely prefiguring the biblical story of Noah’s ark, Zeus sends a flood to punish 
M ankind’s wickedness; warned by his father, Prometheus, Deucalion builds a boat in which he and his 
wife Pyirha escape the general devastation.
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familiar sequence of events, the poet immediately juxtaposes an account of the current 
uproar in London occasioned by the Charter crisis. Oxford may be loyal and peaceful, “But 
we are still alarm'd with senseless noise, / Guildhall Elections, and leud ffantick cry s. / 
Tir’d with dull Managers o f duller Plots, /  And free-born Slaves, and Magna-Charta48 
Sots” (11.24-27). The alignment implies that the two periods o f unrest are at least parallel if 
not identical in scope, arc, and import. Certainly they are sufficiently o f a kind that the 
immediate difficulties may be dispelled according to the resolution achieved at Oxford years 
before. If the capital would but “a pattern take from you, / Whom the worst times still 
found to Caesar true[,I /  Discords wou’d cease, ill-natur’d jars retire, /  And every Muse in 
Charles's praise conspire. / Peace with her train wou’d guard our Halcyon shore, / And 
Britain envy Saturn's Age no more” (11.28-33). In any event, the assumption that present 
controversy parallels the farmer—that the historical template of the Exclusion Crisis may be 
relied upon to intimate the course of the near future—allows the poet the emotional luxury 
of weary exasperation (as opposed to the fear, anxiety, and anger excited by the much more 
ominous prospect of the Civil War figure playing itself out during the original succession 
struggle), for it allows him to presume that the “senseless noise” and “ffantick crys” will be 
muted, the rebellion of the “Magna-Charta Sots” will be thwarted—and thwarted sooner 
rather than later. If the poet evokes with confidence visions of Halcyon days and a new 
Satumian age to come, he may do so because the Exclusion figure as mnemonic gives him 
a foreknowledge that seems not simply to guide him through the maze of the historical 
present, but to lend him the power to shape it as welL
Shadwell might ridicule the blitheness with which the Tories invoked the Civil War 
figure to demonize and stifle the Opposition, but almost no sooner had his “Lenten 
prologue” appeared than events confirmed its validity and vindicated loyalist complacency. 
June 1683 saw the discovery of the so-called Rye House Plot to assassinate the King and
48 “Magna-Charta" was the rallying slogan for defenders of London's municipal autonomy.
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the Duke of York. Ashley describes the plan to kill the royal brothers at Rye House in 
Hertfordshire as they rode from the races in Newmarket as wholly “imaginary,” “as much a 
fabrication as Oates’s Popish Plot had been," though at last “a couple o f  rusty cannon were 
discovered in a London cellar” (152); Kenyon accepts the plausibility o f  “a conspiracy by a 
few radical ex-Cromwellians” and notes as well the existence of “a much less substantial 
plot for an aristocratic coup d’&at which [however] had never got beyond the stage of talk” 
(237). But Ashley and Kenyon agree that, feasible or not, credible or not, the Rye House 
Plot (in Kenyon’s words) finally “delivered the remaining Whig leaders into the 
government’s hands” (237) and thus (in Ashley’s words) “enabled the Tories to complete 
their revenge and their opponents,” who “were thrown out of all their offices whether in the 
municipalities, in the militia, or on the magistrates’ bench" (152). In short, the Rye House 
Plot allowed the Tories to claim what they could be forgiven for believing was final victory 
in their hard-fought struggle over public perceptions and hence public memory of the 
historical present: the Whigs really were the regicidal Roundheads the Civil War figure had 
all along made them out to be.
The fact was now so “obvious” that, at least for the anonymous author of Algernon 
Sidney’s Farewell (December 1683), applying the historical figure to the latest Whig 
enormity was only a matter of letting one of those arrested, indicted, and executed for his 
involvement in the Rye House Plot49 confess as much for himself. As he delivers his own 
summing up, the Sidney of the poem remains wholly unrepentant, welcoming the “kind
49 Grandnephew of Sir Philip Sidney, Algernon Sidney (1622-1683) was bom at Penshurst. An ardent 
republican, he fought for Parliament during the Civil War and occupied a number of official posts 
during the Commonwealth, though his opposition to Cromwell’s assumption of power led him to 
withdraw to Penshurst for the duration of the Protectorate. Though he was not directly involved in the 
trial or execution of Charles I, like Milton he defended the regicide on theoretical grounds. Upon the 
Restoration he fled to the Continent; pardoned in 1677, he returned to England. He remained politically 
active, twice running (unsuccessfully) for Parliament, taking subsidies from France to finance the 
republican cause in England, and (possibly) helping William Penn, a Quaker, frame the constitution for 
Pennsylvania, whose features—including the ballot, universal suffrage, the abolition of the property 
qualification, religious equality, prison reform, and the abolition of capital punishment except in cases 
of murder and treason—embodied many of Sidney’s personal ideals (Chambers Biographical Diction­
ary).
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Death” that will soon waft his “long tir’d spirit” for from “hated monarchy’s detested air”
(11. 1-2) “safe to th’ happier Stygian land” (1.3), where his shade will be seated “high at
Shaftesbury’s right hand” (1. 5).50 In feet, being done to death by such hated enemies is,
for Sidney, to enjoy the martyr’s apotheosis, the glorious reward bestowed by a
sympathetic (if infernal) deity for a  life devoted to militant republicanism. At any rate, he
vows that when at last he meets with the “mighty Prince of Darkness” (1. 14) he will with
joy bid his Tartarean master to “[v]iew my hack’d limbs, each honorable wound, I The
pride and glory o f my numerous scars / In Hell’s best cause, the old republic wars” (11.15-
17), bid him
Behold the rich, grey hairs your Sidney brings,
Made silver all in the pursuit o f kings.
Think of the royal martyr, and behold 
This bold right hand, this Cyclops arm of old,
That labor’d long, stood blood and war’s rough shock,
To forge die ax and hew the fatal block.
Nor stopp’d we here. Our dear revenge still kept 
A spark that in the father’s ashes slept,
To break as fiercely in a second flame
Against the son, the heir, the race, the name (11.18-27).
There are, he admits, those who would “Blast the renown of our illustrious cause” (11.32-
33), but they are mere “Christian ignorants,” “conscientious fools,” and “dull preaching
dotards” (11.31; 34) who would scruple at “Heaven’s forbidding laws” 0- 32) and prostrate
themselves before “that big name” (1. 43) of “the poor viceregent o f a  God” (1. 42). Let
these “soft fools” “tremble at the guilt” (1.41) of regicide: they do not understand that in
demolishing the rotten edifice of “Curst monarchy” (1.56) “[a]ll arts, all means, all hands
are sacred still. / No play too foul to win the glorious game” (11. 50-51), that “[ijn holy
wars ’tis all True Protestant / Kings to dethrone, and empires to supplant” (U. 53-54); they
are too weak to undertake the “sublime rebellion” (1. 59) necessary to effect a  second
Reformation and establish a Commonwealth of saints (1L 60-62).
5° Shaftesbury had died in Holland January 21, 1683.
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Having delivered his personal apologia—and the now-manifest raison d  ’etre o f the 
Whig Opposition—Sidney boldly commands Charon to land him “on th’ Elysian coast, / 
With all the rites of a descending ghost” (II. 63-64). A great cleft opens in the earth. Down 
plummets Sidney, leaving the poet to pronounce above him, “Methinks I saw him, saw the 
yawning deep. /  Oh! ’twas a bold descent, a  wondrous leap! I More swift the pointed 
lightning never fell. / One plunge at once t’ his death, his grave, his Hell” (11.69-72).
If the reality of Sidney’s end was somewhat less dramatic than its poetic treatment 
here, it was no less rich in symbolism. As Gilbert Burnet reports in his History o f My Own 
Times, on the morning of his execution, December 7, 1683, Sidney “sent for some 
Independent preachers, and expressed to them a deep remorse for his past sins, and great 
confidence in the mercies o f God” (205). He would not, however, abjure the tenets and 
aims o f his republicanism. “He was,” Burnet writes, “but a very few minutes upon the 
scaffold at Tower Hill, where he delivered a paper to the Sheriff, in which he showed his 
own innocence and Lord Howard’s infamy [in perjuring himself to obtain his conviction] 
vindicated the subject of the book51 at large; and concluded with a prayer that the nation 
might be preserved from idolatry and tyranny. After that he spoke but little, prayed very 
short, and his head was cut off at one blow” (205-206). When the executioner’s ax fell, 
history had come full circle: a man who had in his thought, life, works, and actions 
embodied the religious and political movement that had brought Charles I to the scaffold 
had met with the very fate of the Royal Martyr. But a further irony lies in the fact that by 
the time Sidney had put his head on the block, the historical figure by which the nation had 
preserved the memory of the man his beliefs had killed had achieved such currency and 
cultural authority that Sidney himself and the cause that yet animated the Opposition had
51 His notes for a treatise he was contemplating in answer to Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha, or, The Divine 
Right o f Monarchy Upon the Son’s  Succeeding to the Authority o f His Father. There, we learn from 
Burnet, Sidney “had asserted that princes had their power from the people, with restrictions and 
limitations, and that they were liable to the justice of the people if they abused their power to the 
prejudice of the subjects, or against established laws” (20S).
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been reduced to mere devices in a pattern that had long since passed from trope to truth. In 
transubstantiating the past, the Tory poets had made spectres of their present foes, meting 
out to them a truly poetic justice.
The success of their Civil War figure had also, we should note, demonstrated for an 
age growing skeptical o f poetry and figurative expression in general that these were 
altogether appropriate—and highly useful—vehicles for the public conduct of political and 
social debate. In addition to this essential legacy, the Civil War figure would leave to later 
generations of public poets another, more specific bequest whose influence would give a 
distinctive shape to the life’s work of the age’s greatest literary inheritor.
So well had loyalist poets reified the historical pattern of the I630’s and 1640’s that 
when at last they had come to regard the Exclusion Crisis retrospectively they seemed to 
believe that the early 1680’s truly had witnessed another civil war. Their visions of national 
apocalypse immediately before and after the perceived resolution of the succession struggle 
were certainly vivid enough to foster the illusion. Recall, for instance, the nightmare 
scenario Dryden paints in The M edal o f Monmouth’s seizure of the throne; or consider a 
similar passage in The Second Part o f Absalom and Achitophel, in which David (that is, 
Charles) delivers his vision of England’s fate should the established succession, “the 
kingdom’s bar” (L 773), be thwarted and Monmouth thrust into James’s rightful place. The 
usurper, he warns, will be “Condemn’d for life the murd’ring sword to wield, / And on 
fhisl heirs entail a bloody field” (11. 769-770), his subjects consigned to self­
cannibalization: “Waste, rapine, spoil, without th’ assault begin, /  And our mad tribes 
supplant the fence within” (U. 775-776). But whether or not the Tory poets had actually 
imposed upon themselves with images inspired by their own poetic analogy, once Charles’ 
resumption of the political initiative in the spring of 1681 and the subsequent continued 
reversal of Whig fortunes had effected in them a  shift from fearful anticipation to confident 
retrospection, the psychological transition they experienced seemed to describe an historical
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demarcation—a before and after—as well. This conceptual illusion made the “before” 
seem, if anything, worse than it actually was (much as the sudden alleviation of pain 
exaggerates our memory of discomfort), contributing to the feeling that England had in fact 
just emerged from a virtual civil war. When Tate looks back upon the recent crisis in his 
Old England, for instance, he sees the ship of State and Church careening madly between 
the rocks of popish intrigues on one side and the reef o f Protestant radicalism on the other. 
But while England’s institutions and citizens prepare “to perish in one common fate” (1. 
261), complacent slumber has “lockjedl Caesar’s temples fast asleep” (1.262). And though 
Tate would mitigate this image of royal negligence by likening Charles’ repose to that of 
Christ in Luke 8: 22-2552—“So slept the almighty pilot on the deep / When wind and 
waves the sacred vessel toss’d, /  When faith was sinking, the ship almost lost” (11. 263-
265)— his picture o f a somnolent king abandoning his people to the “raging storms” (1.
266), “fresh alarms” (I. 267), and “politic fright(s|” (L 269) is, even after the storm has 
abated, far from reassuring. Indeed, it is likely to alarm all the more for showing the nation 
how needlessly close it came to utter ruin.
Fostered by many, many images akin to Tate’s, the supposition that England had 
just emerged from national catastrophe made it logical—inevitable, really—that the Tory 
poets would continue or extend the parallel between past and present to include the 
corresponding instances of national recovery; that the collapse o f the Puritan rule and the 
return of Charles would suggest their respective equivalents in the Opposition’s disarray 
and the King’s successful reaffirmation of his prerogative; that, in short, from their original
5-  “One day he got into a boat with his disciples, and he said to them, ‘Let us go across to the other side 
of the lake.’ So they set out, and as they sailed he fell asleep. And a storm of wind came down on the 
lake, and they were filling with water, and were in danger. And they went and woke him saying, 
‘Master, Master, we are perishing!'And he awoke and rebuked the wind and the raging waves; and they 
ceased, and there was a calm. He said to them, ‘Where is your faith?”” (Revised Standard Version) This 
would seem to be flattery of the highest sort; and yet, oddly enough, Tate would not have Charles 
wakened just yet, but bids “the Cyllenian god [Mercury 1/ Stroke both his temples with his charming 
rod" (11.270-271).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
372
Civil War figure the Tory poets would fashion another for the new Restoration a 
benevolent Providence had seen fit to bestow upon the English people.
Not surprisingly, the political and poetical terms of the new Restoration are all but 
identical to those of its original and model. If in Astrcea Redux (1660) Dry den characterizes 
Charles as Aeneas, driven from his land by the storms of war, “toss’d by fate, and hurried 
up and down, / Heir to his father’s sorrows, with his crown” (11. 51-52), in The Second 
Part o f Absalom and Achitophel he and Tate remind us that “the godlike David” (1. 1116) 
whose “sudden beams dispel the clouds" (1. 1117) of civil broils has been formed, tested, 
and found worthy by trials such as those endured by the Roman hero. Fate has not 
“sooth’d [Charles 1 with soft delights,” nor “stretch’d [him] on roses in the myrtle grove,” 
nor “crown[ed] his days with mirth, his nights with love” (11. 1104-1106), but has “toss’d 
[him] in storms” (1.1104), forced him to remove to “thund’ring camps,” to sleep upon “the 
herbless ground,” “feed from the hedge, and slake with ice his thirst” (11. 1107-1110): 
“Long must his patience strive with Fortune’s rage, /  And long opposing gods themselves 
engage, / Must see his country flame, his friends destroy’d, /  Before the promis’d empire 
be enjoy’d” (11. I l l  1-1114). Never mind that Charles’ recent struggle with the Whigs has 
been political rather than martial; by reiterating the privations endured by the king during 
his “travels” of the 1650’s Dryden and Tate would carry forward the “epic” context of 
Charles’ earlier heroism, reanimate in his readers the fervent admiration they had for the 
young king, recapture the joy and wonder they once felt at his return—and thereby entice 
them into implicitly equating defeat in battle, extended exile, and the loss of a crown with a 
brief period during which the Opposition held the political initiative. To reinforce the 
equation, Dryden and Tate here liken the order achieved by Charles’ restoration to the 
throne with the peace “David’s” reaffirmation of the monarch’s rights and prerogatives has 
restored to Israel (1.1139)—an echo o f the parallel Dryden had drawn in the first Absalom 
and Achitophel between Charles’ reinstatement and his reassertion o f authority in His 
M ajesty’s Declaration, by means of which “Once more the godlike David was restor’d, /
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And willing nations knew their lawful lord” (11. 1030-1031). This last line suggests that 
with the restoration of the King and his prerogative—and with these, order, peace, and 
law—England itself has been restored to a  sense of the right relation between king and 
kingdom. As the conclusion o f Absalom and Achitophel II, with its image of heretofore 
Whiggish London crowds' mourning their error and their resolution henceforth to obey 
their lord (1. 1140), suggests, such a moral restoration is possible only when the nation 
acknowledges and is truly remorseful for its lapses o f  duty and obedience toward its 
sovereign. This insistence upon national penance likely takes its cue from poems 
commemorating the original Restoration. In Astrcea Redux, for example, Dryden tells the 
returning Charles that Dover, his point o f arrival, has dressed its cliffs in the white “of 
penitence and sorrow” (1.255), observing as well that “as those lees that trouble it, refine / 
The agitated soul of generous wine: / So tears of joy, for your returning spilt, Work out 
and expiate our guilt” (11.272-275). Robot Wild, too, in his Iter Boreale (April 23,1660), 
promises the King that “England her penitential song shall sing” (1. 386), adding the 
prayer, “May we all live more loyal and more true, /  To give to C aesar and to God their 
due. / We’ll make his father’s tomb with tears to swim, / And for the son, we’U shed our 
blood for him.” (11. 382-385). Painful as this atonement may be, once achieved, the 
cleansed land shall enjoy a new Golden Age. Dryden assures his readers in Astrcea Redux 
that “now Time’s whiter series is begun, /  Which in soft centuries shall smoothly run” (11. 
292-293)— much as two decades later in Absalom and Achitophel the reconciliation of king 
and people stands fair to usher in “a new series of time” (1. 1028), and, in the anonymous 
Oxford prologue of July 1683, the resolution of their differences shall ensure that “Peace 
with her train [will] guard our Halcyon shore, /  And Britain envy Saturn's Age no more” 
(11. 32-33).
Restoring Charles a second time, and with him not only England itself but the 
glorious future predicted for it in 1660, this new figure seeks also in a sense to 
prefabricate, to secure that future by projecting upon James and his imminent reign the
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character, circumstances, and expectations historically attaching to the present king. It was 
not lost upon the Tory poets o f the day just how closely James’s experiences during these 
years of anxiety and crisis replicated those of his brother. Thrice Opposition pressure had 
forced the Catholic D uke of York into exile; thrice the Whiggish Commons had passed bills 
o f exclusion, effectively depriving James of his native and (to royalists) his sacred right to 
succession—much as the Long Parliament’s abolition of monarchy had debarred Charles 
from the throne. Thus, when at last Charles’ “restoration’’ to full exercise o f his prerogative 
secured the succession for James and allowed him to return to England for good in March 
1682, his homecoming is depicted much as his brother’s had been twenty-two years 
earlier. As Charles’ restoration was frequently said to have allayed the storm of rebellion, 
so in Tate and Dryden’s Absalom and Achitophel II does York’s return to England promise 
to bring peace to “A realm that long with civil discord mourn’d” (1. 794). Having vowed 
“Authority and force to join with skill, /  And save the lunatics against their will” (11.779- 
780), David’s resolution to shower “Impartial justice from our throne” (1. 789) begins to be 
realized with the recall of his banished brother, who “like some arriving god, / Compos’d 
and heal’d the place of his abode; / The deluge check’d that to Judea spread, / And stopp’d 
sedition at the fountain’s head” (11.795-798). Similar claims for James’s power to compose 
a disordered land are made in Otway’s epilogue to the April 21, 1682, performance 
(attended by the Duke of York) of his Venice Preserv’d. There, Otway casts James as the 
agent of “Our Great Physician” (1.5) to cure the land of its latest “Distemper” (1.6). In his 
capacity of High Commissioner, James has been ministering to Scotland: “Where so Your 
Goodness, so Your Justice sway’d, / You but appear’d, and the wild plague was stay’d” 
(11.12-13); now, for England, “He only brings a Medicine fit to aswage / A peoples fo lly, 
and rowz’d Monarch’s rage” (11.51-52). As Charles’ mildness of temper—his “forgiving 
mind,” “long-suffering, goodness, mercy”53—once interposed between strict justice and
53 Astrcea Redux, 11. 261; 265.
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his subjects’ guilt, so now does the restored James act as intercessor, an agent o f
reconciliation between king and people—and in nothing so much as serving as the vehicle
of England’s atonement for its misdeeds. Not only does James provide a ready object for
national contrition—“See, see, the injur’d PRINCE, and bless his Name, / Think on the
M artyr from whose Loynes he came: /  Think on the Blood was shed for you before, / And
Curse the Paricides that thirst for more” (11.17-20)—his choice o f exile over some bloodier
resolution to the political crisis of 1678-1681 offers his future subjects an example o f
Christian humility, patience, and sacrifice: “His Duteous Loyalty before you lay, / And
learn of him, unmurm ’ring to obey. /  Think what he ’as bom, your Quiet to restore; /
Repent your madness and rebell no more” (11.27-30).
As once Denham had declared upon the restoration o f  Charles, Dryden in his
“Prologue to the Duchess on Her Return from Scotland” (May 1682) avers that now the
royal couple is united again, their example of harmony and their patronage of letters shall
revive a wan and drooping English poetry: “The Muse resumes her long-forgotten lays, /
And Love, restor’d, his ancient realm surveys, /  Recalls our beauties, and revives our
plays” (11.30-32). But elsewhere Dryden assures us that James shall achieve much more
for England. As once he predicted that an epoch of martial glories lay in store for the newly
restored Charles—
Our nation, with united int’rest blest,
Not now content to poise, shall sway the rest 
Abroad your empire shall no limits know,
But, like the sea, in boundless circles flow.
Your much-lov’d fleet shall with a wide command 
Besiege the petty monarchs of the land;
And as old Time his offspring swallow’d down,
Our ocean in its depths all seas shall drown {Astrcea Redux, 11.296-303)— 
so in Threnodia Augustalis (March 1685), composed upon the death of Charles and the 
accession of James, Dryden predicts that the new king—his mettle tempered by “His 
father’s rebels, and his brother’s foes” (1. 460)—shall at last lead England into that age of
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unprecedented triumphs long prophesied by poets but somehow never quite realized. James 
“the drowsy genius wakes / Of Britain long entranc’d in charms. Restiff and slumb’ring on 
its arms: / ’Tis rous’d, and with a  newstrung nerve, the spear already shakes” (11. 470- 
473). If only his still doubting, “wond’ring senate” (1- 492) could glimpse, as the poet has. 
Heaven’s “adamantine book” (1.491 in which is written the fates of nations, it would not 
then “be obstinately blind, / Still to divert the good [Heaven] hast design’d, / Or with 
malignant penury, / . . . sterve the royal virtues of his mind” (11. 496-501), but would 
allow James to restore England to her rightful destiny. For Dryden declares that he already 
sees, beyond the “amended vows of English loyalty. . .  The long retinue of a prosperous 
reign, /  A series of successful years, In orderly array, a martial, manly train” (11.505; 507- 
509). These years, he concludes, will witness such a display of English might, even unto 
the world’s “remoter shores” (L 510), that, “starting from his oozy bed, / Th’ asserted 
ocean rears his reverend head, / To view and recognise his ancient lord again; / And, with a 
willing hand, restores the fasces o f the main” (11.513-517).
Recasting the Restoration figure to accommodate James’s present circumstances 
and future reign, the Tory poets managed to create a great deal of good will for the royal 
brother. Alas, it was insufficient to overcome the new king’s bigotry and brutality; three 
years later he was driven from his throne. Yet James’s personal ill-fortune notwith­
standing, the Restoration figure begotten by the Civil War figure had created—or at least 
revivified—an historical pattern by which public poets could hope both to impose 
coherence upon the near past and present and to “shape” the near future. Chaos gave way 
to order, dissolution made way for reintegration; apocalypse prefigured apotheosis. As we 
shall see in the next chapters, such prefabricated patterns informed the respective poetic 
visions of Alexander Pope’s two major public personas. Fashioning himself as the English 
Virgil during the reign of Anne and the early years of George I, Pope would trace recent 
history to demonstrate the pattern fulfilling itself in a new Golden Age; then, as political, 
professional, and personal disillusionment led him to refashion himself as the English
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Juvenal, he would turn this new historical figure upon its head: chaos, dissolution, 
apocalypse—these prefigured no rebirth, only the full, final, and everlasting restoration of 
Nothingness.
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CHAPTER V
FROM “GREAT ANNA!" TO “GREAT ANARCH!” (I):
THE SATIRIST AND PUBLIC MEMORY
I. The Accession o f Alexander Pope 
When Dryden rode into London from Cambridge in I65S, the social, political, and 
economic conditions he found there were just beginning to be favorable for the emergence 
of a fully public poetry. These conditions would prove increasingly favorable to public 
poetry in the decades after the Restoration, but in themselves they could not have produced 
the triumph of public poetry that followed; neither, for that matter, as the example o f Ben 
Jonson demonstrates, could Dryden have effected the emergence o f public poetry in their 
absence. It is clear, I think, that the public mode o f poetry owed its ascendancy in the latter 
half o f the seventeenth century to the fortuitous convergence of favorable circumstances 
with a talented, forceful advocate. Similarly, we might observe o f the social, economic, 
and literary developments outlined in the preceding chapter that however they may have 
predisposed the figurative and literal mnemonic modes toward eventual estrangement, this 
estrangement, if not inevitable, was set in motion—or, if  inevitable, was hastened—by the 
poetic career o f another talented, forceful personality, Alexander Pope.
That Pope was Dryden’s successor to the laurel was acknowledged early in the 
poet’s career, and has been a truism of literary history ever since, together with the fact o f 
Pope’s lifelong habit o f obsessive self-fashioning. What concerns us here, however, are 
two particulars o f Pope’s accession: the role o f Dry den’s successor as Pope envisioned it, 
and the specific poetic persona he adopted in order to fulfill i t  These particulars largely 
determined the course of Pope’s career, and in doing so proved greatly significant for the 
part poetry would play in public affairs both during Pope’s reign as England's de facto  
laureate and in the decades following his death. As I hope to demonstrate in this chapter,
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Pope’s conviction that the role he was to undertake was to be shaped by the exigencies o f 
epic rather than occasional verse altered the nature and direction of public poetry as well as 
the public poet’s claim upon the attentions and esteem of the larger society; further, though 
the peculiar public stance Pope assumed during the 1730’s and 1740's—that of chronicler 
and commemorator o f England’s decline and fall—increased the cultural authority o f the 
poet and his poetry in the short run, over time it had the effect o f diverting the mainstream 
of poetry from the mainstream o f society. This divergence would alter the arc o f literary 
history, but also that o f mnemonic history: as poetry lost its power to frame the historical 
present authoritatively, the union of figurative and literal habits o f memory within the 
collective mindset was likewise forfeited—more or less permanently, as the event has 
proved.
In January 1743, Alexander Pope wrote a long, melancholy letter from London to 
his friend John Boyle, 5th Earl o f Orrery. “All your Lordship tells me of your Enjoyments 
at Marston, truly pleases me," he writes, “but with the allay, o f finding it will be long 
before I shall be happy in yours and Lady O.’s company” (Correspondence, IV, 437). 
Much as he might have felt the absence of good friends, however, or the general lack of 
companions suitable to his tastes and temperament, Pope acknowledges that his 
despondency has a yet more profound origin. “I have seen and heard, what makes me shut 
my Eyes & Ears, and retire inward into my own Heart; where I find Something to comfort 
me, in knowing it is possible some men may have some Principles. I wish I had been no 
where but in my Garden; but my weak frame will not endure it; o r no where but in my 
Study; but my weak Eyes cannot read all the Evening” (437). He employs poor scholars to 
read to him, he says, and pays them in drink, drinking too much himself, further 
weakening his already fragile constitution. Cold weather was always hard on the frail 
Pope, and the physical infirmities, loneliness, and world-weariness occasioned by the 
winter of 1742-43 may have brought to Pope’s mind the conviction—more debilitating than
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any disease—that his life's work had come to nothing, that he now pursued his vocation of 
public poet in vain: “As to any thing else I shall write, it will be very little, and very faint. I 
have lost all Ardor and Appetite, even to Satyr, for no body has Shame enough left to be 
afraid of Reproach, or punish'd by it” (437).
Could we put ourselves at Pope’s elbow, we might remind him that even as he 
wrote these words he was perhaps the best-known personage in England. Certainly he was 
its most renowned (and notorious) poet His image was seemingly everywhere. Voltaire 
had remarked in his Letters on England (1734), “What most encourages the arts in England 
is the consideration they enjoy; the portrait o f the Prime Minister is over the mantel-piece of 
his [own] room, but I have seen Mr. Pope’s in a score o f houses” (112). Voltaire’s 
impression was correct: William K. Wimsatt observes that “Pope was probably the most 
frequently portrayed English person o f his generation, perhaps o f the whole eighteenth 
century. He was surely the English poet most often portrayed before the romantic era” 
(xv). Moreover, his images had, in his own lifetime, become valuable trophies for the 
connoisseur; the year before Pope penned his despairing letter to Orrery he had had what 
must have been the singular experience of seeing three portraits o f himself auctioned off in 
London. James Northcote relates in his Memoirs o f S ir Joshua Reynolds (1813) that 
“Reynolds was at the upper end of the room, near to the auctioneer, when he perceived a 
considerable bustle at the farther part of the room, near the do o r.. . .  he soon heard the
name of Mr. Pope, Mr. Pope, whispered from every mouth Immediately every person
drew back to make passage for the distinguished poet, and all those on each side held out 
their hands for him to touch as he passed” (qtd. in Wimsatt, xviii). If Reynolds’ memory 
and Northcote’s rendering o f it are accurate, this is a revealing episode indeed: the 
talismanic power o f Pope’s name, whispered from mouth to mouth, to part the throng of 
spectators and reduce it to reverential silence; the hands extended in breathless hope for the 
poet simply to touch—it would be difficult, I think, to note these details and not conclude 
that the great and powerful gathered that day saw in the bent figure passing before them not
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an object o f pity or scorn or indifference, but one of veneration, the living icon that had 
inspired those painted ones they had gathered to admire and exchange. How apparently 
foolish, then, for Pope to lament die futility o f his life and vocation. After all, if  Pope could 
claim a wide acquaintance among the peers o f the realm (he had even dined with Frederick, 
Prince of Wales), if he was m aterially comfortable and comfortably affluent, if he had been 
courted by the Opposition to be its spokesman, and if his circle o f intimates had included 
the leading writers, painters, architects, and composers of the day, he owed these marks of 
favor to the very success of his career as a public poet
But it is seldom reasonable to second-guess another's despair. The previous year, 
1742, had seen Pope embroiled in a copyright controversy with his publisher, Bernard 
Lintot, over his revision o f The Dunciad; he had grown disillusioned with the prospects 
and designs of the Opposition; he had entangled himself in an humiliating war o f slanders 
with Colley Cibber, his rival, butt, and foil, who, together with Lord Hervey and Lady 
Mary Wortley Montagu, had circulated pamphlets and poems exposing Pope’s physique 
and sexual prowess to very public ridicule, portraying his morals and temperament as those 
of a being scarcely human; lastly, Pope’s health, impaired since childhood, had declined 
rapidly: his frame, left stunted and twisted by Pott’s disease, had now began to collapse 
upon itself. As Samuel Johnson records in his Life of Pope, “When he rose [in the 
morning] he was invested in [a] bodice made of stiff canvas, being scarce able to hold 
himself erect till they were laced, and then he put on a flannel waistcoat” (202). The decay 
of his ribs and spine had left him a near-invalid—his stockings, says Johnson, “were 
drawn on and off by the maid; for he was not able to dress or undress himself, and neither 
went to bed nor rose without help. His weakness made it very difficult for him to be clean” 
(202)—and had so compressed his internal organs that he was left perpetually short of 
breath. Pope writes to Hugh Bethel in March 1743 that “I have these 3 months or more,
been advancing to an Asthmatic Complaint It is now at such a height, that I can scarce
walk, or go up a pair of Stairs, or move much in my bed, without quite losing breath” (IV,
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445). Pope’s ill-health in January is thus a portent; by year’s end, he will write to Ralph
Allen, “I have nothing to do but to remove from one warm Fireside to ano ther. . . .  My
Asthmatic Complaint necessitates me to this Confinement, for I can neither bear Cold nor
Motion” (IV, 486). And his despondency, instead of abating as 1743 drew on, would
intensify, fed by continued conflicts with his foes, quarrels with dear friends, and the
seemingly deathless religious controversy sparked by the doctrines o f his Essay on Man. In
the preface to his Works o f 1717, Pope had written, “The life of a Wit is a  warfare upon
earth; and the present spirit o f the learned world is such, that to attempt to serve it (any
way) one must have the constancy o f a martyr, and resolution to suffer for its sake” (xxvi-
xxvii). Perhaps during the decade leading up to his letter to Orrery, Pope had been all too
ready to antagonize the “learned world” and play the martyr for poetry, but those years had
also spawned enough political, social, and literary debacles to turn Pope finom an English
Virgil to the English Juvenal. His satires, however, seemed to draw more contempt upon
his own head than upon his targets. Increasingly, Pope seemed at odds with an age in
which “no body has Shame enough left to be afraid of Reproach, or punish’d by it,” an age
in which, Pope concludes to Orrery, “Cibber himself is the honestest M an I know, who
has writ a book of his Confessions, not so much to his Credit as S t Augustine’s, but full
as True, & as open. Never had Impudence and Vanity so faithful a Professor” (437-438).
Given this profound malaise, it is perhaps all the more curious that during this year o f 1743
Pope would pen the first eight lines o f an epic, Brutus, he had long planned but now knew
he would never live to complete:
The Patient Chief, who lab’ring long, arriv’d 
On Britains Shore and brought with fav’ring Gods 
Arts Arms and Honour to her Ancient Sons:
Daughter of Memory! from elder Time 
Recall; and me, with Britains Glory fir’d,
Me, far from meaner Care or meaner Song,
Snatch to thy Holy Hill o f Spotless Bay,
My Countrys Poet, to record her Fame.
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In his biography of Pope, Maynard Mack calls “touching’’ that “at his late stage o f literary 
history, to say nothing o f this late stage in his career” Pope could yet entertain epic 
ambitions, could yet, despite “the political and social criticism of the satires and epistles,” 
foster within himself “a dream for England: the dream of a regenerated land” (773-774). 
But it is tempting to put an altogether different construction upon these lines, to view them 
not as a  dream of what could be, but as a  final glimpse, coming very late in a  life slowly 
eroded by disease, controversy, and the strains o f a problematic success, o f what so long 
ago Pope had set out to become: “My Countrys Poet”; and what he had set out to do: 
“record her Fame.”
Pope’s sense o f poetic mission had been as precocious as his temperament and 
talent The companions o f his youth and early maturity—Sir William Trumbull, William 
Wycherley, Henry Cromwell, William Walsh, and Samuel Garth among them— were men 
of middle age or beyond who had occupied the outer circles o f Dryden’s coffee-house 
coterie. They encouraged the verses that the young Pope seemingly could not keep from 
writing—as he would explain in his Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot (1735), “As yet a  Child, nor 
yet a Fool to Fame, / 1 lisp’d in Numbers, for the Numbers came” (11. 127-128)— and 
carried his Pastorals to London, where they were circulated among those, such as 
Congreve, who had known Dryden more intimately, securing for Pope in 1706 a request 
from Jacob Tonson, Dryden’s publisher and still the leading publisher o f the day, for 
permission to publish them in his next miscellany. One Mend had even carried the twelve- 
year-old Pope himself to Will’s so that he might catch a glimpse of the aged Dryden, “the 
greatest of living poets,” as Peter Quennell describes him, “who sat there amid his courtiers 
and companions, in winter months next to the hearth, and on a balcony above the street in 
summer” (8). The impression that brief glimpse made upon Pope was indelible. Thirty 
years later he would tell his occasional Boswell, Joseph Spence, “I saw Mr. Dryden when 
I was about twelve years o f age:—this bust is like him.—I remember his face well; for I
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looked upon him, even then, with the greatest veneration, and observed him very 
particularly” (194). The features o f the old poet and his brooding prominence amidst a 
circle o f acolytes became emblematic for Pope. Quennell notes that Dryden “typified 
genius, integrity, fame, breadth o f accomplishment and strength o f purpose—all the 
attributes that, as a man and an artist, the adult Pope would most value,” and further, that 
“like some high-arched Roman bridge, Dryden’s work had carried on the Elizabethan 
genius across from the Giant Age ‘before die Flood’ into the later seventeenth century” (8). 
But Dryden represented more to Pope than the genius o f a former age; his achievements 
and status suggested to Pope that he had imposed a particular pattern upon the course of 
literary history, a pattern that his own nascent poetic career might be made to fulfill.
Quennell calls the time that passed between Dryden’s death and Pope’s final 
emergence as his greatest literary inheritor an “interregnum” (38). Obvious as this 
“interregnum” is to us, and as obvious as Pope’s accession to Dryden’s seat was even to 
the later eighteenth century—it never occurs to Johnson, for example, to compare Pope’s 
work to any poet’s save Dryden—the remarkable thing is how obvious this interregnum 
was to the sixteen-year-old Pope, how obvious to him that Dryden had no self-evident 
successor. In his first extant letter, written to Wycherley December 26, 1704, Pope 
declares, “I think with you, that whatever lesser W its have risen since his (Dryden’s] 
Death, are but like Stars appearing when the Sun is set, that twinkle only in his absence, 
and with the Rays they have borrowed from him. Our Wit . . .  is but Reflexion or 
Imitation, therefore scarce to be call’d ours” (Corr. I, 2). Pope’s consciousness o f the 
absence of a greater genius presiding over English poetry led to a subsequent awareness o f 
what the master had left unfinished at his death: “I learned versification wholly from 
Dryden’s works; who had improved it much beyond any of our former poets,” Pope told 
Spence in 1742 or 1743, “and would, probably, have brought it to its perfection, had not 
he been unhappily obliged to write so often in haste” (169). Though Pope’s biographers 
frequently cite Walsh’s admonishment to his young friend that, as Pope would relate to
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Spence, “there was one way left of excelling: for though we had several great poets, we 
never had any one great poet that was correct; and he desired me to make that my study and 
aim” (169), Pope’s correspondence with Walsh and Cromwell in the century’s first decade 
makes clear that Pope sought to improve upon other aspects of Dryden’s craft as well. 
Pope’s October 22,1706, letter to Walsh, for instance, outlines seven general prescriptions 
for good versification; the first, “It is not enough that nothing offends the Ear, but a good 
Poet will adapt the very Sounds, as well as Words, to the things he treats of" (I, 22), 
readers o f Pope will recognize as the germ o f one of his most famous dicta: “’Tis not 
enough no Harshness gives Offense, /  The Sound must seem an Eccho to the Sense” (An 
Essay on Criticism , 11. 324-325). And the quest for a truly “representational metre," as 
Johnson terms it, would become closely identified with Pope (and such a point o f pride 
with him that Johnson, in his Life, would go out of his way to debunk it as a chimera1); but 
Pope in fact takes the hint for this “wonderful force” for “imprinting the Image on the 
reader” from Dryden: “We have one excellent Example o f it in our Language, Mr. Dryden’s 
Ode on S t Ccecilia’s  Day, entitled, Alexander’s Feast" (23). In the same letter, Pope taxes 
Dryden with excessive use o f alexandrines and triplets (and elsewhere, with an 
overfondness for the hemistich in his dramatic poetry). However, Pope’s criticisms of 
Dryden’s stylistics, here and during his 1710 correspondence with Henry Cromwell, are 
not meant to undermine Dryden’s stature as an arbiter o f poetic practice; on the contrary, 
several passages in An Essay on Criticism (which was to appear seven months hence) are 
but renderings in verse of Dryden’s prescriptions in O f Dramatic Poetry: An Essay. Rather, 
Pope means to establish for himself what remains to be done to advance English 
versification; Dryden’s shortcomings set the agenda for his own poetic project Thus the
1 “This notion of representative metre, and the desire of discovering frequent adaptations of the sound to the 
sense, have produced, in my opinion, many wild conceits and imaginary beauties. . . . The fancied 
resemblances, I fear, arise sometimes merely from the ambiguity of words; there is supposed to be some 
relation between a soft line and soft couch, or between hard syllables and hard fortune" (Lives o f the 
English Poets, II, 219).
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preoccupation o f the Pope-CromweU correspondence with establishing rules governing the 
matter and diction in epic poetry takes its cue from the two men’s vivisection o f Dryden’s 
translation o f The Aeneid. In a letter o f October 28, for example, Pope agrees with 
Cromwell’s censure o f “the use o f Sea-Terms in Mr. Dryden’s V irg ill. . .  because no 
Terms of Art, or Cant-Words, suit with the Majesty and dignity of Style [which) Epic 
Poetry requires’’ (I, 101), and subsequent letters exchanged by Pope and Cromwell are 
often taken up with such topics as heroic phraseology and the propriety of incorporating 
into an epic allusions to contemporary politics and learning. Pope had no doubt already 
learned much about such matters from translating passages o f Homer and Statius as an 
adolescent, but his epistolary tutorial with Cromwell would prove fruitful when, five years 
hence, he would turn his hand to translating the whole of The Iliad.
In addition to suggesting to Pope that there should be such a thing as a successor to 
the last century’s literary colossus, and suggesting as well the specific refinements requisite 
for continuing the advancement o f English prosody, the career o f Dryden as Pope 
discerned it likewise intimated an ideal governing pattern for his own poetic career. No 
doubt certain circumstantial parallels between himself and Dryden were evident enough: 
Pope knew many of the literary men Dryden had known, and on occasion participated in 
the culture o f coffee-house debate that Dryden had reinvented after the Restoration; he had 
been published by Dryden’s publisher—and in the same series o f miscellanies that 
Dryden’s work had made profitable; moreover, Pope knew enough about Dryden’s 
business dealings with Tonson (including his earnings on various projects) to benefit when 
it came time to make his own terms with Bernard Lintot, and as he formulated a proposal 
for publishing an English Iliad  by subscription, was well aware that he could cite the 
success o f Dryden’s Virgil—“one o f the first bools that had any thing o f a subscription,” 
he told Spence (160)—as justification for his own undertaking. But even before Pope had, 
like his predecessor, brilliantly translated one o f the great figures o f classical literature (he 
published the last volume of his Homer in 1720, to wide acclaim), he had been mindful of
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Dryden’s example as he imposed a shape upon the poetic career opening up before him. 
Before he was out o f his teens, Pope had executed several imitations of Cowley and 
W aller, poets contemporary with Dryden and acknowledged influences upon him. The 
adolescent Pope also composed verse “paraphrases” and imitations of episodes taken from 
classical mythology, from the M etamorphoses and Heroides o f Ovid, and from The 
Canterbury Tales o f Chaucer. In this exercise, Pope took for his inspiration and model 
Dryden’s final work, Fables Ancient and M odem ; Translated into Verse from  Homer, 
Ovid, Boccace and Chaucer (1700), a  book, Johnson notes, “much in the hands of poetical 
readers” (II, 146)—a book whose subjects Pope’s own compositions were meant to 
complement, and, he implies, upon whose versification he hoped to improve.
However imperfect our own literacy in Greek and Latin, however meager our skill 
in versification, it might not occur to us that Pope’s efforts were necessarily extraordinary 
in an age when the study of classical authors was a major component of a young 
gentleman’s education, and when translations o f Greek and Roman works, as Lynch 
observes, tumbled in “shoals” from the presses (114). But we should remember, first, that 
Pope was largely self-educated, and second, that the program o f study and composition he 
imposed upon himself had but one end: to make himself a poet Quennell supposes that 
once, when the fifteen-year-old Pope lay near death, it was “an intense natural vitality and a 
resolute, ambitious character” that fueled his slow recovery: “[AJlready he was laying his 
plans—not haphazard, vaguely and fancifully, as most adolescents do, but with an exact 
appreciation o f the task that he had set himself” (7). That task, if we may judge from 
Pope’s Pastorals (1709; his first published poems), was to recapitulate the career of Virgil, 
who had progressed from the writing of eclogues and georgics in imitation of Theocritus to 
composition o f The Aeneid, celebrating the founding o f Rome. Spenser, too, had begun 
with pastoral, The Shepheardes Calender (1579), and progressed to epic, The Faerie 
Queene (1590-96), but it seems likely that despite Pope’s admiration for Spenser, he 
eagerly adopted Virgil himself for his model—in part because of Dryden’s massive and
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much acclaimed translation o f the Roman's complete works, finished in 1697. ‘T he 
expectation of his work,” Johnson notes in his Life o f Dry den, “was undoubtedly great; the 
nation considered its honour as interested in the event” (II, 250). And, at least as much as 
to replicate the phases o f V irgil's career, it was some feeling o f national pride that Pope 
undertook, as he asserts in the opening lines of “Spring. The First Pastoral, or Damon,” to 
show the virtues o f the English countryside—and more specifically, of his own beloved 
Windsor Forest—to be in no way inferior to those celebrated by Theocritus and Virgil: 
“First in these Fields I try the Sylvan Strains, I Nor blush to sport on W indsor’s blissful 
Plain: / Fair Thames flow gently from thy sacred Spring, /  While on thy Banks Sicilian 
Muses sing; / Let Vernal Airs thro' trembling Osiers play, /  And Albion’s Cliffs resound 
the Rural Lay” (11.1-6). At the very least, Pope could look back upon these poems with a 
double sense of accomplishment For himself, he could take pride in remarking, in a note 
accompanying a later edition o f his Pastorals, that among the many who had approved of 
his efforts in this genre was W illiam Walsh, “whom Mr. Dryden, in his Postscript to 
Virgil, calls the best critic of his age”2; but he could also share his success with the nation at 
large: in the same note, he goes on to cite Lord Lansdown’s 1705 letter to Wycherley, in 
which, “mentioning the youth o f our Poet, he says ‘that if he goes on as he has begun in 
the Pastoral way, as Virgil first tried his strength, we may hope to see English Poetry vie 
with the Roman’” (123).
We might blush (or worse) at such self-congratulation, but cognizant as he was of 
his skill as a poet, and basking in the approval of those whom Dryden had esteemed for 
their literary judgement, Pope had good reason to be boundlessly confident, and to 
presume that he had all but realized his ambition of gaining Dryden’s chair. It was this
-  For as much emphasis as Pope gives it, we should expect to find Dryden’s commendation of Walsh 
almost anywhere but in a brief, literally parenthetical aside. In a “Postscript to the Reader” (1697) 
appended to his translation of The Aeneid, Dryden tells us that Walsh, “(who has so long honoured me 
with his friendship and who, without flattery, is the best critic of our nation)" (261), has given him 
word that the Duke of Shrewsbury has read and commended his work.
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confidence that allowed Pope to publish An Essay on Criticism—a poem that sets up to be 
a definitive, latter-day equivalent o f Horace’s Ars Poetica, Longinus’ On the Sublime, 
Dryden’s Essay o f Dramatic Poetry, and Boileau’s Art Poetique —on May 15, 1711, six 
days before the poet turned twenty-three. Quennell describes the poem as “above all else, a 
young man’s book—confident, assertive, dogmatic, as am bitious in its critical 
generalizations as it is uninhibited in tone and sharp in utterance” (32); and Mack ascribes 
the “continuing vitality” of the poem to “the felt presence in almost every line of a spirited 
performer who has at last found himself, exulting like a dancer or skilled gymnast in the 
fascination of what’s difficult” (176). For our present purposes, we may set to one side the 
specific principles o f composition and criticism the poem propounds, as well as its many 
successes, ambiguities, and outright defects3; I wish instead to draw attention to two more 
general characteristics o f An Essay on Criticism , its pervasive optimism and the forward- 
looking perspective such optimism nourishes. The first we may discern in Pope’s outline 
of intellectual and literary history from ancient Greece and Rome down to the present day 
(11.643-734). Configuring the very topic Dryden addresses in “To Sir Godfrey Kneller” in 
terms highly similar and in language that seems an echo of Dryden’s, Pope traces the fate 
of the arts from their classical zenith (1L 643-684) through their near-obliteration at the 
hands of the Goths and the medieval Church (11. 685-693), to their rebirth during the 
“Golden Days” (1.697) o f Pope Leo VI. And like Dryden, Pope claims that whatever the 
glories of antiquity or the Renaissance, Britain in the present age shall achieve yet greater 
triumphs, for English literary culture, learning from the example o f French neo-classicism 
and “the juster Ancient cause," has “here restor’d  Wit’s Fundamental Laws” (II. 721-722). 
Thus the rules Pope sets forth in this poem are meant to constitute not so much the end of 
poetic evolution, but the governing laws by which future literary endeavors will be
3 Mack sums up the poem’s strengths and weaknesses concisely in Alexander Pope: A Life, pp. 167- 
177.
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undertaken and assessed. Pope humbly presents himself as the unworthy pupil of the latest
arbiter of literary taste—William Walsh, “the Muse’s Judge and Friend” (1.729), (and, we
remember, the critic Dryden most esteemed)—and thereby shrewdly takes his place at the
vanguard of England’s poetic progress. Referring to himself first as “a  grateful Muse” (1.
734; emphasis added) and then more boldly as *the Muse” (1. 735; emphasis added), thus
identifying himself with the semi-divine, generally immanent “Muse” o f line 729, Pope
assures his countrymen that though he is untouched by either their praise or blame, he will
confront and amend his faults even as he will teach them to recognize their own merits,
deficiencies and failings:
Content, if hence th’ Unleam’d their Wants may view,
The Leam’d reflect on what before they knew:
Careless of Censure, nor too fond o f Fame,
Still pleas’d to praise, yet not afraid to blame,
Averse alike to Flatter or Offend,
Not free from faults, not yet too vain to mend (11.739-744).
We should recognize these lines for what they are, Pope’s declaration of the 
conditions and aims o f his tenure as England’s leading public poet. To this point in his 
career, Pope has more or less privately recognized and drawn implicit parallels between 
himself and Dryden; here he openly commandeers Dryden’s critical and cultural authority 
as he conceived them. But the extent to which Pope saw him self actually walking in 
Dryden’s footsteps, composing a  career parallel to Dryden’s under conditions closely 
identical to those that witnessed Dryden’s emergence during the 1660’s, can be fully seen 
in his first public poem on national affairs, Windsor-Forest, begun, Pope says, in 1704 
and published in 1713 in observance of the final signing of the Treaty of Utrecht, ending 
the War of Spanish Succession. For with Windsor-Forest, Pope goes beyond even the 
assimilation o f Dryden’s public posture: he appropriates for his own purposes the specific 
circumstances, narrative outline, and sensibility of Dryden’s early public poetry,
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particularly Astrcea Redux, “To His Sacred Majesty," and Annus Mirabilis.4
We may briefly recall that in each o f those poems—the first two written to 
commemorate the Restoration; the third, the heroism of London (and especially of the royal 
brothers, Charles and James) during the war and fire o f 1665-1666—Dryden attempts to 
express the nation’s sense o f relief a t having come through some great trial and predicts 
that, having proven itself worthy, England shall henceforth experience a period of 
unprecedented greatness. Each poem, accordingly, employs a three-part structure: a 
graphic, at times hyperbolic exposition o f the national catastrophe; an account o f the 
character and actions of the royal personage, whose superintending presence catalyzes and 
directs the nation’s recovery; and a concluding vision o f an impending Golden Age. In 
“Astrsea Redux," for instance, Dryden likens the chaos of the Civil War and Interregnum to 
a destructive tempest—“The rabble now such freedom did enjoy, / As winds at sea, that 
use it to destroy” (11. 43-44)—but also, and less predictably, calls the overthrow of 
monarchy a willful return to the barbarity o f a Hobbesian state of nature: “Blind as the 
Cyclops, and as wild as he, / They own’d a  lawless salvage liberty, / Like that our painted 
ancestors so priz’d / Ere empire’s arts their breasts had civiliz’d” (11.45-48). Dryden carries 
the imagery of national desolation to its logical zenith in “To His Sacred Majesty,” opening 
the poem with a picture o f the Great Flood, “that wild deluge where the world was 
drown’d, /  When life and sin one common tomb had found” (11.1-2). The Civil War and its 
aftermath are thus placed on a level with global apocalypse; but if England’s culpability for 
the murder o f Charles I has invited Heaven’s obliterating stroke, that obliteration has, as 
the second line of the couplet implies, left England purged and purified, set to begin anew.
4 I am not suggesting that the pattern of “restoration panegyric” Pope apparently adopts from his great 
forbear is in any way unique to Dryden. As Howard Erskine-Hill observes in The Augustan Idea in 
English literature (1983), Dryden’s restoration poetry was much of a kind with the flood of similar 
efforts by far inferior hands, and its structure, themes, and tropes were already well worn by the time he 
had occasion to apply them to Charles II (see Chapter VIII: “Dryden and the Augustan Idea,” 213-233).
I mean only to draw attention to the similarities between Pope’s own “restoration panegyric” and what 
in his day was probably the best-remembered example of such poetry in order to point out the later 
poet’s appropriation of the trappings of a distant historical moment
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Extending his metaphor, Dryden casts Charles as the sun that comes to dry and warm the 
land after the deluge (11. 13ff.), and a bit later as the restorer o f harmony to the jangled 
spheres of state and church: “He that brought peace, and discord could atone, / His name is 
music of itself alone” (11.57-58)—much as in “Astraea Redux” Dryden had portrayed the 
restored Charles H as an all-pervading genius presiding over the reawakening land: a ruler 
made benevolent, wise, and just by his Aeneas-like wanderings and his Christ-like 
sufferings; a second and greater Augustus under whom “Time’s whiter series is begun” (1. 
292): “0  happy age! O times like those alone / By fate reserv’d for great Augustus’ throne! 
/  When the joint growth o f arms and arts foreshew / The world a monarch, and that 
monarch you” (11.320-323). Dryden’s predictions o f England’s renewed martial prowess 
here (11. 292-311) are tempered in “To His Sacred Majesty,” and, as the basis for the 
coming Golden Age, all but abandoned in Annus M irabilis, where trade and the sheer 
magnificence o f a resurrected London rather than force o f arms will make Britain the 
perpetual mistress o f a  suppliant world:
Our pow’rful navy shall no longer meet,
The wealth o f France and Holland to invade;
The beauty o f this town, without a fleet,
From all the world shall vindicate her trade (stanza 301,11.1201-1204).
But if anything, Dryden’s gilded vision o f England’s future is all the more glorious 
for being founded upon means of ascent fax more civilized and civilizing than war and 
conquest For one thing, England shall first renew itself, spiritually as well as materially, 
and only once it has done so shall it be worthy of the world’s estimation. “Before, she 
[London] like some shepherdess did show” (stanza 296, L 1181), uncouth and unkempt, 
“Not answering to her fame, but rude and low, / Nor taught the beauteous arts of modem 
pride” (11. 1183-84). But now, acknowledging her destiny or “fame” and embracing the 
arts—technical, economic, and governmental—by which she may achieve it, London (and 
by extension, England) is at last ready to become the arbiter o f nations. Further, the roles to 
be played in the creation o f this new England are rather broadly apportioned among the
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several ranks o f its citizens. Having earlier paid tribute to Charles II's  leadership and 
bravery during the Great Fire, to James’ admiral ship, and to the gallantry and 
resourcefulness o f the navy generally during its engagement with the Dutch fleet, Dryden in 
these closing stanzas o f Annus Mirabilis makes it clear that it is ultimately to the energies of 
her traders, merchantmen, and artisans that England will owe its new-found ascendancy. 
Trade will make England a “fam’d emporium” (1. 1205), will turn the world’s seas into a 
“British ocean” (1. 1206), will make England so wealthy that its arts will flourish and its 
political weight will increase severalfold at the expense o f her current rivals, Spain, 
Holland, and France: the Tagus and Rhine, Dryden exults, “The glory of their towns no 
more shall boast; /  And Seine, that would with Belgian rivers join, I Shall find her luster 
stain’d, and traffic lost” (s t 299,11.1194-1196). The arts o f order and peace and the vigor 
of a free and enterprising people shall thus inevitably accomplish what the outcome o f the 
present war—still in doubt at the time of the poem’s appearance—might in the short run 
leave open to question.
Pope employs the same three-part formula o f national apocalypse, restoration, and 
apotheosis-in-perpetuity in his Windsor-Forest. It may be that a writer celebrating the 
circumstances o f the present will instinctively seek to contrast them with less agreeable 
conditions of the past and interpret them as portents o f an even more glorious future; and 
having prophesied such a future, the poet will hardly allow himself to foresee a  time when 
its glories will pass away. But as I hinted above, the significance of Pope’s appropriations 
from Dryden is their specificity: he borrows the narrative outline from Dryden’s early 
public poetry, but also the proximate events that gave it life, as well as its animating spirit 
or sensibility. In short, he identifies his historical present so closely with Dryden’s that as 
one reads W indsor-Forest one might in certain places easily imagine that Pope is actually 
commemorating the restoration of the hue monarch, the rebuilding of London, the original 
embarkation of English mercantile enterprise, and the universal Golden Age that will attend 
England’s unprecedented yet predestined rise to global preeminence.
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Pope introduces each o f these themes briefly in the poem’s opening lines. So idyllic 
are the wealds of Windsor Forest, for instance, that they replicate the paradisical “Groves 
of Eden,” and would, “were my Breast inspir’d with equal Flame, /  Like them in Beauty,. 
. .  be like in Fame” (11.9-10). And like their prelapsarian archetype, the woods and fields 
of Windsor are remarkable for their bounty and variety, which not only sustain their 
inhabitants, but provide them the means o f extending a benign dominion over far-flung 
regions o f the world: no need, the poet declares, for England to envy the exotic, amber- 
and balm-yielding arbors o f distant lands, “While by our Oaks the precious Loads are bom, 
/  And realms commanded which those Trees adorn” (11. 31-32). Yet despite its glories, 
Windsor Forest as Pope depicts it is an emblem not so much o f an unsullied Eden—a 
paradise preserved—but of a paradise reclaimed and regained, recently brought to final 
restoration by the informing genius of its superintending mistress, Queen Anne: “Rich 
Industry sits smiling on the Plains, /  And Peace and Plenty tell, a STUART reigns” (U. 41- 
42).
The full thematic significance of this couplet, and indeed the entire section of
exposition it brings to a close, is made clear once we are shown how things stood before a
restoration of peace, plenty, and the richness of industry had been achieved by the requisite
“restoration” of the Stuart dynasty in the person of Anne:
Not thus the Land appear’d in Ages past,
A dreary Desart and a gloomy Waste,
To Savage Beasts and Savage Laws a Prey,
And Kings more furious and severe than they:
Who claim’d the Skies, dispeopled Air and Floods,
The lonely Lords o f empty Wilds and Woods (1L 43-48).
With these lines Pope begins to sketch an altogether different picture o f Windsor Forest,
and more generally, of England itself, throwing the blessings o f the present into clear relief
by returning his readers to an apocalyptic past now all but unimaginable. His ostensible
subject, of course, is the Conquest and the ensuing reign o f the first William, “our haughty
Norman” (1. 63), whose despotism brought about the utter desolation o f the human and
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animal worlds, thwarting even the balance and rhythms o f nature: “In vain kind Seasons 
swelled the teeming Grain, /  Soft Show’rs distilled, and Suns grew warm in vain; / The 
Swain with Tears his frustrate Labour yields, /  And famish’d dies amidst his ripen’d 
Fields” (11. 53-56). Enslaving the populace, levelling cities, despoiling churches, the 
despotic W illiam soon reduces England to “a Waste for Beasts” (1* SO). The “broken 
Columns” now supporting only the “clasping Ivy” (L 69), the “Heaps o f Ruin” frequented 
by the stately Hind” (1.70), the “gaping Tombs” haunted by “the Fox obscene” 0- 71), the 
“sacred Quires” now filled with “savage Howlings” (1. 72)— more than simply the 
aftermath o f war’s fury, these broken remains in their silence offer an eloquent intimation 
of the vitality, prosperity, and purposefulness o f a civilization reduced to nothingness by 
the mad appetites of a tyrant
Pope passes quickly over the centuries separating the reigns o f William and Anne, 
noting almost in passing that “Succeeding Monarchs heard the Subjects Cries, / Nor saw 
displeas’d the peaceful Cottage rise” (11. 85-86), and that at length “Fair Liberty, 
Britannia’s Goddess, rears /  Her cheerful Head, and leads the golden Years” (11. 91-92). 
For his intent, beyond his obvious object of celebrating W indsor Forest as Jonson had 
Penshurst or Denham Cooper’s Hill, is to place the characters and rule o f the Conqueror 
and Anne in such close juxtaposition that the former might be made to seem Anne’s 
immediate predecessor, allowing Pope thereby to insinuate any number o f rough parallels 
between the foreignness, militarism, and autocratic predisposition o f William o f Normandy 
and those of the William Anne actually succeeded, William of Orange, King William m  of 
England. In sharp contrast to the rapaciousness o f those “furious and severe” kings who 
governed before her, Anne is portrayed throughout Windsor-Forest as a loving caretaker of 
her lands, a wise nurturer o f her people. The couplet in her praise concluding the poem’s 
opening section (above, 11. 41-42) foreshadows the more extended complement that 
punctuates the closing o f a  panoramic survey of Windsor in its seasonal variations (11.93- 
158):
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Let old Arcadia boast her ample Plain,
Th’ Immortal Huntress, and her Virgin Train;
Nor envy Windsor1 since thy Shades have seen 
As bright a  Goddess, and as chast a  Queen;
Whose Care, like hers, protects the Sylvan Reign,
The Earth's fair Light, and Empress o f the Main (1L 159-164).
The lines are a  rhetorical masterstroke. Pope has just exhibited the passing of seasons in the
Forest through a series of vignettes depicting the taking of the game afforded respectively
by autumn (pheasants), winter (doves, woodcocks, and larks), spring (various fishes), and
summer (deer). But though Pope, always tender-hearted toward animals, describes their
deaths here with real feeling, he is careful to distinguish the limited predations of local
sportsmen from the wanton slaughter visited upon the land by William and his Normans.
These hunts are strictly regulated by the calendar, and, more important, are here vaguely
implied to be supervised by a huntress (Anne was an accomplished rider) whose governing
instinct is to “protect the Sylvan Reign.” William’s coursing “dispeopled Air and Floods,”
leaving him a “lonely Lord of empty Wilds and Woods”; Anne’s, like Diana’s, maintains
nature’s balance o f these habitats. But Pope’s likening o f Anne to Diana (the homophony
o f the two names would not have escaped him) allows him to make the further claim that,
like the goddess o f die moon, Anne, too, is an agent of elemental order. Figured here as the
moon, Anne’s “fair lig h t” illuminates the dark earth even as her presence regulates the
tides; Anne is thus Nature’s mistress o f land and sea, an all-composing immanence lending
a rhythmical coherence to the physical world that reliably and richly sustains its inhabitants,
both human and animal.
As Pope shall demonstrate, Anne is “Empress o f the Main” in more than one sense,
but for the moment Pope leaves the phrase to linger in the ear, preparing us for his final
identification of Anne with a newly refulgent London and the global domain it
superintends. However, when he next returns to his refrain o f praise—following the myth
of the nymph Lodona (11. 165-218), a catalogue of the poets Windsor has inspired (11.259-
298), and brief accounts of the kings especially associated with the Forest (11. 299-319)—
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he exploits instead what he has implied in these lines, that Anne is an agent o f harmony and
concord, this time in the sphere o f human affairs. Pope concludes his musings on
Windsor’s royal visitants, among them Edward HI, Henry VI, and, lastly, Charles I, by
bidding the Muse to “Make sacred Charles’s  Tomb for ever known, / (Obscure the Place,
and uninscrib’d the Stone)” (11.319-320). The thought o f Charles’ ignominious death puts
the poet in mind of England’s many recent calamities:
Oh Fact accurst! What Tears has Albion shed,
Heav’ns! what new Wounds, and how her old have bled?
She saw her Sons with purple Deaths expire,
Her sacred Domes involv’d in rolling Fire,
A dreadful Series o f Intestine Wars,
Inglorious Triumphs, and dishonest Scars.
At length great ANNA said—Let Discord cease!
She said, the World obey’d, and all was Peacel (11.321-328)
Two things are particularly significant here. The first is that Pope attributes to Anne not
only the power to resolve the discords o f her own time, specifically the “Inglorious
Triumphs, and dishonest Scars” gotten in the artificially protracted War o f Spanish
Secession, but to induce as well a  healing oblivion in a national psyche still troubled by the
images o f Civil War, plague, and the Great Fire still painfully alive, apparently, in
England’s collective memory. By doing so, Pope has, secondly, carried forward the crises
faced by Charles II into the reign of his own queen, as if they had yet to be resolved. He
thereby attempts to recapture for Anne the acclaim Dryden had secured for Charles upon the
successful reintroduction o f order, peace, and prosperity at the Restoration—and for
himself, Pope seeks to commandeer Dryden’s historical moment, his role o f chronicler of
his country’s reconstitution after great trial and hardship, and, perhaps above all, the
cultural authority that accrues to the poet who fulfills this public function.
We should note as well that when Pope has Anne bid “Let Discord cease!” the
instantaneous realization of peace marks her mandate as a moment o f creation: the
tumultuous past is cast into oblivion; order is brought forth from chaos, and time begins
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anew. Pope is thus able to turn a complacent back upon what has gone before and give his
full attention to the glories yet to come, lending the conclusion o f Windsor-Forest the same
forward-looking quality we saw in Dryden’s A straa Redux, “To His Sacred Majesty,"
and—especially—Annus M irabilis. Indeed, the Golden Age over which Pope imagines
Anne presiding is strikingly similar to that Dryden fashioned in the latter poem:
Behold! Augusta’s glitt’ring Spires increase,
And Temples rise, the beauteous Works o f Peace.
I see, I see where two fair Cities bend 
Their ample Bow, a new W hite-Hall ascend!
There mighty Nations shall inquire their Doom,
The World’s great Oracle in Times to come;
There Kings shall sue, and suppliant States be seen 
Once more to bend before a British QUEEN (11.377-384).
Lines 381-384 in fact closely echo a corresponding stanza in the latter poem: “Now, like a
maiden queen, she [London! will behold, / From her high turrets, hourly suitors come: /
The East with incense, and the West with gold, Will stand, like suppliants, to receive her
doom” (stanza 297,11.1185-1188). And here again we see London gloriously rebuilt, with
international trade again the supposed foundation of London’s new-found beauty, wealth,
and power. Pope has the personified River Thames declare, “The Time shall come, when
free as Seas or wind / Unbounded Thames shall flow for all Mankind, / Whole Nations
enter with each swelling Tyde, /  And Seas but join the Regions they divide” (1L 397-400).
As in Dryden’s poem, the world’s seas shall become “a British ocean,” and where Dryden
had declared that “the vent’rous [foreign] merchant, who design’d more far, / . .  .Charm’d
with the splendour o f this northern star, /  Shall here unlade him, and depart no more”
(stanza 300,11.1197; 1199-1200), Pope asserts that “Earth’s distant ends our Glory shall
behold, / And the new World launch forth to seek the Old” (11. 401-401). Where Pope
allows himself to differ from Dryden, the contrast is one of degree, not of kind. Dryden
had envisioned an England so grand within her borders and so strong in terms of trade and
arms beyond them that the rest o f the world will be forced to forego all rivalry and resign
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itself to envious awe o f the resurrected nation; Pope sees the inaugurating words o f 
England’s new apotheosis, Anne’s commandment that discord cease, echoing across the 
face o f the globe, until the Golden Age England enjoys has become a universal condition: 
“Oh stretch thy Reign, fair PeaceI from Shore to Shore, /  Till Conquest cease, and Slav’ry 
be no mare" (11.407-408). “Exil’d by Thee from Earth to deepest Hell," he continues, “In 
brazen Bonds shall barb’rous Discord Dwell” (II. 413-414)—and with it, Pride, Terror, 
Care, Ambition, Vengeance, Envy, Persecution, Faction, and Rebellion (11.415-422).
Pope insists at this point that it is not for his humble muse, his “unhallow’d Lays," 
to do what they have in fact just done, “Touch the fair Fame of Albion’s Golden Days” (11. 
423-424). It is enough for him, he says, that “My humble Muse, in unambitious Strains, /  
Paints the green Forests and the flow’ry Plains” (11.427-428), “Enough for me, that to the 
listning Swains / First in Fields I sung the Sylvan Strains” (11. 433-434). The poetical 
performance Pope has just concluded, however, belies his professed humility. In Windsor- 
Forest he has presumed, first, to adopt the circumstances, themes, vision, structure—even, 
in places, the language—with which the nation’s last great Laureate sought to impose an 
intelligible contour upon the recent history of his country, to commemorate its present, and, 
by articulating the pattern o f its ideal future, to create the age to come. Pope makes 
Dryden’s project his own in order, second, to figure himself in his own time as the 
spokesman for what he here terms “the Thoughts of Gods” (1. 425)—the Omniscience 
beyond human ken that sees and shapes the destinies o f nations. But moreover, for all its 
apparent humility, the poem’s final couplet (11.433-434) is not only self-allusive, bringing 
to the reader’s mind Pope’s early Pastorals, it also reminds the nation’s literary 
cognoscenti—the critics, the poets, the wits o f Court and coffee-house—and those who 
simply knew their Virgil, of the greater composition he has declared himself in The Temple
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
402
o f Fame5 and An Essay on Criticism  to have undertaken: that of his own career as 
England’s effectual laureate. At the conclusion o f his fourth and final georgic, Virgil 
explains that while Augustus “[o]n the glad earth the Golden Age renews /  And his great 
father’s path to heav’n pursues” (U. 813-814), “I at Naples pass my peaceful days, / 
Affecting studies o f less noisy praise; /  And, bold thro’ youth, beneath the beechen shade, / 
The lays of shepherds, and their loves, have play’d” (11. 815-818; Dryden’s translation). 
The arc of the Roman poet’s career was sufficiently well known to make the hint embedded 
in Pope’s allusion unmistakable: having exercised his fledgling muse in the journeyman 
Pastorals, and having, in the present poem, modulated his public voice by the example o f 
Dryden’s early public poetry, Pope was now ready, as the Virgil of the Georgies had been, 
to take his place as “My Countrys Poet”
We might discern in W indsor-Forest one further appropriation o f Pope’s—this 
time, o f the technique used by Dryden and others during the Exclusion Crisis (among many 
other instances), that of carrying the circumstances, personages, and import o f past events 
forward in order to frame social perception o f the historical present within a specific 
mnemonic context But what worked for the generation o f poets that conflated the 
characters, means, and ends of the Parliamentarians o f 1678-81 with those of the 1640’s is 
not quite successful here; for all its poetical brilliance, the reclamation of Dryden’s
5 Pope presents himself in this poem as a youthful “Candidate for Praise” (1* 500): “’Tis true, said I, not 
void of Hopes I came [to Fame’s temple], / For who is not so fond as youthful Bards of Fame?” (11. 
501-S02). He then sets out the rather narrow conditions upon which he will seek and accept fame:
But if the Purchase costs so dear a Price,
As soothing Folly, or exalting Vice:
Oh! if the Muse must flatter lawless Sway,
And follow still where Fortune leads the way;
Or if no Basis bear my rising Name,
But the fall’n Ruins of Another’s Fame:
Then teach me. Heaven! to scorn the guilty Bays;
Drive from my Breast that wretched Lust of Praise;
Unblemish’d let me live, or die unknown.
Oh grant an honest Fame, or grant me none!” (11.51S-S24)
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historical moment at the Restoration in W indsor-Forest is not wholly convincing. 
Appearing in 1713, the poem cannot pretend to commemorate a true restoration, either o f 
Anne herself (crowned in 1702) or the Stuarts generally: they had been absent from the 
throne for a mere eight years, 1694-1702, and only because Queen Mary (daughter o f 
James II) had the misfortune o f contracting smallpox; moreover, the Revolution Settlement 
of 1689 had assured Anne’s succession. Further, though the peace Pope celebrates was 
overdue and long-awaited (Anne’s own administration had prosecuted the war for eleven 
years), it did not follow a destructive civil war and an extended period of social upheaval 
presided over by a  usurping ruler with autocratic tendencies. It is true that the English had 
not taken to William in, and some drew parallels between him and Oliver Cromwell; many 
resented his foreignness and what Kenyon terms his “inner junta o f Dutchmen" (290), and 
some implied that one o f his intimates, Arnold Joost van Keppel, was more than a political 
favorite. Most suspicions, however, were fed by the potential threat to traditional liberties 
William’s wealth and military power represented. Kenyon observes, “He now commanded 
military forces and supplies of money beyond the dreams of his less able Stuart 
predecessors and he could plead ‘war emergency’ for almost any action.. . .  Moreover, 
there was little in the Revolution Settlement to curb this new-style, militaristic monarchy; 
Parliament had been too busy burying the old-style, divine-right paternalistic monarchy o f 
the Stuarts" (290). And we might recall Henry Hall’s epigram, “Upon the King’s Return 
From Flanders” (1695): “Rejoice you sots, your idol’s come again, / To pick your pockets 
and kidnap your men. / Give him your moneys, and his Dutch your lands. / Ring not your 
bells, ye fools, but wring your hands” (Anthology o f Poems on Affairs o f State, 544). 
nonetheless, William was hardly the tyrant William the Conqueror could be made out to 
be—and in any event, whereas the first William had taken England by conquest, and 
Cromwell had triumphed in civil war, William of Orange had been invited by the English to 
replace the despotic Stuart they had driven from the throne. Figuring him forth as a 
conquering tyrant, a desolator o f England’s lands and people, may have given some
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satisfaction to the Tories who had found themselves in the political wilderness during his 
reign and were now flourishing under Anne, but was hardly credible as a reconstitutive 
alloy o f the literal and figurative in the representation of recent history.
This gap between figure and reality in W indsor-Forest is important because it 
foreshadows Pope’s later difficulties in adequately aligning the two mnemonic modes in his 
framing of the historical present (see Chapter VI, section 4). For the moment, however, the 
specific discrepancies between the circumstances o f Dryden and Pope’s respective 
“restoration’’ poetry should put us in mind of the more fundamental differences between the 
respective constitutions, characters, conditions, and circumstances o f the two men to which 
the qualified success of Pope’s appropriation of Dryden is in part due. We should consider 
first that the literary life led by Dryden in the theatres and coffee-houses of London was, 
generally speaking, as impossible for the frail Pope as his family’s modest affluence made 
it unnecessary. Both men set up for professional poets, but on greatly different terms. 
Dryden wrote for sustenance, and because of this, Johnson observes, “[His] performances 
were always hasty, either excited by some external occasion, or extorted by domestic 
necessity; he composed without consideration, and published without correction” (1,214). 
By contrast, he notes,
[Pope’s] effusions were always voluntary, and his subjects chosen by 
himself. His independence secured him from drudging at a task, and 
labouring upon a barren topic: he never exchanged praise for money, nor 
opened a shop of condolence or congratulation. His poems, therefore, were 
scarce ever temporary. He suffered coronations and royal marriages to pass 
without a song, and derived no opportunities from recent events, nor any 
popularity from the accidental disposition o f his readers (II, 212).
As Johnson’s reflections hint, the differences in their conditions meant not only that the
two poets would have varying styles o f composition—one hasty, the other slow,
deliberate—but that they would write different types o f poetry. Dryden might have been a
dramatist in any event (though his surest talents seemed to lie in formal satire, criticism,
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translation),6 but certainly the feet that the dramatic poetry paid determined him to write for 
the theatre, and we should note that the bulk o f his occasional poetry is contained in the 
prologues and epilogues he wrote to frame his own and (for a fee) others’ plays. Pope’s 
comparative financial independence meant that he did not, like Dryden, have to conform his 
genius and temperament to a  genie not perfectly amenable to them, that he could remain at 
Binfield (and later, a t Twickenham) and write what and when he wished.
It is ironic, therefore, that though Pope is often cited as the first poet to make poetry 
a gainful profession, he wrote largely for pleasure, and disdained to serve the whims of the 
marketplace, creating instead his own demand and supply among the reading public, as he 
did when he published The Iliad  by subscription. Thus he wrote little occasional poetry, 
and his theatrical output consists of five prologues,7 an epilogue, and infrequent 
contributions to the plays o f others. Pope is teasing his friend John Cary 11 when he writes 
to him in February 1717/18 that he shall not compose a poem in celebration of Lady 
Caryll’s giving birth to twins: “But you are sensible ’tis not the task o f an Heroic Poet like 
myself, to sing at marriages, burials, and Christenings; Besides that every song relating to 
christenings may be thought satirical in this age” (Corr. 1,465). His actions, however, bear 
out his half-facetious assertion. Though Pope’s moral essays, satires, imitations, and even 
his philosophical poetry draw heavily upon current events, trends, and personages, and 
make frequent use o f minutely local allusions, such material, as we shall see in this 
chapter’s final section, is usually adapted into a thematic scheme that raises it far above its 
immediate significance. Johnson errs, therefore, when he says that Pope “derived no
6 Dryden declares as much when, in A Discourse Concerning Satire, he relates to Dorset “a rude draught” 
of the epic he was always too busy and too poor to write, concluding that had he been able to undertake 
such a project, he would “have left the stage, to which my genius never much inclined me” (91).
7 Pope wrote prologues for Addison’s Cato (1713), a benefit performance of Thomas Durfey’s A Fond 
Husband (1713), Gay’s Three Hours After a Marriage (1717), Thomson’s Sophonisba (1730), and a 
1733 benefit performance of John Dennis’ The Provoked Husband', he also wrote an epilogue for 
Nicholas Rowe’s Jane Shore (1713).
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opportunities from recent events”; yet he is on target when he remarks that Pope's poems 
“were scarce ever temporary.” Pope’s material circumstances allowed him to attempt to 
write for posterity rattier than the present moment, and in the phrase, “’tis not the task of an 
Heroic Poet like myself,” we might detect more than a w hiff o f scorn for those poets— 
eventually immortalized in The Dunciad—whom need and dullness compelled to write for 
hire upon “marriages, burials, and Christenings.” Or even to oblige the importunity of 
friends: in a letter to William Broome dated September 18,1722, Pope cites his “inability 
from some circumstances, of writing anything like a prologue” for Elijah Fenton, even 
though Fenton had (apparently) promised to keep the author’s identity a secret. “I have 
learnt by experience,” Pope continues, “nothing o f the kind is ever kept a secret; and 
therefore I must not delude Fenton, though at the same time I faithfully assure him, I would 
most gladly make the prologue tomorrow, could it be done without any man’s knowing it. 
I have actually refused doing it for [the re-publication of] the Duke o f Buckingham’s play,” 
The Tragedy o f Brutus (Corr. II, 134). Years later Pope would rebuff Aaron Hill’s request 
for an epilogue for his play, The Tragedy o f Caesar. “I have often wished,” Pope writes to 
Hill early in September 1738, “to live to see the Day when Prologues and Epilogues should 
be no more. I wish a great Genius would break thro’ the silly, useless, Formality. But at 
least I would have one try, to leave the Audience fu ll o f the Effects o f a good Tragedy, 
without an Epilogue” (Corr. IV, 127); at month’s end (September 29), Pope finds he must 
make his refusal yet more explicit' “You will, I am sure, be so candid, and so reasonable, 
as to conclude I would not decline writing your Epilogue on any but a just Reason, and 
indeed (for me) an invariable Maxim, which I have held these Twenty Years. Every 
poetical Friend I have, has had my Word, I never would; and my Leave to take the same 
Refusals I made him, ill, if I ever wrote one for another” (IV, 131-132).
Pope’s reluctance to write the kind o f ephemera that had helped bring Dryden to 
prominence may be attributed in part to pride in his independence, his desire to avoid the 
partisan controversy that occasional verse (such his first prologue, for Addison’s political
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tragedy, Cato) tended to attract, and to the likelihood that if  he once made it his practice he 
would be endlessly plagued with requests for songs, panegyrics, prologues, and 
epilogues. But we should also consider his conception o f himself as “an Heroic Poet” and 
his notion o f just what that entailed. From what we have already seen, we may say in 
general that Pope was highly selective in adapting the features o f Dryden’s career to his 
own, retaining those that tended to increase the dignity, independence, and cultural 
authority o f the poet’s craft, and letting pass those that smelt too strongly of hack-work. 
Thus Pope saw his mission as Dryden’s successor to be one o f making English 
versification more “correct,” of making its rhythms smoother and more adaptable to the 
rhythms o f the action it portrayed, of making its diction at once more polite and timeless— 
this, in an effort to make public poetry more durable in its construction and thereby better 
able to support indefinitely the enduring themes he took to be its task to articulate.8 More 
than an attempt to arrest the decay of the material of poetry and thereby extend as well the 
longevity o f his own productions and reputation, however, Pope’s project of bringing 
English prosody nearer to perfection is also, one suspects, an implicit attempt to establish 
an evolutional, progressive path for poetry akin to that Dryden had posited in “An Essay on 
the Dramatic Poetry o f the Last Age” (1672). As (Dryden asserted there) the Elizabethan
8 We see these several concerns at work, for example, in Pope’s highly complimentary (and highly 
selective) appraisal of Dryden’s career in An Essay on Criticism. Pope first compares Dryden to the 
Greek poet Timotheus— "The Pow’rs o f Mustek all our Hearts allow; / And what Timotheous was, is 
Dryden now” (11.382-383)—then draws parallels between his greatness and Homer’s, and the 
persecution each suffered at the hands of spiteful, dull-witted contemporaries:
Parties in Wit attend on those of State,
And public Faction doubles private Hate.
Pride, Malice, Folly, against Dryden rose.
In various shapes of Parsons, Criticks, Beaus',
But Sense surviv’d, when merry Jests were past;
For rising Merit will buoy up at last 
Might he return, and bless once more our Eyes,
New Blackmores and new Milboums must arise;
Nay shou’d great Homer lift his awful Head,
Zoilus again would start up from the Dead (11.456-465).
And yet, having here compared Dryden with one of those “Patriarch-Wits" whose fame “surviv’d a 
thousand Years" (1. 479), only a few lines later Pope is sighing over his impending obscurity: "Our 
Sons their Fathers’ failing Language see, / And such as Chaucer is, shall Dryden be" (11.482-483).
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and Jacobean dramatists lacked the self-awareness necessary to mend their works, so, we 
remember, does Pope assert to Spence that Dryden, “who had improved [verse] much
beyond any of our former p o e ts , would, probably, have brought it to its perfection,
had not he been unhappily obliged to write so often in haste” (169). And so now Pope, 
removed from the hurly-burly o f theatrical composition and insulated from the mercenary 
hurry and diffusion o f the occasional writer, may presume to direct the channel o f poetry’s 
mainstream to its proper end, that is—at least at the tim e o f An Essay on Criticism, 
W indsor-Forest (1713), and the translation of The Iliad  (1715-1720)—to instruct and 
improve the age, to celebrate the glories of its peace and prosperity, and, by means of its 
poetical accomplishment, to leave posterity a lasting monument to its greatness o f mind, 
learning, and taste.
Thus it is ironic only in retrospect that the year after Windsor-Forest appeared, 
Pope wrote the following to Caryll describing his stay a t Bath with one of his fellow 
Scriblerians, Thomas Parnell:
We have scarce any company of figure, no lampoons dispersed, and not a 
face that promises any. As for my own part, my own genius was never 
turned to that sort o f satire, and if I had never so much natural malice, a 
laborious translation, would extinguish all such impetuous emotions. 1 
should be in Dryden’s case, o f whom it was said:
He turned the malice o f a spiteful satire 
To the safe innocence o f a dull translator.
So that, upon the whole, I walk about here as innocently, and as little 
dreaded, as that old lion in satire, Mr. Wycherley, who now goes tame 
about this town. I named you to him, and [he] speaks such things of you (to 
give him his due) as may be heard by your Mend with satisfaction. He that 
dares to despise the great ones of this age, to deny common sense to the 
ministers of state, their small portion of wit to the poets who live by it, and 
honesty to the maids o f fourteen, dares not refuse Mr. Caryll his due. 
(September 25, 1714; Corr. L, 255-256)
Not only does Pope here disavow any inclination in himself toward one of satire’s least
respectable forms, his condescending indulgence of “that old lion in satire, Mr. Wycherley”
renders the man ridiculous, and the ire he expends impotently upon the same few habitual
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targets—the great ones o f the age, the incompetence of ministers o f state, the dullness of 
hack poets, feminine promiscuity—merely tedious in its flaccid predictability. This pen- 
portrait o f a w riter who has outlived his times and his talents does more than make 
Wycherley a  figure o f pathos; Pope seems to roll his eyes at the prospect o f satire itself as a 
worthy and proper pursuit for the serious (that is, “heroic") public poet. Our 
foreknowledge may make us gape in ironic disbelief at Pope's complacent scorn o f the very 
subjects (save for female promiscuity) that would provide him the material for his greatest 
public poetry and the justification for his later carefully crafted public stance as England's 
Juvenal. However, though by nature skeptical and sardonic, a  close friend of Swift, Gay, 
and Arbuthnot, and with them a member o f the Scriblerus G ub (dedicated to the exposure 
and ridicule o f pedantry, false learning, and quackery), Pope in fact had to this date written 
little that might be called satirical, and, other than the infrequent epigrammatical squib, 
would not do so until the first appearance of The Dunciad in March and April of 1728.
When, however, he at last turned from translating Homer and editing Shakespeare 
to the poetry o f social criticism, his generally acknowledged succession of Dryden and the 
self-imposed terms o f that succession had important consequences for the capacity o f what 
was now taken to be the true mainstream of public poetry to accommodate the elements of 
the figurative and literal mnemonic modes in its representation o f the historical present For 
one thing, as Pope began to voice openly his antipathy toward professional writers and 
their productions,9 the aesthetic legitimacy o f purely occasional poetry was put in question. 
Ballads, broadsides, prologues, epilogues, and poems on state affairs continued to be 
composed, o f course; however, the social authority once accruing to their timeliness and
9 Johnson, who did not suffer pretentiousness gladly, later observed, “In the letters of both Swift and 
Pope there appears such narrowness of mind as makes them insensible of any excellence that has not 
some affinity with their own, and confines their esteem and approbation to so small a number, that 
whoever should form his opinion of the age from their representation, would suppose them to have 
lived amidst ignorance and barbarity, unable to find among their contemporaries either virtue or 
intelligence, and persecuted by those that could not understand them" (II, 208-209).
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their broad and ready intelligibility, already being usurped by newspapers and the novel,10 
would be weakened still further by the effectual separation o f poetry into “high" and “low” 
categories. But formal verse would also suffer, having lost a  certain flexibility of response 
to its immediate circumstances, removed as it now was from the widest possible circle o f 
potential readers. Perhaps the comparative distance o f  formal verse from everyday events 
would have inevitably raised the stakes for such poetry and its portrayal of the historical 
present: each production, aiming for cultural longevity, would tend to fit its subject into the 
broadest possible historical and thematic contexts. This would naturally entail elevating the 
matter, form, and significance of one's subject above the particular, the immediate, and the 
local, widening in the process the gap between a poem’s literal materials and its figurative 
recombination of them.11 But Pope’s personal tendency toward the heroic would lead him 
to cast the social, political, and cultural affairs in truly epic terms, with the fate o f the 
English nation itself in the balance, all but ensuring the greatest proportional predominance, 
short of allegory, o f figurative elements over literal, with the consequent representation of 
an historical present at the farthest possible remove from the familiar, the commonplace. 
Moreover, Pope’s predisposition to see himself occupying a definite poetic niche—and, 
particularly, that o f  an heroic poet—led Pope to develop a more stylized and in some ways 
more restricted public role than Dryden had ever felt compelled to adopt for himself. 
Dryden’s public persona had after all been fairly amorphous and largely situational, adapted 
to the exigencies o f the theatre in his dramatic prologues and epilogues, of literary theory in 
his critical essays and prefaces, and of formal verse satire in his few, though distinguished
10 Feather notes, “From the [book-] trade’s point of view, the significance of the novel lay not in its 
literary merit but in its essential triviality. It was seen as an ephemeral production to be read once and 
then forgotten. This meant that, once the demand bad been created, a continuous supply of new novels 
was needed to fill it" (97).
11 Dryden bad chided the French for their timid approach to versification in his preface to The Aeneid: “I 
said before, and I repeat it, that the affected purity of the French has unsinewed their heroic verse. The 
language o f an epic poem is almost wholly figurative: yet they are so fearful of a metaphor that no 
example of Virgil can encourage them to be bold with safety" (247-248; emphasis added).
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compositions in that genre. For despite their brilliance, Absalom and Achitophel, The 
Medal, and MacFlecknoe, are really anomalies in Dryden’s oeuvre, and thus he never had 
occasion to fashion for himself the full-blown persona o f the public satirist that Pope’s 
extended foray into the genre during the 1730’s and 1740’s lead him to reclaim from the 
classical past And because that persona came to Pope ready-made, its features and 
functions more or less clearly defined and regular, the mask he fitted to his face would over 
time impress its fixed expression upon the living flesh beneath it, leading him to perceive, 
reflect upon, and respond to his circumstances in certain predetermined ways. Indeed, for 
Pope the satirist poetic persona would become inseparable from poetic form; in fact one 
might say without much exaggeration that the poetic identity Pope fashioned so publicly 
during the 1730’s was in itse lf an intended social corrective, was in itself a satire upon the 
age.
As we shall see in the final section of this chapter, the rigidly patterned 
interpretation the constraints of Pope’s public posture imposed upon the significance of 
public affairs, would, when combined with the epic tenor Pope used to frame 
contemporary English history, and the increasing estrangement of heroic poetry from its 
more literal occasional counterpart, all but guarantee that the new mainstream of public 
poetry would become increasingly figurative. This tended to diminish the overall cultural 
authority of poetry in an age beginning to value greater realism in a r t But when we add to 
the mixture Pope’s liberal indulgence of his personal disillusionment and pessimism it is 
not at all surprising that from the early 1730’s Pope’s productions increasingly tended to 
reverse the habitual operative “direction’’ of poetic memory. That is, instead of carrying the 
mnemonic structures of the past forward, refitting them with present-day particulars, and 
projecting the resulting blend of figurative and literal into a pattern for the future, as he 
attempts to do in Windsor-Forest, Pope habitually portrays England, its redeeming values, 
ideals, personages, and institutions as already moribund; by doing so he effectively
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suspends historical and cultural time, making the present moment and all it contains seem 
already part of the irrecoverable past—and the future an impossibility.
This peculiar manner of representing the historical present, what one might call 
Pope’s “epitaphic vision,” momentarily increased the cultural prominence of public poetry, 
but would lead to its effective exile from the mainstream of society and social memory. To 
understand why this should be so, we need to examine more particularly the medium of 
formal verse satire: the public stance it enforces on the poet, the special demands it places 
on its readers, and (especially) its operations upon their perception and understanding of 
the world about them. Therefore, before discussing the characteristics and specific 
mnemonic claims of Pope’s epitaphic vision, we need to examine the more general 
consequences of using satire as an agent o f fashioning social memory.
2. Satire and the Framing of Public Memory
As I suggested in the first section of Chapter 2, satire emerged as a preeminent form 
of public poetry in this period because of the alignment of a number of discrete factors: the 
very public nature of the business of governing; increased political participation and 
comment among “the people”; the rise of parties and the need for partisan propaganda; the 
comparative liberty of the press, especially after the expiration of the Printing Act in 1695; 
the continued symbiotic growth o f the book-trade and popular literacy; the consequent 
professionalization of poetry and the potential prominence it lent to the individual poet 
fortunate enough to be distinguished by talent or audacity; and, if one might cite something 
as problematically general and vague as “temper” or “atmosphere,” the skepticism and 
secularism of an age made morally weary and wary from its experience of civil war, its 
disappointed hopes for a new Golden Age attendant upon the Restoration, and its shifting 
cosmological perspective, now, under the influence of empirical philosophy and the New 
Science, turning inward, toward the nature, capacities, and deficiencies of humanity and its
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institutions. We should also cite factors specific to poetry, such as the refinement of the 
heroic couplet (credited to Waller and Denham, and advanced further still by Dryden) into a 
highly flexible medium as appropriate for counsel as for caricature; a  growing 
sophistication among poets and readers alike regarding the manner, matter, and ends o f the 
several poetic genres; and the wide availability of the great classical satirists—Horace, 
Persius, and Juvenal—in the original and in translation, as well as a growing body of 
critical comment upon them, their work, and the essential nature of satire itself.
By far the most important English treatise on the genre to appear during the 
Augustan period was Dryden’s elaborate A Discourse Concerning the O riginal and 
Progress o f Satire, a lengthy historical, critical, and theoretical examination prefixed to his 
1692-1693 translation (with others) of the satires of Persius and Juvenal. Satire—and. 
more specifically, Roman satire—was not unknown in England before the appearance of 
Dryden’s Discourse. Far from i t  By the time o f its publication, imitations and translations 
of Horace, Juvenal and Persius had been appearing for nearly a century. In his essay, 
“Dryden’s Theory and Practice of Satire,” William Frost points out that English imitations 
of Roman satire began appearing in the 1590’s, its early practitioners including Joseph Hall 
(credited with introducing Juvenalian satire into England), John Marston, Thomas Lodge, 
and John Donne (190). The government soon suppressed such satire; however, occasional 
verse satires continued to be published, and adaptations (as well as direct translations) of 
the Roman satirists appeared throughout the seventeenth century. In Roman Satirists o f 
Seventeenth-Century England (1985), William Kupersmith traces the many manifestations 
and innumerable echoes of Horace, Juvenal, and Persius from the time of Jonson, through 
that of Rochester and Dryden, and into the first years of the eighteenth century. 
Kupersmith’s book makes it abundantly clear that Dryden’s Discourse appeared at the end 
of a century saturated with satirical poems, plays, and narratives deriving from Roman 
models. Nevertheless, it is Dryden’s work on satire that would, as Howard Weinbrot 
observes in The Formal Strain: Studies in Augustan Imitation and Satire (1969), influence
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the form and theme of English verse satire for the next century (60; 67), for it is the first 
comprehensive statement in English on the genre’s origin and nature. It is his Discourse 
that gives definition, shape, and purpose to what had been an undisciplined, largely 
occasional genre, his Discourse that methodizes verse satire and sets the stage for his 
literary successors—including Alexander Pope.
A large part of Dryden’s Discourse is taken up with tracing the origins of Roman 
satire and with ranking its three greatest practitioners: Persius, Horace, and Juvenal. This 
background is important, for as Weinbrot rightly argues in Alexander Pope and the 
Traditions o f Formal Verse Satire (1982), contemporary notions of the genesis and 
etymology of satire not only informed the critical appraisals of these poets, but greatly 
influenced the age’s determination of the proper subjects, tone, and objectives o f the genre, 
as well as the relation of the satirist to his society (12, passim). Thus a brief review of 
Dryden’s researches12 is in order hoe.
Though the earliest forms of satire were dramatic, Dryden notes, it has since the 
time of Ennius (239-169 BC), Rome’s first true satirist, been written to be read, not acted, 
and has typically employed a blend o f raillery, venom, and “witty pleasantry” to expose 
and attack vice and to recommend virtue (110; 115). (This variety of tone, and the fact that 
satire originally employed a mixture of verse forms—and sometimes a mixture of verse and 
prose—have given satire its name, derived from satura leave, “a full platter.”) The two main 
traditions of satire Dryden traces, however, retained from their dramatic origins their 
respective tempers and characteristics. Native Roman satire, he says, descended from the 
dramatic verses called Satumian (“from their ancientness, when Saturn reigned in Italy”) 
and Fescennine (“from Fescenina, a town in the same country, where they were first
12 Dryden acknowledges his liberal borrowings from Isaac Casaubon’s De satyrica grcecorum poesi et 
romanorum satira (1605), and from the scholarly prefaces and commentary accompanying the several 
translations of the Roman satirists undertaken during the seventeenth century by Andre Dacier, 
Nicholas Rigaltius, Daniel Heinsius, and Barten Holyday.
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practiced”), with which the actors, “with a gross and rustic kind of raillery, reproach’d 
each other with their failings; and at the same time were nothing sparing of it to the 
audience” (107). A second strain o f dramatic satire was brought to Rome by Livius 
Andronicus, a  freed Greek slave, who introduced the “fine raillery” (110) of Greek Old 
Comedy. As adopted by Ennius into non-dramatic satire, the Greek manner, “which was to 
call some persons by their own names, and to expose their defects to the laughter of the 
people” (108), tempered somewhat “the coarseness of his old countrymen, in their 
clownish extemporary way o f jeering” (110). Though Ennius, with his extensive 
knowledge of Greek, was able to refine satiric expression somewhat through the 
introduction of “fragments” of Greek literature into his verses, it was left to his successor, 
Lucilius, to give “a more graceful tum to the satire of Ennius,” by grafting still more 
“Grecian beauties” into his works (111). But then Lucilius had the advantage over Ennius 
of living in an age when the Roman language, having grown more refined, was better able 
to adopt and adapt the older culture’s more sophisticated and graceful turns of thought 
(111). Thus we would expect that Horace, Lucilius’ greatest successor, “who writ when 
the the language was in the heighth o f its perfection” (118), would in tum be able to add 
“much more of beauty and polishing to his own poems than are to be found in those before 
him” (113), and thereby “complete” satire (109).
We might notice that Dry den traces the history of satire so as to demonstrate that it 
indeed undergoes what he claims for it in the title o f his dissertation, a  progress: that is, 
satire evolves. Further, we should remark that the engine of its evolution is an increased 
linguistic sophistication at once drawing on and enlarging a concomitant advance in human 
consciousness of the kind Dryden describes in “An Essay on the Dramatic Poetry of the 
Last Age” (1672). Accordingly, he can assert that the true difference between Horace and 
his immediate predecessor is to be found in “[t]he polishing of the Latin tongue, in the 
succession of the times,” and observe with approval that “Horace himself, in two of his 
satires, written purposely on this subject, thinks the Romans of his age were too partial in
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their commendations of Lucilius; who writ not only loosely, and muddily, with little art,
and much less care, but also in a  time when the Latin tongue was not yet sufficiently
purged from the dregs of barbarism” (112). Dryden (with his contemporaries) can therefore
commend Horace for the civilized quality of his satire, its polish, clarity, and urbane
humanity: “Horace laughs to shame all follies, and insinuates virtue rather by familiar
examples than by the severity of precepts” (129); he can praise Horace’s worldliness, that
broad acquaintance with human life and nature that allows him to expound “not only all the
rules of morality, but also o f civil conversation” (128). In sum, in his subject matter,
manner, and tone, Horace has “completed” satire in the comic mode, as it has come down
to him from the Old Comedy of the Greeks through Ennius and Lucilius. And as Weinbrot
relates, many commentators of the period, especially in France, thought that the Horatian
strain of satire was the more proper because of its adherence to satire’s distant comedic
origins, and because its topical variety and apparent informality of structure suited better
with the multiform repletion suggested by satire’s etymology (Traditions, 14ff.). However,
the principle of linguistic, intellectual, and generic evolution to which Dryden subscribes
compels him to argue that though Horace has brought satire to a certain plateau of stylistic
and modal perfection, he cannot be credited with bringing it to its potential apex of theme,
structure, and temper. For as the comic temper of Horace’s satire inclined him to treat of
“those little vices which we call follies, the defects o f human understanding, or at most the
peccadillos of life, rather than the tragical vices, to which men are hurried by their unruly
passions and exorbitant desires” (129), so does it dictate that his style remain of a kind with
his subject, “that is, generally grovelling” (130):
He was a  rival to Lucilius, his predecessor, and was resolved to surpass 
him in his own manner. Lucilius, as we see by his remaining fragments, 
minded neither his style nor his numbers, nor his purity of words, nor his 
run of verse. Horace therefore copes with him in that humble way of satire, 
writes under his own force, and carries a dead weight, that he may match 
his competitor in the race. This, I imagine, was the chief reason why he 
minded only the clearness of his satire, and the cleanness o f expression,
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without ascending to those heights to which his own vigour might have 
carried him. But limiting his desires only to the conquest of Lucilius, he had 
his ends o f his rival who lived before him; but made way for a new 
conquest over himself by Juvenal, his successor (130-131).
Juvenal, living at the end o f the first century AO, had the disadvantage, so Dryden
observes, o f using Latin after it had passed its zenith of refinement and grown decadent
However, he did reclaim from the native dramatic satire the vigor and temper of its
invective, and, conflating satire's innate motives o f moral reform and tuition with their
analogues in tragedy and epic—spiritual catharsis and instilling patterns o f virtue and right
action—was able to lend satire a dignity of purpose and tone comparable to those found in
the two genres commonly held to reside at the top of the generic hierarchy. He was thereby
able to “give the last perfection to that work” [to satire] (139), for as the comedic mode
yields in gravity, import, and instruction to the tragic in drama, so too is Horace’s
“comical” satire surpassed by the “tragical satire” of Juvenal (140). Dryden concedes that
Horace’s “urbanity, that is his good manners, are to be commended, but his wit is faint;
and his salt, if  I may dare to say so, almost insipid. Juvenal is o f a more vigorous and
masculine wit; he gives me as much pleasure as I can bear; he fully satisfies my
expectation; . . .  his spleen is raised, and he raises mine; I have the pleasure o f
concernment in all he says” (130). As a poet, Horace may have had the advantage of a
more mellifluous Latin, but Juvenal, living under the reign o f the infamously depraved and
cruel Domitian, had, so far as satire is concerned, the advantage o f his times. For whereas
Horace’s times allowed him to remain “a mild admonisher, a Court satirist," Juvenal’s
“was an age that deserved a more severe chastisement. Vices were more gross and open,
more flagitious, more encouraged by the example of a tyrant, and more protected by his
authority” (135). Adversity, then, provided Juvenal the occasion to raise the “stakes” of his
satire and to sharpen its edge,
so that, granting Horace to be the more general philosopher, we cannot 
deny that Juvenal was the greater poet, 1 mean in satire. His thoughts are 
sharper; his indignation against vice more vehement; his spirit has more of
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the commonwealth genius [i.e. “more political concern”—Watson’s note); 
he treats tyranny, and all the vices attending it, as they deserve, with the 
utmost rigour: and consequently, a  noble soul is better pleased with a 
zealous vindicator o f Roman liberty than with a temporizing poet, a  well- 
mannered Court slave, and a man who is often afraid o f laughing in the 
right place; who is ever decent, because he is naturally servile (131-132).
Accompanying the greater themes, the more exalted temper o f  Juvenal's satire is a
corresponding heightening of thought and expression; Dryden claims for Juvenal that
though “his thoughts are as just as those of Horace,” they are “much more elevated. His
expressions are sonorous and more noble; his verse more numerous, and his words are
suitable to his thoughts, sublime and lofty” (130). “[WJhen there is any thing deficient in
numbers and sound,” Dryden continues, “the reader is uneasy and unsatisfied; he wants
something of his complement, desires somewhat he finds not: and this being the manifest
defect of Horace, ’tis no wonder that, finding it supplied in Juvenal, we are more delighted
with him” (131). This might bring to mind Longinus’ observation that “men find in a
harmonious arrangement o f sounds, not only a natural medium of persuasion and pleasure,
but also a marvellous instrument of grandeur and passion” (150), and his insistence that
this appetite for the sublime is whetted by an innate, “unconquerable passion for all that is
great and for all that is more divine than ourselves” (146). Dryden does not here explicitly
link satire to the sublime, but we should note yet again the close association he assumes
between linguistic facility and formality and poetry’s potential for expressing significant
truths and effecting true changes in a society’s collective understanding and action. Because
sublimity in language unlocks that which is divine in ourselves, it would seem that the
regular realization or near-realization of the sublime by a society’s poets is requisite for
moral and intellectual progress. Having praised Juvenal’s sonorous and noble expressions,
his sublime and lofty thoughts, Dryden hypothesizes that “as versification and numbers are
the greatest pleasures o f poetry,” Virgil, who “practised both so happily” and is all but
perfect in his diction, “could have written sharper satires than either Horace and Juvenal, if
he would have employed his talent that way” (131). Living when Latin was at its zenith.
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having achieved technical perfection, his epic predisposition affording him a panoramic
view o f his time and nation and inclining him to raise his subject and theme to the greatest
possible levels, Virgil might have been the greatest of all satirists,13 Such are the immediate
implications of Dryden’s notions regarding the general progress o f sensibility and its
specific terms, sublimity o f thought and technical proficiency; but the very notion of poetic
progress and the belief, widely held among Dryden’s contemporaries, that Juvenal through
elevation of thought and expression had brought satire itself to its perfection—these would
make it all the easier for a would-be epicist of the first third of the eighteenth century,
having raised English versification to its supposed apex, to survey his society and,
choosing to believe that his nation’s soul was as imperilled as Rome’s under Domitian, tum
his pen to Juvenalian satire and assume without hesitation or apology a public posture of
supreme moral wisdom and authority.
Though the formal definition o f satire Dryden at last appropriates from the
contemporary Dutch classicist Nicolas Heinsius is general enough to describe both the
Horatian and Juvenalian branches o f satire—
Satire is a kind of poetry, without a series of action, invented for the 
purging of our minds; in which human vices, ignorance, and errors, and all 
things besides, which are produced from them in every man, are severely 
reprehended; partly dramatically, partly simply, and sometimes in both 
kinds of speaking; but for the most part figuratively, and occultly; 
consisting in a low familiar way, chiefly in a sharp and pungent manner of 
speech; but partly, also, in a facetious and civil way o f jesting; by which 
either hatred, or laughter, or indignation, is moved (143)—
in deference to Juvenal’s assumed superiority in mode and manner Dryden is careful to
make one important qualification; that the “low familiar way,” so characteristic of Horace,
be replaced by the more elevated and dignified style of Juvenal. And accordingly it is from
the example of Juvenal, the completer and perfecter of the genre, that Dryden abstracts his
13 Though Virgil, the epicist of Augustus’ Rome, would presumably have labored under the same 
disadvantages of the times as his contemporary, Horace.
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five general principles for the composition of modem satire. The modem satire, he says, 
“ought only to treat of one subject; to be confined to one particular theme; or at least, to one 
principally. If other vices occur in the management o f the chief, they should only be 
transiently lashed, and not be insisted upon so as to make the design double” (145). It is a 
flaw in Horace’s satires, he notes, that in each his subjects are so many, his theme so 
diffuse.14 Second, the poet must give the reader “some precept o f moral virtue, and to 
caution him against some one particular vice or folly” (146). For every vice that is lashed, 
the opposing virtue must be praised: “In general, all virtues are everywhere to be praised 
and recommended to practice; and all vices to be reprehended, and made either odious or 
ridiculous; or else there is a fundamental error in the whole design” (146). Third, the 
proper human targets for it must be chosen. These are not ever to include the virtuous—be 
they ever so poor or out o f favor—nor, Dryden implies, anyone with whom one merely 
has a quarrel. In fact, on two occasions in the Discourse Dryden proudly points out that he 
has refrained from answering attacks on his poetry and character; to answer them would 
prolong the public life o f both the slanders and their authors and demean Dryden himself. 
However, it is “an action of virtue to make examples of vicious men” and public nuisances: 
“They may and ought to be upbraided with their crimes and follies; both for their own 
amendment, if they are not yet incorrigible, and for the terror o f others, to hinder them 
from falling into those enormities which they see so severely punished in others” (126-7). 
Fourth, it is ideal to adopt “that sharp, well-mannered way of laughing a folly out of 
countenance” (147)—a blend, it seems, of Juvenalian asperity and Horatian polish: even
14 It is important for verse satire's place in the generic hierarchy that Dryden imposes on it an ideal, 
regular form and an “elevated” manner. He claims, as noted, to derive this form—the so-called bipartite 
structure, in which an attack on a particular vice is followed by praise of its opposing virtue—from 
Juvenal. As Randolph points out, however, it is only with great difficulty that such a structure may be 
imposed on Juvenal’s satires (382). The notion is in fact largely D ry den’s own. He insists on it for the 
same reasons he insists that satire employ dignified diction and versification, for the same reasons that 
he asserts that the composition of satire may be methodized at all: to establish the formal viability of 
the genre and thus demonstrate that the Juvenalian satire he champions is a fully developed genre whose 
inherent rules and aims have reached maturity.
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Dryden concedes that Juvenal is “sometimes too luxuriant, too redundant; says more than 
he needs” (130), and further, that “this way of Horace was the best for amending manners, 
as it is the most difficult His [Juvenal's) was an ense rescindendum  [hacking with the 
swordl; but that of Horace was a pleasant cure, with all the limbs preserved entire” (138). 
A rebuked offender is more likely than a slaughtered one to reform, and so while “Juvenal 
always intends to move your indignation, and he always brings about his purpose” (138), 
Juvenal's manner is sometimes too piquant to achieve the ostensible ends of satire. Thus 
sharpness must be tempered with understatement, subtlety: “Let the chastisements of 
Juvenal be never so necessary for his new kind of satire,” Dryden declares, “let him 
declaim as wittily and sharply as he pleases; yet still the nicest and most delicate touches of 
satire consist in fine raillery,” adding a bit later in a now-famous passage, “How easy it is 
to call rogue and villain, and that wittily! But how hard to make a man appear a fool, a 
blockhead, or a knave, without using any of those opprobrious terms!. . .  [T]here is still a 
vast difference betwixt the slovenly butchering of a man, and the fineness of a stroke that 
separates the head from the body, and leaves it standing in its place” (136-137). And 
finally, as we have just seen, the dignity of the genre should be matched by dignified 
versification. To avoid the burlesque rhythms of Samuel Butler’s Hudibras, for example, 
Dryden recommends that the satirist compose in heroic verse, that is, iambic pentameter. 
This meter is more dignified than tetrameter, Dryden argues, because it is “more roomy: the 
thought can tum itself with ease in a larger compass. When the rhyme comes too thick 
upon us, it straitens the expression; we are thinking of the close, when we should be 
employed in adorning [i.e. giving the best possible expression of) the thought” (147-148).
As Weinbrot asserts in The Formal Strain: Studies in Augustan Imitation and Satire 
(1969), and as his survey of eighteenth-century satiric theory and practice in Alexander 
Pope and the Traditions o f Formal Verse Satire (1982) makes clear, Dryden's Discourse 
was the formative document of English satire, and for a century after his death would retain 
a prestige in kind and degree comparable only to that long accruing to the treatises of
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Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus. Though Dryden’s etymological scholarship, his criticism 
of the Roman satirists, and his prescriptions regarding the composition of satire were 
almost wholly derived from Continental models, the Discourse Concerning Satire, 
Weinbrot says, made the genre newly “popular, gave it an English dress,” and with it “an 
immense new authority” (Formal Strain, 67).
This authority largely derives from the particular public role Dryden’s genealogies, 
definitions, and guidelines for the genre establish for satire and the contemporary satirist 
For above all else, satire is a  public genre, a forum for the exposure and humiliation of the 
wicked or foolish. In The A n  o f Satire (1940), David Worcester suggests that in its earliest 
forms, satire was the “ally o f brute force,” a type o f sorcerer’s spell resorted to when all 
else had failed to achieve one’s ends: “If an enemy is beyond the reach of persuasion, 
bribery, or physical compulsion, magic offers the only hope of controlling him” (148). But 
even in its more mundane manifestations satire remains an essentially coercive force. 
Matthew Hodgart observes that exposing miscreants to public scorn has been used 
universally among ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’ peoples alike as a means of reinforcing social 
norms (14-15). Ideally, the shame arising from such exposure reinforces in the 
transgressor of moral or legal order an intellectual realization of the inappropriateness of his 
behavior. In this way, the guilty are turned from vice, and those inclined to transgress are 
deterred from doing so for fear of being similarly exposed. Dryden makes much the same 
claim in his Discourse when he approves Horace’s choice to desist from writing lampoons 
against personal enemies and instead undertake “to correct the vices and follies of his time, 
and to give the rules of a happy and virtuous life” (125). The lampoon, in which a 
particular person is made publicly ridiculous, often in the coarsest and most scurrilous 
terms, Dryden pronounces “a very dangerous sort of weapon, and for the most part 
unlawful. We have no moral right on the reputation of other men. ’Tis taking from them 
what we cannot restore to them” (125). And yet, he continues, “when we have been 
affronted in the same nature” it is permissible to answer in kind—and when the wicked
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have become public nuisances, noxious to ethics and morality, lampooning satire is not 
merely permissible, but the poet’s duty: “’Tis an action o f virtue to make examples of 
vicious men. They may and ought to be upbraided with their crimes and follies; both for 
their own amendment, if they are not yet incorrigible, and for the terror of others, to hinder 
them from falling into those enormities which they see are so severely punished in the 
persons of others. The first reason [isl only an excuse for revenge; but this second is 
absolutely of a poet’s office to perform” (126-127).
It is this innately public function of satire to punish vice and encourage virtue that 
justifies the satirist’s public stance. But the impulses of satire toward correction and 
instruction put the modem satirist in a problematic position. For it is one thing to enforce 
norms of socially acceptable behavior in small, self-enclosed communities of the type 
Hodgart cites, comparatively homogeneous as they are in worldview and moral sense, and 
quite another to attempt to correct and instruct the population of a metropolis, composed as 
it is o f persons likely to be mutually anonymous and highly unlikely to share identical 
notions of ethical propriety. But if the satirist’s rebuke of vice and the vicious—or 
commendation of virtue and the virtuous—is to be intelligible, let alone cogent and 
authoritative, he must portray broadly recognizable personages or types and appeal to just 
such communal standards of right and wrong. Dryden’s praise o f Juvenal—“his spleen is 
raised, and he raises mine; I have the pleasure of concernment in all he says” (130)— 
reminds us that the satirist must make us feel that we are personally concerned in his satire, 
that our own sense of social propriety has been affronted. We are not likely to be moved by 
his fulminations if the target of his satire is obscure or too far removed from our everyday 
experience, or if the target’s purported transgressions are o f a kind wholly unfamiliar or not 
something we usually consider vicious. And yet these difficulties of addressing an unseen, 
greatly individuated audience may after all be turned to the satirist’s advantage, may in fact 
enhance his authority. For when a sense of communal norms is lacking, or perceived to be 
lacking, it is easier for a moralist to put forth ideals of private and public virtues ostensibly
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recovered from the original ethical ‘‘templates" of a nation’s golden age; and these ideals are 
the more likely to be accepted precisely because they are ideals, timeless abstractions 
unencumbered with the innumerable minute qualifications and equivocations that 
immediate, local circumstances impose on the situational application o f moral principles. 
(Human nature being what it is, we are willing enough to acknowledge our own misdeeds 
if we are convinced that society as a whole has fallen into error.) Further, by putting forth 
such ideals, the satirist can attract a  good deal of cultural esteem to himself—not simply 
because (the implication goes) he alone has been able to recover and articulate them, but 
because by doing so he is made at once a definer and defender of the values of his society. 
Ostensibly, he is personally disinterested in his targets and their particular vices, except 
insofar as they appear to threaten the social and moral order. Or the rational order. As Mary 
Claire Randolph says, “the essential function of Satire is ever by Ridicule to recall Man 
from the byways of Unreason to the base line of Reason, that is, to present Rational Man 
as the norm or standard" (374). This is why Dryden is so careful to argue in his Discourse 
that public, not private interest obliges the satirist to compose and publish, for it is only 
when he can propose his moral prescriptions as the simple, self-evident givens of a healthy 
civilization—impartial, non-partisan, and beyond question—that the satirist can properly 
claim a significant degree of cultural authority for his poetry and himself. When the satirist 
fails to do this, or when, in his role of social conscience, he asserts moral ideals that 
conflict with those held by figures and institutions of social authority, or by a large number 
of his fellow citizens, the satirist finds himself at odds with society at large; he becomes an 
outsider, and is likely to be thought of as seditious, a disturber of the social order—or 
worse still: simply irrelevant. But these circumstances, too, may be turned to the poet’s 
advantage, for they allow the satirist to transcend his usual role of defender of norms 
circumscribed by their particular place and time and assume a truly heroic stance as the sole 
upholder of those absolute, universal truths impervious to change and compromise, truths 
that give no quarter to considerations of rank, condition, and power. And these truths in
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their tum embolden and protect the satirist; beneath their aegis, he may dare to give the lie 
to the world’s wickedness.
Such at least is the posture and temper adopted by the practitioner of Juvenalian 
satire. Perhaps it is ironic that Dryden would so enthusiastically promote this strain in a 
treatise written long after he himself had retired from the public eye to enjoy, as Pope says, 
“the safe innocence o f a dull translator.” In fact, not long after the appearance of the 
Discourse, Dryden would formally renounce satire altogether. In a  postscript to the reader 
appended to his translation o f Virgil (1697), he declares that the deficiencies of 
contemporary poets leave “a field of satire open to me: but, since the Revolution, I have 
wholly renounced that talent For who would give physic to the great when he is uncalled? 
To do his patient no good, and endanger himself for his prescription.” He concludes, 
almost abjectly, “’Tis enough for me, if the Government will let me pass unquestioned” (II. 
259). But if we may judge by the enduring influence of his Discourse, Dryden’s personal 
inclinations and actions did not undermine the force o f his argument On the contrary, the 
treatise gave formal verse satire a lasting definition, shape, and purpose, and positively 
established the satirist as the conscience of his time and people. And the irony of Dryden's 
retirement is compounded when we consider that his Discourse does not vaguely prescribe 
some merely theoretical public role for the modem satirist—in the way, for instance, that 
Neander had made a generally hypothetical case for rhymed drama in O f Dramatic Poesy: 
An Essay—but rather advocates a very specific, pragmatic role for the satirist as moral 
activist, as fearless opponent to the seemingly unopposable forces that would enslave a 
people and subvert their sense o f virtue. Having argued that the Juvenalian mode marks 
satire’s fullest structural, thematic, and tonal development, Dryden is almost compelled to 
argue as well that if  the modem satirist would realize the genre’s noblest capacities, he must 
be moved to Juvenalian indignation by the social and political conditions he finds about 
him. He must, in short, imitate Juvenal’s fury as well as his form.
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As if to facilitate this, Dryden goes so far as to detail, in his contrasting of Horace 
and Juvenal's careers, the particular circumstances in which the satirist-as-activist has 
historically thriven, as well as the appropriate Juvenalian responses to them. We have 
already observed that for Dryden “Horace had the disadvantage of the times in which he 
lived; they were better for the man, but worse for the satirist” (132). Augustus was a 
moderate ruler, after all, and one might argue that Horace thus had no justification for 
turning from his preoccupation with the peccadilloes o f human nature and unleashing 
satire’s harsher sting. But Dryden condemns just as he seems about to exonerate. Horace’s 
preoccupation with folly, he argues, is due to his personal lack o f moral integrity. 
Recounting Horace’s background, character, and role at Augustus’ court at some length, 
Dryden concludes that “though his age was not exempted from the worst of villainies,” 
“Horace, as he was a  courtier, complied with the interest of his master; and, avoiding the 
lashing of greater crimes, confined himself to the ridiculing o f petty vices and common 
follies” (134-5). Almost as an afterthought, Dryden supposes that “he was not the proper 
man to arraign great vices, at least if the stories which we hear o f him are true, that he 
practiced some,” adding with ironic grace, “which [vices] I will not here mention, out of 
honor to him” (135). Horace thus cannot aspire to satire’s highest rank, for he wallows in 
the very vices he has not the moral courage or credentials to condemn. Dryden admits that 
an edict of Augustus had banned satires and lampoons. But this does not excuse Horace; it 
only indicts him further—at least it does once one considers the example set by his 
successor, Juvenal. For whereas Horace flourished under the comparatively benign 
Augustus, Juvenal composed under Domitian, a ruler renowned for his despotism, 
lasciviousness, and arbitrary cruelty. As Dryden observes, “Little follies were out of doors, 
when oppression was to be scourged instead of avarice: it was no longer time to tum into 
ridicule the false opinions o f philosophers, when the Roman liberty was to be asserted” 
(132). Juvenal saw the vices practiced and encouraged by Domitian and attacked them 
openly; and though to screen himself from persecution he makes Nero the villain of his
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satires, it is plain that Domitian and his court are meant In perilous times, Juvenal dared to 
assert a moral law higher than that of mere force, which had grown despotic, or custom, 
which had become debased; Juvenal, therefore, deserves to be ranked as the greatest of 
classical satirists.
In Eighteenth-Century Satire, Howard Weinbrot suggests that Juvenal was so dear 
to Dryden because he, like Dryden, was a political and social outsider (3). But, he observes 
further, such admiration was not unique to Dryden; for Dryden’s age, “To be Juvenalian.. 
. is to resist oppression, to punish those who aid corruption o f manners, virtue or politics, 
and to embody high standards of bravery in the face of the enemy’s hordes” (134). To be 
Horatian was to be something else entirely, for Horace, being Augustus’ court poet, was 
suspected by the age as well as by Dryden of flattery and “moral equivocation” (29; 133). 
Curiously, such appraisals have less to do with Horace than with contemporary views of 
Augustus himself. Augustus is generally known for finally restoring political and civil 
order after a generation of uneasy political alliances, bloody interfactional feuding, and 
outright civil war; he is known also for being a patron of the arts and of learning, for under 
him flourished not only Horace, but Virgil, Ovid, Strabo, and Livy. But in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries a different image of Augustus prevailed. Augustus, conventional 
wisdom went, had restored order, but at the expense of the Republic; he encouraged 
poetry, but simultaneously weakened i t  Weinbrot sums up these notions: “In short in 
France as well as England several major authors and commentators believed that by 
encouraging flattery, servility, and tyranny, and discouraging free and just evaluation of all 
aspects o f the state and its leader, Augustus lowered the quality of letters” (Eighteenth- 
Century Satire, 26). Though Augustus was no Caligula or Nero—nor even a Tiberius, for 
that matter—he was seen as proto-tyrant, as a ruler who set himself above the law, 
gathered into his hands absolute power, and in so doing set for Rome a dangerous 
precedent: later cssars would wield his authority but not exercise his self-restraint; they 
would indulge themselves, and forget the good of Rome. Augustus liked to claim that he
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found Rome a city of bricks and left it a city o f marble; his successors would find Rome 
marble, but leave her brick again. From the Restoration through the time of Gibbon’s The 
Decline and Fall o f the Roman Empire (1776-88) the period following the fall of 
Republican Rome was seen as an age characterized by the rapid expansion of tyranny and 
the equally rapid decline of letters and liberties. Juvenal, says Weinbrot, saw in his own 
day that the hordes of Virtue’s enemies had triumphed; accordingly, “his tones became not 
only biting but ‘epic’ or ‘tragic’ and thus more sublime and compelling” (Eighteenth- 
Century Satire, 133). In saying this, he but echoes Dryden, who would likely have 
accounted for the “epic” quality of Juvenal’s verse by pointing out that satire is the obverse 
of epic: whereas Virgil had depicted the heroic rise of a  people, Juvenal portrayed its slow, 
sordid fall.
In celebrating the achievements of Juvenalian satire, Dryden historically links that 
strain of the genre to political opposition to a decadent Establishment, and thereby implicitly 
invests Opposition in general with an a priori moral authority that validates its indignation 
and resorts to literary attacks on those in power. This is a shrewd move, for it fashions a 
universal law from historically specific circumstances: real or perceived, tyranny merits 
satire. The modem would-be satirist, thus encouraged to realize the genre’s noblest 
capacities, is also subtly encouraged to see about him the trappings of tyranny, subtly 
coaxed to unsheath the weapon forged for the defense o f truth and virtue. Moreover, the 
modem satirist is encouraged to read contemporary history—the historical present—in 
terms of those archetypal scenarios, especially from classical antiquity, into which may be 
fitted and against which may be measured the mazy topography of present-day events and 
personages. Drawing parallels between present and past was then a common feature of 
British historiography, but we should recognize that also at work here is the predisposition 
of contemporary public poetry to unite in its fashioning of social memory immediate literal 
realities with framing devices that are clearly non-literal and therefore function figuratively. 
Here the framing device has to do with a figurative context, that is, when actions.
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circumstances, or historical figures are placed in settings recognizably distinct from their 
original backdrops, or when the mode or tone o f their presentation is at odds with what 
such subjects would seem “naturally” to elicit But Dryden’s discussion of satire also 
allows for the figurative use of content, cast, and (to complete the alliteration) continuity', as 
when, respectively, things normally considered unrelated or incongruous are brought 
together, usually for the purpose of ironic juxtaposition; when the poet eschews drawing 
absolute likenesses and instead uses hyperbole, diminution, caricature, or idealization to 
make the poem’s objects (whether human, institutional, or thematic) more grotesque or 
more beautiful than their originals;15 or when the components of a poem are arranged to 
form either a static paradigm (such as the carefully cultivated association of Puritanism and 
political dissent) or a narrative progress (as in AfacFlecknoe) ostensibly deriving from the 
materials as the poet found them, though each is the poet’s invention.
We should consider then, that, having established satire as a definitively public 
genre, one habitually—necessarily—blending literal and figurative elements, Dryden’s 
essay likewise imposes certain implicit demands upon those whom satire pretends to serve 
and protect, those who, sheltering beneath the satirist’s moral shield, by so doing transfer 
to the poet the public voice and the cultural authority they could not as individuals assert to 
full effect Many of the demands satire places upon its readers follow logically from those 
of public poetry in general, but both the common and peculiar requisites of understanding 
satire are worth enumerating here. Beginning with the literal elements of the genre, we 
should note that because satire is usually topical, frequently to the point o f being 
journalistic, its readers must be competent observers of the world about them; they must be
15 Dryden argues in “A Defence of an Essay of Dramatic Poesy” (1668), “Were there neither judge, taste, 
nor opinion in the world, yet [tragedy and comedy] would differ in their natures; for the action, 
character, and language of tragedy would still be great and high, that of comedy low and familiar; 
admiration would be the delight of one, and satire of the other” (1,119). By the time Dryden came to 
write his Discourse his views had apparently changed a great deal, for, as we have seen, he here declares 
satire—at least its Juvenalian mode—to be of sufficient dignity in theme and expression, of sufficient 
importance in its ends, to be classified as a species of heroic poetry.
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broadly though not deeply knowledgeable of the public figures, events, trends, fashions, 
moods, and catchwords o f their times and locales. Only then will they be capable of 
catching and making sense of the poet’s allusions to circumstances of the present day; only 
then will they have a notion o f what is being attacked and what (by implication) is being 
held up for admiration. More important, only then will they have a desire to attend to the 
satirist at all, for as Worcester rightly points out, satire is distinguished by the 
indispensability o f its readers in the creation of meaning (29-31). If we find a satiric work 
intriguing, provocative, or witty, it is in good part because we have (or imagine we have) 
first-hand knowledge of its subjects. And even if we are vexed to find ourselves, our pet 
ideals and follies pilloried, when we have our own images and experiences to compare with 
those the satirist puts before us, we are nonetheless gratified by the feeling that we form 
with the satirist, in Worcester’s phrase, “a small superior audience of cognoscienti” (165). 
Our knowledge of the everyday world in effect supplies the satirical poem with much o f its 
raw material, but the reward is the perceived compliment the poet pays to our perspicacity; 
conversely, the satirist’s pay-off for obliging our vanity, apart from being understood, is 
our own increased appetite for that esoteric “insider” knowledge he trades in. Controversy 
and scandal excite, magnetize our attention. The more we know, the more we want to 
know; the more we want to know, the more attentive and inquiring we become, hence the 
more knowledgeable; the more knowing we are, the greater the potential range and depth of 
the satirist’s topical allusions; the more successfully this potential is exploited, the greater 
the satirist’s credibility as observer and commentator—and the greater his social 
authority.16
16 In the “Advertisement" for The Dunciad Variorum (1729), Pope would write of the elaborate 
“Commentary which attends the Poem" that “the reader cannot but derive one pleasure from the very 
Obscurity of the persons it treats of, that it partakes of the nature of a Secret, which most people love 
to be let into, tho’ the Men or the Things be ever so inconsiderable or trivial" (317).
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Along with this knowledge o f the everyday, the readers of satire must have a certain 
degree of cultural knowledge. This knowledge includes at least a passing familiarity with 
literary genres and their conventions as well as with the classic works of literary history. 
Such familiarity enables us to trace a  satirist's use of literary allusions; of ironic yokings of 
subject, genre, and mode; and o f  the archetypal or fabulous plots into which discrete 
contemporary details and episodes have been woven. Broad literary knowledge thus 
affords us glimpses into the design (structure), methods (machinery), and ends (moral 
purpose) of a poem that enrich our experience of it. To take an obvious example, our 
appreciation of The Rape o f the Lock as social satire is enhanced if we know something of 
its forebears in the genre of mock-epic, notably Boileau’s Le Lutrin and Garth’s The 
Dispensary, and enhanced still further the greater our acquaintance with epic conventions, 
especially as they occur in The Iliad  and The Aeneid. Familiarity with Boileau and Garth 
will help us recognize the species o f Pope’s poem and read it with expectations appropriate 
for the characteristic features o f the mock-epic, and at the same time set off Pope’s 
deviations from established practice, his innovations and embellishments; familiarity with 
Homer and Virgil will give us the wherewithal to read the poem not just as an amusing 
attack on affectation, idleness, and superficial values, but with a proper irony and an 
appreciation of the ominous moral failings o f a society whose leading inhabitants’ 
attentions and actions so little merit the heroic trappings with which the poet has adorned 
them.
But apart from literary or, more broadly, ssthetic knowledge, cultural “literacy" 
consists in an awareness of the formal and popular institutions of one’s time, place, and 
society—and in something rather more than that: a depth and facility of comprehension 
regarding the political and social history of one’s nation, as well as a ready physical and 
psychological participation in its religions, civic and folk traditions, worldviews, popular 
beliefs, mores and manners (both ideal and actual), manias, and amusements. One must 
also have some sense of what it is that distinguishes one’s own community from others—
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
432
even if the features one cites are in fact common to several communities or are even wholly 
illusory, for without practical, day-to-day notions of communal identity and those things in 
which it consists, it would, paradoxically, be difficult if not impossible to know oneself 
fully as an individual integral to, yet distinct from the whole. As our knowledge of the 
topical enables us to carry on the everyday business o f keeping life going, so does our 
more deeply rooted sense of collective cultural continuity allow us to make ourselves 
ethically, morally, aesthetically, referentially, and thereby personally intelligible to one 
another. This makes it possible for the satirist to appeal to shared assumptions of right and 
wrong, virtue and vice; to shared expectations for the conventions of artistic expression; 
and to shared habits of historical and social allusion. But further, our sense of collective 
cultural continuity makes us desire such mutual intelligibility, and this desire, in turn, 
underlies our capacity for tolerance and compassion—and our appetite for square-dealing, 
liberty, and justice.
This communal perspective might be entirely chimerical, at best a hypothetical 
proposition. For instance, in her Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (1992), Linda 
Colley makes the point that after the 1707 Act of Union, the notion of “Britain” in practice 
connoted very different things to the islands’ many constituencies, who were, she says, 
“infinitely diverse in terms of [theirj customs and cultures of [their] inhabitants” (17). And 
yet, Colley continues, these inhabitants “came to define themselves as Britons—in addition 
to defining themselves in many other ways—because circumstances impressed them with 
the belief that they were different from those beyond their shores, and in particular different 
from their prime enemy, the French” (17). The awareness of these differences, together 
with the nation’s increased internal physical and economic cohesion, and its continued 
emergence on the international stage, forced Britons o f every stripe to accept that a 
“Britain” did indeed exist, if “only” as some abstract entity or ideal. Analogously, though a 
society at large may share no single set of values, no single sense of history and culture, in 
practice its members often assume that just such a unified (and unifying) moral and social
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identity in feet exists—or should. The satirist, as I have suggested above, is all but obliged 
to posit and appeal to such assumptions as if  they were self-evident, givens. Yet in doing 
so, the satirist depends not only upon his readers’ desire for mutual cultural intelligibility, 
but upon their capacity to receive and entertain ideas of things that occur nowhere literally 
in the world about them.
Put another way, the satirist demands of his readers that they be able to read a text 
the way they “read" their society and its institutions, as operative conflations o f the actual 
and the ideal, and that they be able to read literally and figuratively at the same time. 
Worcester calls satire “a game of wits” (29) between poet and reader. More than any other 
mode, he argues, satire makes use of what he calls the cognitive “time-lag” in 
communication,“that is, the interval between the perception of the printed or spoken words 
and the full comprehension o f their message” (29). That interval is greatest in this genre, 
presumably, because of the ironic gap satire typically opens between what is said and what 
is meant, but also because of the figurative framing devices satire employs. The readers of 
satire must be able to read ironically, against the apparent meaning or significance o f what 
is set before them; further, they must also be able to “triangulate”: to recognize the poet’s 
model or original, but also the particular distortions of setting, make-up, paradigm, fable, 
and appearance effected by the satirist's several figurative apparatus (context, content, 
continuity, cast, and their many combinations) upon the object in question—and beyond 
both, what neither a literal nor a figurative portrayal of the object conveys in itself, but only 
when alloyed with the other that subsuming moral or ethical ideal embodied in a particular 
person, action, or circumstance. That these moral and ethical ideals are the true and ultimate 
aim of the satirist is implied in Dryden’s admonition in his Discourse that a satiric work 
should treat of a single vice and a single opposing virtue. “If other vices [or virtues] occur 
in the management of the chief,” his argument continues, “they should only be transiently 
lashed [or praised], and not be insisted on so as to make the design double,” for a doubling 
of design would divide the reader’s attention, hindering the apprehension of the desired
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precepts, and thus leaving the reader unclear about the moral significance of the poem—  
“As in a play of the English fashion, which we may call tragi-comedy, there is to be but 
one main design; and tho’ there may be an under-plot, or second walk of comical characters 
and adventures, yet they are subservient to the chief fable, carried along under it, and 
helping to it; so that the drama may not seem a  monster with two heads” (145). Further, 
what variety of topic Dryden does allow in a satiric work (“if  variety be o f absolute 
necessity in every one of them, according to the etymology o f the word”) is to “arise 
naturally from one subject, as it is diversely treated, in the several subordinate branches of 
it, all relating to the chief. It may be illustrated accordingly with variety of examples in the 
subdivisions of it, and with as many precepts as there are members of it; which altogether 
may complete that olla, or hotchpotch, which is properly a satire” (145-146). In other 
words, the satirist is to give us a complete picture—that is, a  composite idea—of a single 
vice (or virtue) by putting before us its various inflections or manifestations.
If this sounds familiar, it is because Dryden has said much the same thing in his 
many discussions of dramatic representation, where, as we have seen, he anticipated 
Locke’s notion of the complex idea, that object of the understanding existing nowhere but 
in human thought, and best imparted to the mind by practical illustrations of its observable 
properties, supplemented by enumeration of those properties not obvious to the senses. 
Keeping this in mind, as well as the several constraints Dryden’s directions for the 
composition of modem satire place upon satirist and reader alike, one gains a fairly clear 
notion of how satirical presentation and representation work upon individual and public 
memory.
Breaking down the mnemonic operations of satire according to the categories used 
in Chapter 3 to describe the workings o f images in general upon the sense, psyche, and 
intellect, we might recall, to begin with, Dryden’s criteria for Virgil’s hypothetical 
preeminence among satirists. As with public poetry in general, satire must leave a deep 
sensual impression upon the reader, beginning with the ear. Here the sensation must be a
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pleasing one: unacceptable is the “scabrous,” “hobbling” verse of Persius, whose diction is 
“hard,” his words “not everywhere well chosen” (118). Rather, as satire at its noblest 
seeks to instill in its readers an abhorrence of vice and a  love of virtue, its “versification and 
numbers” must be of sufficient smoothness and regularity, its diction of sufficient elevation 
and dignity not simply to give us pleasure, but to answer our innate sense o f aural 
propriety. For, as Dryden warns, “when there is any thing deficient in numbers and sound, 
the reader is uneasy and unsatisfied; he wants something o f his complement, desires 
somewhat which he finds not” (131). And thus Dryden scorns Hudibrastics and 
recommends heroic verse as the proper medium for satire: its “roominess” allows for 
“sublimity of expression” (149); its rhyme knits up the memory. It is important that the 
satiric poem be aurally pleasing, for as in other modes of poetry, the appropriate sound and 
rhythm incline the other portals of perception and feeling to admit those impressions that 
move us most readily and powerfully: the images that play before the mind’s eye. As with 
the imagery of public poetry in general, satiric images, whether as wholes or in their 
several components, must be broadly recognizable to their potential public, yet 
distinguished by their intensity, cohesion, and durability from the stream of visual 
impressions washing over us every day. And here, too, the poet must strike a balance 
between the ephemerally commonplace and the perversely idiosyncratic confabulation. 
Dryden faults Horace, for instance, because the “lowness” of his subjects forces him into 
correspondingly low locutions, and Persius, because “his figures are generally too bold 
and daring, and his tropes, particularly his metaphors, insufferably strained” (118). But the 
satirist has the additional labor, first, o f making his images recognizable not in spite o f the 
effects of their physical distortion or the unexpected combination of their discrete elements, 
but because of them, for, second, these unfamiliar manifestations of familiar persons, 
objects, or settings must, unlike merely illustrative images, convey a fairly self-evident 
moral significance to the reader. This moral tendency is the main difference between the 
satiric and the primarily descriptive image; the former may describe and the latter may be
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put toward a satiric end, but whereas the descriptive figure—a metaphor, simile, or an 
image designed to aid memory—works by making the unfamiliar better known, the satiric 
figure seeks to make the known at least momentarily unfamiliar, as it must if it is to induce 
in the reader the habit o f triangulating en route to the controlling idea behind the image. It 
follows that, as the same difference holds between larger arrangements or configurations of 
satiric images and their descriptive counterparts, the same variances in mnemonic operation 
will recur as well, even (and perhaps especially) when, to use Worcester’s term, the 
cognitive “time-lag” is greatest, the figurative framing apparatus at its most elaborate, its 
operations upon the senses and understanding most oblique, subtle.
The additional burden satiric imagery must bear points up the special claims of 
satire upon the intellect and memory. For one thing, the public nature of satire forces the 
satirist to show us what we know, or what we might be expected to know, about our times 
and culture. Familiar faces, settings, events, and customs are set before us, and we are 
implicitly asked to recognize our collective portrait, and by doing so, add our presence to 
the satirist’s in the public sphere he fashions on the page before us. But, because satire has 
as well a moral function (to expose vice and exalt virtue), and because, as poetry, it must 
please as it teaches, or teach by pleasing, the poet must proceed from exposition to tuition 
indirectly, via delight Mere railing against wrongdoing and wrong-doers is not satire, but 
invective; and it is the lot of the parson, not the poet, to induce right action by bare 
prescription. As he takes his leave of Dorset near the end of his Discourse, Dryden spends 
a moment to underscore the teaching power of satiric delight: “They who will not grant me 
that pleasure is one of the ends o f poetry, but that it is only a means o f compassing the only 
end, which is instruction, must yet allow that, without the means of pleasure, the 
instruction is but a bare and dry philosophy: a crude preparation of morals, which we may
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have from Aristotle and Epictetus, with more profit than from any poet” ( 153).17 Attracted 
to the poem by its topicality, amused by the distortions effected by its figurative apparatus, 
we are then seemingly left to infer the poet’s precepts for ourselves.
Seemingly—for the satirist carefully engineers the process o f our self-instruction. 
Having enticed us into the world o f the poem, a world familiar to us as a reflection o f our 
everyday experiences and received knowledge, the poet goes about making the familiar 
appear foreign (and sometimes, the foreign familiar)—not at random, but according to cues 
inherent in the satire’s objects and themes, and according to recognizable patterns of 
figurative representation. Thus, for example, in Absalom and Achitophel Dryden sets the 
Shaftesbury-contrived struggle between Charles II and the Duke o f Monmouth in the 
context of the Biblical story of the evil counselor Ahithophel’s beguiling Absalom into 
rebellion against his father, King David; thus, in the same poem, he juxtaposes a roster of 
the unambiguously villainous with one for their unambiguously heroic opponents, all the 
while telescoping the progress of current events for maximum dramatic effect; thus he 
recasts the major players in the drama—Oates, Shaftesbury, Buckingham, Charles himself, 
and many others—as Biblical personages, and as exemplars of particular traits of character; 
and thus he arranges his reconfigured circumstances, episodes, and caricatures into a loose 
narrative that lends the coherence of archetype to current events, yet is left incomplete, 
Dryden says in his preface to the poem, so that the unfortunate ending of the Biblical 
parallel may be averted: “Were I the inventor, who am only the historian, I should certainly 
conclude the piece with the reconcilement of Absalom to David. And who knows but this 
may come to pass? Things were not brought to an extremity where I left the story; there
17 Pope was of a mind with Dryden on this point; he would write to Arbuthnot on July 26, 1734, "To 
attack Vices in the abstract, without touching Persons, may be safe fighting indeed, but it is fighting 
with Shadows. General propositions are obscure, misty, and uncertain, compar'd with plain, full, and 
home examples: Precepts only apply to our Reason, which in most men is but weak: Examples are 
pictures, and strike the Senses, nay raise the Passions, and call in those (the strongest and most general 
of all motives) to the aid of reformation” (Corr., IV, 419).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
438
seems yet to be room left for a composure; hereafter there may be only for pity” (189).18
Other literary forms use illustrative parallels, but as satire reconstitutes the familiar, 
it does not so much fashion parallels to everyday reality as effect changes in its originals 
and then merge these “inflected” elements inextricably within its figurative apparatus. These 
changes or distortions affect social memory of the historical present in three ways. First, 
the reconstitution o f form, whether in terms of context, content, cast, or continuity, tends 
in itself to operate as a mnemonic device, as an aid  to memory: the complexities and 
minutiae of current events are simplified and set within an easily retained narrative scheme, 
the personages made memorable by their exaggerated features. Second, by being 
conventional, that is, clearly deriving from the peculiarities o f the historical present, the 
distortions or figurative apparatus the poet imposes upon his materials tend to follow 
certain foreseeable patterns, with the resulting reconstitutions also assuming readily 
anticipated “shapes.” In this way, the satirically focused eye (of poet and reader alike) can 
train itself upon literal realities and discern in them their logical figurative analogues—much 
as Dryden (and many others) saw in Shaftesbury’s machinations or in Charles’ promiscuity 
and love o f ease latter-day exempla o f Scriptural types, and in their Biblical struggle, a 
recurring historical pattern. This pattern is inflected, to be sure, by immediate and local 
circumstances, but useful nonetheless as a moral “text” from which to cull examples of 
villainy, folly, and virtue sufficient to warn readers against the wickedness of sedition— 
and to remind Charles that if he was to be revered as a monarch he must comport himself 
with a king’s discretion and dignity. In short, the satirical habit tends to incline our 
experience o f the historical present toward certain perceptual and interpretive 
prefabrications. Third, and perhaps less obviously, the experience of momentary 
disorientation that sweeps over us as our world is made suddenly unfamiliar throws into 
relief those features of it that we had perhaps taken for granted, forcing us into a new
18 From James Kinsley’s edition of Dryden’s poetical works (Oxford: Oxford: UP, 1970).
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recognition of them, fixing in our understanding a heightened sense of their practical and 
(especially) ethical significance.
This last consideration takes us from the influence o f satiric reconstitution upon 
memory to the complementary influence o f satiric indirection, for the reconstitution of the 
familiar and the underscoring o f its moral import is fixed in the mind of the reader by the 
process of closing the ironic and figurative gaps inherent in satiric representation. Satire is 
by nature rhetorical, persuasive, to some degree coercive; as Worcester observes, its 
“preconceived purpose [is] to instill a given set of emotions or opinions into the reader” 
(8). But unlike other rhetorical forms, satire leaves its auditors or readers to make the 
connections between utterance and intent, figure and reality, exposition and theme—to 
fashion the meaning for themselves. Worcester argues sensibly that the greater these gaps, 
the more the audience is forced to participate in the satirist’s “game o f wits,” and further, 
that the longer the “time-lag” between perception and comprehension, the greater the impact 
of the sudden recognition of unlooked-for truth upon the understanding (30-31)—the 
greater, one should add, because the readers have apparently brought themselves to that 
sudden discovery; it is thereby more immediate, complete, and personal. Though Dryden 
uses different terms, it is the rhetorical effectiveness of indirect tuition he asserts when he 
declares in his Discourse that to “ spare the grossness” of name-calling is “to do the thing 
yet more severely, is to draw a full face, and to make the nose and cheeks stand out, and 
yet not to employ depth of shadowing” (137). We are left to finish the adumbrated picture 
in the mind’s eye. The resulting portrait may be exactly what the satirist has meant for us to 
see, but we are likely to take the features we imagine we see as true or justified, for we 
ourselves have sketched them. Similarly, a bit later in the same passage, Dryden makes his 
famous analogy between satire and decapitation: satire at its most artful, its most effective, 
delivers what seems to be a glancing blow that however it may “separate the head from the
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body,” yet “leaves it standing in its place” (137).19 For the time being, anyway: when the 
head finally rolls off its perch we realize just how lethal the ‘glancing’ stroke has been; but 
even before then, once we have seen the axe itself and the force o f the swing we are likely 
to guess, long before the clueless victim has, the true consequences of the encounter—and 
thus the satirist makes us accomplices to his attack.
The satirist must do this, Worcester argues, in order to make “his readers 
comprehend and remember [his social] criticism and adopt it as their own. Without style 
and literary form, his message would be incomprehensible; without wit and compression it 
would not be memorable” (13). Worcester’s “style and literary form” correspond roughly 
to the figurative apparatus I have outlined above; his “wit and compression,” to the 
trappings of satiric indirection as Dry den, for one, treats of them. But we should go a bit 
further and observe that though wit and compression may serve epigrammatically as a 
mnemonic, the underlying influence of satiric indirection upon memory occurs during the 
process of our personally closing the ironic and figurative gaps between what we are told 
or shown and are meant to hear or see. For one thing, this process helps to fix in our minds 
the literal and figurative terms of the satirist’s production, as well as the controlling idea 
subsuming them; for another, it helps cement the connection between these three things 
specifically (whatever they may be), even as it encourages the satiric habit in general: as the 
particular “shape” or configurative habit of our memory is determined by the way we are 
asked to remember, the mental task of closing the gaps between utterance and meaning, 
between figure and reality, and between both and the ethical principle they involve, may 
well become its own primary object o f memory. But moreover, and more important, this 
habit of reading against appearances, when combined with the habit of reconstituting the 
familiar, has the further general effect of inducing us to misremember with regard to the
19 Dryden means to point out that fine raillery is less likely to give needless offense than gross invective, 
yet as Weinbrot points out, “The malefactor may ‘die sweetly,' but the satirist has beheaded him 
nonetheless" (12).
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literal realities o f the historical present, because it inculcates the practice o f emending our 
perceptions and interpretations o f physiological, psychological, and intellectual experiences 
with non-literal overlay. It may in any event be impossible to know things as they are in 
themselves, but by encouraging us to recall the literal through the figurative, satire 
designedly imposes upon us a  certain brief suspension of our belief in what lies observable 
before us and within us, and hence a certain dissociation o f sensibility, a certain 
displacement of Self from the social panorama.
Thus, although satire might seem an ideal vehicle for combining the literal and 
figurative habits of memory in an age when these modes existed side by side, satire is and 
would remain a  problematic framework for social memory. For if its union of the literal and 
figurative lends it great currency and a great capacity for exposition and tuition, it is, first of 
all, by no means a reliably stable configuration of elements. For satire to remain viable as a 
mnemonic device, the topical and cultural allusions it makes must be broadly clear and 
important for the reader; if  they are not, the satirist has little chance o f invoking among his 
readers a sense of communal being; and without this, the satirist cannot hope to break 
down and reconstitute the social conditions, customs, and institutions that make up the 
experience of living. Further, its figurative apparatus must be capable of bearing the literal 
“weight” fitted within it; if  it cannot, not the satirist’s object, but the satire itself will seem 
absurd, and lack credibility. Unbridgeable gaps between the literal and figurative are the 
bane not only of elaborate ironic fictions, but of all figures of speech, such as similes and 
metaphors. But the moral element of satire means that the stakes for its figures are far 
higher than for other figurative utterances. When, say, a metaphor fails, the image it 
produces may be misshapen, self-contradictory, and therefore unilluminating; we may 
laugh at it and say the poet has miserably botched the central task o f close observation. But 
when a satiric figure fails, far more than the image is called into question: not just the 
credibility of the satire itself, but most likely a whole moral and ethical scheme. The 
consequences for the satirist’s credibility are also greater, for the moral dimension and the
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satirist’s public persona (the third and fourth quantities, respectively, in the alignment of 
elements comprising formal verse satire) are inextricably linked. In non-satirical poetry, the 
failed metaphor may excite ridicule, but the poet can hardly be charged with bad faith, for 
though he or she is asking us to view a thing a certain special way, we are not asked to 
extend our belief to anything o f abiding importance. Satire, being rhetorical, seeks to 
persuade, seeks to compel belief in a certain (reconstituted) cultural continuity, compliance 
with a certain system o f ethics, and deference to the authority o f a  certain person (or 
persona) to explicate these things to us. If the satiric figure fails, we feel taken, betrayed, 
humbugged. “Fool!” we might exclaim at the clumsy poet; “Fraud!” we exclaim at the 
failed satirist
Unfortunately, the persona o f Juvenalian satirist as Dryden fashions it in his 
Discourse is beset by internal contradictions that make it a  difficult matter indeed for the 
modem satirist to remain simultaneously credible as poet social observer, and moralist 
Dryden bequeaths to his contemporaries and successors a satiric role fairly well-defined in 
terms of its ideal temper, subjects, and poetic forms, but by linking satire’s highest strain 
with fury and indignation, and this particular stance with political Opposition, Dryden all 
but ensures that the modem satirist whatever assurances given to the contrary, will be by 
definition self-interested, biased—or at least merit our suspicion that he is no high-minded 
moralist, but a political opportunist But this practical difficulty is only a symptom of a 
larger one, one that gives rise as well to the cognitive dissonance inherent in the experience 
of formal verse satire: the genre’s simultaneous operation within and beyond real cultural 
time, that is, its being at once topical and timeless. Faced with the difficulty of articulating 
in figurative terms the universal ideals and moral truths suggested by or applicable to the 
circumstances of the present-day, and then, to remain relevant, returning those ideals and 
truths in realizable forms to the everyday world—faced with this difficulty, the satirist is 
understandably tempted in practice to favor one side of the equation or the other in any one 
work, as Gay, for instance, in Trivia offers minutely situational advice, and, in his Fables,
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precepts bound by no fixed time or place. The modem satirist, however, who attempts to 
realize the Juvenalian stance fully and treat equally of the timeless and the topical risks, on 
the one hand, sinking into cynical self-interest, and, on the other, making the features of 
the historical present mere props for his figurative apparatus, effectively freezing cultural 
time within the fiction he has created for its betterment
During the 1730’s and 1740’s Pope would try to assume just such a Juvenalian 
posture. His stance, the fiction he fashioned, and their consequences for public poetry and 
the viability of the figurative as an element in public memory are traced in the following 
chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
FROM “GREAT ANNA!" TO “GREAT ANARCH!” (II):
BRITANNIA MORIBUNDA: POPE’S EPITAPHIC VISION
1. Pope’s Satiric Persona 
Tracing the influence of Dryden’s treatise on satire upon his most famous literary 
inheritor, William Frost argues that “Pope in his imitations of Horace and original poems 
similar in method is the greatest exemplar of satire as discussed in the Discourse; the 
greatest exemplar in English, if not also (as I believe) the greatest of all time. When Dryden 
writes the Discourse, satire is still more or less a theoretical possibility—achieved in France 
and Rome, yes, but only foreshadowed as yet in England” (205). However, of equal 
importance to the theoretical form of satire and the ideal role of the satirist Dryden 
established in his Discourse was his bequeathal to his successors in satire (in his essay, but 
also in the translations that followed it) of what one might call a Juvenalian worldview, that 
is, the habit of seeing about one the telltale signs of civilizational decay; o f ascribing this 
decay to corruption among the powerful, decadence in the affluent, and a  dullness in the 
arts that implicitly supports and is supported by the viciousness of the times; and of 
insisting on the moral obligation of aligning oneself against these forces o f national decline 
and with their political, social, and ethical opposition.
Certainly the first half of the eighteenth century provided ample material for the 
Opposition satirist who would affect a Juvenalian stance. When George, Elector of 
Hanover succeeded Anne in 1714, the Whigs assumed absolute political hegemony. Tory 
power and spirit were broken; their leaders, Robert Harley, Earl of Oxford and Henry St. 
John, Viscount Bolingbroke, were in disgrace or exile; their supporters and friends among 
the leading writers of the day—the Scriblerians prominent among them—were out of favor 
and dispersed We might expect that with their access to the circles of power gone, their
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chances of preferment and patronage forever blighted, Swift, Gay, Arbuthnot, Pope, and 
others would turn readily to attacking the new regime. But their antipathy to the Hanoverian 
administration was at least partly justified. In The First Four Georges, J.H. Plumb 
characterizes the early years of George I’s reign as being poisoned by incessant in-fighting 
and scheming in both court and ministry (47ff.). The king feuded with the Prince o f Wales 
(while flirting with his daughter-in-law, Princess Caroline), Whig factions fought among 
themselves for the opposing favors of the king and prince, and the Secret Committee of the 
Commons was busy ferreting out Tories it could prosecute for treason. Relative order was 
achieved, oddly enough, only with the failure o f the South Sea Company in August 1720, 
for the crisis propelled to prominence the ambitious, though heretofore politically marginal 
Robert Walpole, who was able to screen the government from scandal. For his services he 
was rewarded with the Prime Ministership, a position he held for two decades and in which 
he gained power, wealth, and a  title. Walpole secured and enhanced his position by 
creating a bureaucratic machine controlled exclusively by him, and by making an elaborate 
show of protecting the kingdom from its many “enemies,” actively persecuting Tory 
leaders and suspected Jacobites, and pushing through legislation that significantly abridged 
the rights of England's Catholics.
When George II succeeded to the throne in 1727, Opposition leaders hoped that, 
given his violent enmity to his father, their new king would break with George I’s 
favorites, the Whigs, and restore the fortunes of the Tories. They had no such luck. 
Indeed, their fortunes declined further. Walpole’s hold on the machinery of government 
became more absolute, and his influence over the throne’s occupant increased, for though 
the new George disliked Walpole, the king depended on the counsel of Caroline, his 
Queen—and Caroline, in turn, found a favorite and confidant in Sir Robert In retrospect it 
seems foolish for the Tories and former Scriblerians to have hoped for a restoration under 
George II of those golden years they now claimed England had enjoyed under Good Queen 
Anne. The new monarch was not simply neglectful of the arts, as his father had been; he
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allowed Walpole to exploit them callously to further the Administration’s ends. Moreover,
the atmosphere at court was polluted by cynical political toadyism and by equally cynical
sexual intrigue. Both George II and Caroline, Plumb notes, were notorious for their
excesses o f the flesh; moreover,
their strength was so great that they grew to resent with all the bitterness and 
fury of their natures the slightest attack on their greatness. They hated the 
challenge of men of ability; disliked criticism; enjoyed sycophancy and 
thought it truth. Gradually, as they destroyed those friends and allies who 
were proud enough to maintain an attitude of independence, they reached a 
lonely and dangerous eminence (First Four Georges, 73).
An historian writing from the safe vantage point of the twentieth-century discerns in
Walpole’s rise the emergence o f Parliamentary preeminence—and thus more fully
representational government—and in the limited political, moral, and cultural chaos under
Hanoverian rule the inevitable fitfulness of a nation undergoing tremendous economic and
social change. Needless to say, the Opposition saw these developments quite differently. It
seemed to them, as Louis Bredvold notes in “The Gloom of the Tory Satirists” (1949), that
England had reached an historical moment o f crisis, that its virtues and glories were faced
with extinction (7). Indeed, the true shape and import of the current national crises could, it
seemed, be understood by consulting the historical precedents of ancient Greece and Rome,
whose cultural decline and ultimate fall were presaged by the advent o f  tyranny and moral
decay. Classical literature and history, in short, provided the Opposition and the writers
supportive of it with the framework and terms in which they were to cast the social and
political struggles they saw unfolding before them. For example, as Augustus, restorer of
order and culture, patron of the arts, had given way to a line o f corrupt, despotic Caesars,
so now, it seemed, had the benevolent Anne given way to the unscrupulous Georges and
their grafting, power-mad prime minister, Robert Walpole. And whereas Charles II had
had the good sense to make Dryden Poet Laureate, and Anne, to favor the Scriblerians, it
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was for those poets out of favor a sign o f the Administration's moral deficiency that the 
compliant and fawning Laurence Eusden and Colley Cibber had been made Laureates.1 It 
indicated at least a nascent tyranny, when true artistic genius was neglected and the arts 
became mere propaganda for the ruling clique. Bought out, manipulated, shorn of their 
power to ennoble and instruct, the arts under Walpole would become, in the eyes of the 
most eminent poet associated with the Opposition, both symptom and cause o f ethical 
decadence—as they had been under the Caesars.
Of course, the fact that Pope was by no means alone in attacking the deficiencies of 
the Hanoverians and their Prime Minister should in itself prompt one to raise a skeptical 
eyebrow at the effulgence of Frost’s pronouncement that he was “the greatest exemplar of 
satire as discussed in the Discourse.” But even if such assertions could be objectively 
demonstrated once for all, they are ultimately more pernicious than helpful: too often, 
thinking of something as the “greatest” of its kind leads us to neglect the very real merits of 
its possible competitors; and toward that work or author designated “the greatest of all 
time” we tend to adopt either a jealous resentment or a thoughtless admiration. Both 
mindsets are unreasonable; both preclude the rewards of a more disinterested scrutiny. In 
the present case, the influence o f Dryden's Discourse upon later generations of formal 
verse satirists was widespread, and as Weinbrot’s researches into the place of Juvenal and 
Juvenalian satire in early eighteenth-century England make clear, many were the Opposition 
writers who between 1726 and 1742, when Walpole’s power as Prime Minister was at its 
height, sought to assume the defiant stance, the lofty strain that Dryden had established as 
an ideal. Weinbrot points out that Horace’s growing Continental popularity as a model for 
the satirist was in England “blocked by the opposition’s ploy of painting the court of 
Walpole and George Augustus [George II] with the dark colors of Augustus Caesar”
1 Eusden served from 1718-1730; Cibber, appointed in 1730, would hold the office until his death in 
1757.
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(Traditions, 40). Such a court merited not the polite admonitions of a Horace, but the
outraged lashing of a Juvenal; and it was Juvenal, Weinbrot says, who gave Opposition
writers a useful prototype of the pose appropriate for their “resistance to tyranny”: “the
bloody but unbowed soldier in a  small army fighting the good fight against a  horde of
powerful and unscrupulous brutes wishing to destroy the remnants o f national virtue” (40):
Juvenal was the sublime or tragic satirist appropriate for the worst o f times, 
when the nation and its government were in decline and oppression was 
rampant; he was appropriate for an audience seeking sublimity in poetry and 
unified structure in satire; he therefore was closer both to what many 
regarded as the “true” satire and to the free, rough, and even bloody nature 
of the British nation staunchly refusing to be ‘polish’d into Slavery’; he 
would attack even the most exalted of governors if they deviated from 
public morality; and, together with his ally Persius, he was easily drafted 
into the opposition to Walpole during the 1730s, when Horace was 
regarded as one of the “flattering, soothing, Tools” of that great man (43).
As Weinbrot argues, “By 1739 such replacement o f Horatian sense, method, and outlook
with Juvenalian outrage and hostility was commonplace, especially among opposition
authors. Equally commonplace was the view that though Pope was sometimes Horatian, he
was also, qualitatively, the chief native architect o f such satiric displacement and of
mingling of modes. These efforts sometimes won praise and sometimes condemnation; but
they were never ignored” (139). Indeed, though Pope’s assumption of this widely
recognized Juvenalian stance was neither original nor unique, Pope was generally credited
with having best realized the satirical ideals Dryden’s dissertation had crystallized decades
earlier. In fact, he was regarded by many of his contemporaries as he came to regard
himself, and as he demanded the age regard him—as the living Muse of English satire.2 If
2 During the I730’s, Opposition poets, emboldened by his example, borrowing heavily from his 
compositions, attacked with increasing vigor and outrage the perceived corruption of the Hanover- 
Walpole Administration (Weinbrot 123; 128). “Pope," Weinbrot says, “was often invoked by other 
satirists as the lonely writer defending decency against its powerful enemies" (128n), as in Benjamin 
Loveling’s “The First Satire of Persius Imitated" (1740), where the poet “echoes” Pope’s satires and 
“[celebrates] that satirist as ’sworn Foe to Knave and Fool,’" recounting the many conquests of his pen; 
as Weinbrot observes, “[Loveling’s] heroes are not Lucilius and Horace, but Dryden and the hostile 
Pope, and his poetical enemies are all those, including Boileau and Prior, who praise kings" (127-128). 
And lest we think extravagant or too absurd to be credited Pope’s assertion in his “Epilogue to the
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Pope’s claim to such deference was more successful than that of others who pretended the 
wickedness of the times had moved them to Juvenalian indignation, it was largely because 
by 1740 Pope had spent the better part of a decade very carefully and very publicly 
fashioning an ever-more-elaborate, ever-more-recognizable satirical mask. So closely, in 
fact, was Pope able to associate his public persona himself with the Juvenalian mode of 
social criticism that the two would become all but inextricable, both in his own mind and in 
the mind of his public.
This would prove important in two ways. First, the closeness o f Pope’s personal 
identification with the heroic public stance he assumed would greatly influence the specific 
terms of the figurative apparatus he came to impose on his age: the operative satiric fiction 
he developed little by little in poem after poem during the 1730’s drew heavily from the arc 
o f his poetic career as he came to see it, but also from the slow evolution of his own 
sensibility—from that of self-confident moralist prescribing to reasonable contemporaries 
(as in An Essay on Man and the four Moral Essays) to the self-consciously strident scourge 
grown so disillusioned he seemed to believe more in the inevitability of vice than in the 
viability of virtue. Second, so successful was Pope in establishing his satirical persona and 
framework in the public mind, that both over time became part of the social landscape, 
became recognizable institutions. This seems ideal, the most for which any poet in any age 
could hope. But perversely, the more reified his persona and fiction became, the more 
easily detachable from the arena of public debate they seemed to be. Make no mistake: Pope
Satires: Dialogue II" (1738), “Yes, I am proud; I must be proud to see / Men not afraid of God, afraid 
of me” (11. 208-209), at least one contemporary attributed to Pope the broad reforming power he had 
presumed to claim. In “The First Satire of Juvenal Imitated” (1740), Thomas Gilbert boasts on Pope’s 
behalf that “Gay modem Atheists kiss the Poet’s Rod, / Reform their Lives, and tremble at a God" (qtd. 
in Weinbrot, 41). Other poets showed their obeisance to Pope by defending him as the touchstone of 
wit and righteous satire, their diffidence sometimes extending to wholesale adoption of his characteristic 
conceits. The anonymous author of The Scribleriad (1742), for example, “borrows” the central fiction 
of the later Dunciad (down to appointing Cibber chief Dunce) in his attack upon those vexing Pope 
with their squibs. Not that he would have them desist: Write on, write on, he bids them ironically, and 
claim “the Privilege to be his Foes," for in this, “my Sons, is all your living Hope, / To be immortal 
Scriblers, rail at POPE” (6).
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never became the toothless “old lion in satire” Wycherley had been in his dotage; to the 
end, his verse had the power to expose, embarrass, make ridiculous, and wound, to excite 
outrage and calumny, to make the Administration sufficiently nervous to retain its own 
hacks to write satires upon him. However, we might say that the more elaborate and well- 
defined the fictions of Pope’s persona and satire became, the more their existence seemed 
to run parallel to rather than within the course of their cultural milieu— with the effect, 
ironically, of deepening Pope’s disillusionment, confirming his belief that the age was past 
hope of redemption, prompting him to lash it still more vigorously. The futility o f this cycle 
may be attributed in part to the inherent limitations of formal verse satire itself, particularly 
its tendency to stress the figurative over the literal; but much is attributable as well to the 
peculiar satirical framework Pope employed, what I call his “epitaphic vision”: his habit— 
so generally, so frequently occurring as to constitute a controlling idea in his poetry of the 
1730’s and 1740’s—of portraying not an imperiled Britain, but a Britain already moribund, 
its best qualities beyond all possibility of resuscitation.
Given Pope’s intense personal identification with his Juvenalian mission, it is not 
surprising that his vision for England would have its roots in his fashioning o f a suitable 
public persona. One might even say that for Pope the terms of that persona are in 
themselves a large part of the poet’s satiric arsenal. We have already seen the young Pope 
first fashioning the role of Dryden’s successor, then styling himself to fill i t  From the mid- 
1730’s onward, he undertakes a similar project of self-creation, melding his epicist mask 
with that of the moral philosopher he had but recently worn to devise one appropriate for 
the new role he had set himself. A new role it was. Aside from the first Dunciad (1728), its 
immediate successor, The Dunciad Variorum (1729), and the ironical treatise, Peri 
Bathous: O f the Art o f Sinking in Poetry (1728), Pope’s forays into the genre had been 
infrequent incidental. Thus in An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot (written 1731-34; published 
1735), Pope’s fullest account of his early career and its subsequent redirection, Pope sets
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about laying anew the foundations of his credibility while justifying and setting the terms of 
his comparatively recent vocation. Portraying himself in the poem’s early sections as a 
figure whose literary fame has made him the perpetual object of bad amateur poets begging 
his imprimatur, o f fawning place-seekers who would tap his influence with the great, of 
tasteless patrons offering to buy his praise, and, o f course, of the unrelenting squibs from 
literary hacks left smarting by his early Dunciads—Pope at last pushes aside his 
exasperation and reflects soberly upon how it is that he finds himself in this position. He 
starts with the most basic question: “Why did I write? what sin to me unknown /  Dipt me in 
ink, my Parents’, or my own?” (11. 125-126). Part o f his answer we have seen before: “As 
yet a Child, nor yet a Fool to Fame, / 1 lisp’d in Numbers, for the Numbers came” (11. 127- 
128), but he continues, “The Muse but serv’d to ease some Friend, not Wife, / To help me 
thro’ this long Disease, my Life” (11. 131-132). Note that the impulse toward poetry is 
something inevitable, undeniable—the Heaven-imposed burden that seems to be his 
personal version of the Ruling Passion, whose doctrine he had already expounded in An 
Essay on Man (1733-34) and his Epistle to Cobham (1734). But if poetry is his congenital 
obligation, it is also the main solace for a life made difficult by crippling infirmities, and is 
thus essentially an invalid’s innocent comfort and occupation. In pursuing his vocation, 
then, Pope has only done Heaven’s bidding—and anyway, who could reasonably deny the 
sick man his medicine, the lame man his cane? “But why then publish?” (1. 135). Again, 
Pope denies that he ever exercised any volition in the matter, shrewdly laying the “blame” 
at the feet of those—“Granville the polite,” “knowing Walsh,” “well-natur’d Garth," 
Congreve, Swift, “the Courtly Talbot, Somers, Sheffield," “mitred Rochester," and “5Ir. 
John’s self* (11. 135-141)—who were, he slyly lets drop, “great Dryden’s friends before” 
(11.141). These men (so labelled here as to exemplify a good many noble attributes) pushed 
him into the public sphere. “Soft were my Numbers, who could take offence /  While pure 
description [as in his PastoralsJ held the place of Sense?" Yet once before the public eye, 
Pope claims, his work has been unaccountably and bewilderingly assailed by critics
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prompted not so much by a genuine love o f the poet’s craft, but by peevishness, poverty, 
and mere madness. This might be borne—“Did some more sober Critic come abroad? / If 
wrong, I smil’d; if right, I kiss’d the rod” (U. 157-158)—but his critics did not stop there. 
His physique, morals, parents, friends, condition—all have been publicly slandered in the 
crudest, crudest ways. And so, much against his temperament and will, the rules of 
engagement had to change, for patience and resignation are hardly attributes in the face of 
an active viciousness intent on libelling the good and virtuous and thereby subverting right 
notions of goodness and virtue generally. Pope is therefore obliged to assert poetry’s moral 
imperative and disabuse the public on the matter of society’s true rogues and villains: 
“Curst be the Verse, how well soe’er it flow, / That tends to make one worthy Man my 
foe,” that affronts virtue, innocence, or “from the soft-ey’d Virgin steal[s] a tear” (11. 283- 
286):
But he, who hurts a harmless neighbor’s peace,
Insults fall’n Worth, or Beauty in distress,
Who loves a Lye, lame slander helps about,
Who writes a Libel, or who copies out:
That Fop whose pride affects a Patron’s name,
Yet absent, wounds an Author’s honest fam e. . .
Who reads but with a Lust to mis-apply,
Make Satire a Lampoon, and Fiction, Lye.
A Lash like mine no honest man shall dread,
But all such babling blockheads in his stead (11.287-292; 301-304).
With this assertion, Pope redefines the nature of his compulsion to write, as well as
the sort of poetry he must write. Whereas innate predisposition had previously guided his
efforts, that instinctive impulse has now been supplanted (or at least given direction) by a
self-consciously moral one, one that requires him to compose something other than
pastorals or translations. An Epistle to Arbuthnot thus establishes the tripartite apologia that
underlies Pope’s subsequent self-fashioning in his Im itations o f  Horace, his
‘versifications’ of Donne’s satires, and his Epilogues to the Satires: nature compels him to
write; the maliciousness of the times compels him—much against the softness and humility
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of his temper (11. 366; 372)—to publicly defend the worthy and expose the wicked by
writing satire; and the moral ideals he seeks to define and defend compel his satire to
respect no rank, condition, or power. And so when Pope has Arbuthnot ask, “But why
insult the Poor, affront the Great?” (1. 360), Pope’s answer is unambiguous and
uncompromising, as it must be:
A Knave’s a Knave, to me, in ev’ry State,
Alike my scorn, if he succeed or fail,
Sporus at Court, or Japhet in a Jayl,
A hireling Scribler, or a hireling Peer,
Knight of the Post corrupt, or o f the Shire,
If on a Pillory, or near a Throne,
He gain his Prince’s Ear, or lose his own (11. 361-366).
The last two elements of his self-definition—disgust with the times and an 
aggressive willingness to attack vice whenever and wherever he finds it—are especially 
prevalent in Pope’s subsequent satires. In “The First Satire o f the Second Book of Horace 
Imitated” (written about the same time as Arbuthnot, published in 1733), for example, 
Pope’s tone on these points is, if anything, more strident, more defiant than in Arbuthnot. 
Retaining from Horace’s original the device of a friendly, if ethically obtuse interlocutor to 
act as a rhetorical foil, Pope has his friend, the attorney William Fortescue, advise him, 
“I’d write no more” (1. 11). “Not write?” Pope responds, incredulous, “but then I think, / 
And for my Soul I cannot sleep a wink. / 1 nod in Company, I wake at Night, /  Fools rush 
into my Head, and so I write” (11. 11-14). Well then, says Fortescue, “if you needs must 
write, write C E SA R ’S Praise: / You’ll gain at least a Knighthood, or the Bays” (11. 21-22). 
Display, he continues, “all your Muse’s softer Art” (1.29): celebrate the Queen and all the 
royal line—but whatever you do, leave off your attacks upon “the City’s best good Men” 
(I. 39), upon the follies and indigence of the realm’s peers, their superficial tastes and 
trivial amusements (11.38-40). Abandon satire. Having afforded himself an opportunity to 
lay out again the rationale, temper, and range of his satire, Pope insists that satire is his 
pleasure; that his satire, if poignant, is yet politically disinterested, an “impartial Glass” (1.
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57). It is the production of an earnest spirit, but one predisposed to every sort of 
moderation:
My Head and Heart thus flowing thro' my Quill,
Verse-man or Prose-man, term me which you will,
Papist or Protestant, or both between,
Lite good Erasmus in an honest Mean,
In Moderation placing all my Glory,
While Tories call me Whig, and Whigs a Tory (11.63-68).
But at this point the mask of good-humored earnestness slips a bit, revealing the ferocity of
the soul and visage beneath. Though Pope declares himself no Don Quixote in satire—
“Satire’s my Weapon, but I’m too discreet /  To nm a  Muck and tilt at all I meet” (11. 69-
70)—he then issues a warning as quixotic in its breadth as in the severity of its promised
punishments:
Peace is my dear Delight—not Fleury’s more:
But touch me, and no Minister so sore.
Who-e’er offends, at some unlucky Time 
Slides into Verse, and hitches in a Rhyme,
Sacred to Ridicule! his whole Life long,
And the sad Burthen of some merry Song (11.75-80).
Such a resolve, his friend reasons, shaking his head sorrowfully, will no doubt mean an
early death for Pope: perhaps his foes are already taking up a collection to put a contract on
his head. At the corresponding point in Horace’s poem, the Roman replies to this
suggestion that the authority o f literary precedent should shield him from persecution: “Yet
Lucilius laid hands on the leaders / And on the people themselves: he played no favorites, /
But favored virtue alone, and virtue’s friends.”3 Pope, too, cites precedent: “Could
pension’d Boileau lash in honest Strain / Flatt’rers and Bigots ev’n in Louis’ Reign? /
Could Laureate Dryden Pimp and Fry’r engage, / Yet neither Charles nor James be in a
Rage? (11. 111-114). Yet the threat o f personal danger moves him to a very un-Horatian
degree of indignation and contempt; moreover, it raises his sense of moral purpose to a far
3 Translated by Smith Palmer Bovie.
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higher pitch, moving him not merely to defend his way o f satire, but to an impassioned 
insistence of what for him is not (as for Horace) the afterthought of common decency, but 
the noblest of poetic missions: to expose the wicked and defend Virtue—or die in the 
attempt:
What? arm’d for Virtue when I point the Pen,
Brand the bold front of shameless, guilty Men,
Dash the proud Gamester in his gilded Car,
Bare the mean Heart that lurks beneath a Star,
Can there be wanting to defend Her Cause,
Lights of the Church, or Guardians of the Laws?-----
[Could Boileau and Dryden dare to do the same]
And I not strip the Gilding off a  Knave,
Un-plac’d, un-pension’d, no Man’s Heir, or Slave?
I will, or perish in the gen’rous Cause.
Hear this, and tremble! you, who ’scape the Laws.
Yet while I live, no rich or noble knave 
Shall walk the World, in credit, to his grave.
To VIRTUE ONLY and HER FRIENDS, A FRIEND
The World beside may murmur, or commend (11.105-110; 115-122).
Though Pope’s imitation of Satire II: i follows the structure of Horace’s poem quite
closely, the striking features of this passage—the truculent voice, the defiance of the world
at large, the treatment of moral ideals as causes—have been introduced by Pope himself. Or
rather, Pope has been led to introduce them by wishing to assume a particular stance
relative to his society and its values. That stance, of course, is that which Pope’s age took
to be Juvenalian, and one might say that here as elsewhere in his Imitations o f  Horace,
Pope seeks in tone, stance, and purpose to imbue Horatian form with Juvenalian fury. He
achieves thereby what Weinbrot describes as an ideal amalgam: Horace’s modesty, grace,
and polish joined to the unequivocal moral seriousness of Juvenal (Traditions, 33 Iff.). But
we might also see the blend as a shrewd rhetorical move, a practical way of better realizing
the Juvenalian model itself. When the poet appears to make at least a pretence to putting on
the Horatian mask of good humor, impartiality, moderation, and a love of peace and
retirement (as Pope does here), he can throw it aside (as Pope does here) to greater effect
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when the systemic corruption of the times makes the former pose a  moral liability. If we 
lend credence to the Juvenalian Pope it is in part because we first believe in his Horatian 
alter ego.
This is as true for his satiric output taken as a body as it is for this particular poem. 
Nearly all of Pope’s imitations of Horace, for instance, use the controlling themes of their 
originals—the poet’s desire to leave the bustle of the City and Court (Satire II, W); his 
pursuit of temperance and moderation, and his forfeiture of ambition and desire (Satire II, 
if); his mature concern with the proper ordering of one’s life and soul (Epistles I, i and I, 
vii); his readiness to take leave even of poetry itself (Ep. II, ii)—to couch piquant jabs at 
Pope’s favorite human and institutional targets: the Hanoverian Court, Walpole’s ministry, 
aristocratic decadence, bad writers, and (combining all within a single narrow compass) his 
arch-tormentors and butts, the effeminate Lord Hervey and the slovenly Lady Mary 
Wortley Montagu. But more broadly still, appearing after these imitations are Pope’s two 
so-called Epilogues to the Satires (1738 and 1739), in which he foregoes all pretence of 
Horatian moderation and impartiality and returns to the tone and pose he adopts at the end 
of his Imitation o f Satire II, i.
Once more he employs the device of an interlocutionary foil, though in both 
Epilogues his companion is more explicitly antagonistic than in the earlier poem. In the first 
of these poems, Pope is again advised to forego the aggressive strain of satire, to ally 
himself instead with the Court’s scheme of ethics and attack Scripture, honesty, principle, 
and those odd creatures called patriots who would preserve their nation’s worth and honor: 
“These nothing hurts; they keep their Fashion still, /  And wear their strange old Virtue as 
they will” (11. 43-44). But in all events, the “friend” explains, one should not take aim at 
public figures simply because they are foolish or corrupt Doing so would be ineffective: 
“Laugh then at any, but at Fools and Foes; / These you but anger, and you mend not those” 
(11. 53-54); and besides, unless the satirist takes care to lash the Good as vigorously as the 
Bad, he creates the impression that Virtue is somehow preferable to Vice, and thereby “sets
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half the World, God knows, against the rest” (I. 58). Faced with Horatian temporizing at 
its most extreme, Pope first bids an ironical farewell to sharp, biting satire—“Dear Sir, 
forgive the prejudice o f Youth: / Adieu Distinction, Satire, Warmth, and Truth” (11. 63- 
64)—and asks to be filled with such a temper as will let him “sing without the least 
offense, / And all I sung should be the Nation’s Sense” (11. 77-78): “So—Satire is no 
more—I feel it die—  /  No Gazeteer more innocent than I! / And let, a God’s name, ev’ry 
Fool and Knave / Be grac’d thro’ Life, and flatter’d in his Grave” (11. 83-86). Pope’s 
elaborate farewell is, o f course, an inverted affirmation of satire’s express qualities and 
duties as he conceives them—and of Britain’s pressing need for satiric scrutiny. Satire 
must draw definite, even absolute distinctions between good and evil, virtue and vice;4 
because of this, it must arouse and admonish its readers, and thus must speak with warmth; 
it must not flatter its readers, but shake them from their complacency and therefore must be 
willing to offend even the most powerful. Indeed, because it is in the “nation’s sense” (or 
interest) that satire asserts the truths in which it deals, the country’s leaders must be held to 
higher moral and ethical standards and thus are especially fair game. Pope makes this last 
point clear enough when, having seemingly capitulated to his friend’s argument, he then 
gives that argument a further ironic twist: on second thought, it might be worth keeping 
satire around after all; for if nothing else, the fear of being exposed and made ridiculous 
will keep the lower orders in their places, discourage them from aping those sins set aside 
for their betters:
Virtue, I grant you, is an empty boast;
But shall the Dignity o f Vice be lost?
4 Pope would later include in the front-matter of The New Dunciad an essay, “Of the Hero of the Poem," 
purportedly supplied by one Ricardus Aristarchus (the classicist Richard Bentley, another of his frequent 
targets). Explaining the moral compass of the ensuing poem, Aristarchus remarks (with Pope's 
blessing, one assumes), “If the Gods be not provoked at evil men, neither are they delighted with the 
good and just For contrary objects must either excite contrary affections, or no affections at all. So 
that he who loveth good men, must at the same time hate the bad; and he who hateth not bad men, 
cannot love the good; because to love good men proceedeth from an aversion to evil, and to hate evil 
men from a tenderness to the good” (712).
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Ye Gods! shall Cibber’s Son, without rebuke 
Swear like a Lord? or a Rich out-whore a Duke?
A Fav’rite’s Porter with his Master vie,
Be brib’d as often, and as often lie?
Shall Ward draw Contracts with a Statesman’s skill?
Or Japhet pocket, like his Grace, a Will?
Is it for Bond or Peter (paltry Things!)
To pay their Debts or keep their Faith like Kings?. . .
This, this, my friend, I cannot, must not bear;
Vice thus abus’d, demands a Nation’s care-----
Vice is undone, if she forgets her Birth,
And stoops from Angels to the Dregs of Earth:
But ’tis the Fall degrades her to a Whore;
Let Greatness own her, and she’s mean no more (11.113-22; 127-8; 141-44).
And having argued that vice on the grand scale is unarguably the prerogative of the 
Administration, Church, Court, and Royalty, Pope in the poem’s final lines (11. 145-170) 
takes the next logical step and portrays—perhaps in allusion to the conclusion of the 
Dunciad Variorum, and seemingly in anticipation of the more dire tone of the new Dunciad 
to come—the safeguarding of vicious privilege through Britain’s repudiation of Virtue and 
“Old England’s Genius” and her sanctification of Vice: “[H]ers the Gospel is, and hers the 
Laws” (1.148). What Pope had seemed to celebrate is now suddenly under direct attack, as 
satiric inversion makes its way full circle into unironic, full-throated denunciation. 
Amusing as it is to imagine Pope’s fictional friend wincing at the onslaught, it is yet more 
satisfying to reflect that he has only himself to blame for being scandalized. “Not twice a 
twelvemonth you appear in Print,” he had baited Pope at the poem’s opening, “And when it 
comes, the Court see nothing in’L / You grow correct that once with Rapture writ, / And 
are, besides, too Moral for a Wit” (11. 1-4).
Once roused, Pope’s sense of satiric mission seemingly will brook no doubt of its 
divine sanction, heed no limits to its moral authority. At the end of his “versification” of 
Donne’s fourth satire (1733), Pope had, following his original, declared that “Courts are 
too much for Wits so weak as mine; / Charge them with Heav’n ’s Artill’ry, bold D iviner 
(II. 280-281), though he teases himself into imagining that “what’s now Apocrypha, my
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Wit, / In time to come, may pass for Holy Writ” (11.286-287). Such self-ironic touches are 
altogether absent, however, in his second Epilogue (1739). Again the question between 
Pope and his antagonist is satire’s proper sphere and targets, and again the “friend” would 
have Pope direct his attack only where it does no harm (and can do no good). But this time 
Pope does not play along. Instead, he defies his interlocutor, boldly (some might say 
vaingloriously) asserting not simply the power of his satire and the justness of his cause, 
but the self-evident righteousness of his own peculiar pursuit of the vocation. Heaven, in 
short, has ordained him and his verse to vex and scourge the wickedness o f his times. If he 
claims to be above common considerations o f tact, propriety, modesty, and discretion, it is 
because now he pays heed only to the guide and object of his quest—Virtue. Accused of 
being splenetic, an outright misanthrope, Pope responds with a long list o f those he 
delights in commending (11.62-93), then adds, “Yet think not Friendship only prompts my 
lays; / I follow Virtue, where she shines, I praise” (II. 94-95). It is in fact his selfless, 
single-minded devotion to the pursuit and defense of Virtue and Truth that allows Pope to 
disavow any partisan or private bias—but also, to claim a moral authority far beyond that 
of his personal social station as Alexander Pope, Esquire, and to presume to survey not 
only with impunity but with justice the appetites and actions of all levels and conditions of 
society. And so to his friend’s repeated assertions that the supposed misdeeds of Court, 
Administration, and Clergy do not concern and therefore should not provoke him, Pope the 
satirist can respond with a humbling high-mindedness,
Ask you what Provocation I have had?
The strong Antipathy of Good to Bad.
When Truth or Virtue an Affront endures,
Th’ Affront is mine, my Friend, and should be yours.
Mine, as a Foe profess’d to false Pretence,
Who think a Coxcomb’s Honour like his Sense;
Mine, as a Friend to ev’ry worthy mind;
And mine as Man, who feel for all mankind (11.197-204).
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Further, it is this high moral purpose that justifies Pope’s claim for the supposed
sacredness of his poetry and public persona. It is his satire, after all, that makes “Men not
afraid of God, afraid of me: / Safe from the Bar, the Pulpit, and the Throne, / Yet touch’d
and sham’d by Ridicule alone” (11. 209-211); and satire’s power, in turn, Pope argues, is
derived in part from its utility as an instrument of divine justice, and in part from the
providential election of the poet who plies it, made evident by the demonstrated probity and
brilliance of his verse:
O sacred Weapon! meant for Truth’s defence,
Sole Dread of Folly, Vice, and Insolence!
To all but Heav’n-directed hands deny’d,
The Muse may give thee, but the Gods must guide.
Rev’rent I touch thee! but with honest zeal;
To rowze the Watchmen of die Publick Weal,
To Virtue’s Work provoke the tardy Hall,
And Goad the Prelate slumb’ring in his Stall (11.212-219).
Pope clearly thinks of himself as being the “Heav’n-diiected” wielder of the “sacred
Weapon” of satire. Such a conception has been implicit in his self-portraiture since
Arbuthnot, when he first promised to lash the “babling blockheads” who dared to insult
beauty, worth, and truth, but emerges fully developed and fully articulated only now, when
the exigencies of a continuous social critique that has been building in volume and virulence
throughout the decade force him to stake out at last the most extreme public position that
may be claimed. Ironically, though he would seem here to have achieved rhetorically (and
practically, in the esteem of his contemporaries among the literary Opposition) the fully
realized Juvenalian stance that existed for Dryden only theoretically, Pope would declare in
a textual note to a later edition of this Epilogue,
This was the last poem of the kind printed by our author, with a  resolution 
to publish no more; but to enter thus, in the most plain and solemn manner 
he could, a sort o f PROTEST against that insuperable corruption and 
depravity o f manners, which he had been so unhappy as to live to see.
Could he have hoped to have amended any, he had continued these attacks; 
but bad men were grown shameless and so powerful, that Ridicule was 
become as unsafe as it was ineffectual. The Poem raised him, as he knew it
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would, some enemies; but he has reason to be satisfied with the approbation 
of good men, and the testimony of his own conscience (703).
In one sense, the slow emergence of Pope’s persona upon the public stage has been its
own satire on the times, reluctant, hesitant, antipathetic to his essential withdrawing nature
as it has ostensibly been, coaxed out, then called forth only by the good man’s instinct to
deliver Virtue from danger. In a village of the just, Diogenes would have no need for his
lantern. But Pope manages in his gloss upon this Epilogue to turn even his farewell to
topical satire into a reflection on an age grown insensible to his lash. To hold the world
unworthy o f correction is indeed to make the grandest display of one’s contempt for i t  Or
of one’s self-conceit: as Johnson declares o f Pope’s resolve to quit poetry over the
controversy attending his Epistle to Burlington (1731): “The man who threatens the world
is always ridiculous; for the world can easily go on without him, and in a short time will
cease to miss him.. . .  Pope had been flattered till he thought himself one of the moving
powers in the system of life. When he talked of laying down his pen, those who sat round
him intreated and implored; and self-love did not suffer him to suspect that they went away
and laughed” (II, 181). And of course Pope did not lay down his pen after 1739 any more
than he had in 1731. As it proved, there was yet one great work ahead of him that would
stunningly crystallize the satiric fiction he fashioned and propagated along with his public
persona; and whatever his reservations (real or affected) about the efficacy of his satire may
have been, they did not prevent him in the meantime from gazing into the future and taking
it upon himself to deliver posterity’s verdict upon his mission and muse:
Truth guards the Poet, sanctifies the line,
And makes Immortal, Verse as mean as mine (11.246-47).
2. Epitaphic Satire and the Foundations of the Epitaphic Vision 
Lest one conclude that Pope had by this time succumbed utterly to monomania, we 
should make note of John Butt’s observation that Pope’s two satiric dialogues had so 
discomfited Parliament that the House of Lords threatened him with prosecution for libel—
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only to be threatened into silence again by the poet’s promise to write a  more explicitly 
scandalous piece should the prosecution go forward {Poems, 704n). But we might turn 
also to a short poem Pope composed the same year the second o f his Epilogues appeared, 
“On receiving from the Right Hon. the Lady Frances Shirley a  Standish and Two Pens.” It 
is a playful poem, opening with “th’ Athenian Queen” descending “in all her sober charms” 
(1.2) to solemnly hand the poet her “celestial arms” (1.4): the “golden lance” whose steel 
“shall stab [Vice] to the heart” (11. 5; 7), and “the sable Well, /  The fount of Fame or 
Infamy” (11. 11-12). The real-life giver of pens and ink (the poem’s “Flavia”), however, 
will have nothing to do with the poet’s extravagantly heroic analogy:
‘What well? what weapon? (Flavia cries)
A standish, steel and golden pen;
It came from Bertrand’s, not the skies;
I gave it you to write again’ (11.13-16).
She goes on to underscore the absurdity of the conceit: “Athenian Queen! and sober
charms! / 1 tell ye, fool, there’s nothing in’t” (U. 25-26); but if he will “be a quiet soul, /
That dares tell neither Truth nor Lies, /  I’ll list you in the harmless roll /  Of those that sing
of these poor eyes” (11. 29-32).
If nothing else, Pope’s jab at his own pretensions shows us that the satiric persona 
he had created was for him just that, a  fictive self employed in specific poetic contexts to 
declare what Pope could not if speaking in public in his own person. However, though we 
should not assume a one-to-one correspondence between the public persona and the private 
man, neither can we say that the two are absolutely distinct. We might note, for example, 
the strikingly close similarity between Pope’s marginal lament at the end of the second 
Epilogue to the Satires that “bad men were grown shameless and so powerful, that Ridicule 
was become as unsafe as it was ineffectual” and his declaration to John Boyle in the 
January 1743 letter that opened this chapter “As to any thing else I shall write, it will be 
very little, and very faint I have lost all Ardor and Appetite, even to Satyr, for no body has 
Shame enough left to be afraid of Reproach, or punish’d by it.” Nor is this particular
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example of the correspondence between the public and private selves chosen at random, for 
indeed, one o f the most important characteristics they share is a tendency to figure 
themselves as precipitously near death—or as one already dead and buried. (Note, for 
instance, that his marginal comments upon his last topical satire read as if their task was to 
explicate the motives o f some auth-or whose passing has long since made his motives and 
meaning obscure.) Perhaps one can account for this by remarking Pope’s early and 
emphatic awareness of his own highly vulnerable life-force. He related to Spence that while 
in his late teens, incessant study had reduced him “to so bad a state of health; that, after 
trying physicians for a  good while in vain, he resolved to give way to his distemper; and 
sat down calmly, in full expectation o f death in a short time. Under this thought he wrote 
letters to take a  last farewell of some of his more particular friends” (38). Half a decade 
later, another dangerous illness prompted him to write to Henry Cromwell on May 17, 
1710, that his friend should quickly finish the elegy he had proposed to write for him: “I 
shou’d at least have expected you to have finishd that Elegy upon me, which you told me 
you was upon the point o f beginning when I was sick in London; If you will but do so 
much for me first, I will give you leave to forget me afterwards; & for my own part, will 
dye at discretion, & at my leisure” (Corr. 1,87). His tone here and throughout the letter is 
somewhat waggish, but his infirmity—“my present, living, dead Condition”—is 
sufficiently serious, the prospect of death real enough to preoccupy him with thoughts of 
possible epitaphs and o f the several ways in which he has already been consigned to the 
shades: “I am, it must be own’d, Dead in a Natural Capacity . . . Dead in a Poetical 
Capacity, as a damn’d Author; and dead in a Civill Capacity, as a useless Member of the 
Commonwealth buried in Solitude” (87-88). But whether or not his frail constitution is the 
source of Pope’s habit of speaking in his public and private voices as if he were a revenant, 
the fact remains that the propensity makes up an important feature in his self-fashioning. 
Reinforcing and reinforced by both his private pessimism and the extreme Juvenalian 
persona he had assumed in his public satires, it seems to have been a major influence upon
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his adoption of the peculiar figurative apparatus—the “epitaphic vision”—he used to 
portray contemporary England.
In Pope's hands, the epitaph’s rhetorical and commemorative capacities would fit 
well with the public persona he had fashioned. As Addison comments in Spectator No. 26 
(Friday, March 30, 1711), the finality o f the tomb and the infinity of time are likely to 
doom “the little Competitions, Factions and Debates of Mankind” as well as the variety and 
complexity of our individual personalities, experiences, and actions to oblivion—or, if any 
lasting record is made of them, to preservation in a few crudely reductive commemorative 
lines stamped on paper or engraved on stone. Record is made of our names, the dates of 
our births and deaths, our character and profession, and our lives are summed up in a 
motto or pious verse. But it is the very finality of death that makes those few reductive lines 
so important, for they have the power to define us and perpetuate our memories in the 
minds of the living. And this capacity, in turn, lends epitaphs the power to exhort the living 
to pursue virtues of the dead or admonish them against their vices. Epitaphs may thus serve 
as commentary upon the dead yet exercise a powerful moral appeal upon the living and 
their concerns. Pope was well aware of this, and instead of merely commemorating the 
dead, exploits the rhetorical form and force of the epitaph in an attempt to define absolutely 
and indelibly the personal, political, and poetical principles he publicly claims to champion. 
In this way, the conventions of the genre would give a  distinctive epitaphic perspective and 
“shape” to the body of his philosophical and satirical poetry. Pope’s epitaphs, whether 
actual or merely literary, are therefore a logical—and important—extension of the satiric 
themes he pursued in his poetry at large. Yet the epitaph could serve still another turn. 
Taking  a cue from his habit of portraying his own death in Virtue’s cause, Pope would 
expand this epitaphic pose or stance into a much broader “epitaphic vision,” insinuating the 
utter corruption of the age by portraying in his epitaphs the demise of all that once had been 
noble and worthy of English civilization.
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Doubtless there are certain advantages accruing to the satirist who from the unique 
conventions, outlook, and contours of epitaphic rhetoric weaves the all-enfolding figurative 
“shroud” o f his social criticism. But the peculiar figurative apparatus that slowly evolved 
from this practice and would culminate in the fourth book of the New Dunciad (1742- 
1743)— the idea o f Britain itself cast as an entity in extremis, tenable once perhaps but now 
a thing past recovery and beyond belief—would have the probably unlooked-for but 
(coming when it did) likely unavoidable consequences of first, greatly segregating literal 
and figurative mnemonic cues within public poetry, which would have the effect, secondly, 
of disrupting the configuration and current of social memory established at the Restoration, 
thereby (thirdly) diminishing appreciably the role of poetry in the public sphere, a setback 
from which the genre has yet to recover.
Beginning with An Epistle to Dr. Arbuthnot, the moribund quality of the public 
persona Pope crafts in his more general autobiographical statements becomes increasingly 
discernible, because more elaborate, more insistent as a component of Pope’s social 
rhetoric. In Arbuthnot, we remember, Pope speaks o f poetry as the anodyne for “this long 
disease, my life,” but the poem even opens with the poet, harried by the world’s 
importunities, bidding his servant, “Shut, shut the door, good John', fatigu’d I said, / Tye 
up the knocker, say I’m sick, I’m dead” (I. 2). And though Pope here would feign death 
merely for comic effect, this episode foreshadows what by the end of the poem the fiction 
of his own death will have become (and henceforth remain) for Pope the public poet, a 
subtle reinforcement of his heroic stance: separated from the mundane distractions and self- 
serving preoccupations of the living, the “dead” man can speak in full knowledge of the 
world and its ways without being caught up or corrupted by them; he therefore can deliver 
with credible disinterest the absolute truths, the ideals o f moral and ethical conduct that 
should govern human affairs. Moreover, he has the advantage of looking back upon his 
own life and its work as if it were a thing already accomplished, assigning it its final real
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significance in the sweep o f history and the otherwise unknowable course of Providential
design. Thus when Pope inserts a sketch o f himself immediately after the scathing
“Sporus”-portrait o f Lord Hervey, the effect he achieves is not simply a compelling
contrast between the incarnation o f Courtly decadence and depravity on one hand and of his
ideals for himself on the other, but a shift in temporal perspective that underscores the
moral disparity between the two men. Whereas Hervey, as a living embodiment of servile
treachery—“Beauty that shocks you, Parts that none will trust, /  Wit that can creep, and
Pride that licks the dust” (11. 332-333)—is a creature of the times’ corruption, and as such
is likely to manifest still greater depravities, the figure Pope creates for himself exists
outside of time, is fixed, final, and therefore not subject to the fleshly temptations and
appetites that tend to wear away and make suspect even the most virtuous resolutions:
Not Fortune’s Worshipper, nor Fashion’s Fool,
Not Lucre’s Madman, nor Ambition’s Tool,
Not proud, nor servile, be one Poet’s praise 
That, if he pleas’d, he pleas’d by manly ways;
That Flatt’ry, ev’n to Kings, he held a shame,
And thought a Lye in Verse or Prose the same:
That not in Fancy’s Maze he wander’d long,
But stoop’d to Truth, and moraliz’d his song:
That not for Fame, but Virtue’s better end,
He stood the furious Foe, the timid Friend. . .  (11.334-343).
Note that this summary o f the poet’s attributes is cast in the past tense—as is the catalogue
of personal trials that makes up the second half of the portrait: “the loss of Friends he never
had, / The dull, the proud, the wicked, and the mad” (11. 346-47), the “distant Threats of
Vengeance on his head” (1. 348), “the Lye so oft o’erthrown” (1. 350), “the Morals
blacken’d,” “the libel’d Person, and the pictur’d Shape” (11. 351-352), “Abuse on all he
lov’d, or lov’d him spread, /  A Friend in Exile, or a Father, dead” (11.354-355). As Pope’s
use of the past tense renders the qualities of character that safe-guarded his pursuit of
“Virtue’s better end” seemingly indelible, so are the worldly battles occasioned by that
pursuit made to seem long resolved—and triumphantly so, allowing Pope to reduce the
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disappointments and tribulations (but also the ambiguities, compromises, and missteps) of 
a life spent and lost in this quest to the nobility o f its ostensible aims: “Welcome for thee, 
fair Virtue! all the past: /  For thee, fair Virtue! welcome ev’n the last\m (11. 358-359). The 
reflection that the imminent “last" (that is, death) will overtake him laboring in a worthy 
cause lets Pope reconcile himself to his own mortality, but also lends his current and future 
attitudes and actions—for he is, after all, still among the living—the moral authority of 
history’s favorable verdict upon them. In sum, by seeming to rank himself among the 
dead, Pope coaxes his contemporaries to look upon his persona and career as if  both were 
but the visible forms of those defining virtues (to be) inscribed by posterity upon his 
epitaph.
This “epitaphic strain” or stance recurs throughout the satires of the 1730’s. At 
times, as in “The First Epistle o f the First Book of Horace Imitated” and “The Second 
Epistle of the Second Book of Horace Imitated,” it is sublimated into the more conventional 
wish for retirement from public life. In the latter poem, for instance, Pope tells his 
imagined correspondent, Colonel Anthony Browne, that since poetry has brought him a 
competence that removes the necessity o f further toil, “Sure I should want the Care of ten 
Monroes,5 / If I would scribble, rather than repose” (70-71), for he has reached that time of 
life when he must lay poetry aside and “learn to smooth and harmonize my Mind, / Teach 
ev’ry Thought within its bounds to roll, /  And keep the equal Measure of the Soul” (11. 203- 
205). What Brean S. Hammond observes of “The First Epistle . . .” (addressed to 
Bolingbroke) may therefore be said o f this as well: “To a limited extent, the poem can be 
placed in the ars moriendi tradition. The poet is examining his own preparedness to die, the 
readiness of soul and conscience for death and judgement” (119). In other places, 
however, the epitaphic strain bursts forth much more forcefully. In Pope’s “versification” 
of Donne’s fourth satire, for example, the poet bids “Adieu to all the Follies of the Age! I
5 Dr. MONROE, Physician to Bedlam Hospital [Pope’s note|.
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die in Charity with Fool and Knave, /  Secure of Peace at least beyond the Grave” (11.2-4); 
the first Epilogue to the Satires concludes, as noted, with the apotheosis of Vice, but set 
apart from the rest of the poem is this final couplet; “Yet may this Verse (if such a Verse 
remain) / Show there was one who held it in disdain” (11.171-172)— making the preceding 
poem a “posthumous” monument to his struggle against the wickedness of the times; and in 
“Verses on a Grotto by the River Thames at Twickenham” (1741), Pope describes his 
beloved retreat as if he saw it many years hence, abandoned, obscure, yet in-spired still 
with the ethical and political ideals of those who once frequented it, those who joined with 
Pope in the struggle to uphold British civilization. “Approach,” Pope’s spirit bids the 
traveller, yet “Let such, such only, tread this sacred floor, / Who dare to love their 
Country, and be poor” (11. 13-14).
If Pope’s grotto here stands as a physical remnant evocative of the larger cultural 
struggle taken up by its denizens, we might notice likewise that, beginning with the 
passages from Arbuthnot, Pope’s autobiographical statements have in addition to their 
rhetorical functions a similar commemorative purpose, serving as monuments in verse to 
himself, to his art, to the skirmishes he fought in service of the ideals he tried to uphold. 
Johnson in his Life o f Pope wonders aloud upon the irony that by attacking so many 
knaves and fools Pope bestowed upon them an immortality they would otherwise not have 
enjoyed (II, 177). But this seems precisely what Pope had in mind. In the Advertisement to 
The Dunciad Variorum he declares grandly, “Of the Persons it was judg’d proper to give 
some account: for since it is only in this monument that they must expect to survive, (and 
here survive they will, as long as the English tongue shall remain such as it was in the 
reigns of Queen ANNE and King GEORGE) it seem’d but humanity to bestow a word or two 
upon each, just to tell what he was, what he writ, when he liv’d, or when he dy’d” (317). 
The cynical might conclude that Pope hoped to ensure for himself posterity’s high esteem 
by keeping alive the memory of inferior talents. But satirists no less than love-poets must 
leave us pictures of their objects. Mere love is not enough: Dante must enchant us with his
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Beatrice, Boise her Abelard, Astrophel his Stella. Neither is the satirist’s precept enough. 
In itself, as Dry den has told us, it is but “a crude preparation of morals, which we may 
have from Aristotle and Epictetus, with more profit than from any poet.” If the satirist is to 
live after his death, so must his targets, sustained by the same verse that keeps his own 
memory alive. We might then observe to Dr. Johnson what Pope observed to his friend 
Cromwell in that waggish letter on death and monuments: “I fear I must be forc’d, like 
many learned Authors, to write my own Epitaph, if I wou’d be remember’d at all” (Corr. I, 
87-88). For in a  general sense, Pope’s satire is its own epitaph, his way of keeping alive 
memories o f the particular configuration of his historical moment, of those particular 
circumstances and cultural stakes that led him to modulate Virgil’s voice into Juvenal’s. 
And if eternal union with Dennis, Bentley, Tickell, Theobald, Cibber, Walpole, George H, 
Bubb Dodington, Lord Hervey, and Lady Mary strikes us (as it did Johnson) as less than 
ideal, Pope knew such to be the inescapable lot of the satirist. Thus in Arbuthnot, for 
instance, he does not grudge the “word-catching” quibblers (1. 166) their incessant fault­
finding with his works; for as “such small Critics some regard may claim, / Preserv’d in 
M ilton’s or in Shakespear’s name” (11. 167-68), so too does their dullness set off the 
genius of those lines o f his in which it finds itself forever fixed: “Pretty! in Amber to 
observe the forms / Of hairs, or straws, or dirt, or grubs, or worms; / The things we know, 
are neither rich nor rare, /  But wonder how the devil they got there?” (11. 169-172).
Pope’s epitaphic pose had its natural complement and culmination in the two actual 
epitaphs he wrote on himself. They are the most definitive of his self-definitions, and in 
them the elements and techniques of his rhetoric are most overt, his commemorative aims 
most evident The first composed around 1738 and published in his Works of the same 
year, is headed, “Epitaph for One who would not be buried in Westminster Abbey”:
HEROES, and Kings! your distance keep:
In peace let one poor Poet sleep,
Who never flatter’d Folks like you:
Let Horace blush, and Virgil too.
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If Pope had declared in previous autobiographical statements that he would not spare the 
great and powerful (“A Knave's a Knave, to me, in every state”), he here offers in his 
posthumous act o f defiance perhaps the most grandiose gesture of poetic independence. 
Living, he never flattered “Heroes and Kings”; dead, he keeps his distance from them by 
warning them away from his final resting place, and by spuming the possible posthumous 
recognition of being buried in Westminster Abbey. Such recognition would in any event be 
tainted enough coming from a class whose tastes Pope often lampooned,6 and whose 
neglect of true literary merit in favor of buying the flattery of hacks was a constant source 
of irritation—or worse. In Arbuthnot, for example, Pope remarks bitterly of the belated 
appreciation of Dryden’s genius, “But still the Great have kindness in reserve, / He help’d 
to bury whom he helped to starve” (11.247-248). A few lines later his disgust leads him to 
an ironic endorsement of literary prostitution: at least it matches dunce with dunce and 
keeps blockhead patrons and poets alike from his own door. His anger resurfaces, 
however, when he thinks of the fate met by John Gay, his beloved friend and fellow 
Scriblerian:
Blest be the Great! for those they take away,
And those they left me—For they left me Gay,
Left me to see neglected Genius bloom,
Neglected die! and tell it on his Tomb;
Of all thy blameless Life the sole Return
My Verse, and QUEENSB’RY weeping o’er thy Um! (11.255-60)
Pope follows this up with a passage closely foreshadowing his first epitaph upon himself:
0  let me live my own! and die so too !. . .
Maintain a Poet’s Dignity and Ease,
And see what friends, and read what books I please.
Above a Patron, tho’ I condescend
Sometimes to call a Minister my Friend:
1 was not bom for Courts or great Affairs,
I pay my Debts, believe, and say my Pray’rs (11.261; 263-268).
6 The Epistle to Burlington offers perhaps the best single example; especially 11. 99-176.
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Note that in both these passages from Arbuihnot, Pope implies that death is a welcome 
alternative to the corruptions of the world, the tomb a sanctuary from its follies, the dead at 
last sanctified and beyond the reach o f both. In his epitaph, however, Pope goes a bit 
further this moral distance of the dead from the living is no longer sufficient to protect the 
former from the taint o f the latter, who might yet compromise the poet’s independence and 
integrity by interring him in Westminster Abbey—die burial place of those poets the people 
(and especially “the Great” among them) have taken to their hearts. He therefore takes care 
to avoid even the appearance of complicity with “Folks like you” (“folks” being a deft 
undercutting of their dignity) by forestalling their (presumably bumptious) efforts at tribute 
and composing his own commemorative verses. As Joshua Scodel argues in a lengthy and 
impressive explication of this epitaph, Pope seeks here not only to assert his independence 
from the world at large, but to define himself against the epitaphic stances of his fellow 
poets—Cowley and Prior among them, and even Horace and Virgil—who living have 
courted the Great, and who in death were assumed by them “into the mainstream o f 
political and poetical tradition” (“Epitaphic Stance” 615; 625; 629-630). Distancing himself 
from the Great, Pope implies that he is in some way superior them, if not in wealth, power, 
or lineage, then in a capacity that casts doubt on the true worth of such earthly trappings. 
And what of this nature could he, the “poor Poet,” possess but the virtuous rage and poetic 
indignation that suffuses these four lines? But by putting himself beyond the reach even of 
the world’s just esteem, Pope assumes likewise in this epitaph the satirist’s ultimate 
antagonistic stance, estranging himself not simply from the realm of the living, but from his 
nation, time, people, and the cultural and literary traditions that lent structure to and in turn 
drew sustenance from his life, career, and memory.
This posture o f extreme renunciation carries over into Pope’s second epitaph on 
himself, published anonymously in January, 1741. Here he asserts with proud humility,
Under this Marble, or under this Sill,
Or under this Turf, or e’en what they will;
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Whatever an Heir, or a  Friend in his stead,
Or any good Creature shall lay o 'er my Head; 
lie s he who n’er car’d, and still cares not a  Pin,
What they said, or may say o f the Mortal within.
But who living and dying, serene still and free,
Trusts in God, that as well as he was, he shall be.
Scodel calls Pope’s declaration o f his indifference both to the manner of his commemor­
ation and its agent (11. 1-4) an exaggerated form o f what we have seen before, the ancient 
poetic ideal of retirement from the world (“Epitaphic Stance,” 627); the poet, withdrawing 
from the final concerns of his fleshly mortality, resigns himself (U. 5-8) with a clear 
conscience to the justice of heaven. But here as in the earlier epitaph, Pope goes beyond 
mere withdrawal from the world and beyond a weary resignation to its ways we have seen 
in several of his imitations of Horace to an active scorn of all worldly trappings—even, 
significantly, the dear intimates on whose companionship his Horatian idealizations of 
comfortable retirement had largely been based. This time it is not “the Great” from whom 
Pope defiantly takes his leave and asserts his independence, but the blood heir he would 
never have; the friends whose petty quarrels with him and with each other had become an 
all but continual vexation; and the “good creatures” whose officiousness and self-serving 
flattery—always resented—had grown truly noxious. The moroseness sufficient to prompt 
a farewell to friendship and humanity might, in Pope’s case, be attributed to a  gathering 
disillusionment regarding his Opposition acquaintance that the year before had taken form 
in the poem “One Thousand Seven Hundred and Forty,” which Pope left incomplete (and 
unpublished). There Pope ascribes to a whole catalogue of plainly identifiable Patriot 
leaders the same venalities he had all along identified with the Walpole Administration. And 
if the Opposition leaders are humbugging opportunists, their rustic rank and file are a sorry 
lot of rubes indeed: “They follow rev’rently each wond’rous wight, / Amaz’d that one can 
read, that one can write: / So geese to gander prone obedience keep, / Hiss if he hiss, and if 
he slumber, sleep” (11.33-36). “The plague is on thee, Britain,” Pope concludes, “and who 
tries / To save thee[,] in th’ infectious office dies” (11. 75-76). Or rather, becomes as dead
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to Virtue as the body politic itself has. Reason enough, therefore, not only to disclaim any 
personal involvement in the practical guidance o f the country, but (whatever the immediate 
causes of Pope’s discontent) to disclaim publicly as well in this second epitaph those 
human ties most likely to cloud and compromise the satirist’s integrity. Putting himself 
beyond the reach even of such elemental attachments, Pope can affect an absolute 
identification with a Providential justice that recognizes and prefers only Virtue, and knows 
him (as he knows himself) to be o f  such probity in life that with a conscience “serene still 
and free” he may in death “[trust] in God, that as well as he was, he shall be.” Pope stops 
short of placing himself among God’s elect, but his stoic renunciation of the mundane, his 
beatific anticipation o f death are designed—perversely enough—to lend his persona an 
omniscience and objectivity sufficient to give his words an added moral weight among the 
mortals about whom he pretends to care “not a Pin.”7
Pope occasionally extends elements o f his self-fashioning to his epitaphs on others, 
as he does in his belated piece on Charles Earl of Dorset (1638-1706), written about 1731 
and published in the Works of 1735. The epitaph commemorates Dorset as an ideal pattern 
of political merit: “Blest Courtier! who could King and Country please, /  Yet sacred keep 
his Friendships and his Ease” (1L 9-10); and Pope associates Dorset’s ancestry with the 
lineage of Virtue itself: “Blest Peer! his great Forefathers ev’ry Grace / Reflecting, and 
reflected in his Race; / Where other Buckhursts, other Dorsets shine, / And Patriots still, or 
Poets, deck the Line” (U. 11-14). It is, however, as poet-as-patriot that Dorset most fully
7 As it turned out. Pope chose neither of these epitaphs for his tomb—though his friend and literary 
executor William Warburton later inscribed (against Pope’s wishes) the first upon the monument he 
raised to Pope in the church at Twickenham, where the poet was buried beside his parents. Instead, Pope 
had “and to himself’ appended to the epitaph he had composed for them:
To God the Creator and best of Beings,
To Alexander Pope, a Gentleman of Honesty, Probity and 
Piety, who liv’d LXXV. Years, died M.DCC.XVII.
And to Ed it ha, his Excellent and tmely Pious Wife, 
who lived XCIH. Years, died M.DCC.XXXIII.
To his well-deserving Parents the Son erected this, 
and to himself (Prose Works, II, 505).
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comes to life (so to speak) in Pope's portrait, perhaps because during this period Pope was
coming to see himself as a satirist laboring for the public weal. In any event, so closely
does Pope identify himself with the courtly wit (whose verse characters he had imitated in
youthful exercises) that his sketch o f Dorset could have been the model for his own self-
portraits of the 1730’s—indeed, the following lines would not be out of place in An Epistle
to Dr. Arbuthnot or in either o f the Epilogues to the Satires:
The Scourge of Pride, tho’ sanctify’d or great,
Of Fops in I .earning, and of Knaves in State:
Yet soft his Nature, tho’ severe his Lay,
His Anger moral, and his Wisdom gay.
Blest Satyrist! who touch’d the Mean so true,
As show’d, Vice had his Hate and Pity too (11.3-8).
The parallels between Dorset’s epitaph and Pope’s own claims for himself and his 
satire alert us to two things. First, they alert us to the generic capacity of the epitaph for 
upholding the larger ideals, topics, and themes of the satirist’s major works. But secondly, 
the demonstration of this capacity within this particular epitaph, coinciding as it does with 
the nascent emergence of Pope’s satiric persona, hints that the development of that 
persona—coaxed into assuming its epitaphic stance by the lifelong “imminence” of Pope’s 
own mortality and the extreme (though logical) consequences o f his peculiar assimilation of 
the Juvenalian model—might have links as well with Pope’s frequent forays into memorial 
verse between 1716 and 1736, when he composed the majority o f his epitaphs. And a 
survey of Pope’s epitaphs in fact reveals that the progress of the epitaphic stance I have 
traced in the foregoing pages largely recapitulates, rapidly and within a narrow compass, 
the slow evolution of that stance during the previous two decades within his actual 
epitaphs. Indeed, the features characterizing the development of Pope’s epitaphic pose—the 
quest for an impregnable rhetorical space; the exposition of ideals of private and public 
conduct and the segregation o f those ideals from the living world in order to secure them 
from its corruptions; the use of these ideals, once segregated, to serve as an implicit 
commentary on the depravity of Pope’s foes and times; and finally, the implication that as
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
475
the world has become dead to virtue, so virtue must be dead to the world—occur in 
roughly the same order there as they do here. It is tempting, therefore, to argue that even as 
Pope’s epitaphs on others serve as an early auxiliary to the ideals he would uphold and the 
targets he would assail in his satires o f the 1730’s, so do the epitaphic habits acquired in 
the composition o f these commemorations seem to confirm Pope in his later satiric 
predisposition toward portraying a moribund Britain, facilitating his movement from mere 
epitaphic stance toward a more comprehensive epitaphic vision.
In his earliest epitaphs, Pope yokes the somewhat self-contradictory elements o f the 
epitaphic form, its supposed disinterestedness (the dead, beyond “the little Competitions, 
Factions and Debates of Mankind,” would appear immune from both the scorn and flattery 
of the living), its severely limited space, and the finality of its sentiments, to lend authority 
to the patterns of public and private virtue his verse commemorations seek to establish. For 
as with his own epitaphs, the nearly thirty epitaphs Pope wrote for others are designed not 
so much to commemorate the individual as to define and proffer models o f good character 
and right action. However, though Pope frequently seems to append a name to a list of 
abstract virtues, one cannot say that Pope’s epitaphs are wholly impersonal, or that he has 
no feeling for his subjects. Rather, Pope emphasizes the abstracted and therefore more 
broadly recognizable merits of his subjects over their more specifically individual qualities 
of mind and manner, assembling these merits in a highly idealized way. This might be 
expected in an age held to favor general expressions o f universal truths over, in Dr. 
Johnson’s words, numbering the streaks o f the tulip or describing the different shades in 
the verdure of the forest. But even for Johnson Pope’s epitaphs seem overly generic. In 
“An Essay on Epitaphs” (1740), Johnson asserts that epitaphs are not to be too general, 
“because the mind is lost in the extent of any indefinite idea, and cannot be affected with 
what it cannot apprehend” (134). This would be a just criticism of Pope’s epitaphs, if one 
did not recognize that their rhetorical effectiveness within his general satire would be 
diminished if they were any more intimate or particular. As in his own case, the qualities he
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defines and defends seem to operate most effectively as satire only after they have been 
abstracted from the living world, and, once fixed and stabilized, have been placed beyond 
all possibility of corruption and compromise.
Pope's habit of fitting his subjects within themes of broad, absolute ideals may be 
demonstrated by comparing two early epitaphs written on behalf o f friends. The first, 
composed in 1716 for William Trumbull and published in the 1717 edition of Pope’s 
Works, ascribes to its subject:
A pleasing form, a firm, yet cautious mind,
Sincere, tho’ prudent, constant, yet resign’d;
Honour unchang’d, a  principle profest,
Fix’d to one side, but mod’rate to the rest;
An honest Courtier, yet a Patriot too,
Just to his Prince, yet to his Country true (11. 1-6).
Well might Pope so praise Trumbull, for Trumbull had been both a faithful public servant 
and a warm friend. Trumbull, whose long diplomatic career culminated in a Secretaryship 
of State under William III, and who in retirement was a model steward in his appointment 
as royal administrator for Windsor Forest, had befriended Pope, Mack notes, by June 1706 
(104). Despite the vast difference in their ages (Trumbull was nearly 50 years Pope’s 
elder), their friendship Mack calls “the most intimate and affectionate of [Pope’s] early 
career” (104), adding that for Pope, “Trumbull played the role of a second father, or 
perhaps more accurately, o f a solicitous grandfather and great uncle” (105). Trumbull and 
Pope read and rode together, and the older man encouraged Pope in his early poetry. It is 
somewhat odd, then, that a  man so beloved by Pope is commemorated in part with lines 
taken from an earlier epitaph, one Pope wrote for John Lord Caryll (uncle and namesake of 
his great friend John Caryll), a  Jacobite who at the Glorious Revolution had fled to France, 
where he served as Secretary of State to the exiled Stuarts—and a man whom Pope had 
never met
A manly Form; a bold, yet modest mind;
Sincere, tho’ prudent; constant, yet resign’d;
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Honour unchang’d, a Principle profest;
Fix’d to one side, but mod’rate to the rest;
An honest Courtier, and a  Patriot too;
Just to his Prince, and to his Country true (II. 1-6).
Men of different factions, different faiths, different fortunes, described not in equivalent
but in identical terms in these lines. Moreover, of the two epitaphs, Caryll’s is the longer,
more elaborate. Whereas Trumbull is said to possess “the sense of age, the fire of youth; /
A scorn of wrangling, yet a  zeal for 10116" (11.7-8), religious tolerance, love of peace and
hatred of tyranny—no mean qualities, to be sure—Caryll in whom wisdom, learning,
virtue, and bravery are met, is painted as the touchstone of human achievement: “Go now,”
Pope exhorts the reader,
leam all vast Science can impart;
Go fathom Nature, take the Heights of Art!
Rise higher yet: leam even yourselves to know;
Nay, to yourselves alone that knowledge owe.
Then, when you seem above mankind to soar,
Look on this marble, and be vain no more!8 (11. 12-17)
Having mastered every art and science, Caryll has apparently attained complete self-
knowledge as well, and in doing so seems to possess a degree of knowledge and wisdom
somewhat above what is usually possible for human beings. [Indeed, he surpasses even
Newton, who, Pope says, has revealed all Nature’s law but cannot “Describe or fix one
movement of his mind,” or “Explain his own beginning, or his end” (Essay on Man, II,
36; 38)].
8 In “Epistle to Mr. Jervas” (1717) Pope adapts lines 16-17 to refer to Elizabeth Countess of 
Bridgewater “Bid her [any paragon of womanhood] be all that makes mankind adore; /  Then view this 
marble, and be vain no more!” (11* 53-54). In either case, the expansiveness of this praise can be seen 
when these lines are compared to those with which Pope later upbraided human pride and ignorance of 
self in The Essay on Man (1733-34), lines very similar in tone and rhetorical structure:
Go, wond’rous creature! mount where Science guides,
Go, measure earth, weigh air, and state the tides;
Instruct the planets in what orbs to run.
Correct old Time, and regulate the Sun;. . .
Go, teach Eternal Wisdom how to rule—
Then drop into thyself, and be a fool! (II, 19-22; 31-32)
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Though it may seem curious that Pope praises a relative stranger more lavishly than 
an intimate friend, one need not conclude from this that Pope is either inconsistent or 
insincere. For one thing, the extravagance of Lord Caryll’s epitaph may have been 
prompted in part by Pope’s great affection for the younger John Caryll, and by his desire to 
praise a fellow Catholic with whose politics and plight he could well sympathize. For 
another, it is the particular license o f poets and politicians to assume masks appropriate for 
the moment, and to believe (and have us believe) that these are indeed their true faces. But 
still more to the point, Pope in these epitaphs is not praising the man so much as the virtues 
he possesses. Both Caryll and Trumbull were men who served loyally the leaders and 
causes to which they had pledged themselves. It matters not that they were on opposite 
sides of the political and religious debates of their day: integrity is integrity. As Pope would 
later declare in his second Epilogue to the Satires, there are, above considerations of blood, 
rank, and wealth, certain “Trophies [that] deck the truly Brave” (1* 236), “Such as on 
Hough’s unsully’d Mitre shine, / Or beam, good DlGBY! from a Heart like thine” (U. 240- 
241). And who are Hough and Digby? Pope explains in a footnote: “Dr. John Hough 
Bishop of Worcester, and the Lord Digby. The one as assertor o f the church of England in 
opposition to the false measures of King James II. The other as firmly attached to the cause 
of that King. Both acting out of principle, and equally men of honour and virtue” (703n). It 
is to Pope’s credit that he can call by the same name such mutually antipathetic stances. 
Virtue remains fixed, though its practitioner and its expression may differ. Indeed, the 
similarities between the Trumbull and Caryll epitaphs suggest that for Pope the concepts of 
virtue and nobility o f character (among others) exist as a set of fixed ideals, outside the 
individual and his immediate circumstances, to be judged according to the general 
competence and not the idiosyncrasies of their execution. The varied lives of these two men 
help round off our abstract notions o f the qualities each embodied—much as in Locke’s 
explication of complex (or moral) ideas, or in Augustan mimetic theory generally, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
479
usefulness o f the tangible lies mainly in its power to intimate the intangible, the 
indiscernible aspects of what lies before us.
This patterning o f moral cognition becomes a rhetorical strategy in Pope’s epitaphs 
for statesmen and public figures. As in the epitaphs for Trumbull and Caryll, Pope appends 
the name of his subject to an ideal pattern o f right character and action for his subject’s 
station and duties, implying, o f  course, that he indeed fulfills the stated ideal. However, 
when (or at least as) this formula is applied to the friends of a Catholic poet known to be at 
least sympathetic to the Opposition and suspected of Jacobitism as well, the effect works 
both ways, giving us an idea of perfect vice as well as perfect virtue—or rather, an idea of 
vice by way of the poet’s segregation of public virtues among the dead. For by linking the 
opposition of goodness to corruption with the analogous, absolute opposition o f the dead 
to the living, Pope establishes the friends he commemorates as models for public 
emulation, with the clear, inescapable implication that those currently in authority fall far 
short of the moral standards against which they are being measured. Pope’s verse raises the 
merits of its subjects to perpetual perfection. Such impossibly high ideals will always find 
the living wanting, but the satire of these pieces comes, first, from Pope’s canonization of 
controversial, even officially disgraced personages at odds with or persecuted by Pope’s 
enemies in office, and, second, from the consequent implication that the ruling powers are 
so antipathetic to virtue generally that only in death—that is, in his own memorial verse, 
written in despite of the times—may it find its fullest realization and reward.
Such is the thought behind the final couplet of Pope’s epitaph for Trumbull, “who 
now, from earth remov’d, / At length enjoys that liberty he loved” (11. 11-12). And such is 
the epitaphic rhetoric at work in Pope’s epitaph for James Craggs, who had been made 
Secretary at War in 1717, and who had succeeded Addison as Secretary of State in March 
1718. Upon taking the latter office, he received in Pope’s “Epistle to James Craggs” his 
friend's congratulations and admonishment :
But can did, free, sincere, as you began.
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Proceed—a Minister, but still a Man;
Be not (exalted to whate’er degree)
Asham’d of any Friend, not ev’n of Me.
The Patriot’s plain, but untrod path pursue;
If not, ’tis I must be ashamed of You (11.12-17).
Pope sent him yet another “reminder” in “A Dialogue” (c. 1718), in which he puts into
Craggs’s mouth the appropriate reassurances:
Alas! if I am such a Creature,
To grow the worse for growing greater;
Why Faith, in Spite of all my Brags,
’Tis Pope must be asham’d of Craggs (11.5-8).
The political climate gave Pope good cause to worry, tainted as it was by the brutal
machinations of opposing Whiggish factions vying for ministerial power and royal favor,
which culminated, at about the time of Craggs’s death in 1721, in Walpole’s rise to power
after successfully screening members of the Court and Administration from accountability
(and prosecution) in the South Sea scandal. When Pope composed Craggs’s epitaph he had
yet to fall out with Walpole; however, the epitaph’s first appearance in print—in Pope’s
Works of 1735—came at a time when the poet was making his antipathy toward the Prime
Minister widely known. With this in mind, it is difficult not to read Pope’s epitaph for
Craggs as a barb against Walpole and his ministry, for Craggs, in short, is everything
Walpole is not:
Statesman, yet Friend to Truth! of Soul sincere,
In Action faithful, and in Honour clear!
Who broke no promise, serv’d no private end,
Who gain’d no Title, and who lost no Friend,
Ennobled by Himself, by All approv’d,
Prais’d, wept, and honour’d by the Muse he lov’d.
Pope had originally included these lines in an apostrophe to Craggs in his “To Mr.
Addison, Occasioned by his Dialogues on Medals” (1720), before Craggs’s death and
before Craggs had, according to Morris Brownell, “disgraced himself in the South Sea
scandal, and was subjected to ridicule and parody” (349). (The sixth line then read, “And
prais’d, unenvy’d, by the Muse he lov’d.”) But they served the moment of their publication
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very well, for in establishing an ideal pattern for the statesman, Craggs’s epitaph would 
have served likewise as an easily and broadly recognized satire on the shortcomings of the 
Prime Minister, the most powerful, and therefore by default the most dangerous living 
embodiment of the soul-destroying “plague” that had infected Britain’s political sphere, 
killing the integrity of her public servants. By 1735 Walpole (known to contemporaries as 
simply, “the Great Man”) had long since grown notorious—and not only in Opposition 
circles—for his political “pragmatism”: that is, for duplicity, moral equivocation, the 
heavy-handed execution of his policies, and for brokering his office into a knighthood, a 
title (George II created him Earl of Orford), and great personal wealth. As W.A. Speck 
explains in Stability and Strife: England, 1714-1760 (1977), “Walpole himself was quite 
cynical about the allegations of corruption made by the opposition. As he put it ‘I am no 
saint, no spartan, no reformer.’ . . .  It is significant that where his own immediate 
predecessors, Godolphin, Harley and Stanhope, had all left office poorer than they had 
entered it, Walpole himself amassed a fortune during his twenty year premiership. The 
period of his administration was undoubtedly coarser, more materialistic and indeed more 
corrupt than the previous era” (228-229). For Pope, who had known Sir Robert when, as 
Robin Walpole, he had been an amiable coffee-house habitue, known him “in his happier 
hour / Of Social Pleasure, ill-exchang’d for Pow’r, / Seen him, uncumber’d with the Venal 
tribe, / Smile without Art, and win without a Bribe,”9 the Prime Minister had become by 
mid-decade the antithesis of political justness and integrity. It was as such that Pope had 
portrayed him in his “versification” of Donne’s fourth satire (revised and published two 
years before the appearance of Craggs’s epitaph), in which he puts into the mouth of a 
Court creature his own (and the Opposition’s) criticisms of Walpole and his policies:
Then as a licens’d Spy, whom nothing can
Silence, or hurt, he libels the Great Man;
Swears every Place entail’d  for Years to come,
9 Epilogue to the Satires (I), 11.29-32).
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In sure Succession to the Day of Doom:
He names the Price for ev’ry Office paid,
And says our Wars thrive ill, because delay'd;
Nay hints, ’tis by Connivance of the Court,
That Spain robs on, and Dunkirk’s still a  Port (11.158-165).
Coming from Pope, the assertion here that the courtier’s accusations are mere libel would
only have underscored the poet’s implicit faith in their accuracy. In an analogous, if
inverted way, the epitaph on Craggs, preceded by many such critical enumerations of the
Prime Minister’s supposed missteps, would have directed at least as much attention toward
Walpole’s deficiencies as toward the memory of one whose merits saw him ruined, not
enriched by the scandal that had raised the Great Mar. to power.
Pope is bolder in his 1732 epitaph for his friend and sometime moral confidant,
Francis Atterbury (1662-1732), dean of Westminster and bishop of Rochester, a man of
strong Jacobite sympathies who had allowed himself to become half-heartedly involved in a
plot of 1722 to restore the Stuarts in the wake of the South Sea fiasco, when the Whiggish
Hanoverian administration was greatly discredited and seemingly vulnerable. Though the
plot came to nothing and no restoration was attempted, Walpole used it as an excuse to
disgrace the Opposition once for all, thereby ingratiating himself further with George I and
solidifying his own power base. Atterbury was his prime target After a brief show trial (at
which Pope himself testified, skirting both perjury and the incriminating truth), Atterbury
was exiled to France, where in 1729 he received his ailing daughter, who died of
tuberculosis shortly after her arrival. It was a felony to correspond with Atterbury, but
Pope wrote anyway to console him. And when Atterbury died, still in exile, in 1732, Pope
took it upon himself to rehabilitate the man Walpole had sacrificed to political expediency.
It was a dangerous thing to do, even so many years after the facts. Howard Erskine-Hill
argues that when Johnson observes in his Life, “The contemptible ‘Dialogue’ between He
and She should have been suppressed for the author’s sake” (II, 242) he speaks less of the
quality of the piece than of what Erskine-Hill calls its “politically subversive nature,”
which, he says, still had the power to embarrass Johnson in the 1750’s (“Life Into
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Letters," 220). If this is the case, it is no wonder that at the last minute Pope had the poem 
struck from the 1735 edition of his Works.
Erskine-Hill calls Pope's epitaph, a  dialogue between father and daughter, “startling 
and unconventional,” for it seemingly has no formal precedents (215-216). In it, Pope 
collapses time and alters strict historical fact so that Atterbury dies moments after his 
daughter expires in his arms:
She: Yes, we have liv’d—one pang, and then we part!
May Heav’n, dear Father! now, have all thy Heart 
Yet ah! how once we lov’d remember still,
1111 you are Dust like me.
He: Dear Shade! I will:
Thai mix this Dust with thine—O spotless Ghost!
O more than Fortune, Friends, or Country lost!
Is there on earth one Care, one Wish beside?
Yes— Save my Country, H eav’n,
—He said, and dy’d.
This epitaph is shameless in its attempt to evoke pathos for Atterbury. The immediate cause 
of his death, apparently, is a heart broken by grief at his daughter’s loss. But there have 
been other heartbreaks: the loss of Fortune, Friends, and Country. At his death, Atterbury 
is a man, like Job, utterly bereft of earthly trappings; he is in possession “only” of deep 
love for daughter and country, and of great faith in the power and benevolence o f Heaven. 
A model father, a long-suffering Christian resigned to fate’s whims, a patriot whose dying 
words show his yet fervent love for the country that betrayed him—can this man, Pope’s 
epitaph seems to ask, really have been the traitor he has been painted to be? And if he is not 
a traitor, what can one help concluding about the characters of those men who prosecuted 
and persecuted him? What could be in their hearts? Certainly nothing that could appreciate 
Atterbury’s benevolence, fortitude, and constancy. As with the epitaph for Craggs, that for 
Atterbury establishes a space for Virtue far removed—and necessarily so, it would seem— 
from the circles of political society, implying thereby the total mutual incompatibility of 
honor and power. But even the direct assertion of Atterbury’s virtue is a bold political
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statement giving the lie to the government’s case against him. Prudence may have led Pope 
to suppress this epitaph—it was first published only in Warburton’s 1751 edition of Pope’s 
Works—but this does not diminish its importance as a political document, for Pope 
composed it after he had finally broken with Walpole, and it serves as evidence that in 
Pope’s mind the associations of corruption with the Administration, of integrity with the 
Opposition had become fixed and absolute.
In this epitaph and in that for Craggs, Pope makes a point of putting himself in the 
scene, of commemorating his own recognition of merit In Craggs’s epitaph, for instance, 
Pope declares openly that his subject is “Prais’d, wept, and honour’d by the Muse he 
lov’d.” He is less conspicuous in Atterbury’s epitaph, but the final half-line makes it clear 
that the dialogue between father and daughter has had a witness, that its pathos has been 
deeply felt that the episode has been reflected upon, its greater moral import understood 
and recorded. By so underscoring his own commemorative presence in his epitaphs, Pope 
achieves three main things. For one, he calls attention to the power of poetic memory, to 
his skill in managing the conventions of the genre, and thus to his own reputation among 
those who wished to perpetuate the memory of their beloved. For another, he establishes 
his stake in the history and social heritage of the nation by directly associating himself with 
some of its greatest and most distinguished families, as in his epitaph for Simon Harcourt, 
the “Son most dear” (1.2) of England’s Lord Chancellor. “Oh let thy once-lov’d Friend in­
scribe thy Stone, I And with a Father’s Sorrows mix his own!” (11. 7-8); or that for Robert 
and Mary Digby, the grown children of the 5th Lord Digby: “These little rites, a Stone, a 
Verse receive, /  ’Tis all a Father, all a friend can give!” (11. 19-20). Finally, and most 
important for the present purpose, Pope’s insistent presence in these pieces makes us aware 
of the larger consequences for the temporal, living world when the greatly good and the 
good among the great pass away, for though he mourns as a friend, it is, however, as a 
public poet that he records their loss and interprets its significance for the nation. In short,
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his poetic presence facilitates the arrangement o f these commemorations within a moral and
cultural context far beyond the personal or familial circumstances of his individual subjects.
Exactly what that greater context is begins to emerge explicitly in several later
“political” epitaphs. In his epitaph to General Henry Withers (published 1730), for
example, Pope addresses his long-time friend in a voice that is meant to speak for the
nation and the age:
Withers adieu! yet not with thee remove 
Thy Martial spirit, or thy Social love!
Amidst corruption, luxury, and rage,
Still leave some ancient virtues to our age:
Nor let us say, (those English glories gone)
The last true Briton lies beneath this stone (11.7-12).
But the voice is Pope’s own. The direct address, the reference to “our age,” and the phrase
“Nor let us say” all call attention to the speaker, his world, and his idiosyncratic view of it.
His characterization of the present age as one o f “corruption, luxury, and rage,” for
instance, does throw into relief Withers’ apparently uncommon virtues, yet their scarcity,
in turn, sets off to far greater effect the speaker’s anxiety lest the “ancient virtues,” “those
English glories,” really have been removed from Britain with the general’s death, lest “the
last true Briton” really does “[lie] beneath this stone.” To a greater degree than in earlier
epitaphs, Pope here directly contrasts the virtues of his subject with the general and deep-
set decadence of the age, enabling the piece to function as a comprehensive social criticism.
In a sense, Pope has raised the stakes vis-i-vis the segregation of virtue among the dead:
not only has that virtue in itself become a reflection on the times—in its rareness, a rebuke
to the moral status quo—but the times themselves seem no longer capable of nourishing
men like Withers,10 of replenishing the nation’s loss of such, because they can no longer
10 In a preface to the printed versions of the epitaph. Pope says of Withers, "A love of glory and of his 
country animated and raised him above that spirit which the trade of war inspires; a desire of acquiring 
riches and honours by the miseries of m ankind . His temper was humane, his benevolence universal, 
and among all those ancient virtues, which he preserved in practice and in credit, none was more 
remarkable than his hospitality” (809n).
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instill in succeeding generations those “ancient virtues” and “English glories” that sustain a 
people and its civilization. When one can imagine the passing of “the last true Briton,” it 
seems only logical to think of Britain itself as an unsound entity, its mortal hour imminent 
Indeed, what we see here—and in his epitaphs for Edmund Duke of Buckingham and John 
Knight—is a  foreshadowing of how Pope will adopt and extend the figure of a moribund 
Britain into his poetry at large.
Pope’s epitaphs for Buckingham and Knight, composed in 1736, appear to develop 
the themes found in his lines on Withers. Both pieces are animated by a sentiment closely 
similar to a flattering observation Pope had made to Lord Digby in a letter of September 8 , 
1729, regarding the memorial verses he was writing for Robert and Mary Digby’s 
monument: “It is you My Lord, that perpetuate your Family the best way, by transmitting 
thro ’ yourself all the Virtues o f it into your Posterity. Your whole fam ily is an example o f 
what is alm ost now lost in this Nation, the Integrity o f ancient Nobility” (Corr. Ill, 52; 
emphasis added). Virtue has no guarantee o f posterity; its lines of descent may be 
prematurely and permanently severed. Pope underscores this in heading Buckingham's 
epitaph “On Edmund Duke of Buckingham, who died in the Nineteenth Year of his Age, 
1735,” and by emphasizing in the poem’s first lines that goodness is no less vulnerable to 
“fate” (1. 3) for being good, nor “modest Youth,” “cool Reflection,” and “ev’ry opening 
Virtue” (11. 1-2) any less immune to death. He underscores likewise the consequences for 
the nation of losing so early those merits that might have “add[ed] one Patriot to a sinking 
state” (1.4): “how many Hopes lie here! / The living Virtue now had shone approv’d, / The 
Senate heard him, and his Country lov’d” (11. 6-8 ). Instead, now the “Race, for Courage 
fam’d, and Art” (1. 11), and for the “Chiefs or Sages long to Britain giv’n” (1. 13) meets its 
end “in the milder Merit of the Heart” (1. 12). Edmund was the youngest and only 
surviving son of John Sheffield, first Duke o f Buckingham and Normanby. He is lost, and 
with him the family line, and with the line, presumably, the qualities that so long had kept 
the “sinking state” from utter dissolution. In a similar way, Pope’s opening epithet
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describing John Knight as the “fairest Pattern to a failing age!” (1. 1) implies that the 
personal qualities he enumerates in subsequent lines are starkly antithetical to prevailing 
mores—vital to the social health o f the nation, yet so rare that their actual occurrence is 
something o f a curiosity, worthy of a record in marble. Knight, whose “Publick Virtue 
knew no Party rage” (1. 2), was one “Whose Private Name all Titles recommend, / The 
pious Son, fond Husband, faithful Friend” (11. 3-4); one remarkable for his “Manners 
plain,” his refinement “in Sense alone,” his goodness “without Show,” and his principled 
kindness (11. 5-6). As such, his passing is consequential enough, given present 
circumstances, to be “by Friendship, Honour, Virtue; mourn’d” (11. 9-10), for with him 
these things themselves pass from living force into an abstract existence in Pope’s 
memorial verse.
3. Pope’s Epitaphic Vision 
To be sure, epitaphic conventions encourage the hyperbolic praise of the dead as 
well as an exaggerated lament for their loss. But given the similarity of feature between 
these pieces for Withers, Buckingham, and Knight, and Pope’s own epitaphic poses, as 
well as their coincidence with the emergence of Pope’s epitaphic persona in Arbuthnot, it 
seems reasonable to think of these epitaphs as prototypes and extensions of the more 
general epitaphic stance he was beginning to assume in his poetry at large. But if the 
rhetorical progress in Pope’s epitaphs— from appropriating the voice o f the dead for 
purposes of the living, to asserting the decadence of the world by pointing to its deadness 
to virtue, to the assertion in these last three epitaphs of the deadness of that virtue itself— 
roughly prefigures the evolution of that more general stance from Arbuthnot to Pope’s own 
epitaphs, it moreover facilitates the transition from epitaphic pose or stance (that is, from a 
rhetorical figure adopted for a particular situation) to a more general vision for the 
sustaining values of British civilization as a whole. For underlying the epitaphic pose is the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
488
implicit conviction that those values are somehow unable to survive outside the nourishing 
idealism and nostalgia o f the poet’s lines: if  Virtue shows to best advantage when 
segregated from the living world, the implication is that it is too frail to survive in it, either 
because it is too rarified and theoretical to make itself effectual, and therefore relevant, or 
that it is too readily overmatched and defeated by vice; and when Virtue itself is portrayed 
as actually dying or dead, as in these latter epitaphs, we are left to infer that that idea o f 
England sustained by the several private and political aspects of this Virtue is imperilled as 
well. Pope thus puts himself in something of a paradox, for by assuming this epitaphic 
stance, he is led almost inevitably to the position that the living English panorama unfolding 
before his poetic eye is not worth observing and portraying in his work save as a  foil to an 
idealized Britain that can exist only in the poet’s commemorative verse.
Thus far, Pope’s outlook seems only an extreme version of that shared by 
pessimists, reactionaries, curmudgeons, and the aged nearly everywhere in nearly all times: 
the best days are well behind us; only worse can follow. More specifically, he takes up the 
historical perspective adopted by the Tory Opposition at almost precisely this moment in his 
career. As R.C. Richardson reminds us, during the 1730’s “the political rivalry between 
Walpole and the Whigs and Bolingbroke and the Tories came to acquire a curious 
historiographical dimension,” with Tory politicians “espousing the basic tenets of Whig 
historiography [that is, of the general decline in the rightness and integrity o f social and 
political institutions since the ancient past], while in retaliation Whigs hurled back a hastily 
assimilated version of Tory historical principles [that is, of the general progress in these 
same institutions]” (48). What “the Tory Bolingbroke [for one] was doing was to use the 
Whig appeal to a free past as a weapon in his assault on the corrupting and enslaving 
efforts of Walpole’s Whig administration. Turning Whig theories of history on their head, 
Bolingbroke was arguing in his Remarks on the History o f England (London, 1730) that 
the present was not better than the past but worse” (48). Pope, however, goes further than 
either human nature or Tory ideology singly or together would have carried him, and with
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perverse deliberation sets about—as we have seen him do with his own persona— 
effectively “killing off" those private, political, and poetic (or, more broadly, aesthetic) 
virtues that still survive and might yet redeem the age, or at least suspend the utter ruination 
of British civilization. Instead o f highlighting the remaining excellences of Britain and of 
individual Britons, Pope pretends that they are already past nurturing, propagating, and 
preserving for succeeding generations—as if by figuring forth England as a dead land he 
may the more convincingly portray its moral and cultural despoilers, lament the more 
vividly and movingly its “erstwhile” merits in their passing. In short, Pope would destroy 
England as it is in order to save it in his verse as it ought ideally to have existed. And 
further still, far exceeding the grumblings o f the disillusioned and the self-serving 
discontentment of the merely partisan, Pope’s satiric fiction is distinguished by its peculiar 
quality of bringing the arc of English history to a complete end-stop, of reducing the 
present moment to an all-dissolving nothingness, as void of form and meaning as of merit 
Void, too, of any future, of any possibility of reconstitution and rehabilitation. Social 
memory itself thus stands suspended—at least as it has been heretofore fashioned within 
poetry and projected beyond its bounds. For (as we shall see when we come shortly to the 
culmination of Pope’s epitaphic vision in the fourth book of The New Dunciad) by 
abstracting living Virtue from the vitality of its settings in the historical present and 
embalming it in premature commemoration, Pope’s figurative apparatus necessarily loses 
contact with the known and knowable literal world, while suspending or fixing its own 
non-literal elements (e.g. its images and ideals) within a static fiction that seems almost 
designed to defy practical application. However brilliant its concept and realization, Pope’s 
epitaphic vision ends in its own undoing.
Pope’s thematic formula for extending the features of the epitaph and epitaphic 
stance to the larger body of his work is simple enough: Virtue and its exemplars are dead; 
Vice and its minions live and thrive. Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that 
throughout Pope’s poetry of the 1730’s his portraits of the good are cast syntactically in the
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past tense, those o f the corrupt or debauched in the present—as if the extinction of one and 
the perpetual viability of the other were self-evident givens, standing concessions. Often 
Pope commemorates the good well before their actual physical deaths in what one might 
call “epitaphic statements'*: not true epitaphs, but sketches of character and deeds so closely 
patterned after Pope’s epitaphic form and rhetorical stance as to be virtual epitaphs for the 
living. And though we might expect a retrospective treatment of those moral heroes who 
have died before Pope has had a  chance to memorialize them, we find that in their epitaphic 
statements Pope frequently kills off the distinguishing Virtue with its paragon, forestalling 
the possibility of its finding another adequate living champion. Active virtue thus shares the 
fate o f the virtuous in these epitaphic statements, consigned to the shades mid-stride while 
it yet walks abroad.
Two pictures of private virtue show Pope, if not quite burying goodness with the 
good, at least displacing his ideal patterns o f domestic goodness far from the living 
world—and so idealizing his subjects and their merits as to put their examples beyond 
realization and therefore beyond serious emulation. The first o f these portraits, Pope’s 
tribute to the philanthropist John Kyrle (1634-1724; known to history as the Man of Ross) 
in his Epistle to Bathurst (1733; subtitled, “Of the Use of Riches”), especially has much of 
popular legend and parable about it. The sketch itself is familiar enough, but we should 
note the specific context of its occurrence in the poem. Having given us portraits of the 
Miser and the Prodigal in the persons o f Sir John Cutler and his son-in-law and heir, 
Charles Bodvile Robartes, respectively (11.179-218), the poet appeals to Bathurst to serve 
as a model for moderating the extremes of meanness and waste: “To balance Fortune by a 
just expence, / Join with (Economy, Magnificence; / With Splendour, Charity; with Plenty, 
Health; / Oh teach us, BATHURST! yet unspoil’d by wealth!” (11. 223-226). We might 
expect such an invocation to preface a fairly specific, detailed account o f that moderation 
Bathurst so aptly embodies—but no such sketch is forthcoming. Instead, Pope restates the 
need for the wise use of riches—“Wealth in the gross is death, but life diffus’d, / As
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Poison heals, in just proportion us’d” (11. 233-234)—then wonders aloud if there be any 
noblemen left “Who cop[yl Your’s, or OXFORD’S better part, / To ease the oppress’d, and 
raise the sinking heart?” (11. 243-244). For, he adds, it is by the example of such that 
“English Bounty yet a-while may stand, / And Honour linger ere it leaves the land” (11. 
247-248). Yet Pope here merely associates Bathurst and Oxford with the English bounty 
and honour about to retreat forever from the land; his only full-drawn exemplum of the 
bounty and honor now seriously imperilled depicts an obscure gentleman who has been 
dead for a decade. But after ail, examples must be gathered where they are found. As Pope 
writes on June 7, 1732, to Jacob Tonson, Sr., “My motive for singling out this man, was 
twofold: first to distinguish real and solid worth from showish or plausible expence, and 
virtue fro’ vanity: and secondly, to humble the pride of greater men, by an opposition of 
one so obscure and so distant from the sphere of publick glory, this proud town,” adding 
that the portrait’s beauty and power derive “from the manner in which it is placed, and the 
contrast (as the painters call it) in which it stands, with the pompous figures of famous, or 
rich, or high-bom men” (Corr. HI, 290). At first glance, it appears that the contrast Pope 
alludes to is the succeeding sketch of the abject end made by the once-magnificent George 
Villiers, Second Duke of Buckingham (1628-1687) (11. 299-314). But given his elliptical 
treatment of Bathurst and Oxford’s noblesse oblige and the abrupt segue to his “epitaphic” 
tribute to John Kyrle11— “But all our praises why should Lords engross? / Rise, honest 
Muse! and sing the Man  of R oss” (U. 249-250)—one is left to infer that the contrast 
applies to the better sort of noblemen as well, and that for Pope the best days of hospitality, 
magnanimity, and social responsibility among them are already long past, having first 
descended to one “so obscure and so distant from the sphere of publick glory, this proud
11 Pope’s tribute was in fact eventually inscribed on a monument to Kyrle erected by Jacob Tonson at 
Pope's suggestion. As Kathleen Lynch observes in her biography of Tonson, the Man of Ross had for 
some years obsessed Pope (166-167), who wrote to the publisher November 14, 1731, asking him to 
discover the Man’s real name and “any Particulars you can procure about him. I intend to make him an 
Example in a Poem of mine’’ (Corr. Ill, 244).
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town” and now, with his death, past recovery.
The portrait itself tends to strengthen this inference, for it asks to be read as much 
as a reflection on the times as a truly moving encomium on the man it commemorates—or 
rather, as Pope’s comments to Tonson, Sr. would imply, the enumeration of the Man of 
Ross’s virtues and deeds is meant to stand as a rebuke to the “pompous figures of famous, 
or rich, or high-born men.” If  so, the rebuke is compounded nearly forty-fold, once for 
every line of Pope’s memorial (11.249-290): the Man of Ross has forested the mountains’ 
“sultry brow,” improved the waterways and designed an irrigation system, constructed a 
tree-lined causeway through the countryside (not forgetting to set up resting places for the 
weary traveller), and erected churches; he has overseen the distribution of alms among the 
needy, provided poor women with dowries, placed orphans in apprenticeships, found 
employment for the able-bodied, and arranged for pensions for the old; he has prescribed 
for and tended to the sick (even making their medicines himself), and as magistrate for his 
little community has administered justice with the wisdom of Solomon: “Is there a 
variance? enter but his door, /  Balk’d are the Courts, and contest is no more” (11. 271-272). 
The Man of Ross has in fact so nurtured the lives of his charges, and so justly executed the 
law, that “Despairing Quacks with curses fled the place, / And vile Attomies, now an 
useless race” (11. 273-274).
If, at this point, the Man of Ross seems more demigod than human, it is by shrewd 
design. In his letter to Tonson, Pope confesses that he has somewhat exaggerated the 
bounty of Mr. Kyrle, observing, “If any man shall ever happen to endeavor to emulate the 
Man of Ross, ’twill be no manner of harm if I make him think he was something more 
charitable and more beneficent than he really was, for so much more good it would put the 
imitator upon doing” (Corr. HI, 290). Though such emulation would be ideal (if it were at 
all possible to do more than endeavor to emulate—and note the vaguely despairing tone 
introduced by the imprecision of “any man” and “shall ever happen”), Pope is quite aware
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that his idealized portrait is far more likely to elicit among his readers the response of the 
awe-struck interlocutor12 he suddenly introduces at this point:
'Thrice happy man! enabled to pursue
What all so wish, but want the pow’r  to do!
Oh say, what sums that gen'rous hand supply?
What mines, to swell that boundless charity?’ (11.275-278)
So deftly in the lines that follow does Pope expose the vulgarity and hypocrisy of this 
entirely reflexive exclamation that one senses a  trap has been sprung, that all along the aim 
of the passage has been to demonstrate the world’s preoccupation with the price rather than 
the practice of virtue:
Of Debts, and Taxes, Wife and Children clear,
This man possest—five hundred pounds a year.
Blush, Grandeur, blush! proud Courts, withdraw your blaze!
Ye little Stars! hide your diminish’d rays (11.279-282).
In an age when, as Roy Porter estimates, a family could live in minimal comfort on £50 a 
year, and bachelor curates often had to make do with £10-15 per annum (83,91), £500 a 
year might seem a fortune. In fact, as W.A. Speck demonstrates, it put the possessor near 
the bottom of the ranks of the landed gentry; by contrast, he observes, the nation’s 
wealthiest men were clearing more—often far more—than £10,000 annually (35ff). These 
last are the men Pope admonishes in lines 281-282, and it is worth noting that he seeks 
rather to shame and belittle than to exhort them. But not content with pointing up the 
relative paltriness of their charity, Pope bids them further, in light of the all-encompassing 
and unsurpassable goodness o f this humble squire, to “withdraw” and “hide” their 
pretensions to magnificence and benevolence—and not at all to vindicate them. Seemingly, 
as the Man of Ross’s medicines and justice have made quacks, with lawyers, “an useless 
race,” so too, it appears, has his bounty made that of his betters morally and socially 
irrelevant
12 Perhaps the addressee of this epistle. Bathurst himself?
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And if doubt remains that Pope here uses the example of John Kyrle primarily to 
demonstrate the utter antipathy of virtue to the values of the world (and, given that Kyrle 
was long dead when this tribute appeared, the effective deadness of that virtue itself), one 
should consider the second “trap” Pope springs on his interlocutor, the reader’s hapless 
stand-in. Upon hearing what real goodness can perform with the most modest of sums, he 
exclaims indignantly, “And what? no monument, inscription, stone? /  His race, his form, 
his name almost unknown?” (11. 283-284). Pope’s reply shows that he has again missed 
the point:
Who builds a Church to God, and not to Fame,
Will never mark the marble with his Name:
Go, search it there, where to be bom and die,
Of rich and poor makes all the history;
Enough, that Virtue fill’d the space between;
Prov’d, by the ends o f being, to have been (11. 285-290).
As Pope had recently expounded in the fourth epistle of An Essay on Man (1733-34), 
“Virtue’s prize” is “What nothing earthly gives, or can destroy, / The soul’s calm sun­
shine, and the heartfelt joy” (11. 169; 167-168). Because Virtue is complete in and of itself 
as the end and test of being, it stands beyond the purview even of an admiring world’s 
commendations and memorials. If these passages have something of stoic indifference in 
them, they share also that note o f defiance characteristic of Pope’s epitaphs on himself. “I 
was not sorry [the Man of RossJ had no monument,” Pope wrote to Tonson, “and will put 
that circumstance into a note, perhaps into the body of the poem itself” (290-291), 
promising to hint that “the Man o f Ross himself would not have any monument in memory 
of his own good deeds” (291)— lest, perhaps, such a monument, tendered by the corrupted 
world, would somehow compromise the memory of one whose life gave the lie to its 
complacence and whose death in consequence has left it all but bereft o f goodness. When 
England’s bounty and honor are but lingering before their final disappearance (11.247-48), 
even the estimable Bathurst is only “yet unspoil’d by wealth” (1.226; emphasis added).
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A second portrait o f  private virtue—of Pope’s father, Alexander Pope, Sr.—points 
up the poet’s operative emphasis on this deadness of virtue and the contrasting resiliency of 
vice. The power and larger significance of this portrait, too, are set off by “the manner in 
which it is placed, and the contrast (as the painters call it) in which it stands.” Appearing 
near the end of Arbuthnot, the sketch is immediately preceded by the poem’s second 
catalogue of the abuse Pope has endured without answering in kind. Describing himself 
(not quite believably) as “soft by Nature, more a Dupe than Wit” (1. 368), he claims his 
temperament has prevented him from provoking or answering the ceaseless attacks of Lady 
Mary, Dennis, Theobald, Cibber, Moore, Welsted, and Budgell with attacks of his own; he 
has even, he says, “Let the Two Curls of Town and Court, 13 abuse / His Father, Mother, 
Body, Soul, and Muse" (11. 380-381): “Yet why? that Father held it for a rule / It was a Sin 
to call our Neighbor Fool, / That harmless Mother thought no Wife a Whore” (11.382-384). 
Brandishing this parental injunction for Christian submissiveness, forbearance, and 
tolerance at the libels o f his foes, Pope renders them puny and pathetic indeed, while 
establishing by force of contrast the replete goodness and guilelessness of his parents, 
those “Unspotted names! and memorable long, / If there be Force in Virtue, or in a Song” 
(386-387). But whereas his enemies and their malice are very much alive, these two 
unspotted names now live only in this his song: the senior Alexander Pope died in 1717; 
Edith Pope in 1733. Their loss and the ethical disparity it exposes within the nation are 
brought home by the following sketch of Pope’s father, an obvious “answer” to the earlier 
“Sporus”-portrait of John Hervey (11.305-333).
Donald Torchiana observes that Pope’s thinking is characterized by its tendency to 
find in “earlier principles” models for right behavior (713). Certainly this applies to the 
epitaphic portrait of his father in Arbuthnor, the senior Pope is drawn as a representative of
13 Respectively, Edmund Curll, the piratical publisher and sometime pomographer, and Lord John 
Hervey, Baron of Icksworth.
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essential Man uncorrupted by the lust for power and possession, and in fact seems an 
amalgam of Pope’s ideas regarding prelapsarian humanity, as illustrated in the third epistle 
of An Essay on M an (11. 146-240), which, appearing in May 1733, is therefore almost 
exactly coeval with Arbuthnot. There, living in a paradisical Lockean state of Nature, 
humanity is instructed in religion, social order, law, and the mechanic arts by examples 
found in the natural world. But the natural world also forms human character and ethics: 
self-love and social responsibility have yet to become estranged; so united is humankind 
with the greater web o f life that immoderate appetites have no occasion to thrive: “Pride 
then was not; nor arts, that Pride to aid; / Man walked with beast, joint tenant o f the shade” 
(11. 151-152). Guileless as the beasts, humanity could let itself be directed as they were—  
by instinct—for instinct, being closest to nature, was the purest, the surest guide: “And 
Reason raise o ’er Instinct as you can, / In this ’tis God directs, in that ’tis Man” (11.97-98). 
Thus when Pope puts his father before us, the embodiment o f all that is peaceful, decent, 
unsophisticated, instinctive, and temperate—
Bom to no Pride, inheriting no Strife,
Nor marrying Discord in a  Noble Wife,
Stranger to Civil and Religious Rage,
The good Man walk’d innoxious thro’ his Age.
No Courts he saw, no Suits would ever try,
Nor dar’d an Oath, nor hazarded a Lye:
Un-learned, he knew no Schoolman’s subtle Art,
No Language, but the Language of the Heart 
By Nature honest, by Experience wise,
Healthy by Temp’ranee, and by Exercise:
His Life, tho’ long, to sickness past unknown,
His Death was instant and without a  groan (11.392-403)—
we are to see in the portrait an image drawn from the original pattern of unalloyed human
virtue. As he does in his true epitaphs for General Withers, the Digbys, or the young Duke
of Buckingham, Pope here presents his subject as the latest descendant o f an honored
lineage, the worthy man who has in his person and actions maintained uncompromised the
virtue of his forbears. And as in those epitaphs, Pope adds poignancy to this figure by
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implying that virtue’s line of descent is in real peril o f extinction: “O f gentle Blood (part 
shed in Honour’s Cause, / While yet in Britain Honour had applause) / Each Parent 
sprung” (11.388-390). Though in brackets, that “while yet in Britain honour had applause” 
is hardly parenthetical in its import: the nation has become so dead to honor that town and 
court alike openly asperse the honorable; thus honor will remove itself from the land as, 
one by one, its exemplars pass away, their loss not to be recouped in a Britain unable to 
regenerate and nourish such virtues. 14
Not that such a nation could care very much whether or not it does so, given its 
ready generation and doting husbandry of creatures who are as depraved and corrupt as 
their moral opposite, Mr. Pope, was estimable. In Pope’s world, though we have only 
memories of the good, the wicked are ever before us, thriving and seemingly impervious to 
justice and fortune. And by the time we have come to the end of the senior Pope’s 
portrait—if the poet’s hint about the Curll of the Court (that is, John Hervey, Baron of 
Icksworth) abusing his father and mother, together with his own “Body, Soul, and Muse” 
(1.381) has not already alerted us to the connection—we might reflect that it serves as the 
now-unrealizable antithesis of the sort of man that currently flourishes, that same Court 
Curll whose own portrait as Sporus15 (11. 305-333) exposes him as the living, diabolic 
caricature of the ideals the deceased man once upheld. If the senior Pope “walk’d innoxious
14 Pope concludes his portrayal of his father with the wish, “O grant me, thus to live, and thus to die!” (1. 
404), yet, ironically, it is not a standard to which Pope himself can truly aspire. As Scodel shrewdly 
points out, Pope cannot exalt such a model without departing from it himself (“Epitaphic Stance,” 
623). To assume a moral and rhetorical stance that seeks to define virtue absolutely and thereby 
confront the corruption of the age is to forfeit for oneself the image of the modest, ingenuous country 
gentleman. But such a guise is not what Pope seeks to fashion for himself, as his epitaphic statements 
on himself make clear.
15 Pope is ill-served by the fastidious, aggravatingly incomplete, explanations most critical annotators 
furnish for the allusion to Nero’s minion. The scope of Pope’s insult and the degree of humiliation he 
intended to inflict are best appreciated if we have the following passage from Suetonius’ Life of Nero 
before us: “Having tried to turn the boy Sporus into a girl by castration, he [Nero] went through a 
wedding ceremony with him—dowry, bridal veil and ail—took him to his palace with a great crowd in 
attendance, and treated him as a wife. A rather amusing joke is still going the rounds: the world would 
have been a happier place had Nero’s father Domitian married that sort of wife” (The Twelve Caesars, 
228; trans. Robert Graves).
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thro’ his Age," Sporus likewise gives no offense—because he says always what his 
auditor wants to hear, and because his “Eternal Smiles his Emptiness betray" (I. 315); if 
Pope’s father spoke with “the Language of the Heart,” Sporus knows the tongue well—at 
least the dialect o f self-interest: “in florid Impotence he speaks, /  And, as the Prompter 
breathes, the Puppet squeaks" (11. 317-18); i f  Pope is descended from ancestors whose 
“gentle Blood” was “part shed in Honour’s Cause,” Sporus also serves his royal masters— 
as “Fop at the Toilet, Flatt’rer at the Board" (1. 328); if  Pope, Sr., enjoyed the health of 
moderation and exercise, Sporus is nothing if  not well-formed: “Eve’s Tempter thus the 
Rabbins have exprest, / A Cherub’s face, a  Reptile all the rest; / Beauty that shocks you, 
Parts that none will trust, /  Wit that can creep, and Pride that licks the dust” (11. 330-33); 
and where Mr. and Mrs. Pope were (their son implies) something of an ideal union of man 
and woman, Sporus in him self comprises such a union: he is an “amphibious Thing,” who 
“now trips a Lady, and now struts a Lord” (11. 326,329).
Hervey’s essential duplicity of being underlies all the rest of his falseness, and 
though the sketch here shows him in his habitat at Court, it shows likewise the essential 
human degeneracy underlying Hervey’s treachery in that sphere. Damning as it is, in fact 
this depiction of Hervey as Sporus, “this Bug with gilded wings, / This painted Child of 
Dirt that stinks and stings” (U. 309-10), is only the most scathing portrait Pope composed 
for the courtier whose loyal pamphleteering on Walpole’s behalf had earned him a title and 
the offices of vice-chamberlain and privy councillor, and whose effeminate appearance had 
led Pope elsewhere to dub him “Narcissus,” “Adonis,” and “Lord Fanny.” So frequently 
does Pope thrash Hervey that this supposed composite o f unalloyed Vice seems for him to 
represent all that is corrupt in the court and ministry. For in this picture of Sporus, Pope 
fixes an image not simply of Hervey himself, but of the eternal courtier, fawning, cynical, 
servile and cruel. It is a picture of the man whom the trappings of the Court and the 
intrigues of the powerful have irrevocably beguiled from virtue and principle. And the 
portrait was bound to sting, not just Hervey and his friends, but Walpole, for Hervey was
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Walpole’s man—and even George n, for Sporus, ultimately, is the creature of a royal 
presence that petted sycophants but withheld favor from the worthy if  they dared be strong- 
willed.
Sporus thus serves double duty (fittingly enough) as a living emblem of the 
Administrational depravity that has made political virtue obsolete and therefore effectively 
moribund. At least, in his tributary verses to those whose public integrity he professes to 
admire, Pope often casts his subjects as already eclipsed and ineffectual, turning his praise 
into epitaphic commemoration. And this by design rather than chance. In his second 
Epilogue to the satires, Pope declares to his interlocutor, “God knows, I praise a Courtier 
where I can” (1. 63), and names specifically Richard Lumley, 2nd Earl of Scarborough. 
Scarborough, however, would commit suicide in January 1739, and it is suggestive that in 
later editions of the poem Pope did not replace him in the commendatory couplet, “When I 
confess, there is who feels for Fame, / And melts to Goodness, need I Sc a r b r o w  name?” 
(11. 64-65), choosing instead to explain in a footnote that Scarborough’s “personal 
attachments to the king appeared from his steddy adherence to the royal interest, after his 
resignation of his employment of Master of the Horse; and whose known honour and 
virtue made him esteemed by all parties” (I. 65n). Curious, too, that Pope is careful to 
praise the earl for his service after the resignation of his post—but this seems only natural 
for one avowedly resolved to honor such men only once their moment of power has 
passed; indeed, dismissal and disgrace seem to be preconditions for the poet’s esteem:16
But does the Court a worthy Man remove?
That instant, I declare, he has my Love:
I shun his Zenith, court his mild Decline;
16 Pope defends (or explains) his practice of posthumous commendation in “A Letter to the Publisher," 
prefacing The Dunciad Variorum and subsequent editions of the poem: “[The poet] has liv’d with the 
Great without Flattery, been a friend to Men in power without Pensions, from whom as he ask'd, so he 
receiv’d no favour but what was done Him in his friends. As his Satyrs were the more just for being 
delay’d, so were his Panegyricks; bestow’d only on such persons as he had familiarly known, only for 
such virtues as he had long observ’d in them, and only at such times as others cease to praise if not 
begin to calumniate them, I mean when out of Power or out of Fashion" (323).
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Thus SOMMERS once, and HALIFAX were mine.
Oft in the clear, still Mirrour o f Retreat,
I study’d SHREWSBURY, the wise and great:
Carleton’s calm Sense, and STANHOPE’s noble Flame,
Compar’d, and knew their gen’rous End the same:
How pleasing ATTERBURY’s softer hour!
How shin’d the Soul, unconquer’d in the Tow’r!
How can I PULT’NEY, CHESTERFIELD forget,
While Roman Spirit charms, and A ttic Wit:
ARGYLE, the State’s whole Thunder bom to wield,
And shake alike the Senate and the Field:
Or WYNDHAM, just to Freedom and the Throne,
The Master of our Passions, and his own.
Names, which I long have lov’d, nor lov’d in vain,
Rank’d with their Friends, not number’d with their Train;
And if yet higher the proud List should end,
Still let me say! No Follower, but a Friend (11.75-93).
Of those listed here, all but the Opposition Whigs William Pulteney and the Earl of
Chesterfield, as well as Frederick, Prince of Wales (hinted at in 1. 92) are either out of
office (enjoying—or enduring—their “mild decline”) or dead. Assembling the active with
the retired, interring the quick with the dead, Pope’s catalogue of heroes suggests much
about the poet’s estimation of political integrity in 1738, and, consequently, much as well
of how he would have his readers view i t  We should remember that Pope produces this
list in self-defense, to demonstrate that he is not so innately or affectedly antipathetic to
power and place as to be dead to merit where it exists. But his list implies nonetheless that
such merit lies for the most part buried with the dead—or in any event with those now
excluded from the ruling circles. In phrases and figures we have seen often enough before,
Pope makes the point here implicit unmistakably explicit near the poem’s conclusion:
Yes, the last Pen for Freedom let me draw,
When Truth stands trembling on the edge of Law:
Here, Last of Britons I let your Names be read:
Are none, none living? let me praise the Dead,
And for that Cause which made your Fathers shine,
Fall, by the Votes of their degen’rate Line! (U. 248-253)
Just as Pope is about to draw up another catalogue o f champions, he is caught short by the
dearth of living candidates, and so must search over the ranks of the dead: Britain has,
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apparently, seen the last of the “last o f Britons.” In consequence, Britain itself would 
become irredeemably corrupt—and corrupting. Only two years hence, in the unpublished 
“One Thousand Seventeen Hundred and Forty,” Pope would, as we have seen, lament that 
“a plague is on thee, Britain, and who tries / To save thee in th’ infected office dies” (II. 
75-76), repudiating both Pulteney and Chesterfield (the first for being mercenary, the 
second for being a political dupe), and ironically praising Walpole for being “spite of 
thyself a glorious minister”: “At length to Bjritain] kind, as to thy [whore,] /  Espouse the 
nation, you [debauched before]” (11.47-48; fragmentary couplet completed by John Wilson 
Croker).
Obviously, England cannot be utterly lacking in political worthies if  Pope has
managed to find political personages to praise—despite the somewhat imprecise use of
possessive pronouns in lines 250 and 252, which makes the “Last of Britons” and the
“degen’rate Line” of their fathers one and the same. Pope is simply being forthright in
fashioning his conceit o f an England void of heroes by burying the worthy before their
time. But the practice is one he has practiced at least twice before, in epitaphic passages on
his friends and political idols, Robert Harley, 1st Earl o f Oxford and 1st Earl Mortimer,
and Henry SL John, Viscount Bolingbroke. In his “Epistle to Oxford,” published in 1722
in Pope’s edition of Thomas Parnell's Poems, Pope commemorates Oxford’s friendship
with Parnell (and with the Scriblerians generally) and presents the aging Tory (Oxford was
then 61) with a picture o f  himself in his “mild Decline.” With more emphasis and
condescension than would seem reassuring, let alone polite, Pope stresses to Oxford that
even when his career was at its height, he did well to neglect his official duties for the sake
of friendship’s obligations:
For him [Parnell], thou oft hast bid the World attend,
Fond to forget the Statesman in the Friend;
For Swift and him, despis’d the Farce of State,
The sober Follies of the Wise and Great;
Dextrous, the craving, fawning Crowd to quit,
And pleas’d to 'scape from Flattery to Wit (11.7-12).
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If Pope thus reduces Oxford’s Ministry under Queen Anne to a  motley of farce, folly, and 
flattery, it might be because the poet had no very great opinion of it; in the mid-1730’s he 
would tell Joseph Spence, “Lord Oxford was not a very capable minister, and had a  good 
deal of negligence into the bargain. He used to send trifling verse from court to the 
Scriblerus-club almost every day, and would come and talk idly with them almost every 
night: even when his all was at stake. —He talked of business in so confused a manner, 
that you did not know what he was about; and every thing he went to tell you was in the 
epic way; for he always began in the middle" (130-31). But by distinguishing the Friend 
from the Statesman, Pope is perhaps better able to reconcile Oxford to his fortunes,17 and 
to isolate for his own purposes those aspects of Oxford’s career and character that he can 
sincerely commend. As Pope would tell Spence, “They were quite mistaken in his temper, 
who thought of getting rid o f him, by advising him to make his escape from the Tower 
[when imprisoned there by the Whigs from 1715-1717]. He would have sate out the storm, 
let the danger be what it would. —He was a  steady man, and had a great firmness of soul, 
and would have died unconcernedly: or, perhaps, like Sir Thomas More, with a jest in his 
mouth” (131). For this dissevering of Oxford from his “toilsom Days" (1. 15) is but the 
first step in rehabilitating an officially disgraced personage into a model o f personal and 
public integrity and Christian fortitude, with the likely ends o f voicing his own political 
ideals and undercutting the moral character of the party that would persecute such a 
paragon: “A Soul supreme, in each hard Instance try’d, / Above all pain, all Passion, and 
all Pride, / The Rage of Pow’r, the Blast of publick Breath, / The Lust of Lucre, and the 
Dread of Death” (11.23-26). To achieve such a rehabilitation and the rhetorical ends thereof, 
Pope must place Oxford beyond the vagaries of public life and indeed from those of life
17 Upon his dismissal from office in 1714, Oxford enclosed the following poetic maxim in a letter to 
Swift: “To serve with love, / And shed your blood, / Approved is above / But here below, / Th’ 
examples show / ’Tis fatal to be good” (qtd. by Brian Hill in Robert Harley: Speaker, Secretary o f State 
and Premier Minister, 222).
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itself. Thus Pope memorializes Oxford prematurely, in effect entombing him in his 
retirement, lending his commemorative voice additional authority by pretending to speak 
from the perspective of the dead, in this case the late Parnell, who “Perhaps forgets that 
Oxford e’er was Great; / Or deeming meanest what we greatest call, /  Beholds thee glorious 
only in thy Fall” (11.18-20)—as if true merit can only emerge, be discerned, and celebrated 
once the “Farce of State” has been foregone. Pope therefore has little compunction about 
romanticizing Oxford’s absence from power or revelling in his chance to impose himself 
between the sun and his subject and record the hastened twilight of Oxford’s life:
In vain to Deserts thy Retreat is made;
The Muse attends thee to thy silent Shade:
'Tis hers, the brave Man’s latest [that is, last] Steps to trace,
Re-judge his Acts, and dignify Disgrace (11.27-30).
Pope even goes so far as to give Oxford’s political demise the trappings of actual death; the
muse accompanies him “or to the Scaffold, or the Cell,” and waits with the condemned
man as one by one interest with “all her sneaking Train,” the obliged, “all the Vain,” and
“the last ling’ring Friend” (11. 31-34) bid him farewell, the Muse alone crossing with him
into that realm beyond the ken o f the public sphere, bearing witness even to Oxford’s
ultimate cloud-shrouded apotheosis:
Ev’n now she shades thy Evening Walk with Bays,
(No Hireling she, no Prostitute to Praise)
Ev’n now, observant of the parting Ray,
Eyes the calm Sun-set of thy Various Day,
Thro’ Fortune’s Goud One truly Great can see,
Nor fears to tell, that MORTIMER is He (11.35-40).
By eulogizing him thus, Pope can make the living Oxford worthy of the expansive epithet,
“And sure if ought below the Seats Divine / Can touch Immortals, ’tis a Soul like thine” (11.
21-22), making him as well more than fit for the implicit moral contrast between the worthy
man in exile and the shameful culpability of those in power who put him there.
Though a similar address to his friend, personal philosopher, and political mentor,
Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, at the end of An Essay on Man, is not so markedly
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epitaphic as this for Oxford, it nevertheless demonstrates Pope’s preoccupation with 
posterity, whose verdicts he would preempt by pushing his living heroes from the stage in 
order to render authoritative pronouncements o f their merits as well as, conversely, the 
systemic deficiencies of their historical moment. Calling Bolingbroke the “master o f the 
poet, and the song” 0- 374), Pope throughout this passage associates the arc of his poetic 
career with Bolingbroke’s political fortunes. Like Oxford, his rival for power under Anne, 
Bolingbroke had suffered proscription when the Whigs regained ascendency under George 
I; unlike Oxford, however, he had fled the country, living in France for a decade, 
simultaneously intriguing for a Jacobite restoration and his own reconciliation with the 
Hanover administration. He returned to England in 1725, insulated from reprisals initially 
by the substantial bribes he had paid to the King’s mistress, and subsequently by a 
parliamentary pardon. Safe from persecution and once more in full possession o f his 
property, Bolingbroke was yet denied his seat in the House of Peers, forcing him to 
resume his political career from the margins, as pamphleteer and eminence grise o f the 
Opposition. It is with these events in mind that Pope bids Bolingbroke, “Teach me, like 
thee, in various nature wise, /  To fall with dignity, with temper rise” (11. 377-378), and 
though he allows Bolingbroke what he denies to Oxford, the possibility of rising again, as 
the passage unfolds it becomes clear that Bolingbroke himself will remain in the shadows, 
exercising his power at one remove, through the poet’s voice. For as the “Genius” (1.373) 
of Pope’s muse, Bolingbroke will instruct her while remaining publicly silent himself. 
“Form’d by thy converse,” his muse shall “happily to steer / From grave to gay, from 
lively to severe; / Correct with spirit, eloquent with ease, / Intent to reason, or polite to 
please” (11. 379-382). Thus informed, the Muse shall ensure her own immortality by 
attaching herself to the name she shall celebrate: as Bolingbroke’s renown “Expanded flies, 
and gathers all its fame” along “the stream o f Time,” so shall Pope’s “little bark attendant 
sail, / Pursue the triumph, and partake the gale” (11. 383-386). As in the “Epistle to 
Oxford,” Pope claims his commemoration o f a statesman in eclipse will preserve memory
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of his merits; so, too, will it serve to distinguish its subject from his one-time antagonists,
and, given their rank and authority, to comment implicitly upon the age at large:
When statesmen, heroes, kings, in dust repose,
Whose sons shall blush their fathers were thy foes,
(Then shall] this verse to future age pretend
Thou wert my guide, philosopher, and friend (387-390).
Effective as such premature commemoration is in setting forth the private and public
virtues needed to sustain the nation socially and politically, and in distinguishing Virtue’s
guardians from its antagonists, it likewise lends a peculiar rhetorical force to the poet’s
emerging satiric figure o f an England dying because dead to all that is good and worthy. If
exaggerated posthumous praise makes the examples of the dead rather more fantastic than
credibly practicable, an early memorialization o f the living effectively consigns them and
their merits to the grave, for when living subjects are, with their virtues, translated from the
three-dimensional human world, both are rendered incapable of participation in that world:
insofar as the fiction o f their demise teases us into lamenting their supposed passing, we
are prompted to regard both with a retrospective glance, and to accept tacitly that the death
of the individual has left the world substantially poorer in, if not altogether dispossessed
of, those abstract qualities he is said to embody.
Pope does not hesitate, therefore, to extend the practice of premature
commemoration to the sphere that for him above all others establishes and safeguards the
cultural, intellectual, and moral robustness of the nation, its health offering a ready measure
o f the soundness of its civilizational foundations—that is, the sphere of the arts and
learning generally, and o f poetry more particularly. In an early prose work, “The Narrative
of Dr. Robert Norris, Concerning the Strange and Deplorable Frenzy of Mr. John Dennis”
(1713), Pope has a Dennis maddened with paranoia cry out melodramatically at what he
takes to be a universal conspiracy to overturn his critical tenets, “Is all the Town in a
Combination? Shall Poetry fall to the ground? Must our Reputation be lost to all foreign
Countries? O Destruction! Perdition! Opera! Opera! As Poetry once rais’d a City, so when
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Poetry fails, Cities are overturn’d, and the World is no more” (162). But though here his
quarrel with Dennis over An Essay on Criticism  (1711) prompts Pope to mock Dennis’
self-obsession, dogmatism, and irascibility, the raving man’s identification of the death of
poetry with the world’s undoing is really quite close to Pope’s habit o f linking dullness to
what for him is the nearest temporal approximation of Apocalypse, the suspension of moral
and ethical progress and humanity’s subsequent return to barbarism via the overthrow of
humane thought and letters. In An Essay on Criticism  itself, for example, Pope had written
of Rome, learning, and the consequences of their fall,
Learning and Rome alike in Empire grew,
And Arts still fo llow ’d  where her Eaglesflew;
From the same Foes, at last, both felt their Doom,
And the same Age saw Learning foil, and Rome.
With Tyranny, then Superstition join’d,
As that the Body, this enslav’d the Mind;
Much was Believ’d, but little understood,
And to be dull was constru’d to be good;
A second Deluge Learning thus o ’er-run,
And the Monks finish’d what the Goths begun (11.683-691).
And this early association of intellectual and artistic dissolution with cultural and national
ruin would, in fact, remain with Pope until his death, serving as the controlling figure of
his last major work, Book IV of The New Dunciad (1741). But long before that final
triumph of Dulness over enlightenment, Pope reprises—at greater length and in greater
detail—the destruction of classical civilization at the hands of the Goths and monks in the
third book of The Dunciad Variorum o f 1729. There, the “clouds of Vandals” (1. 78)
pouring down on Latium, Spain, and Gaul, and Rome’s “gray-hair’d Synods damning
books unread” (1.95) take their place among many of Dulness’ “old scenes of glory, times
long cast behind” (1. 55) disclosed in a vision to the new King of the Dunces, Lewis
Theobald: the Chinese emperor Shi Huang-ti’s piling high the scholarship of untold ages
and with “one bright blaze tum[ing] Learning into air” (1.78); the caliph Omar I’s burning
of the great Ptolemean library at Alexandria; Mohammed’s conquest of the lands that had
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first nurtured Western letters and science, his “conqu’ring tribes” enthroning ignorance by
laws (11. 89-90). For the poet who in his The Temple o f Fame (1715) made the columns
depicting Homer, Virgil, Pindar, Horace, Aristotle, and Cicero the edifice’s strongest,
grandest, and centermost support, literature and learning, as the clearest, deepest mirrors of
Nature and Truth, were not merely the trappings of civilization, but were civilization itself.
The death of either is the death of both.
Pope, then, is not backward in portraying the death of poetry in Britain in order to
demonstrate the death of Britain itself, to suggest that in its historical present, matters stand
much as they stood in Shi Huang-ti’s China, Mohammed’s Middle East, and Omar’s
Egypt; in barbarian-razed Rome, and in a medieval West reduced by the Church to “one
heavy sabbath” (1. 91). Pope wrote despondently to Gay October 23, 1730, soon after the
appearance of The Dunciad Variorum,
I can tell you of no one thing worth reading, or seeing; the whole age seems 
resolv’d to justify the Dunciad, and it may stand for a publick Epitaph or 
monumental Inscription, like that at Thermopylae, on a whole people 
perish ’dl There may indeed be a Wooden image or two of Poetry set up, to 
preserve the memory that there once were bards in Britain; and (like the 
Giants at Guildhall) show the bulk and bad taste of our ancestors (Corr. HI, 
142-143).
Putting aside for the moment Pope’s describing The Dunciad itself “a publick Epitaph or
monumental Inscription,” we should note his close identification of poetry and people, the
two here so narrowly conflated that their demise may be denoted and commemorated by a
single common memorial. Note also the manner of that demise as suggested by Pope’s
allusion to Thermopylae, the reference evoking as it does images of the General Leonidas
standing with his 300 Spartans at Thermopylae pass, holding it against the vast Persian
army till the last Spartan had fallen. Simonides’ epitaph tells their story:
Leonidas, king of the open fields of Sparta, 
those slain with you lie famous in their graves, 
for they attacked absorbing the head-on assault
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of endless Persian men, arrows and swift horse.18 
How tempting for Pope to equate these Spartans with the circle of Scriblerians, guarding 
desperately the integrity o f sense, truth, and virtue against hordes of Dunces—ministers, 
fops, pedants, poeticules—but doomed at last to fall to them. Weinbrot notes that the 
example of Juvenal had given the age the “formulaic fury” of “a morally collapsing world, 
an offended God, exalted enemies and venal flunkies massed against the isolated, angry 
good man” (Traditions, 117). But as usual, Pope gives the commonplace his own 
distinctive turn, and here once more takes the liberty of preempting posterity to show his 
correspondent a vision of what must be as a way of intimating what he would have his 
reader take for already having been: the literary battles o f the present day have been fought 
and decided, the heroes defeated—routed, in fact—no trace at all remaining of them, only 
tacky wooden images “to preserve the memory that there once were bards [rather than 
poets1 in Britain.” These m akeshift memorials are testament as well to the “bad taste” that 
once spawned, sustained, and fed itself fat upon the “Persian” swarms of what Weinbrot, 
in imitation of contemporary idiom, terms the “hostile poetic insects and locusts destroying 
the nation” (Traditions, 118). The allusion to Thermopylae, therefore, allows Pope to 
suggest not so much that he, his circle, and their literary values are under relentless attack, 
but that even now they are long dead, long forgotten—and with them the British virtues 
they once defended, the Britain they once celebrated. As the progress of Pope’s poetic 
treatment of English letters throughout the 1730’s and into the 1740’s makes clear, few 
other images, if  any, could have so concisely, so powerfully captured the mindset that 
would both lead Pope to consign English poetry and poets to early burial and determine the 
manner of their commemoration.
As he does with private and public virtues and their paragons, Pope tends to bury 
poetry with its worthy practitioners, not hesitating to inter the quick as well as the dead
18 Translated by William Barnstone.
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when necessary. As in his other epitaphs and epitaphic statements, he seeks thereby to 
perfect, stabilize, and segregate merit from the compromises and corruptions of the living 
world in order, in this case, to portray and indict a nation so dead to poetic virtue that 
poetry itself is left to wither and die. The ready emblems o f this national philistinism were, 
not surprisingly, a Court and an Administration whose neglect of the arts and learning was 
notorious, and made the more harmful because of the influence it seemed to have upon the 
patron classes. As Plumb notes, the aristocracy and the nouveaux riches patronized the 
works o f foreign masters: French and Italian painters and furniture makers, Italian 
architects, Continental decorators, Italian opera singers, French dramatists. And thus, 
Plumb concludes, “There was no development, no increase in stature, no burgeoning o f a 
culture, literary, scientific, or artistic, which could compare with France; at times even the 
Dutch and Italians seemed far superior” (Four Georges, 33).
Pope’s anger at the nation’s especial neglect of poetry spills over into his epitaphs 
on poets. He uses his first epitaph of Rowe (1720), for example, to point to the neglect of 
Dryden, who lies beneath “a rude and nameless stone" (1. 3), and concludes that Rowe is 
fortunate: “One grateful woman to the fame supplies / What a whole thankless land to his 
[Dryden’s[ denies” (11.7-8). This epitaph, Brownell observes, led John Sheffield, Duke of 
Buckinghamshire, to erect a monument to Dryden, completed in 1726 (339). Pope did as 
much for other poets. He was a consultant (at least) for the design of Samuel Butler’s 
monument in Westminster, and, if Curll may be believed, may have written its inscription, 
which labels Butler, too, an unappreciated genius—indeed, “the outstanding writer of 
satirical verse among us” (qtd. in Brownell, 343). Pope also helped to raise money for a 
monument to Shakespeare (based on the design for Craggs’s), again not sparing those who 
neglect poetic genius. The wry inscription above the monument: “Erected by Public Love 
124 years after his death” (Mack 734).
But without doubt, John Gay (1685-1732) stands for Pope as the consummate 
symbol of poetry’s neglect. If Pope, by reason of his religion and temperament, was
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admittedly unsuitable for preferment and promotion within Court, Administration, and 
University circles, the same could not have been said of Gay, whom Pope aptly describes 
in the opening couplet of his 1733 epitaph as being “Of Manners gentle, of Affections mild; 
/ In Wit, a Man; Simplicity, a Child” (11.1-2). Mack characterizes Gay as “happy-go-lucky, 
infinitely good-natured, distinctly a bon vivan tf he was an affectionate if exasperating 
friend, for though his tastes were expensive he had no head for money, and he was 
perpetually disappointed in his lifelong search for official appointments (187).19 However, 
if Gay’s equanimity allowed his spirits to survive such disappointments,20 he yet possessed 
a keen satirical edge, and in his best-known work, The Beggar’s Opera (1728), he 
lampooned savagely the corruptions of the Walpole ministry. This side of Gay furnishes 
Pope with the second and third couplets o f his epitaph: “With native Humour temp’ring 
virtuous Rage, / Form’d to delight at once and lash the age; / Above Temptation, in a low 
Estate, /  And uncorrupted ev’n among the Great” (11.3-6). Pope might have put something 
of his own ideal self in these lines, but for the most part his epitaph for Gay presents its 
subject as the purest of hearts and most deserving of poets, the one man whom “the Great” 
could not neglect without exposing their philistinism and their indifference (if not outright 
hostility) toward the good poet who is also a good man. Pope appears to recognize that the 
more guileless, innocent, and humane Gay’s character is made out to be, the greater the 
culpability o f those who “Left me to see neglected Genius bloom, / Neglected die! and tell it
19 Two months before Gay’s death, Pope sent him a mock epitaph:
Well then, poor G— lies under ground!
So there's an end of honest Jack.
So little Justice here he found,
Tis ten to one he’U ne’er come back.
20 Not that Gay bore these disappointments gladly. When, in October 1727, his dedication of his Fables 
to the young Prince William earned him, not the respectable place he might have expected from Queen 
Caroline, but only the insultingly trivial appointment of Gentleman-Usher to the infant Princess 
Louisa, he wrote to Pope, “There is now what Milton says is in Hell, Darkness visible. —O that I had 
never known what a Court was! Dear Pope, what a barren Soil (to me so) have I been striving to 
produce something out of. . . .  I find myself in such a strange Confusion and Depression of Spirits, 
that I have not Strength even to make my Will; though 1 perceive, by many Warnings, 1 have no 
continuing City here. 1 begin to look upon myself as one already dead" (66).
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on his Tomb.” Hence his reluctant compliance to Gay’s request to have the epitaph he
composed for himself—“LIFE is a jest; and all things show it. / 1 thought so once; but now
I know it”—put upon his tomb. Pope followed Gay’s wishes, but, as Maynard Mack
surmises, likely felt that this epitaph made Gay appear flippant and cynical (189).
Therefore, in his epitaph, inscribed in the Poets’ Corner of Westminster Abbey, Pope
sought to establish Gay as the self-evident touchstone o f all that is virtuous and humane:
A safe Companion, and an easy Friend,
Unblam’d thro’ Life, lamented in thy End.
These are Thy Honours! not that here thy Bust 
Is mix’d with Heroes, or with Kings thy dust;
But that the Worthy and the Good shall say,
Striking their pensive bosoms— Here lies Gay (11.7-12).
Johnson argues that it is inconsistent to ascribe to the same man “manners gentle” 
and “affections mild” as well as “virtuous rage” (II, 240-241). But he has only caught Pope 
at his favorite epitaphic strategy o f fashioning an ideal type to serve his rhetorical ends, 
among them here the (by now) familiar antipathies o f virtue to the trappings of the beau 
monde, and of the beau monde to real merit It is significant for example, that though Gay 
is buried among heroes and kings, it is at his monument that the worthy and the good find 
their own image. Even in death, Gay is among the Great but not one of them; his ashes 
mix with theirs, but his spirit dwells in nobler chambers, the hearts o f the virtuous. Pope is 
thus able to insinuate that a moral opposition exists between this true poet and the Great 
who neglected him in life, between the virtue that outlives the grave and the pomp that 
crumbles to dust within i t  But by insisting on this absolute opposition, Pope is able to 
suggest likewise that with this poetic exemplar has passed as well the possibility of there 
being in future a model poet in whom are met all virtues, but especially ease of 
temperament a loathing of vice, and a character impervious to corruption—not simply 
because the noblest of poetic characters has forever departed the world, but because by its 
neglect that world has proven itself complicitous in his passing, has demonstrated by its
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indifference that poetic genius is irrelevant in Britain, that Britain is incapable o f nourishing
such genius, and therefore that such genius, once lost, can never be replenished.
The inevitable outcome o f this slow atrophy is demonstrated by Pope’s epitaphic
statement on Jonathan Swift (1667-1745) in “The First Epistle o f the Second Book of
Horace Imitated,” better known by its subtitle, “To Augustus” (1737). Indeed, the mere
presence of Pope’s “memorial” portrait o f his friend, collaborator, and fellow Opposition
satirist suggests that the attrition o f poetry in Britain already underway at the time of his
epitaphs on Gay has since become mortal—or if  the poetry o f the highest technical and
moral order is not yet utterly extinct in Britain, it is as good as dead for having become
culturally irrelevant. On first glance, however, Pope’s tribute to Swift would seem in line
with the declared purpose of the poem, to illustrate to “Augustus”—that is, George II—the
continued potential usefulness of poetry in England:
Let Ireland tell, how Wit upheld her cause,
Her Trade supported, and supply’d her Laws;
And leave on Swift this grateful verse ingrav’d,
The Rights a Court attack’d, a Poet sav’d.
Behold the hand that wrought a Nation’s cure,
Stretch’d to relieve the Idiot and the Foot,
Proud Vice to brand, or injur’d Worth adorn,
And stretch the Ray to Ages yet unborn (11.221-228).
But recommending the utility of this particular poet’s writings to George H involves the
King and his Prime Minister in a  grotesquely ironic tangle. For Swift upheld Ireland’s
rights against the self-interested encroachments of the Walpole ministry, defeating the
minister’s attempted imposition o f  a debased currency and fighting the English monopoly
of trade between the two islands, going so far as to organize boycotts o f  English goods.
That Swift would “relieve the Idiot and the Poor” speaks well of him, but it also suggests
the misery and poverty to which English economic exploitation under Walpole had reduced
Ireland. The “Proud Vice” Swift took such delight in branding includes, in fact, the cynical
predations of “Augustus” and his government If anything, therefore, the latent indictment
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of the policies and ethics of the Hanoverian administration contained in these lines would 
bring home to George H what an embarrassment, what a political liability such “relevant” 
poetry could and would be, given the moral incompatibility of the government and the 
age’s best poets—all the more reason, perhaps, for the Court to continue its habitual 
neglect of letters, or at most to patronize only those poor or inept enough to be made 
reliably servile by the prospect of royal pay. But Pope’s irony redounds in part upon Swift 
as well. By interring Swift prematurely, Pope’s epitaphic statement establishes exactly the 
opposite of what the portrait of him purports to show—the importance o f poetry in present- 
day Britain, but also Swift’s individual influence. Consigned to the shades with Dryden 
and the late Addison, the yet living Swift is effectively precluded from further engaging his 
enemies. The character and exploits Pope here praises for their heroism now must take their 
place in literary and national history, along with Dryden’s earnestness in the time of 
Charles II’s “lewd, or un-believing Court” (1. 212) and Addison’s passion for propriety, 
truth, and virtue (II. 215-220). As such, they are from a broad historical perspective mere 
relics of the battles Swift won during the larger war he lost: for though he dwells now in 
eclipse, his antagonists yet thrive.
A similar irony pervades the whole o f “To Augustus.” Though the verse epistle 
purports to solicit royal patronage by vindicating the utility of poetry, in fact its case could 
hardly have moved George even if he had been inclined to listen— first, because under 
guise of praise and petition the poem delivers a pointed running critique of the Hanoverian 
administration’s deficiencies (a la  the sketch o f Swift); and second, because although Pope 
follows his original in recounting the past glories of his nation’s literature in order to stoke 
his addressee’s enthusiasm for contemporary poetry, he “neglects” to offer, with Horace, 
evidence that the best elements o f that literature have survived into the present day. It is the 
presence of this second irony that makes “To Augustus” an extended epitaphic statement on 
poetry in England, for if we base our assessment of the present state of poetry on the 
survey Pope here provides, we are bound to conclude that though once quite robust, the
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British Muse now lies in the grave with her mouldering champions, having found among 
the living none worthy of bearing her standard.
In fact, “To Augustus” is Pope’s second epitaphic statement for English poetry. 
Two years earlier, in his “versification” of Donne’s “Satyre II” (1735), Pope had depicted 
poetry as an anemic, emaciated entity indeed. As the poem’s speaker reviews a number of 
disreputable professions in an attempt to find the most noxious, he is able, before awarding 
the prize to England’s attorneys, to dismiss poetry almost immediately from consideration. 
Though such a plague and nuisance as to be a ready and deserving scapegoat for the 
nation’s ills—“I grant that Poetry’s a crying sin; / It brought (no doubt) th’ Excise and 
Army in” (U. 7-8)—it is actually quite harmless, an impotent virus easily treated: “the cure 
is starving, all allow” (1. 10). So impotent, in fact, that it hardly merits attention: “Yet like 
the Papists is the Poets state, / Poor and disarm’d, and hardly worth your hate” (11.11-12). 
Readers have grown too mercenary, poor bards too cringing, and genteel authors too vain 
for poetry to retain its native spirit and force:
One sings the Fair; but Songs no longer move,
No Rat is rhym’d to death, nor Maid to love:
In Love’s, in Nature’s spite, the siege they hold,
And scorn the Flesh, the Dev’I, and all but Gold.
These write to Lords, some mean reward to get,
As needy Beggars sing at doors for meat 
Those write because all write, and so have still 
Excuse for writing, and for writing ill (11.21-28).
Moreover, poetic invention has seemingly deserted the island, with the result that
plagiarism now thrives. But bad as he is “who makes his meal on others wit” (1. 30),
worse still is an unlooked-for consequence of such thieving: the wit of former ages is lost
to the present, because it grows odious in its reconstitution. Though “changed no doubt
from what it was before,” the poetic pickpurse’s “rank digestion makes it wit no more”
(31-32): “Sense, past thro’ him, no longer is the same, / For food digested takes another
name” (11. 33-34). Its current productions at best innocuous, its past triumphs despoiled by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
515
the predations o f literary harpies, poetry is rendered socially, morally, and aesthetically 
null.
Pope’s pursuit of this theme in “To Augustus” is, however, perhaps all the more 
effective rhetorically for being oblique, for presenting the case for contemporary poetry 
while “inadvertantly” arousing, then confirming the reader’s suspicions that indeed no such 
case can be made. For though he purports in his imitation of Horace to champion living 
writers against the nation’s reflexive slighting of them and its equally unthinking adulation 
of past giants of English literature, by tracing the rich history of English letters without 
extending the line of poetic achievement into the present day, Pope suggests thereby that 
that line has expired: whatever the glories of its past, English poetry can be afforded no 
moment in the historical present, and thus can have no claim to effectual existence. This is a 
significant departure from Horace’s original. Horace, impatient with those who blame a 
work, “not for its grossness f  Or awkward matters of style, but for being new, / When old 
things deserve not praises and prizes but excuses”21 (251), assures Augustus that despite 
the prejudices and loud carping o f the old-guard and the frequent ineptness of living 
writers—“Doctors do doctors’ work, and carpenters carpenters’; / But we all write poems, 
whether we know how to do it or not” (253)— modern Roman poetry holds out real 
benefits to society, at least potentially:
The poet helps mold 
The tender and lisping speech of the young, and diverts 
The ear even then from coarse conversation; and soon 
He can form the heart with his friendly advice, and expunge 
Its rawness, its envy, its anger. Reciting great deeds,
He fits out the rising age with noble examples;
He comforts the sick at heart and holds up the helpless (253).
And should these general boons leave Augustus unmoved, Horace reminds the Emperor
that in preferring poets he serves his own self-interest: “Still, it’s worth your while to take
21 Translated by Smith Palmer Bovie.
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cognizance of those /  Who minister unto your merit at home and abroad, / And not trust 
your fame to an unworthy servant” (257). Horace names likely candidates for 
encouragement, “Those poets beloved by you, your Varius, your Vergil, / Don’t disgrace 
your judgement of them, or your gifts, /  Which reflect great credit on die donor” (253), and 
hints that he for one, “if  my powers but matched my desires,” would likewise be a good 
candidate for Augustus’ favor, though he confesses, “Your majestic achievement cannot be 
aptly encompassed / In makeshift song; my modest attainments preclude / Attempting a 
work that lies outside of my range” (258).
Pope largely follows the arc of Horace’s argument He chafes, for instance, at the 
fact that “Authors, like Coins, grow dear as they grow old; /  It is the rust we value, not the 
gold” (11. 35-36), and is so bold as to clip some of that gold from even the most hallowed 
reputations of the English Ancients, the dramatic and non-dramatic poets of the last century: 
Shakespeare wrote for money and “grew immortal in his own despight" (1.71); Jonson “as 
little seem’d to heed / The Life to come, in ev’ry Poet’s Creed” (II. 73-74); “Spenser 
himself affects the obsolete, /  And Sydney’s verse halts ill on Roman feet” (U. 97-98); 
Milton’s performance is wildly uneven, now soaring above heaven, now creeping 
“serpent-like” along the ground (1. 100): “In Quibbles, Angel and Archangel join, / And 
God the Father turns a School-Divine” (11. 101-102). Of the Courtly Wits, the “Mob[sl of 
Gentlemen” (1. 108) who wrote during “either Charles’s days” (1. 107), he speaks yet more 
harshly: “One Simile, that solitary shines / In the dry D esert of a thousand lines, / Or 
lengthen’d Thought that gleams thro’ many a page, / Has sanctify’d whole Poems for an 
age” (11. 11 l- l  14). Yet unlike Horace, Pope has barely begun his defense of the Modems 
at the expense of the Ancients before making clear that his case is not wholly unalloyed 
with irony: “In ev’ry publick Virtue we excell, / We build, we paint, we sing, we dance as 
well, / And learned Athens to our Art must stoop, / Could she behold us tumbling thro’ a 
hoop” (11.45-48). This contrast of ancient writing with modem stage-effects and spectacle 
reflects sharply upon current poetic standards and proficiency, as does Pope’s observation
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that “one Poetick Itch / Has seiz’d the Court and City, Poor and Rich: / Sons, Sires, and
Grandsires, all will wear the Bays, / Our Wives read Milton, and our Daughters Plays" (11.
169-172). But poetic ideals have been debased as well by the professionals and
acknowledged masters of recent years. True enough that “Dryden taught to join / The
varying verse, the full resounding line, / The long majestic march, and energy divine" (11.
267-269), but true as well that like Shakespeare this “copious” poet “wanted, or forgot, /
The last and greatest Art, the Art to blot” (11. 280-281). And unfortunately, Dryden’s
deficiencies have only multiplied themselves in his dramatic successors:
Observe how seldom ev’n the best succeed:
Tell me if Congreve’s Fools are Fools indeed?
What pert low Dialogue has Farqu’ar writ!
How Van wants grace, who never wanted wit!
The stage how loosely does Astraea tread,
Who fairly puts all Characters to bed:
And idle Cibber, how he breaks the laws,
To make poor Pinky eat with vast applause!
But fill their purse, our Poet’s work is done,
Alike to them, by Pathos or by Pun (11.286-295).
That last couplet cuts especially deep, for in it Pope moves from pointing up the 
characteristic weaknesses o f  individual dramatists to ascribing those debilitating idiosyn­
crasies to a general failure o f poetic ethics: English dramatic poesy has grown so mercenary 
as to seriously compromise its fundamental end, to make moral instruction delightful, 
preferring to aim at delight alone—and the profits to be had by pandering to the lowest 
possible appetites. Note that in the progress of this passage’s more or less chronological 
survey of the theatre’s leading lights, we move from stylistic and technical flaws— 
Dryden’s “copiousness,” William Congreve’s faulty characterization, respectively—to 
ever-greater transgressions against taste: George Farquhar’s “pert low Dialogue," Sir John 
Vanbrugh’s coarseness, Aphra Behn’s bedroom naughtiness, and lastly, Cibber’s play for 
applause by having a gluttonous character in his Love Makes a Man (1700) fall upon a 
brace of chickens and devour them in three minutes’ time. The growing slackness of
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professional standards has meant that ‘Taste, eternal wanderer, now flies / From heads to 
ears, and now from ears to eyes” (11.312-313), infusing all ranks of society with the same 
desire for cheap sensual gratification: “What dear delight to Britons Farce [for one) affords! 
/  Farce once the taste o f Mobs, but now of Lords” (1L 310-311).
But even if  we grant, as I think we must, that in finding fault with his 
contemporaries or near-contemporaries Pope is not denying outright their talent or the 
power o f their productions to please with wit and in wholesome ways, his portrait of 
encroaching literary decadence nonetheless points up the larger theme of the extinction of 
England’s line of poetic achievement It follows that the more poetry plays to “the many­
headed Monster of the Pit: / A sense-less, worth-less, and un-honour’d crowd” who 
“before ten lines are spoke, / Call for the Farce, the Bear, or the Black-joke” (11. 305-306; 
308-309), the more diminished its power to exercise the kind of instructive, civilizing, 
culturally sustaining influence upon its audiences that Horace had described to Augustus. 
Following his at best ironic defense of the English modems, then, Pope can only make a 
second departure from his Roman model when he recommends the advantages of poetry to 
his royal addressee. Where Horace could point to the positive benefits of poetry, the 
debased state o f English tastes means that Pope can offer only the “negative utility” of 
letters to his king and country. Annoying as it is, for example, that “All ryme and scrawl, 
and scribble to a man” (1. 188), these would-be poets can present no danger to the state: 
“Allow him but his Play-thing of a Pen, / He n’er rebels, or plots, like other men” (11.193- 
194). Preoccupied with rhyming, the poet is too busy to be much concerned with 
Government scandals: “Flight of Cashiers [as in the South Sea Bubble], or Mobs, he’ll 
never mind; /  And knows no losses while the Muse is kind” (11. 195-196). Criminality he 
leaves to others (“To cheat a Friend, or Ward, he leaves to Peter”)—hardly a surprise, 
since his pursuit of the Muse has left him so introverted that he has no ambition above 
“enjoy[ing] his Garden and his Book in quiet; /  And then—a perfect Hermit in his Diet” (11. 
197; 199-200), precluding his concern with and participation in the public sphere, making
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him safely acquiescent in the face of governmental corruption and mismanagement In
short, poetry is useful precisely because it does not arouse, inform, teach, and reform,
because it instead operates upon the national psyche as an ideal soporific, reducing
mettlesome subjects to social and political cyphers. When Pope does pretend to enumerate
the positive benefits o f poetry, they prove, if  read unironically, to be no better than
superficial:
Yet let me show, a Poet’s of some weight,
And (tho’ no Soldier) useful to the State.
What will a  Child leam sooner than a song?
What better teach a Foreigner the tongue?
What’s long or short, each accent where to place,
And speak in publick with some sort of grace 01- 203-208).
However, it is more than likely that these lines axe meant as a reflection upon what many 
Englishmen saw as disturbing attributes of their King: his doting maintenance of his 
standing armies and his “despotic” love o f military show; his foreign birth and manners, 
and his preoccupation with his native Hanover; his inability to achieve more than a minimal 
competence in the English language, and his unwillingness to acclimate himself to the 
temperament and traditions of his subjects, or even to appear much before them. Thus, at 
the point where Horace reminds Augustus of the lasting fame poetry can confer upon its 
subjects, Pope says instead that the only real harm a poet can commit is to “praise some 
monster o f a King, /  Or Virtue, or Religion, turn to sport, / To please a lewd, or un­
believing Court” (1L 210-212); and where Horace wishes aloud that his talent matched his 
desire to praise Augustus as he deserves, Pope backhandedly lists the qualities of George 
Augustus he would praise—“Your Arms, your Actions, your Repose to sing!” (1. 395; 
emphasis added); “Your Country’s Peace, how oft, how dearly bought'." (1.397; emphasis 
added); “How, when you nodded, o’er land and deep, / Peace stole her wing, and wrapped 
the world in sleep” (11. 400-401)—and concludes disingenuously, “But Verse alas! your 
Majesty disdains; /  And I’m not us’d to Panegyric strains” (U. 404-405), insinuating in 
addition that in any event the King is not worthy of whatever praise he could offer: “A vile
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Encomium doubly ridicules; / There’s nothing blackens like the ink of fools; / If true, a 
woeful likeness, and if lyes, /  ‘Praise undeserv’d is scandal in disguise’ “ (11. 410-413). 
When I stoop to such flattery, he declares, let my “dirty leaves” (1.415), smeared with the 
“qualities” of an undeserving subject, “Cloath spice, line trunks, or flutt’ring in a row, / 
Befringe the rails of Bedlam and Sohoe” (II. 418-419).
So Pope obviously does not hold out to George II the possibility that any serious 
poet can offer him serious praise and secure thereby posterity’s good opinion. Thus Pope’s 
appeal to the king as he “[nods] serenely, surrounded by his smiling troop of Hanover- 
Walpole poetasters, educators, ecclesiastics, and politicians” (Torchiana 714) to assume his 
rightful place as patron of the arts is weighted with the heaviest irony. Given its immediate 
context, the appeal becomes a dare, a stinging accusation o f royal dullness. But by this 
point Pope has made it equally clear that even if he had meant to make a serious case to his 
monarch for the theoretical usefulness of poetry in establishing the heroic stature of its 
subjects, the present debilitated state of British poetry would prevent the success of any 
actual attempts to do so. Horace could point proudly to a  Varius and a Virgil as worthy 
objects o f Augustus’ favor and Rome’s esteem; but Pope, making a third deviation from 
his model, uses the weakening of poetic standards and the resulting moral and cultural 
enervation of poetry to throw into relief the embarrassing inferiority of the present 
generation of England’s literary figures. For though he admonishes George II to “Think of 
those Authors, Sir, who would rely / More on a Reader’s sense, than Gazer’s eye” (11. 
350-351)—that is, those non-drama tic poets who could plausibly fulfill the roles of their 
Augustan counterparts—Pope does not recommend any living poets by name. Indeed, it 
seems that for Pope few living writers o f any type are o f sufficient stature even to earn a 
bare mention in “To Augustus”: his catalogues of England’s notable dramatists and poets 
(especially 11. 69-114 and 11. 286-295) exhaust themselves with those who flourished at 
about the turn of the century or a  bit beyond—as if  the line o f major and minor worthies 
grew first faint, then altogether extinct. For Pope’s catalogues are clearly designed to trace
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a general diminution of literary talent His first for example, takes us from Shakespeare 
and Jonson down to the authors o f those “dry Desertfs] o f  a  thousand lines,” “Sprat, 
Carew, Sedley, and a hundred more” (1. 109); and within this list he recounts the 
succession of English dram a's popular laureates: Beaum ont Fletcher, Shadwell, 
Wycherley, Southeme, and Rowe—all those “[f]rom eldest Heywood down to Cibber’s 
age” (1.88). Cibber also rounds off Pope's second catalogue (given above, p. 96), which, 
beginning with Dryden, shows the descent (qualitative as well as chronological) of 
dramatic accomplishment from Charles II’s Laureate to George II’s own ill-chosen 
composer of birthday odes.22 As Cibber’s example twice demonstrates, the living literary 
men Pope does name are used to point up how slight their capacities are compared to those 
even of the last generation. Thus elsewhere in T o  Augustus,” the late Addison is replaced 
as the age’s leading critic by “slashing Bentley with his desp’rate Hook” (I. 104), and 
Swift, prematurely commemorated as the model of poetic virtue, courage, and indignation, 
by the blandishments of sapless Administration apologists: Walpole’s creature, the foppish, 
philistine Lord Hervey, “th’ affected fool / At Court, who hates whate’er he read at School” 
(11. 105-106), and those whose “pathetic strains” (1. 232) beguile work-house children 
from the drudgery o f their labor, reconciling them to the misery of their condition while 
instilling in them attitudes friendly to ministerial policy: “Verse cheers their leisure, Verse 
assists their work, /  Verse prays for Peace, or sings down Pope and Turk” (11. 235-236). 
In “The Battel o f the Books” (1710), Swift had derisively portrayed the “modernist” 
Dryden in a helmet (i.e., a  reputation) “nine times too large for the Head, which appeared 
Situate far in the hinder P art. . .  like a Mouse under a Canopy o f State, or like a shriveld
22 Pope advises George that if he would have his exploits celebrated as Louis XTV’s had been by Boileau 
and Racine, he must consider well "what Poet best may make them known” 0- 377); at minimum. 
Pope admonishes, the King must “chuse at least some Minister of Grace, / Fit to bestow the Laureat’s 
weighty place” (U. 378-379). When these lines and those in which Pope ironically disqualifies himself 
from praising George II (11. 390-419; quoted above) are taken together, the overall impression we 
receive is that there is no poet fit even to offer base flattery to a King who is himself unfit to receive 
even that
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Beau from within the Pent-house o f a modem Perewig” (390). Perhaps in “To Augustus” 
no single image captures the bathetic devolution of the literary “hero” in England than a 
similar image o f Colley Cibber cavorting on stage in the actual helmet, breast plate, and 
greaves o f the Black Prince, making himself (and Edward’s memory) ridiculous as he 
earnestly plays the role o f England’s champion (1L 316-319). There could be no apter 
emblem for what Pope would have us see as a  literary culture inept, impotent, and presided 
over by a stunted race absurdly strutting before the public eye in the armor forged by the 
giants of a former age.
As in his “versification” o f Donne’s second satire, Pope must content himself with 
painting his survey of the triumphs o f English letters in luminous retrospect. For as the 
utter lack of honest statesmen among the living forced him in his second Epilogue to the 
satires to praise the dead exclusively, so does the extinction of the “last o f Britons” in the 
sphere of poetry here oblige him to turn in disgust from the present and recall those who, 
great enough to be plagued by merely petty faults, have taken to the grave with them the 
true poet’s skill and virtue, as well as that sense of higher moral mission that once defined 
and defended the soul of the nation, stood fast between its civilization and the dissolution 
attendant upon dullness.
4. The Dunciad: Pope’s Grand Epitaph for England
The cultural bulwark o f  poetry once breached, weakened, and overthrown, the 
overturning o f civilization itself must follow. Indeed, it is because The Dunciad Variorum 
o f 1729 stands as a record of the defeat of arts and letters in England that it may likewise 
stand, as Pope wrote to Gay in 1730, “for a  publick Epitaph or monumental Inscription, 
like that at Thermopylae, on a whole people perish But what in 1728 and 1729 was 
largely a brilliant mock-heroic treatment of the dull, the scandalous, and the inept (Books I 
and II)—to which the poet had appended an extended conceit of a Britain undone by the
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triumphant dunces (Book HI)23—became something else altogether with the addition in 
1741 of a fourth book that treats the prophecies of Book IQ as fiiits  accomplis. Poetry has 
failed and Britain is no more; Dulness and her empire have been restored—now and for all 
time. Pope’s satiric figure has hardened from fancy into established “fact”; it remains only 
to give a final, comprehensive account of the expiration of poetry and the institutions that 
had once sustained British civilization. As such, Book IV of The New Dunciad not only 
brings Pope’s epitaphic vision to its logical culmination, but in itself serves as Pope’s 
grand epitaph for England.
Even before we come to Pope’s declaration in the “Argument” of Book IV that its 
design is “to declare the Completion o f the Prophecies mention’d at the end of the former” 
(764), we might have inferred that the coming of the Goddess Dulness “in her Majesty, to 
Destroy Order and Science, and to substitute the Kingdom of the Dull upon Earth” is a 
foregone conclusion, that in fact it has all but been accomplished. After all, we have seen 
the new King o f the Dunces anointed in Book I, the games held in his honor in Book II, 
and in Book III a survey of the Goddess’ past triumphs and a vision of those yet to come 
under the reign of Colley Cibber—but nowhere have we seen the struggle between Sense 
and Dulness, at no point witnessed the decisive battle between the Wits and Dunces. The 
defeat of Sense and Wit, the victory of Dulness are simply givens, easily confirmed if only
23 A conceit, Pope says, fashioned from such staff as “the Fool’s paradise, the Statesman’s scheme, / The 
air-built Castle, and die golden Dream, / The Maid’s romantic wish, the Chymist’s flame, / And Poet’s 
vision of eternal fame” (II. 9-12). Pope has the purblind Martinus Scriblerus gloss lines 5-12 as 
follows: “Hereby is intimated that the following Vision is no more than the Chimera of the Dreamer’s 
brain, and not a real or intended satire on the Present Age, doubtless more learned, more inlighten’d, 
and more abounding with great Genius’s in Divinity, Politics, and whatever Arts and Sciences, than all 
the preceding.” The disavowal, of course, only underscores that the learning of the present age is 
precisely the object of the poet’s satire. Yet in the “Argument” for Book QI of The Dunciad Variorum, 
Pope explains that the most dire effects of dullness have still to be realized:
[The ghost of Fllcanah Settle] first prophecies how first the nation shall be overrun with farces, 
opera’s, shows; and the throne of Dulness advanced over both the Theatres: Then how her sons 
shall preside in the seats of arts and sciences, till in conclusion all shall return to their original 
Chaos: a scene, of which the present Action is but a Type or Foretaste, giving a Glimpse or 
Pisgah-sight of the promis’d Fulness of her Glory; the Accomplishment whereof will, in all 
probability, hereafter be the Theme of many other and greater Dunciads (348-349).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
524
one knows how to read aright the telltale signs o f the times. And so as Cibber nods in the 
lap of Dulness near the conclusion of Book EH, he beholds in his dream-vision the shade of 
Fflkanah Settle enumerating to the hosts o f the Underworld evidence that the “new 
Satumian age of Lead” (1,1. 28), long-expected, has at last arrived with the reign of King 
Colley:
Signs following signs lead on the mighty year!
See! the dull stars roll round and re-appear.
See, see, our own true Phoebus wears the bays!
Our Midas sits Lord Chancellor of Plays!
On Poets’ Tombs see Benson’s titles writ!
Lo! Ambrose Philips is prefer’d for Wit!
See under Ripley rise a  new White-hall,
While Jones’ and Boyle’s united labours foil:
While Wren with sorrow to the grave descends,
Gay dies unpension’d with a hundred Mends,
Hibernian Politics, O Swift! thy fete;
And Pope’s, ten years to comment and translate (11.321-332).
Taken together, there could for Pope be no surer portent of the imminent extinction of
English civilization: dullness not only thrives, it is rewarded with title, office, and wealth—
while talent is allowed to languish and die. Thus Cibber is made Laureate and Chancellor of
Plays—and Swift is denied preferment and all but exiled to Ireland. Thus Thomas Ripley
(d. 1758), the inept, inexperienced architect who “[builtJ a Bridge that never drove a pyle”
(“To Augustus,” I. 185), is yet assigned, owing to Walpole’s influence, to repair the
King’s palace at Whitehall; and William Benson (1682-1754) is brought in to replace the
aging genius Wren as Royal Surveyor, though so incompetent that he first wrongly
pronounces the building housing the House o f Lords unsound and then so badly botches
his commission to refurbish it that Defoe would observe in A Tour Through the Whole
Island o f Great Britain (1724-26) that “some thought he was more likely to throw the old
fabric down, than to set it to rights” (324). No wonder that Wren “with sorrow” descends
to his grave—when, in his case, merit is pushed aside, and in that o f Inigo Jones, its
works are neglected. “At the time when this Poem was written,” Pope glosses in a footnote
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in The Dunciad Variorum, “the Banquetting-house o f W hitehall, the Church and Piazza of
Covent-garden, and the Palace and Chappel of Somerset-house, the works of the famous
/rn’go Jones, had been for many years so neglected, as to be in danger o f ruin" 0- 324n)—
and had to be restored privately by Richard Boyle, Earl of Burlington. Benson, moreover,
is one o f those who promote the Empire of Dulness “by connivance, weak resistance, or
discouragements of Arts; such as Half-wits, tasteless Admirers, vain Pretenders, the
Flatterers o f Dunces, or the Patrons of them” (“Argument" for Book IV, 764), setting up as
a promoter of the arts when in fact his taste and judgement limit him to subsidizing living
fools and monuments to worthies long dead.24 Thus while Benson builds his reputation as
a connoisseur, Gay “dies unpension’d with a  hundred friends.”
Given these signs of the dullness immanent in Georgian England, we should not be
surprised to find, even as Book IV opens, that Science already “groans in Chains” (1.21)
beneath the footstool of Dulness; that “Wif dreads Exile, Penalties and Pains" (1. 22); that
Logic, “gagg’d and bound” (1.23) has been supplanted by Sophistry, “fair R het’ric” (1.24)
by “shameless Billingsgate” (1. 26), and Morality by “Chicane in Furs, and Casuistry in
Lawn” (1. 28). But by reason of their innately virulent antipathy to Dulness and their
peculiar ability to withstand her power, the Muses in defeat must be treated with such
severity as guarantees their absolute nullification. Held “in ten-fold bonds” and “[wjatch’d
both by Envy’s and by Flatt’ry’s eye” (11. 35-36), Mnemosyne’s daughters have no
recourse but despair and no hope but death:
There to her heart sad Tragedy addrest 
The dagger wont to pierce the Tyrant’s breast;
But sober History restrain’d her rage,
And promis’d Vengeance on a barb’rous age.
There sunk Thalia [Comedy], nerveless, cold, and dead,
Had not her Sister Satyr held her head (U. 37-42).
24 Such patrons are, as we have seen, one of Pope’s frequent targets; he skewers Benson specifically in an 
epigram on Shakespeare’s monument: “Thus Britain lov’d me; and presav’d my Fame, / Clear from a 
Barber’s or a Benson’s Name." Better to remain in oblivion than to be the occasion of a self-promoting 
Philistine’s monument to his own ego.
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Their impotence leaves them subject as well to the noxious insults and tortures arising from
the Goddess’ especial enmity. Dulness smiles, for instance, when the “Harlot form” (1.45)
of Opera makes her entrance “with mincing step, small voice, and languid eye” (1. 46),
casts “on the prostrate Nine a scornful look” (1- 51), and exults over the captives, “Joy to
great Chaos! let Division reign: / Chromatic tortures soon shall drive them hence, /  Break
all their nerves, and fritter all their sense” (11. 54-66). She then grants Opera’s prayer to
drive “Giant Handel” (1. 65) from England unto “th’ Hibernian shore” (1. 70), lest the
sense, power, and sublimity of his music “stir, rouze, and shake the Soul” (L 67) of the
nation and disrupt the torpor o f the Goddess’ reign. And with the Muses conquered and
powerless, their would-be followers languishing in oblivion or exile, Dulness has now
only to call her children to her and bid her particular favorites, the Patrons “who sneak
from living worth to dead, / With-hold the pension, and set up the head” (11.95-96) and the
Critics who “in the chequer’d shade, /  Admire new light thro’ holes yourselves have made”
(11.125-126), to mangle between them the memories and achievements of the Muses’ past
champions. “Revive the Wits!” she commands, “But murder first, and mince them all to
bits” (11.119-120):
Let standard-Authors, thus, like trophies bom,
Appear more glorious as more hack’d and tom —
Leave not a foot of verse, a foot of stone,
A Page, a  Grave, that they can call their own;
But spread, my sons, your glory thin or thick,
On passive paper, or on solid brick (11.123-124; 127-130).
Thus defeated, enchained, and tormented, their glories obscured, so helpless are the
Muses in the face of “the Restoration o f Night and Chaos” (“Argument” for Book IV,
765), that as the final book of The New Dunciad opens, the poet finds that if  he is to be
able to articulate the final triumph of Dulness, he must first beg from her a brief space of
time in which articulation itself can yet exist: “Yet, yet a moment, one dim Ray of Light /
Indulge, dread Chaos, and eternal Night!” (II. 1-2). Putting his request to those powers
“whose Mysteries restor’d I sing,” and toward which, he acknowledges, “Time bears me
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on his rapid wing” (11.5-6), the poet recognizes implicitly that with the expiration of that 
final brief, dimly lit instant o f poetic vision, the very possibility o f poetry will be 
extinguished, and he along with i t  “Suspend a while your Force inertly strong, /  Then take 
at once the Poet and the Song” (11. 7-8): one last moment in which to sing one last song 
commemorating the end of poesy, and the poetic voice resigns itself to being stilled, now 
and forever.
Such use the poet makes o f the “one dim Ray o f Light” remaining to him after the 
fall o f the arts and sciences. Around him, however, the remaining pillars o f British 
civilization—liberal humanist education, social and political liberty, faith in the justice of an 
immanent Providential order—have already been toppled, and precluded from ever being 
restored.
Certainly the youth of Britain will not grow up to threaten Dulness’ reign. As the
legions o f the dull crowd about their triumphant goddess, the spectre o f the legendary
schoolmaster William Busby, here depicted as archetypically autocratic, brutal, and
narrow, pushes to the fore and, brandishing a bloody switch, boasts that the education
meted out to the young ensures their lifelong loyalty to Dulness. Curiosity, intelligence,
quickness of parts, imagination—all the intellectual attributes that might rebel against the
goddess have been beaten, drilled, and recited out o f them:
To ask, to guess, to know, as they commence,
As Fancy opens the quick springs of Sense,
We ply die Memory, we load the brain,
Bind rebel Wit, and double chain on chain,
Confine the thought, to exercise the breath;
And keep them in the pale of Words till death.
Whate’er the talents, or howe’er designed,
We hang one jingling padlock on the mind (11.155-162).
Once they have been rendered sufficiently uniform, habitually insipid and obtuse, the
young scholars will be herded in their “sable shoal[s]” (1. 190) to the universities, where,
under the tutelage of “Aristotle’s friends” 0-192), they will make up the “black blockade”
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(1.191) of latter-day scholastics that promotes “each staunch Polemic, stubborn as a rock” 
(1.195), and applauds “each fierce Logician, still expelling Locke” (11.196). And there they 
will come under the influence of those such as the pompously purblind Aristarchus,25 who 
now strides up to Dulness and demands haughtily if the goddess does not know him, “Thy 
mighty Scholiast, whose unweary’d pains / Made Horace dull, and humbled Milton's 
strains” (11. 211-212). His programme, much akin to Busby’s, is to so clog the mind with 
trivia that it is incapacitated for higher contemplation—or even for connecting up the 
innumerable bits of minutiae it has ingested in order to comprehend their larger significance. 
“In ancient Sense if  any needs will deal,” avows Aristarchus, “Be sure I give them 
Fragments, not a  Meal” (229-230): “How parts relate to parts, or they to whole, / The 
body’s harmony, the beaming soul” (U. 243-235) are things “the critic Eye, that 
microscope of Wit” (1.233) shall see only “When Man’s whole frame is obvious to a Flea” 
0. 238). For Aristarchus, as he goes about petrifying each “Genius to a Dunce” 0- 264), 
the object is never to advance knowledge, but to multiply it needlessly and demonstrate it to 
no purpose—and thus he “dim[sj the eyes, and stuff[sj the head / With all such reading as 
was never read” (11. 249-250); thus he sets the pupil “on Metaphysic ground to prance, / 
Show all his parts, not a step advance” (11. 265-266); thus his regimen successfully 
“bringfs] to one dead level ev’ry mind” (1.268).
One dead level, because whether the “scholars” produced by Aristarchus’ parsing 
methods busy themselves, as he does, with texts or, like the virtuosos, antiquarians, and 
collectors that soon afterward appear before Dulness, with curiosities and trifles, none is 
capable of ever being more than an intellectual dilettante, for none has the method, 
discipline, or desire to raise the sights of his investigation from the parts before him to the
25 That is, the classicist Richard Bentley. As Maclc points out, Bendey was the most renowned—or 
notorious—practitioner of the maddeningly self-obsessed “new criticism.” Bendey, Mack writes, “did 
not hesitate to present himself as endowed with powers of textual divinadon which in his own view 
entirely equalled . . .  if indeed they did not surpass, whatever art or genius might have been possessed 
by the poet on whom he was then commenting'' (483).
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larger aesthetic, natural, or providential design that subsumes them. For this latter group,
the tribe of myopic natural philosophers, “with weeds and shells fantastic crow’d” (1- 398),
then, the only possible business o f their investigations, the only possible end o f their
obsession with the minutiae of physical objects is, to paraphrase John-son, to register only
the streaks o f the tulip, not the flower itself—and certainly not the interrelatedness o f the
natural world. Hence the feud Dulness is forced to arbitrate between the florist and the
butterfly collector. The florist is outraged that other’s “v ile . . .  insect lust" (L 415) has led
him to trample the new species of carnation he has created; the collector, pridefully ignorant
of what lies at the edge of his acquaintance, replies with contempt, “Rose or Carnation was
below my care; / 1 meddle, Goddess! only in my sphere” (11.431-432). Both fail to see that
the objects of their self-absorbed studies occupy a single, interdependent natural system.
Dulness can only be pleased to observe how effectively the specialists’ vocations have
blunted their intellect and scattered their energies, and thus she congratulates the disputants
for promoting her arts, encouraging them to disseminate the hobbyist’s enthusiasm among
the ranks o f the idle young:
‘O! would the Sons of Men once think their Eyes 
And Reason giv’n them but to study Flies?
See Nature in some partial narrow shape,
And let the Author of the Whole escape:
Learn but to trifle; or, who most observe,
To wonder at their Maker, not to serve’ (11.453-458).
As Dulness’ benediction suggests, the benefit she derives from the reduction of learning to
the microscopic examination o f minutiae—whether physical or textual—is twofold. First,
reason itself atrophies in its close confinement, becomes incapable o f seeing or imagining
beyond the objects with which it has surrounded itself; second, a reason thus narrowly
self-enclosed soon becomes self-reflexive, interested only in its own perpetuation. This all
but guarantees that learning and science will be rendered insignificant and unintelligible
because of their isolation from the experience, exigencies, and language of the everyday
world. But more important, because the investigations undertaken in such isolation soon
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become answerable only to themselves, they become divorced as well from the ethical and 
spiritual spheres, content, as Pope observes in a gloss on line 453, to “rest in Second 
causes, with a total disregard o f the F irst” So dissevered, even if they produce nothing 
positively harmful to human society, such studies yet constitute a real obstacle to material 
and moral progress. For one thing, whether undertaken within or beyond the bounds of 
formal education, they draw young scholars “out o f the way o f real Knowledge” 
(“Argument” for Book IV), and lead them to forfeit the full exercise and scope o f their 
reason, precluding thereby any profitable examination, explication, and propagation of the 
useful, the beautiful, the true, or the sacred; for another, the regimen o f such studies all but 
ensures that the present generation of the learned dull will only replicate themselves in their 
charges, rendering these in their turn incapable o f producing anything but yet another 
generation of dunces.26 And so decade by decade, learning follows the errant footsteps of 
its past, hastening to its own extinction.
Disastrous as this development is in itself, its malign power is magnified by the fact 
that the consequences of dullness never come singly, and never remain localized—and 
never less so than in the present instance. The boys dancing before Busby’s bloody switch, 
the young scholars receiving their well-parsed fragments of knowledge by Aristarchus and 
his ilk, and (the product o f these two systems) the intellectually and occupationally idle 
gentlemen soon to be initiated into the mania of esotericism by the likes o f the botanist and 
butterfly collector, are all, by reason of their birth, lineage, condition, and rank, destined
26 Roy Porter’s description of preparatory and higher education in England during the eighteenth century 
largely confirms Pope’s unflattering portrait “Public-school culture,” he says,” was that of [the boys'] 
lathers in embryo; boys drank, gambled, rode, fought and gained precocious bi-sexual experience. They 
frequently rebelled: the militia had to be called in to storm Eton”; the universities, with their “dons 
steeped in port and privilege,” were no less shabby or intellectually stagnant:
Oxford and Cambridge came to be attended principally by sauntering young gentlemen tilling in 
time with bagatelles (few troubled to graduate) and by penurious sorts on scholarships, many the 
sons of curates, seeking ordinations into the Church. It was grinding tutors and slumbrous pedants 
who made an academic career in the colleges: the great scholars of Georgian England—the law 
reformer Jeremy Bentham, historians such as Edward Gibbon, Archdeacon Coxe, and Charles 
Burney, and scientists such as Joseph Priestly and Henry Cavendish—were not dons (English 
Society in the Eighteenth Century, 177).
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for public life and office. The erosion of humanist education’s traditional connections 
between the particular and the universal, the practical and the philosophical, the material 
and the moral, ruinous enough to individual talents and sensibilities, promises to be yet 
more so for Britain’s social and political life when,
First slave to Words, then vassal to a  Name,
Then dupe to Party; child and man the same;
Bounded by Nature, narrow’d still by Art,
A trifling head, and a contracted heart (11.501-504),
“ev’ry finish’d Son” (1.500) takes his place among the ruling classes. Justice, policy, and 
statecraft must go begging once those “mark’d out for Honours, honour’d for their birth” 
(1. 507), have been by the course o f their education “to [Dulness’] gentle shadow . . .  
shrunk, / All melted down, in Pension, or in Punk” (11. 509-510). Confirmed in their 
impudence (11. 530-531), self-conceit (11. 534ff), and party interest (11. 537ff), in their 
pride, selfishness, and dullness (1.582), they leave school ethically, even developmentally 
stunted. Disinclined to discharge their social responsibilities, they are scarcely fit to do so 
in any case, their lives and fortunes given over to adolescent whims and appetites, to bland 
eccentricities. A certain duke likes to pretend that he is a jockey; a marquis impersonates his 
footman; an earl drives his own coach from theatre to theatre (11. 585-588). Harmless 
enough in themselves, inasmuch as the indulgence o f idiosyncrasy compromises the 
dignity of authority and subverts social order, and insofar as such pursuits divert the 
attention and energies that might have been spent on the fulfillment o f one’s duties, they 
comply with Dulness’ charge to her favorites, “Guard my Prerogative, assert my Throne” 
0- 583). And so they take their place in the Goddess’ final directions to her privileged 
sons, along with her bidding
The learned Baron Butterflies design,
Or draw to silk Arachne’s subtile line;
The Judge to dance his brother Sergeant call;
The Senator at Cricket urge the Ball;
The Bishop stow (POntific Luxury!)
An hundred Souls of Turkeys in a pye;
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The sturdy Squire to Gallic masters stoop,
And drown his Lands and Manors in a  Soupe (11.589-596).
Thus distracted, “No more, alas! the voice o f Fame they hear, /  The balm of Dulness
trickling in their ear” (1L 543-544); “How quick Ambition hastes to ridicule! / The Sire is
made a Peer, the Son a Fool" (U. 547-548).
As Roy Porter points out in his study o f Edward Gibbon, throughout the eighteenth
century the “classic object lesson in political suicide” was the “degeneration” of Republican
Rome into Imperial Rome (27). The republic, so the view ran, had “presented a  fair
prospect of a virtuous, flourishing, militarily successful commonwealth. . . .  animated by
the political energies of a  citizenry whose conflicts proved to be healthy safeguards against
despotism, and flee from the abuses of hereditary or arbitrary power" (28):
By contrast, imperial Rome, its patricians corrupted by luxury, its plebeians 
slaves to bread and circuses, afforded a spectacle o f arid despotism. The 
proponents o f this vision of history feared that Britain, like Rome, would 
lapse from liberty into despotism through a chain o f socio-political trans­
formations set o ff by changing circumstances but exploited by crafty 
opportunists.. . .  Standing armies, dropsical bureaucracies, ‘placemen’ and 
hangers-on would render the nation helpless before the machinations of 
absolutism. Thus wealth would breed luxury, luxury corruption, and 
corruption despotism (28-29).
As Pope depicts them, the British “patricians" fashioned by miseducation and the privileges
of place are destined to preside over England’s own decline and fall. Raised in dullness,
tyrannized and trivialized by turns in their youth, disused by the time of their maturity from
serving anything but their own material and sensual self-interests, these are not the men to
attempt and achieve English glories abroad—or, more important, defend traditional English
liberties at home. The connection between such an upbringing and the encroachment of
domestic despotism is not lost upon Pope, who in tracing the inculcation of dullness
accounts as well for the weakness of mind, character, and idealism that underlies his
scenario for the slow erosion of political will and power among the Parliamentary classes in
the face o f Administrational hauteur. Nor is the connection lost upon Dulness herself. She
is so taken with Busby’s methods of “instruction,” for instance, that she wishes the whole
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kingdom might be made subject to “some pedant Reign," presided over by a schoolmaster- 
king who, ruling by words alone (rather than by laws, or the principles upon which those 
laws are founded), would reduce his Parliaments and advisors to a  group of terrified 
schoolboys, would “Senates and Courts with Greek and Latin rule, / And turn the Council 
to a Grammar School!" (U. 179-180). “For sure,” she concludes, “if  Dulness sees a 
grateful Day, / ’Tis in the shade o f Arbitrary Sway" (11. 181-182).27 It is in fact with this 
end of arbitrary sway in mind that before one of her “finish’d sons” is presented to her as 
one fully her own, the lad is first coaxed by “a WIZARD old" (that is, Walpole) to drink 
from the “Cup o f Self-love, which,” as Pope explains in a footnote, “causes a total oblivion 
of the obligations o f Friendship, or Honour, and of the Service o f God or our Country; all 
sacrificed to Vain-glory, court-worship, or yet meaner considerations of Lucre and brutal 
Pleasures” (1.517n):
. . .  a  WIZARD old his Cup extends;
Which who so tastes, forgets his former friends,
Sires, Ancestors, Himself. One casts his eyes 
Up to a Star, and like Endymion dies:
A Feather shooting from another’s head,28 
Extracts his brain, and Principle is fled,
Lost is his God, his Country, ev’ry thing;
And nothing left but Homage to a  King! (U. 517-524)
Steeped in dullness from childhood, those who from personal virtue, familial tradition, or
noblesse oblige might have found the strength to check or at least challenge the
encroachments o f royal and ministerial authority upon the ancient rights of Parliament and
people, are instead led by the prospects o f advancement and title to become accomplices to
the Court’s predations. He who is lost to “his God, his Country, ev’ry thing" and is left
27 Pope has Dulness sigh for “some gentle Janies" (1. 175), i.e., the scholarly (and absolutist-tending) 
James I, but her picture of the schoolmaster’s brutal, autocratic manner could have been drawn from the 
court of George and Caroline, as Plumb’s description of the monarchs’ demeanor (see p. 46, above) in 
governing makes clear.
28 The star of the Order of the Garter; the feather worn in the caps of the Knights of the Gaiter.
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with nothing at heart but mercenary “Homage to a King” will be unwilling, unable
(morally, philosophically, constitutionally) to oppose those like Walpole who, while other
virtuosos lose themselves in their several eccentricities, seek to import still more eccentric
“arts” into England. As, for instance, the arts to “Teach Kings to fiddle, and make Senates
dance,” that is, o f introducing absolutism-by-proxy from France:
Perhaps more high some daring son may soar,
Proud to my list to add one Monarch more;
And nobly conscious, Princes are but things 
Bom for First Ministers, as Slaves for Kings,
Tyrant supreme! shall three Estates command,
And Make One Mighty Dunciad o f  the Land! (U. 599-604)
Note how closely W alpole's achievement complements that of the Laureate he
appointed. As Cibber has brought “the Smithfield Muses to the ear of Kings” (1,1.2)—that
is, has introduced the “Shews, Machines, and Dramatical Entertainments” of London's
great cattle market to the Court, debauching its taste as well as poetic standards in the
process—so have W alpole’s power, policies, and intrigues figuratively reduced kings to
fiddling and senates to dancing to the tune he calls. One sphere of dullness replicates itself
in another. But in this case, the translation o f esthetic dullness into its ministerial
equivalent has been abetted by an all-encompassing, all-infecting relativism that has
weakened the nation’s moral, artistic, and political principles by eroding the will to uphold
them. Pope here portrays its arch-champion as a ffeeth inking clerk, “Whose pious hope
aspires to see the day / When Moral Evidence shall quite decay” (U. 461-462). A scientific
materialist in clerical garb, he would replace faith with a reason that ignores both ethical
considerations and the evidence of the senses and refers only to its own method: “We nobly
take the high Priori Road, / And reason downward, till we doubt o f God” (11. 471-472).
The model reductivist, it is a  simple matter for him to move from mere doubt to the actual
elimination of God, and to then
Thrust some Mechanic Cause into his place;
Or bind in Matter, or diffuse in Space.
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Or, at one bound o’er-Ieaping all his laws,
Make God Man’s Image, Man the final Cause,
Find Virtue local, all Relation scorn,
See all in Self, and but for self be bom -----
Wrapt up in Self, a  God without a Thought,
Regardless o f our merit or default (11.475-80,485-6).
It is far more dangerous to make gods o f men than tyrants o f kings. God represents a
higher law; as creator o f the best of possible worlds, he is the first cause of ethical behavior
or right action. As such, he constitutes a check on human behavior ultimately, he will
punish the vicious, and reward the virtuous. Contemporary philosophy would have told
Pope that in the absence o f an operative universal moral order—the “Moral Evidence” as
revealed in Scripture and in Nature—human beings would quickly lose their humanity and
“all Relation [i.e., all social ties, all communal curbs upon individual appetite and power]
scorn.” There would be nothing to inspire and compel adherence to the necessary ideals o f
civilization: justice, order, humanity. But we should consider as well that, as Porter
reminds us, “the scheme of history as the fulfillment o f a divine plan remained powerful
through Georgian England” (Gibbon, 24). Whether viewed as cyclical or progressive,
history ultimately constituted a providential pattern that lent cosmological significance to the
affairs of individuals and nations. Nullify God in the universe and human society reverts to
moral chaos, to the ethics of circumstance and the exigencies self-interest; remove God
from the flow o f human events, and the result is the historical shapelessness, and in turn
the despair, confusion, and cynicism of existence in a world without meaning. And this is
exactly what the clerk and his ilk have done. Having separated the world and humanity
from their creator, the clerk has likewise separated both from their place in creation, that is,
from their purpose and significance in the cosmological order. He has, in short, divorced
the all-creating Word from its manifestation. In doing so, he has invalidated the heretofore
inherent justification for Britain’s sustaining values and institutions.
In the absence o f immanent moral and providential order and of literary,
educational, or governmental cultures capable of reasserting and upholding it, nothing
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remains to stand between British civilization and its utter dissolution. And so when
Dulness, having charged her minions to make one mighty Dunciad o f the land, yawns so
potently that “All Nature nods" (1.605), the entire nation must sink, rotted institution by
rotted institution, into a final torpor. Pape’s description of the event largely recapitulates the
progress of dullness throughout Book IV: “Churches and Chapels instantly it reach’d" (1.
607); “Then catch’d the Schools; the Hall scarce kept awake; / Lost was the Nation’s
Sense, nor could be found, /  W hile the long solemn Unison went round" (11. 609-612).
Even “Palinurus” (i.e., “white hall,” Le., Whitehall, i.e., Walpole) succumbs, bringing the
business o f Government to a  halt: “The Vapour mild o ’er each Committee crept; /
Unfinish’d Treaties in each Office slept; /  And Chiefless Armies doz’d out the Campaign; /
And Navies yawn’d for orders on the Main” (11.615-618).
As the effects o f the Goddess’ yawn ripple outward across the land, the poet
invokes his Muse to “Relate, who first, who last resign’d to rest; / Whose Heads she
partly, whose completely b le s t. . .  / ’Till drown’d was Sense, and Shame, and Right, and
Wrong— / 0  sing, and hush the Nations with thy Song” (11. 621-622; 625-626). But the
invocation is made in vain: that final, half-lit moment the poet had begged of Night and
Chaos at the opening of Book IV has expired, and now, as those powers are restored with
their dull daughter, and all order is quickly dissolving into elemental anarchy, the Muse
finds that her being, too, is rapidly evaporating: “Before her [Dulness], Fancy’s gilded
clouds decay, / And all its varying Rain-bows die away. / W it shoots in vain its momentary
fires, / The meteor drops, and in a flash expires” (U. 631-634). There is just time now,
before the Muse’s voice is forever silenced, to list the arts going out one by one, leaving
nothing behind them but endless night; just time now to record the end of being:
See skulking Truth to her old Cavern fled,
Mountains o f Casuistry heap’d o’er head!
Philosophy, that lean’d on Heav’n before,
Shrinks to her second cause, and is no more.
Physic of Metaphysic begs defence,
And Metaphysic calls for aid on Sense!
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See Mystery to Mathematics fly!
In vain! they gaze, turn giddy, rave, and die.
Religion blushing veils her sacred fires,
And unawares M orality expires.
Nor public Flame, nor private, dares to shine;
Nor human Spark is left, nor Glimpse divineI 
Lo! thy dread Empire, Chaos! is restor’d;
Light dies before thy uncreating word:
Thy hand, great Anarch! lets the curtain fell;
And Universal Darkness buries All (11.641-656).
5. Universal Darkness. Poetry, and Public Memory 
Universal Darkness buries All. The corresponding lines o f The Dunciad Variorum 
had read, “Thy hand great Dulness! lets the curtain fall, / And universal Darkness covers 
all” (11.355-356). The difference in rhetorical degree between “Dulness” and “Anarch” and 
between “covers” and “buries” is so great as to signal a difference in rhetorical end. That 
difference is described in part by the respective contexts of the two couplets in which these 
terms occur. In The Dunciad Variorum, for instance, the couplet is, significantly, the last 
but one, and only concludes the dream of the new King of Dunces as he snores in Dulness’ 
lap. The final couplet—“‘Enough! enough!’ the raptur’d Monarch cries, / And thro’ the 
Ivory Gate the Vision flies” (11.357-358)—therefore emphasizes that the preceding scenes 
of Dulness’ ultimate triumph have been yet but a vision, and a fa lse  vision at that, tradition 
holding that trustworthy images pass through the Gate o f Horn on their way from Hades to 
mortal imaginations, misleading ones through the Ivory Gate. By contrast, because these 
framing lines have been trimmed from the conclusion o f The New Dunciad, we know that 
its final couplet is meant to mark the actual and unequivocal restoration of Dulness. 
Moreover, her new title, “Great Anarch,” establishes her as a force no longer merely 
capable o f blunting and frustrating genius and integrity, but o f effecting their utter—and 
final—destruction. Hence her darkness now does not simply cover all, leaving open the 
possibility that these have only been occluded and might again burst to the fore; her
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darkness now buries all, suggesting crushing, suffocating obliteration—an entombment, in 
fact. And this, together with the shift in context, the Goddess* new puissance, and the 
greatly expanded account o f the extinguishing o f the arts, underscores that the rhetorical 
end of The Dunciad is no longer the ridicule o f a bothersome literary opponent but an 
epitaphic commemoration o f England and the English.
But Pope’s act o f epitaphic commemoration (both here, in its explicit climax, and as 
it recurs more or less implicitly throughout the body o f his satire) is curious in at least two 
major respects. For one thing, the extremity of its conclusion all but obliges us to second- 
guess both the poet’s motives and the validity of his satiric figure; for another, the unusual, 
even paradoxical, configuration o f temporal, spatial, mnemonic cues within the 
commemoration itself is more likely, ultimately, to muddle the reader’s perception and 
understanding o f the historical present than to offer him or her a clear and compelling 
explication of i t
I argued in the second section o f Chapter 5 that to gain and hold the attention and 
trust of his audience, to secure his credibility with it and extend his authority over it, the 
satirist must establish himself as the champion of the public’s interests, while distancing 
himself from his own. As we have seen in this section, Pope habitually insisted upon the 
balance o f his temper, the breadth o f his acquaintance, the impartiality o f his tolerance, his 
lack of material and political ambition, and his distaste for partisan feuds; if and when he 
unleashed his satiric wrath, his capacity to excite indignation and ridicule, it was, after all, 
in the personally disinterested defense o f virtue and the virtuous, in which cause, naturally, 
he could give no quarter, could leave no vice unlashed, could spare no name, no rank, no 
condition. However, Pope was so long and so minutely in the public eye, and his chronic 
infirmity, his personal and poetic tempers (the one choleric, the other fundamentally epic), 
his antipathy for the Hanoverian regime, and his sympathies for Bolingbroke and the 
Opposition so well known, that long before the fourth book o f The New Dunciad
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appeared, the reading public would have had ample reason to suspect his assessments of 
contemporary Britain to be hyperbolic and alarmist.
I argued as well in Section H that both the literal and figurative elements of the 
satirist’s controlling figure or fiction must not only be sufficiently compatible to cohere 
advantageously, but be readily and broadly intelligible in themselves. However, from what 
we know of Pope’s Britain, and what we know his contemporaries knew, Pope’s depiction 
of its everyday (or literal) realities would seem only to have undermined the figurative 
power o f his epitaphic vision. For universal darkness did not fall on eighteenth-century 
England. If anything, the reverse is true. As Linda Colley points out in Britons, life under 
the first two Georges did not, in general, give the peoples o f the British Isles reason to 
believe that their newly united kingdom, its institutions and values, were about to pass 
away into nothingness. On the contrary, Colley says, as Britons looked upon their nation 
and compared it to others on the Continent (especially France) they could not help but be 
impressed by what they saw: food in plenty; a comparatively high standard of living, 
sustained in good part by a robust internal and external trade; a high degree of physical 
mobility with (at least at the beginning of the century) encouraging prospects for social 
mobility as well; ready access to newspapers and political and social debate, as well as to 
Scripture and the spiritual life of the kingdom (30ff.). Indeed, if Britons during this period 
believed “that they were richer in every sense than other peoples, particularly Catholic 
peoples, and particularly the French” (33), the notion was largely due to the conviction— 
building rather than abating with the passing years, shared alike by the English, Scots, and 
Welsh, and by the prosperous and poor, by the Whigs and Tories among them—that 
Protestant Britain was “a chosen land” (33) enjoying God’s special care and favor (42-43). 
Such a belief so widely held would seem rather to suit with a people expecting, not national 
apocalypse, but national apotheosis. And ironically, such expectations are exactly of a kind 
with those Pope himself had encouraged in Windsor-Forest with his stirring climactic 
portrait o f an England in full possession of the destiny a doting Providence had set aside
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for her, an England singularly blessed among the w orld's nations: justly triumphant 
abroad, free, peaceful, and prosperous at home.
Colley rightly cautions that such national myths are always more comforting than 
true (33), but as the event would prove, this one at least was not wholly chimerical. For not 
only was Britain not benighted by tyranny and chaos; the strong, centralized Parliamentary 
authority under Walpole allowed for the emergence of the first true constitutional monarchy 
Britain had known. This provided Britain the requisite stability for the tremendous 
economic and territorial expansion it would enjoy during the middle and latter parts of the 
century—expansions already underway by the time o f The New Dunciad. Furthermore 
(gazing to the end of the century and beyond), this stability, the general prosperity that 
accompanied it, and the gradual expansion of civil liberties that grew out of both, would 
allow England to escape the horrors o f the French Revolution. And it was a strong, stable 
England that defeated Napoleon and set the terms for a  European peace that would last a 
full century. Given all this, it is more than easy to be skeptical of the nightmare scenario of 
a poet who affected to cast himself as the conscience and scourge of his age.
O f course, Pope could not have known how the political, social, and economic 
upheavals, struggles, and controversies of his time would resolve themselves; and it is only 
just to observe that Pope’s concern is not so much with England’s material or imperial 
well-being, as with its moral foundation, with its “soul.”29 As such, his premature 
commemoration of British civilization, its sustaining values and ideals—even when
29 England was successful in the eighteenth century, but it paid a high ethical price for that success. 
Political stability under Walpole had its dark side: cronyism, graft, factionalism, savage party in­
fighting, repressive legislation against religious and political dissenters, chronic lack of faith in 
government; so did economic expansion: enclosure, the ills attendant on (early) industrialization, a 
money ethic replacing noblesse oblige and the bonds of familial and communal unity. And what of the 
arts? Perhaps Plumb overstates the case when he says of Georgian England, “[I In ail the arts, save 
perhaps for the poetry of the romantic revival, it was definitely inferior. Here and there—Gibbon and 
perhaps Hume—there is a writer of European stature, but the general level of achievement in 
philosophy, history, and literature is mediocre. Painting and music tell the same story" (35). But it 
might be observed that by the end of the century poetry ceased to matter very much in England. That 
is, it largely ceased to participate in and therefore be relevant to government, economics, and religion.
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delivered as graphically, as emphatically as at the conclusion of The New Dunciad—is 
arguably not only descriptively accurate, but rhetorically necessary if  the poet is to rouse 
his country and countrymen from their complacency. And as we have seen, premature 
commemoration has certain inherent advantages. It gives the satirist a  redoubtable vantage 
point as an assessor o f persons and society; it allows him thereby to make definitive 
distinctions between vicious and virtuous thought and action, and between the vicious and 
virtuous themselves; and it affords the moralist the strongest possible expression o f 
righteous disgust with the times, for in adopting the epitaphic figure he shows his 
willingness to see the good, the worthy—the world itself—destroyed rather than leave 
them at the mercy of the corrupt who stand ready to overwhelm them.
But for the satirist to bury a  body while it is still discemibly vital, however sluggish 
its reflexes, feeble its pulse, or shallow its breath, is to infect his own operative figure or 
fiction with any number o f potentially mortal flaws. Most obviously, as we have just seen, 
there will be significant discrepancies between the moribundity the poet portrays and the 
vibrancy readers are likely to see should they undertake their own critical survey o f the 
society about them. Second, the satirist risks succeeding all too well in filling readers with 
his own despair, if all that is good and worthy has passed away, and—as in Book IV of 
The Dunciad—with them the nation and even Creation itself, how can moral tuition matter 
any longer? Such instruction must, after all, assume that its lessons can be learned and that 
once learned these can in future be applied practicably and effectively. If it assumes instead 
that those whom it would teach are incapable o f profiting by its efforts, or are simply 
unworthy o f them, and further, that the principles and ideals it would instill are wholly 
untenable in the world, how relevant can such instruction be? One can and probably should 
observe that one function of epitaphs is to advise the living and remind them of their own 
ultimate mortality. As a grand epitaph to an age, The Dunciad, for one, is self-evidently a 
record o f the poet’s role in the cultural struggle within his nation, among his people, 
immortalized in his verse. But it is likewise a warning to other times and other places,
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giving us vivid, instantly recognizable, instantly understood images o f Dulness, her 
minions, her many manifestations, and the consequences for civilization if  these are 
allowed to thrive and spread unexposed and unchecked. But when the writer o f epitaphs 
assumes that his end and that o f time itself are one and the same, whom can he expect to 
heed his warning? This points up a third weakness in the epitaphic figure: even if Pope's 
readers wished to act upon what he shows them, they cannot, for the figure deprives them 
(at least rhetorically) of the time and space in which they might do so. W hether done 
implicitly (as throughout the satires) or explicitly (as here in the fourth book of The 
Dunciad), to cast the present moment as the last is to bring time to an effective stop, much 
as the premature commemoration of an individual effectively abstracts him from the living 
world and in so doing suspends his being, renders him incapable o f moving and acting 
among the living to any purpose. And much as the lens of figurative moribundity forces us 
to regard his living being with precocious retrospection, so does the suspension o f time’s 
course induce us to view the present as if  it were already the past—an ever-beckoning 
stage, well lit and gaudily appointed, yet ever-receding, forever unapproachable, a mirage 
incapable of bearing the living weight of our desire and disgust, our ideals and indignation, 
our hope and anxiety.
This brings us (if we have not arrived already) to the second peculiarity o f Pope’s 
act o f premature commemoration, the unusual configuration o f temporal, spatial, and, 
when these are taken together, the mnemonic cues within the epitaphic figure itself. These 
cues might be identified and examined in nearly all of the poems I have discussed in this 
section, particularly in those passages—such as that describing the triumph o f Corruption 
in the “Epistle to Bathurst” (11.135-152), and of Vice in the first Epilogue to the Satires (11. 
141-170; see above, p. 55)—that seem to prefigure closely the curtain fall o f Universal 
Darkness. But not surprisingly, it is this curtain fall, this final, most explicit epitaphic 
statement that displays these cues most prominently. And to throw their problematic nature 
into greatest relief it will be helpful to compare Pope’s treatment of them here, in a poem
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designed to memorialize the end o f British civilization, with his treatment o f similar cues in 
Windsor-Forest, composed, as noted, to give shape to the coming national apotheosis.
We might begin by observing that both poems commemorate restorations. 
W indsor-Forest, as we have seen, commemorates (or would have us believe it 
commemorates) a  threefold restoration—of the Stuarts, o f internal peace and prosperity, 
and o f England herself to her rightful place among the world’s nations. The Dunciad, for 
all its promise o f apocalypse, is no less a  restoration piece. Certainly in both its earlier and 
later versions its coronational elements are prominent enough: the new King of the Dunces, 
whether Theobald or Cibber, is anointed by Dulness, games are held in the new king’s 
honor, and visions o f the glories o f his reign are disclosed to him. But the accession of the 
dunces’ new king entails the restoration of Dulness herself—and with her, “the Restoration 
of Night and Chaos” (“Argument” to Book IV, 765). That is, all things are returned to the 
formless void, the dimensionless depths from which time, space, and creation were called 
forth. As once for Pope Great Anna’s commandment, “Let Discord cease!” (Windsor- 
Forest, 1.327) brought order, peace, and meaning to the world, so now the Great Anarch’s 
“un-creating word” (1.654) reduces all to universal darkness—to nothingness. Given this, 
the restoration conceit can only be paradoxical.
This central paradox spins off others. Recall that in Windsor-Forest the trappings of 
an earlier restoration—its circumstances, personages, episodes, and consequences—are 
reclaimed in order to frame readers’ perception of the historical present and to give shape to 
their anticipation of Britain’s future glories. But even as these trappings give Pope’s 
readers the wherewithal to discern the distinctive features o f their own age (its 
“topography”), they also serve as so many cues in the formation of a more general temporal 
perspective, orienting readers in their own present moment Knowing what has been, they 
know, in consequence, what must be now, and what in consequence o f th a t must be in 
future. Or, if this is to claim too much, as they read, they are secure in a present moment 
vivid before the mind’s eye, and assured of an equally vivid future moment even if its
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anticipated features finally prove unrealizable. No such temporal orientation is possible for 
the reader of The New Dunciad, however. By the time the panegyrical impulse behind his 
paean to Great Anna has given way in Pope to the disillusionment and bitterness arming his 
depiction of the Great Anarch's triumph, both Pope’s satiric persona, the demands of his 
new poetic mode, and the satiric figure he felt obliged to adopt dictate that he now employ 
his temporal cues so as to reverse die temporal perspective fostered by his poem. In Section 
II, I suggested that the Juvenalian satirist had to write as if he were both within and beyond 
real cultural time. His moral precepts bad to be as universally timeless as their illustrations 
had to be recognizably topical. Moreover, I suggested that given die difficulty of achieving 
such “universal topicality,” the satirist in any one work would be tempted to incline toward 
one end of the literal-figurative scale at the expense of the other. As we have seen, Pope 
here (and under the aegis o f the epitaphic figure generally) does not simply incline toward 
the figurative end of the scale, he passes beyond it, insinuating the present moment into the 
past and precluding altogether the possibility of a future. Not only is there no “now” for the 
reader to “occupy,” there is no “then” for him or her to anticipate. This effects an 
unnecessary estrangement between the literal and figurative worlds. The reflective reader is 
denied the familiar typological convention o f past events prefiguring those o f the present 
(and these, in turn, others still to come), but also denied reference to the most elementary of 
temporal patterns—yesterday, today, tomorrow. Hence the temporal paradox of The New 
Dunciad: the fictional and real worlds the poet would have us occupy can exist 
simultaneously only in a moment outside o f time. Put another way, the lack of temporal 
cues linking the poet's figurative world to the everyday world of the reader forces us at any 
given point to identify with one world only, and to view the other as mere tapestry. This 
effectively abstracts the poem itself from real time, and therefore from the real world it 
would address and influence.
The spatial cues of The New Dunciad lead to a similar paradox: within and beyond 
the poem, the spaces the reader must occupy exist nowhere. In W indsor-Forest, our gaze
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seems to pass with the poet’s over the various scenes and locales he describes. The effect 
derives in part from Pope’s detailed rendering o f the landscapes, events, and personages 
before his poetic eye, though in fact his manner o f describing them is often highly idealized 
or stylized according to classical literary precedent. Nonetheless, we are “there” in Windsor 
Forest as the poem unfolds before us on the page; we even seem to see vividly, though 
they are images o f the future related to us third hand, the thrilling tableaux o f an Augusta 
triumphant. If the poet enables us to see so clearly, it is due mainly to the fact that his 
figurative overlays complement and enrich their originals, investing them with an historical 
or mythological significance that allows one actually passing through Windsor to “read” in 
its physical features, landmarks, and monuments much that does not appear directly to the 
eye.30
The situation is just the reverse in The New Dunciad, and particularly in Book IV. 
Despite the many specific topographical references in the poem—to Smithfield, Bedlam, 
Grub Street, Fleet Ditch, Whitehall, the Universities, the law courts, the several boroughs 
of London—it is difficult to put and maintain oneself in these locales for any appreciable 
time, for, generally speaking, they are used only allusively, to give us a rough notion of 
Dulness’ progress. Throughout much of the poem we seem rather to be standing to one 
side of Dulness’ throne, sitting at her feet among her minions, or reposing in her lap with 
the Dunces’ new King. Though Pope is careful to locate the Goddess’ “sacred Dome” (i, I. 
265), her “Cave of Poverty and Poetry” (i, 1. 34), close-by the gates of Bedlam (i, U. 29- 
44), the site itself is “conceal’d from vulgar eye” (i, 1. 33). This is fitting, for the setting 
neither occupies nor reflects any real place in the literal world. Imaginary places can exist 
very credibly in the imagination. But here again, the problem is that Pope would have us
30 Pope’s extended account of the forest under the Conqueror, for instance, evokes a distant period in 
Eng lish  history, affording profitable before-and-after glimpses of the places we thought we knew; 
likewise, the myth of the nymph Lodona, though sheer Ovidian pastiche, awakens us to pleasures of 
seeing the unexpected in the familiar, charging the humble River Loddon with the romance and mystery 
attaching to classical lore.
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see the literal through the lens o f the figurative. In the previous section I suggested that by 
encouraging us to recall the literal through the figurative, satire imposes upon us a certain 
brief suspension o f our belief in what lies observable before us, and hence a certain 
dissociation o f sensibility, a  certain displacement o f Self from the social panorama. 
However, in this case the figurative is so far removed from the literal that once we have 
turned from Dulness' lair to the world beyond our window, we are likely to find that 
though our idea o f her is complete to repletion, our literal surroundings remain uninflected 
by her figurative presence. Again, at any given moment we must choose between the 
spectacle we know for ourselves and that the poet fashions for our imaginations. And the 
difficulty is only compounded once we come to the end of the poem, and stop to consider 
where we “are,” as readers, while we witness, with the poet, the dissolution o f English 
civilization. I am not asking if we are reading the poem in a chair, or on the bus, or in a 
meadow, but rather, where we stand in direct relation to the apocalypse before us. The 
answer, I think, is that when Pope’s epitaphic figure at last swells to consume all creation, 
being, and time, we must a t that moment stand with the poet outside o f any imaginable 
place, just as that moment itself must exist outside of time. At that moment, die extremity of 
this the epitaphic figure’s fullest expression points up that this particular satiric fiction, 
being absolutely opposed to the everyday world, cannot satisfactorily reconstitute that 
world—anymore than it can reconstitute our perception of and our relation to it, for to 
accept the fiction the reader has to allow himself to be abstracted from his own historical 
present
These temporal and spatial vagaries of Pope’s satiric fiction all but ensure that his 
literal and figurative materials will not be in synch. Because they are not, Pope cannot, for 
all his topical references, imbue his peculiar poetic figure with the urgency o f the 
immediate, with the energy and pulse of the living, everyday world. As we observed in 
Section II, the satirist who tends overmuch toward the figurative risks making the features 
of the historical present mere props for his framing conceit, effectively freezing cultural
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time within the fiction he has created for its explication and, ultimately, its betterment And 
by now it should be clear that Pope's epitaphic vision forces him toward just such a 
figurative extreme. Accordingly, when the lessons of that vision are brought to bear upon 
the everyday world, for all their timeless pith, for all the brilliance o f their illustration, they 
cannot be more than vaguely relevant for they grow out o f a set o f circumstances that 
simply do not exist England is not dead. Hence we come to the mnemonic paradox. We 
have observed that the satirist as he overlays the literal with the figurative, forces us in 
effect to misremember, that is, to remember not the thing in itself, but as the satirist had 
transfigured it through the use o f context content cast or continuity. Ideally, the elements 
o f one mode will lead us to those o f the other. This does happen in many discrete 
instances, as in the caricatures o f Cibber and Hervey, the one drawn as the King of 
Dunces, the embodiment o f poetic ineptitude (and an oblique stand-in for George II 
himself), the other made an emblem of Court corruption and intrigue; or as in Pope’s use of 
epic machinery to depict the migration o f depravity in taste from Smithfield to the formerly 
knowledgeable world o f the theatre and the formerly sophisticated world of the Court. 
Pope’s greater figurative overlay, however, would have us remember at cross purposes: 
not simply misremember, but to give cultural authority to the memory o f something that 
quite obviously never happened and could never happen. When, therefore, we come to the 
end of The Dunciad and encounter that final, chilling couplet—“Thy hand, great Anarch! 
lets the Curtain fall; /  And Universal Darkness buries All”—we may find ourselves 
overcome by the grand melancholy, by the sheer horror of the lines, but we must also 
acknowledge that our reaction takes place in a wholly figurative sphere that can only 
parallel, never impinge upon the sphere of our workaday lives.
Obviously, a single poetic figure, however elaborate, however well executed, 
however powerful in its effects, cannot in itself be held responsible for bringing about the 
estrangement of the two mnemonic modes, or for the consequent diversion of the 
mainstream o f poetry from the mainstream of public memory. However, we can discern in
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the epitaphic figure an emblem of the increasingly figurative course poetry had begun to 
take, and undoubtedly its progress was accelerated by the example and stature of Alexander 
Pope, said by Johnson in his Life to have brought English versification to its nearest 
perfection, and reported by Weinbrot to have been the touchstone for formal verse through 
the end of the eighteenth century, well into the age o f Wordsworth. Neither the new current 
of poetry’s mainstream nor Pope’s role in determining it seems to have been incidental. If 
we look back over The New Dunciad, for instance, we might see that if  England’s 
sustaining institutions and ideals have shared poetry’s ostensible fate, it is largely because 
for Pope their failure has been the failure of poetry, for the demise of poetic standards has 
prefigured, then facilitated the complete and final failure o f language itself to maintain 
within itself the essential cognitive and cultural bonds between the literal and the figurative, 
the material and the moral, the immediate and the age-old. Verbal chaos prefigures all other 
disorder. As Book IV progresses, Pope’s depiction o f the dullness that has fatally 
contaminated Britain’s learning, government, and spiritual life reveals it to be, ultimately, 
the very same underlying dullness in the arts, particularly poetry: the steady divergence of 
words from their traditional collective connotations, whether aesthetic, ethical, or sacred. 
Thus isolated, the meaning o f words, and that which words suggest beyond their 
connotative significance, become subject to individual whim, to circumstance, to 
expediency; language becomes formless. A good deal of this linguistic divergence, Brean 
Hammond notes in his essay, “Scriblerian Self-Fashioning,” was the result of the “new 
scientific methodology” being indiscriminately applied to all learning, even the humanities 
(110-111). Such an application, he asserts, tended to rob the arts of their spiritual and 
ethical properties by reducing all learning to a mechanical study of words. This had the 
effect of reducing words to objects, thereby stripping them o f their ability to convey 
meanings beyond the merely material. Love, honor, integrity—these would have no 
connotative power to the linguistic materialist And the more objectified words became, the 
further they were isolated from their meanings. The Scriblerians saw writers as “custodians
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of verbal culture entrusted with the task of restoring an organic harmony between body and 
soul, the material and the immaterial” (111)—and, one might add, between words and their 
meanings. They set themselves the task, Hammond observes, of “replacing] in the world 
the spirituality that mechanistic natural philosophy and the professionalization o f writing 
had taken away” (113).
Unfortunately for formal verse’s role in the shaping o f public memory, Pope’s 
response to the materialist challenges o f his day would over time leave poetry in much the 
same condition as the poet had found himself on that cold dark night of January 1743, 
when he wrote to his friends the Orrerys, “I have seen and heard, what mates me shut my 
Eyes & Ears, and retire inward into my own Heart; where I find Something to comfort me, 
in knowing it is possible some men may have some Principles. I wish I had been no where 
but in my Garden; but my weak frame will not endure it; or no where but in my Study; but 
my weak Eyes cannot read all the Evening” (437). It is in large part this inward turn, from 
the folly and viciousness of the world toward the inner recesses o f the poet’s own heart and 
imagination, that had effected what Pope so bitterly complains o f here, that lash the age as 
he will, “no body has Shame enough left to be afraid o f Reproach, or punish’d by i t ” As 
the event proved, Pope’s example ensured that others, Wordsworth prominent among 
them, could and would seize upon the cult o f poetic personality and strike an heroic public 
pose. But from now on that pose would be in defiance of, not on behalf of the public—for 
Pope’s example also ensured that the materials and predominant mode o f the poetry 
appearing before the public would put poet and reader essentially at odds, their interests 
and ends now being so different “(The poet] must write as the interpreter o f nature, and 
the legislator o f mankind, and consider himself as presiding over the thoughts and manners 
o f future generations; as a being superiour to time and place”—Dr. Johnson could write 
these words with complacence in 1759; they had become a desperate declaration by the time 
Shelley appropriated them, in 1821.
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CONCLUSION
I. By Way o f Denouement: Pope and Posterity 
Nearly half a century has passed since James Sutherland reminded us that it is 
foolish indeed to speak of eighteenth century poetry and Alexander Pope as if the two were 
equivalent terms. To do so may, Sutherland says, “be an unintentional tribute to Pope's 
contemporary importance; yet there is surely something wrong with a definition that leaves 
out most of the other notable poets o f the age—Thomson, Gray, Collins, Goldsmith, 
Cowper, Crabbe—on the grounds that they were in revolt from its poetical standards, and 
groping their way with varying success towards the dawn of romanticism’’ (Preface to 
Eighteenth Century Poetry, 158-159). And no doubt we would today add the names of 
other poets to Sutherland's list o f notables: Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, perhaps, or 
Edward Young, or John Byrom, or Mary Leapor. But while acknowledging the justness of 
Sutherland’s admonishment, we should not let the great variety o f eighteenth-century 
poetry, or our delight at discovering “new” poets of the period or at reclaiming its half­
forgotten names, lead us to overlook the fact that during bis lifetime Pope so impressed his 
poetical persona and principles upon Britain’s cultural consciousness that his identification 
with the mainstream o f contemporary poetry was automatic and absolute.1 If anything, this
1 Pope’s careful fashioning of a poetic mainstream to be inherited from Dry den, together with his 
specification of the terms upon which he sought to be acknowledged Dry den’s successor, were traced in 
the first section of the last chapter. There I observed that such acknowledgement was broadly 
forthcoming with the appearance of Pope’s translation of The Iliad: thus in his “Winter” (1726), for 
instance, James Thomson portrays Pope as the perpetual occupant of “the Muses’ hill” (1. 550), his 
place there reserved for him by the sweetness of his Homer (1.553) and the “more endearing song” (1. 
554) of his own life; George Lyttelton’s “An Epistle to Mr. Pope, From a Young Gentleman at Rome” 
(1730) terms him an “Immortal Bard” (1.1) bom “our drooping Genius to restore, / When ADDISON and 
CONGREVE are no more," “the darken’d Age’s last remaining Light!" (11. 3-4,6), and, like Thomson’s 
apostrophe, would style Pope the English heir of the great classical poets; and though the anonymous 
author of “An Epistle to the Little Satyrist of Twickenham” (1733), argues that Pope has wasted his 
“Gift of Numbers” in the writing of satire, he acknowledges nonetheless that that gift “still encreas’d
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identification intensified in the decades following his death, perhaps because his death
forced Pope’s biographers, critics, and readers generally to set forth the distinctive features
of his character and career, the defining merits and deficiencies o f his work, and his place
in the popular imagination in order to assign him a “final” resting place in the field of
English literary history.
Certainly his admirers were not backward in proclaiming him the latest of
England’s poetic greats, a ranking they usually justified by citing the one criterion that
would have pleased Pope best, his “perfection” o f English versification. “An Elegy on Mr.
Pope,” for example, written by an anonymous “friend” and appearing only days after
Pope’s death on May 30,1744, terms him “the brightest ornament o f Albion” (1. 9), “Of
the poetick World th’ illustrious Sun” (1-10), “the first distinguish'd Genius” (1.15):
Not George returning to his native sky,
From these sad Scenes shall with more Glory fly,
Than Pope who in his loftier Sphere did sit 
Sov’reign o f POETRY, and Prince o f WIT,
Whose Fame wide Earth’s remotest Corners heard,
And own’d and lov’d th’ inimitable Bard (11.25-30).
The elegist goes on to say that “soon as [Pope’s] Lyre was tun’d and touch’d the Ear”
Dryden’s followers knew their man to have been bested, “For not by Dryden’s voice, not
W aller’s tongue, / Such Harmony of melting Sounds was sung” 01- 57, 59-60); and
Dryden is only the first of his conquests: Prior, Garth, Swift, and Congreve, “at his
stronger Blaze, / Shrunk in their Spheres, and shone with fainter Rays” (11.63-64). Such
epithets and pronouncements may strike us as hyperbolic, overwrought, yet even Dr.
Johnson, arguably the most sober critic o f the age, credited Pope with having discovered in
with Age and as you grew, / 'Till to Perfection you at last arriv’d, / Which none have e’er excelled that 
ever liv’d" (273). In section three of the last chapter I noted that by the time of his death Pope had 
become for his contemporaries the living muse of English satire; indeed, so generally pervasive was 
Pope’s example in this mode that even his literary foes often felt themselves obliged to attempt (though 
in the event with mixed success) to pay him back in his own coin, as in Lady Mary’s Verses Address'd 
to the Imitator o f the First Satire o f  the Second Book o f Horace (1733) and Lewd Hervey’s The Difference 
Between Verbal and Practical Virtue (1742).
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the works o f Dry den “the most perfect fabric o f English verse” (ii, 229) and bringing this 
fabric to its nearest possible perfection: “New sentiments and new images others may 
produce; but to attempt any further improvement o f versification will be dangerous. Art and 
diligence have now done their best, and what shall be added will be the effort o f tedious toil 
and needless curiosity” (ii, 230). Even critics essentially hostile to him had to confess that 
Pope had taught England to tune its poetic ear according to the sounds and rhythms of his 
verse, that Pope was poetry in the public mind. Joseph Warton, for instance, who could 
not bring himself to admit Pope to the ranks of Spenser, Shakespeare, and Milton—the 
“more genuine” poets, whose works excited sublimity and pathos—yet conceded that Pope 
had introduced “that harmony in English verse, which is now2 become indispensably 
necessary; and which has so forcibly and universally influenced the publick ear, as to have 
rendered every moderate rhymer melodious” (386). The same year the second volume of 
Warton’s Essay appeared (1782), one more openly antipathetic toward Pope, William 
Cowper, wrote to his friend the Reverend W illiam Unwin that Pope’s renowned 
correctness was but “the unwearied application of a  plodding Flemish painter, who draws a 
shrimp with the most minute exactness.. . .  Never, I believe, were such talents and such 
drudgery united” (474-475). But for Cowper the real problem with Pope was the 
pernicious ubiquity o f his example. True enough, he concedes in Table Talk (1782), that 
Pope’s harmony, his “well disciplined, complete, compact” (1.647) verse “Levied a tax of 
wonder and applause, / E’en on the fools that trampled on [Virtue and Morality’s] laws” (11. 
650-651). But the very polish of his lines tended to conflate pains with genius in the 
popular mind, reducing poetry in theory and practice to “a mere mechanic art,” the more so 
since the exactness o f his harmonies merely ensured that “every warbler ha[d] his tune by 
heart” (11.654-655).
2 That is, 1756; the quotation is from the first volume of Warton’s An Essay on the Writings and 
Genius o f Pope.
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Far from calling Pope’s stature in the cultural imagination into question, such 
unflattering appraisals o f his career tend rather to confirm i t  Indeed, there may be no surer 
evidence of Pope’s identification with the mainstream o f English verse than that in the 
decades after his death Pope was the main target o f the reaction against the supposed 
didacticism, prosaism, imitation, pedantry, and stylistic artificiality that critics and poets 
had begun to cite as evidence o f contemporary poetic decadence and as justification for their 
several programmes of poetic reform. Warton, for instance, termed Pope “the great Poet of 
Reason, the First o f Ethical authors in verse" (ii, 521) and cast his works as the perfect foil 
for his own ideas about the characteristics o f a “genuine" poetry produced by “a creative 
and glowing IMAGINATION" (i, 380), among them the power to elicit “strong emotions” 
(pathos and rapture) in the reader (ii, 520), and its inability to be reduced to prose. “If there 
be really in [a verse composition] a true poetical spirit," Warton argues, “all your 
inversions and transpositions will not disguise and extinguish it; but it will retain its lustre, 
like a diamond, unset, and thrown back into the rubbish of the mine” (i, 381). Pope, 
Warton admits, is “our last great poet,” an “English classic” (i, 383); and yet, he says, the 
nation’s esteem for his elegance and wit, for his insight into human nature, for the moral 
force of his satire, has left it in need o f a reminder that for all its brilliance, his poetry 
(much o f it) is not true poetry at all, but prose tricked up into verse (i, 381). As if he would 
reawaken a poetic sensibility too long bewitched by the beauty of Pope’s versification, 
Warton declares with some impatience that “a clear head, and acute understanding are not 
sufficient, alone, to make a POET; . . .  the most solid observations on human life, 
expressed with the utmost elegance and brevity, are MORALITY, and not POETRY” (i, 380). 
As if he would startle readers into seeing a truth self-evident to all but the enchanted, he 
insists warmly that poetry, to be genuine, must partake o f the sublime and the pathetic: 
“What,” he demands, “is there very sublime or very Pathetic in Pope?” (i, 381).
Pope is likewise the obvious, if  for the most part unnamed, target o f Edward 
Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition (1759). He is for Young the archetypical
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poetic imitator who “but nobly builds on another's foundation" (330B), emblematic of 
those whose poetry is too greatly infused with a learning that is “fond, and proud, of what 
has cost it much pains; it is a great lover o f rules, and boaster o f famed examples" (332B). 
Yet if  imitation and pedantry prevent Pope's own poetry from being o f the highest order— 
that is, original: “ris[ing] spontaneously from the vital root o f genius; it grows, it is not 
made” (330B)—a career spent, as Pope’s purportedly was, in keeping before the public 
eye the “illustrious examples” of past masters has had the more generally deleterious effect 
of diffusing the spirit of imitation throughout the realm o f letters, instilling in the nation's 
poets especially an enervating diffidence, stifling original observation, thought, and 
expression. Worse, this imitative impulse has prevented the innovation necessary for the 
advancement o f letters, “hence, while arts mechanic are in perpetual progress, and increase, 
the liberal are in retrogradation and decay”; has extinguished the uniqueness innate in each 
of us, “blots out nature’s mark of separation, cancels her kind intention, destroys all mental 
individuality”; and therefore “with great incongruity it [has made] us poor, and proud: 
makes us think little, and write much” (334). That Pope yet stands high in public estimation 
merely reveals how thoroughly the example of the man who could reduce Homer’s “lofty 
and harmonious” numbers into the “childish shackles, and tinkling sounds" o f heroic 
couplets and convince the nation that to copy Homer is to copy Nature itself has debased 
right thinking about poetry. If the truth be told, Pope is one of those “grandees . . .  who 
owe more of their elevation to the littleness of others’ minds, than to the greatness of their 
own” (336B)—and is the more culpable because he himself is largely responsible for that 
littleness. Not only has he unleashed “that gothic demon”—rhyme—“which modem poetry 
tasting, became mortal" (336B), he has grossly imposed upon the age, letting himself pass 
for a “famed example” of the present day, basking in the esteem, obedience, and deferential 
imitation normally accruing only to the greatest o f Ancients. Bad in itself, the offense is 
compounded by Pope’s scorn for M ilton’s genius, by his refusal to follow up on the 
glories of Paradise Lost—his choice, in effect, to remain a second rate example to the
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nation. “Great things he [Pope, “our favorite”] has done,” Young sighs, “but he might 
have done greater” (336B).
We might continue patterning ourselves after one whose heel went “undipped in 
Helicon” (337A), as Achilles’ in Styx; or we might—every one o f us, Young insists— 
choose rather to assert our own original geniuses. But we must first come to know 
ourselves truly: “Dive deep into thy bosom; learn the depth, extent, bias, and full forte of 
thy mind,” he enjoins us, “contract full intimacy with the stranger within thee; excite and 
cherish every spark o f intellectual light and heat, however smothered under former 
negligence, or scattered through the dull, dark mass of common thoughts; and collecting 
them into a  body, let thy genius rise . . .  as the sun from chaos”; and we must leam to 
reverence ourselves: “[L]et not great examples, or authorities, browbeat thy reason into too 
great a diffidence of thyself: thyself so reverence, as to prefer the native growth o f thy own 
mind to the richest import from abroad” (336A). Only then will we be able to call our 
productions truly our own; only then will we deserve the title o f “author.”
These imperatives, self-knowledge and self-reverence, together with Young’s 
admonition to contemporary writers to find and drink for themselves from “the true 
Helicon, that is, the breast of nature” (33IB), are almost identical to those William 
Wordsworth would wield in his attempts to displace Pope from his position o f cultural 
authority and remake English poetry in his own image. That literary history has seen 
Wordsworth as Pope’s most notable theoretical antagonist is no doubt bound up with the 
fact that Wordsworth’s generation is the very last for whom Pope’s legacy represents the 
mainstream o f poetic sensibility3—the last, because it was Wordsworth who finally
3 Coleridge (1772-1834), for instance, writes in Chapter 1 of Biographia Literaria (1817) that “Among 
those with whom I conversed [in youth about poetry], there were, of course, very many who had formed 
their taste, and their notions of poetry, from the writings of Mr. Pope and his followers: or to speak 
more generally, in that school of French poetry, condensed and invigorated by English understanding, 
which had predominated from the last century” (18). For Byron (1788-1824), by contrast, Wordsworth 
represented the poetic norm to be served—or subverted: Reeves notes that Byron, attributing “the present 
deplorable state of English poetry . . .  to that absurd and systematic depreciation of Pope, in which, for 
the last few years, there has been a kind of epidemical concurrence” (qtd. in Reeves, 16), was only too
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succeeded in diverting that mainstream into a new channel, leaving Pope’s poetic sensibility 
to eddy everlastingly in the backwaters of literary history. For though after Wordsworth 
Pope is neither forgotten nor neglected, after Wordsworth it is simply no longer possible to 
take him as the defining emblem o f English poetry. William Lisle Bowles might in his 1806 
edition o f Pope’s Works sketch an unflattering biographical portrait o f the poet, painting 
him as one made despotically temperamental, “impatient of contradiction, scarcely 
brook[ing] a dissenting voice” by overindulgence in childhood and the unremitting 
“sunshine o f flattery” in his maturity (qtd. in Reeves, 14); Byron, in response to Bowles 
and in despite of “those miserable mountebanks o f the day, the poets,” might champion 
Pope as “the most faultless of poets, and almost of men.” 4 Hazlitt might describe him (and 
Dry den) as “the great masters o f the artificial style of poetry in our language,” with “a clear 
and independent claim upon our gratitude, as having produced a kind and degree o f 
excellence which existed equally nowhere else”5, whereas Macaulay, in his essay, “The 
Life and Writings o f Addison” (1843), might viciously describe Pope as the master 
rhymester in an age in which “[one] who had any skill in it passed for a great poet, just as 
in the dark ages a person who could write his name passed for a great clerk” (334),6 and De 
Quincey, in “The Literature o f Knowledge and the Literature of Power” (1848), might
glad to turn Coleridge’s cutting assessment of Pope—“next to the man who formed and elevated the taste 
of the public, he that corrupted it, is commonly the greatest genius” (Biographia Literaria, I, 40n)— 
against Wordsworth himself in, for instance, English Bards and Scotch Reviewers. Byron, of course, 
would himself come to be the poetic hero and touchstone for the generation (Tennyson’s) succeeding his 
own.
4 Letter written from Ravenna to John Murray, September 4,1820 (266).
5 Lectures on the English Poets (1818-19): Lecture IV, “On Dryden and Pope" (68).
6 Citing the “mechanical” nature of the heroic couplet, Macaulay observes with a scorn unsurpassed in 
these later assessments of Pope’s art and life that “From the time when his Pastorals appeared, heroic 
versification became a matter of rule and compass; and, before long, all artists were on a level. . . . 
Hundreds of dunces who never blundered upon one happy thought or expression were able to write reams 
of couplets which, as far as euphony was concerned, could not be distinguished from those of Pope 
himself.” Thankfully, says Macaulay, “we are now as little disposed to admire a man for being able to 
write [heroic couplets], as for being able to write his name” (333-334).
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argue that the example o f Pope’s polished obscurity is ultimately responsible for a 
century’s worth of bad poetry: “[R]are is the man amongst classical writers in any language 
who has disfigured his meaning more remarkably than Pope by imperfect expression’’ (qtd. 
in Reeves, 25). But whether their pronouncements upon Pope are ultimately favorable or 
damning, it is clear that for each o f these writers—even for Byron—Pope has become 
merely representative of a poetic mode once fashionable but now no more than a curiosity, 
an artifact from a distant age to be preserved, studied, and anatomized, not for the purpose 
either o f perpetuating or expunging it, but o f assessing, in Hazlitt’s phrase, “an entirely 
distinct turn of mind” (68; emphasis added).
However, at the time the young Wordsworth was producing translations and 
imitations o f classical authors and turning out descriptive sketches of the Loire Valley in 
competent heroic couplets, that turn of mind had yet to become entirely distinct Its poetic 
values and their primary human emblem were in fact sufficiently current to serve 
Wordsworth in his Preface to the second edition o f Lyrical Ballads (1800) and the later 
Essay Supplementary to the Preface (1815) as ready, widely recognized ssthetic standards 
against which he could set his own proposals for the reformation of English poetry. 
Repeatedly in these theoretical pieces, Wordsworth acknowledges (or complains) that the 
“[new] class o f Poetry . .  . well adapted to interest mankind permanently” (320B) his 
friends have credited him with devising, faces its major opposition from long-standing 
expectations about the sound, subjects, and aims of poetry. “It is supposed,” he says in the 
Preface, “that by the act of writing in verse an Author makes a formal engagement that he 
will gratify certain known habits o f association; that he not only thus apprises the Reader 
that certain classes o f ideas and expressions will be found in his book, but that others will 
be carefully excluded” (320). Metrical language is one of the elements contributing to those 
“blind associations of pleasure which has been previously received from works o f rhyme 
and metre” (329A); allegory or the “personification of abstract ideas” is another, used so 
extensively as to have become a mere “mechanical device of style, or as a family language
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which Writers in metre seem to lay claim to by prescription’’ (323A). But it is another 
branch of this “family language” o f poets, “the grandiose and inane phraseology o f many 
modem writers" (321 A), their “arbitrary and capricious habits o f expression” (321B)— that 
is, poetic diction—that has had the most sinister consequences for poetry and poetic 
sensibilities. For though, Wordsworth explains in the “Appendix” to the 1802 edition of 
Lyrical Ballads, such constructions have their origin in the first age o f  poetry, when poets 
“wrote naturally, and as men” (331 A), later writers, “desirous of producing the same effect 
without being animated by the same passion, set themselves to a mechanical adoption of 
these figures of speech, and made use o f them, sometimes with propriety, but much more 
frequently applied them to feelings and thoughts with which they had no natural connection 
whatsoever”; worse, they “introduced phrases composed apparently in the spirit o f the 
original figurative language o f passion, yet altogether o f their own invention, and 
characterized by various degrees o f wanton deviation of good sense and Nature” (331B). It 
is this “adulterated phraseology” (33IB), couched in verse, that has come to symbolize 
poetry in the popular mind, that has “[thrust] out of sight the plain humanities o f Nature by 
a motley masquerade of tricks, quaintnesses, hieroglyphics, and enigmas” (332A), that has 
beguiled poets from a faithful observation of the natural and human worlds into the toils of 
a decadent artifice “in order to furnish food for fickle tastes, and fickle appetites o f their 
own creation” (Preface, 32IB).
Given the inability o f these “perverted” appetites to distinguish between “the true 
and the false” in the language o f poetry (“Appendix,” 33IB), it is unlikely, Wordsworth 
argues preemptively in the Essay Supplementary, that readers his age and older will “be 
moved by the unostentatious beauties o f a pure style" (336B)—that is, by the qualities he 
believes specific to his poetry: “Is it not, then, inevitable that an eye, accustomed to the 
glaring hues of diction by which Readers are caught and excited, will for the most part be 
rather repelled than attracted by an original Work, the colouring o f which is disposed 
according to a pure and refined scheme of harmony?” (336B-337A). Not that his would be
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the first worthy poetry to lose out to vulgarities in verse. English literary history would 
have been very different, for instance, if readers had had the sense to prefer Thomson over 
Pope. For all his faults, Thomson at least had the temerity to anticipate Wordsworth by 
examining the natural world about him and recording his responses to it. But though 
Thomson's poetry pleased many, it remained an anomaly because it could not overturn the 
narrow, prejudicial expectations for poetry inculcated by those (Wordsworth quotes 
Thomson's biographer, Patrick Murdoch) “who had not been used to feel, or to look for 
anything in poetry, beyond a point of satirical or epigrammatic wit, a  smart antithesis richly 
trimmed with rhyme, or the softness o f an elegiac complaint” (341 A). Wordsworth 
comments (no doubt with wrinkled lip), “Wonder is the natural product o f Ignorance; and 
as the soil was in such good condition at the time o f the publication o f the 'Seasons,' the 
crop was doubtless abundant” (342A). As it is in the present day, apparently, for of the 
famous moonlight scene in Pope’s translation of The Iliad  (VIII, 11. 555ff) Wordsworth 
remarks incredulously that “there is not a passage of descriptive poetry, which at this day 
finds so many and such ardent admirers” (34IB)— admirers who have been sufficiently 
dazzled by artifice not to notice that “though he had Homer to guide him” Pope’s lines “are 
throughout false and contradictory”: “A blind man, in the habit o f attending accurately to 
descriptions casually dropped from the lips of those around him, might easily depict [the 
scene] with more truth” (341B).
Pope had been dead for nearly three-quarters of a century now, but the extreme 
warmth o f these words leads one to suspect that for Wordsworth he is as menacingly alive 
as ever he had been for Dennis, Addison, Theobald, and Cibber. To be sure, Wordsworth 
in these theoretical pieces does not fault Pope alone; Dryden, Johnson, Gray, and Cowper 
come in for their share o f criticism. But it is clear that for Wordsworth, even at this late 
date, Pope is the arch-emblem o f the poetical ethos he feels compelled to challenge and 
overturn. And thus, as depicted in Wordsworth’s survey and assessment of the preceding 
200 years of British letters in the Essay Supplementary, Pope is Britain’s own cultural
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Mephistopheles, a self-conjured spectre whose arts of self-promotion “procure[d] himself a
mote general and higher reputation than perhaps any English poet ever attained during his
life-time,” a guileful phantasm who “bewitched the nation by his melody, and dazzled it by
his polished style, and was himself blinded by his own success,” inducing both it and
himself to grasp for the gaudy shade of poetic ornament (metre, rhyme, and “the vague, the
glossy, and unfeeling language of [his] day”) and cast away the Humanity and Nature that
are poetry’s true matter (341 A; 343A). The result has been a self-perpetuating corruption of
poetic sensibility, a tolerance and even a  yearning for “metrical writers utterly worthless
and useless, except for occasions like the present, when their productions are referred to as
evidence what a small quantity o f brain is necessary to procure a stock of admiration,
provided the aspirant will accommodate himself to the likings and fashions of his day”
(344B)—as well as a corruption of human sensibility that Wordsworth’s own example as
poet and earnest soul is only just now beginning to redress:
The love, the admiration, the indifference, the slight, the aversion, and even 
the contempt, with which these [his own] Poems have been received, 
knowing, as I do, the source within my own mind, from which they have 
proceeded, and the labour and pains, which, when labour and pains 
appeared needful, have been bestowed upon them, must all, I think, be 
received as pledges and tokens, bearing the same general impression, 
though widely different in value;—they are all proof that for the present time 
I have not laboured in vain; and afford assurances, more or less authentic, 
that the products of my industry will endure (345A).
2. Pope and the Romantics
The present moment often plays Prospero to the Caliban of the past. The
progressive fallacy obtains no less stubbornly in letters than in philosophy or technology.
Dryden, we recall, ascribed the purported advancement of literary theory and practice from
Shakespeare and Jonson’s day to his own to a general advancement in human 
consciousness; likewise, if Pope presumed to correct English versification, he could do so
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only because he could first presume the judgement and taste o f his own age to be more 
refined, more sophisticated than Dryden’s. Now we see it is Wordsworth’s turn to look 
back—and down—upon Pope and the age of “metrical writers utterly worthless and 
useless,” to pronounce its poetic sensibility an aberration imposed upon a gullible nation,7 a 
grotesquerie thankfully no more now than a cautionary tale useful for throwing into relief 
the more enlightened sensibility that has since emerged, the essential humanity of which 
ensures that “the products of [its] industry will endure.” But though the Present would 
teach the Past to speak in its tongue and in the sentences it finds most useful and pleasing, 
it thereby indentures itself to the discipline of its pupil, and in time finds its own voice rich 
in and modulated by the accents o f the Past Or, putting metaphor aside, though the Present 
is continually recasting the Past in terms that further its sense of itself, its self-definition, 
the Past seldom proves as tractable as we would have it, and in fact tends to give our 
pretensions to progress and originality the lie the more we would contemn it or constrain it 
toward our ends. Indeed, for all the pride we might take in our uniqueness, in our 
independence from the past, we often find ourselves playing the Caliban and cursing our 
masters in the very language they took such pains to teach us.
And so it proves with the case before us. For all the apparent antipathy between the 
credos o f “Augustan” and “Romantic” poetry, and for all o f Wordsworth’s insistence on 
there being a definite, readily identifiable “then” and “now” in the condition and character 
of English poetry, the fact of the matter is that both the peculiarly figurative mode of Pope’s 
poetry and the peculiar example o f Pope’s highly public career would provide Wordsworth 
(and the Romantics generally) with the terms of his reaction against both, would greatly 
influence Wordsworth’s own poetic theory and practice, and thus have lasting conse­
quences for the course poetry would take in the decades and centuries after his death. We
7 In Sleep and Death (1817), Keats would treat the period as a poetic dark age, as “a schism / Nurtured by 
foppery and barbarism” (11.181 -182).
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must keep Sutherland’s admonition in mind, and acknowledge the seeming recklessness of 
attributing to a single poet—let alone to a  single poetic figure, such as an epitaphic vision— 
the power to effect a fundamental change in the nature of mainstream poetry and thereby a 
lasting shift in its relation to the larger society. Nonetheless, we should observe that the 
figurative extravagance of Pope’s epitaphic vision is at the very least emblematic of the by­
now uneasy yoking of literal and figurative elements within public poetry, and may well 
have accelerated the disruption o f their union in the decades following the poet’s death. 
Warton, for one, would argue in effect that the topical or local had no place in genuine 
poetry; Young and (especially) Wordsworth, by contrast, would advocate the stripping 
away of the figurative machinery they claimed had come to obscure the poet and public’s 
view of the literal world around them. Warton champions a transcendent poetic genius over 
Pope’s prosaic preoccupation with “observations on familiar life, and the manners of the 
age”8; Wordsworth, an imaginative sensitivity to the pathos of everyday life at the expense 
of his technical facility. But both make their final appeal to the personal character and public 
prestige of the poet, and thus owe much to the cult of the poetic personality Pope had 
established during his careen his boldly stepping before the public eye; his highly public 
fashioning of first one, then another poetic persona; his demanding that his society accede 
to his aesthetic and cultural authority, to his defining vision of its historical present
Though the segregation o f the literal from the figurative would at last, as we shall 
see, call into question the efficacy and even the desirability of public poetry itself, it is this 
turning inward, this assumption o f absolute autonomy from the outside world Pope’s 
example encouraged in later poets that all but ensured the ultimate withdrawal of poetry 
from the public sphere, and with it, poetry’s influence upon the shaping o f  public memory.
Turning first to the reaction against the highly figurative materials or trappings of 
Pope’s poetry, we might recall that in constructing his epitaphic vision, Pope inclined so
8 Warton. An Essay on the Writings and Genius o f Pope (I, 380).
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far toward the figurative end o f the spectrum that the personages, events, and
circumstances of the everyday world became wholly subordinated to a highly idiosyncratic
satiric apparatus that had very little to do with Britain as it existed outside the poet’s
imagination. Such discrepancies did not go unremarked. For instance, of the Epilogues to
the Satires—a major component, as we have seen, in the fashioning o f Pope’s apocalyptic
vision—Warton declares the invective to be “carried to excess”:
Our country is represented as totally ruined, and overwhelmed with 
dissipation, depravity and corruption. Yet this very country, so emasculated 
and debased by every species of folly and wickedness, in about twenty 
years afterwards, carried its triumphs over all its enemies, through all 
quarters of the world, and astonished the most distant nations with a display 
o f uncommon efforts, abilities, and virtues. So vain are the prognostications 
of poets, as well as politicians. It is to be lamented, that no genius could be 
found to write an One Thousand Seven Hundred and Sixty-One, as a 
counterpoint to these two satires (Essay II, 516).
But it seems that for Warton, the merging o f the literal and figurative would have been
problematic in any case. On the one hand, he faults Pope for imposing a figurative
apparatus upon everyday life, as when he declares that the “mixture o f British and Grecian
ideas may be deemed a blemish in the P a s t o r a l s  of Pope”—the Grecian trappings suiting
ill with the realities of the English landscape (I, 384). On the other hand, Warton is
reluctant to allow the raising o f everyday life above its literal pitch: there is little in the
present day, for instance, that seems worthy of, say, epic treatment If it is true, Warton
argues, “that for a poet to write happily and well, he must have seen and felt what he
describes, and must draw from living models alone; and if modem times, from their luxury
or refinement, afford not manners that will bear to be described; it will then follow, that
those species of poetry bid fairest to succeed at present, which, treat of things, not men;
which deliver doctrines, not display events” (II, 509). The poet, such as Pope, who would
portray his age is thus debarred from casting it in heroic terms and must content himself
with composing “didactic and descriptive poetry” (II, 509) instead—as Pope does in An
Essay on Man and his Moral Epistles. Such poetry is necessary, Warton admits, because it
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is an elegant component o f moral tuition. He observes of the Epistle to Bathurst, for 
example, that its “use” and “force”—its instructive power—comes from its “raising, clear, 
complete, and circumstantial images, and in turning readers into spectators” (II, 513). But 
we must not let the jingle of verse mislead us into believing that something as mundane as 
human nature, society, and manners is the stuff o f “genuine” poetry, the sublimity of 
which mates it truly philosophical, its pathos, truly heroic. And so the essentially prosaic 
nature o f the subjects, illustrations, and aims of An Essay on Man, a  poem in which Pope 
has “relied on the poetry of his stile, for the purpose of interesting his readers,” keeps its 
author from laying claim to an imagination and genius of the first rank (II, 509-510). At 
most, the trivialities of the present age9 will permit only the mock-epic—The Rape o f the 
Lock, for instance, which Warton praises as “the BEST SATIRE extant,” for “it contains the 
truest and liveliest picture of modem life;.. .  the subject is of a more elegant nature, as well 
as more artfully conducted, than that o f any other heroi-comic poem.” “It is in this 
composition,” he continues, “[that] POPE principally appears a POET; in which he has 
displayed more imagination than in all his other works taken together” (1,399). Here the 
combination of attention to the literal details of “modem life”and the figurative machinery of 
the epic is successful because Pope has raised contemporary persons and manners in order 
to ridicule them, to diminish their significance, not to exalt them; usually, however, Warton 
argues, “[tjhe meaner the subject is o f a preceptive poem, the more striking appears the art 
of the poet” (II, 510), making (we might add) the union of figurative and literal rather more 
problematic, more bathetic than complementary. Best, then, Warton implies, to leave prose 
what is essentially so, and to reserve the vestments of poetry for truly poetic works—such 
as Spenser’s Fairie Queene, or Shakespeare’s tragedies, or Milton’s Paradise Lost—that
9 If Warton views his age as less than epochal, it is likely because one’s close familiarity with the actors 
of one’s own time, their circumstances, and their often less-than-heroic ambitions and deeds has the 
effect of demystifying them, humanizing them to a degree impossible with the characters and 
personages of antiquity.
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derive their inspiration from subjects and themes far removed from everyday experience 
and the average human condition.
The more familiar response, however, to the highly figurative trappings of Pope's 
mode of poetry—its specialized diction and syntax; its often elevated, even epic, tone; its 
frequent recourse to expansive historical and literary allusion and to the personification of 
abstract ideas; the rhetorical cast, the “points of satirical or epigrammatic wit," the “smart 
antitheses" of its sharply chiselled couplets—has been Wordsworth’s call for the rejection 
of such devices in favor of the “fitting to metrical arrangement a selection o f real language 
of men in a state of vivid sensation" (Preface of 1800,320A). In this view he is, as I have 
hinted, anticipated at least obliquely by Edward Young, who in Conjectures on Original 
Composition argues for a similar renunciation o f received thoughts and forms and a first­
hand re-examination of the original truths o f Nature (having himself already employed in 
his 1742-45 Night Thoughts a “unique” approximation o f blank verse and a series of 
perambulatory cogitations reminiscent of Thomson’s Seasons to recast many of the 
precepts of An Essay on Man). But if we credit Wordsworth with leading the reaction 
against Augustan figurativism (much as we might credit Dryden with effecting the 
transition from the baroque “Metaphysical" to the comparatively spare public mode of the 
Restoration), it is in part because in theory and practice he is far more sophisticated and 
thoroughgoing than Young. In feet, as it is set forth in the Preface of 1800—
The principal object, then, proposed in these Poems was to choose incidents 
and situations from  common life , and to relate or describe them, 
throughout, as fa r as was possible in a selection o f language really used by 
men, and, at the same time, to throw over them a certain colouring of 
imagination, whereby ordinary things should be presented to the mind in an 
unusual aspect; and, further, and above all, to make these incidents and 
situations interesting by tracing in them, truly though not ostentatiously, the 
primary laws o f our nature: chiefly, as ja r  as regards the manner in which 
we associate ideas in a state o f excitement (321 A; emphasis added)—
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the programme of what one might call the “new literalism” o f Wordsworthian Romanticism 
is sufficiently complex that we should examine separately each of its three distinct 
components (italicized in die above passage): subject, language, and affect
It is difficult to separate Wordsworth’s predisposition toward “literal” subjects from 
the “literal” language in which he proposes to treat them, for, as he explains in the Preface, 
it is the poet’s steady gaze upon the former—the “incidents and situations of common 
life”—that makes possible his use of the latter, that is, such language as is “really used by 
men.” However, the close conjunction of the two actually emphasizes, first, that when 
Wordsworth resolves to describe the circumstances, occupations, and episodes of “humble 
and rustic” lives (321A), and in language that is itself drawn from those lives, he signals 
his intent to eschew the conventions of pastoral poetry and to draw his scenes, not from 
literature, but directly from life. That is, from conditions and persons as they actually—or 
literally—exist. But the conjunction also points up a second, more oblique aspect of 
Wordsworth’s literalism in his choice of subject Note that Wordsworth takes “common 
life” to denote life as it lived in the countryside, by those whose station obliges them to 
labor in close proximity to “the beautiful and permanent forms o f Nature” and thus puts 
them in “hourly communica[tion] with the best objects from which the best part of language 
is originally derived” (32IB); in such an environment, “the essential passions of the heart 
find a better soil in which they can attain their maturity, and speak a plainer and more 
emphatic language” (321A-B). In other words, it is among the modest, normally obscure 
lives o f shepherds, farmers, mendicants, rural lovers, the feeble-minded, and those whose 
marginal employments raise them only occasionally to the level of bare subsistence that one 
may find the closest approximation of a  one-to-one correspondence between perception, 
feeling, and expression. And so, if  rustic folk, “from their rank in society and the sameness 
and narrow circle of their intercourse, [and from] being less under the influence of social 
vanity” (32IB), lack the refinements, material comforts, formal learning, and experience of 
the wider world (all the things, in short, that enable Wordsworth to exercise the
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counterintuitive sophistry needed to envy those less fortunate than himself), their want has 
left them more essentially, more nobly human. We might argue that it is wholly arbitrary to 
regard lives spent toiling or trekking in all weathers as more natural, more wholesome than 
those passed in other settings and pursuits, and highly patronizing to regard such lives as 
touchstones for the “common,” that is, as more fully representative o f “the primary laws of 
our nature,” of human existence as it ought by design to unfold. But Wordsworth’s notion 
derives from a  primitivist impulse still thriving in our own time: that the life passed in 
close, sensual contact with the elements is necessarily more “real” because it is taken up 
satisfying the most basic appetites and needs; because the struggle for subsistence leaves 
little time for human desires to grow complicated or corrupt; because the labors of the 
body, unlike those of the mind, are readily observable, their practicality and benefit readily 
measurable; because the life o f labor is passed among the unambiguous solidities of things 
rather than the shapeshifting ether o f ideas, allusions, and conceits. Seemingly, it offers 
few occasions and has even fewer uses for the superimposition o f conventional poetic 
figures, and thus (one infers from this portion of the Preface) may be thought of as more 
essentially literal than urban or courtly life, which, being more under “the influence of 
social vanity,” is necessarily given over to affected complexities in its leisures, luxuries, 
learning, and assthetic tastes, is necessarily more artificial— more inherently figurative. 
Wordsworth’s resolve, therefore, to “keep the Reader in the company of flesh and blood” 
(323A), allows, justifies, and even dictates a rejection not only o f the figurative trappings 
of Augustan poetry, but of its typical materials: the places, persons, episodes, and themes 
upon which these trappings had habitually been fixed.
A necessary consequence of this turning away from Augustan poetry’s matter and 
manner is the levelling of poetic subjects, making existing generic hierarchies suddenly 
obsolete—as they must be when the intense family feeling of poor orphans (“We Are 
Seven”), the experiences and homilies of a leech-gatherer (“Resolution and 
Independence”), or the life and sad end of a promising son of the countryside (“Michael”)
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are considered as worthy (if not more so) of the poet’s attention as the affairs and follies of 
the Court and aristocracy, or the bewildering, corrupting political, social, and economic life 
of the metropolis. And this levelling is reinforced by Wordsworth’s insistence upon a more 
literal poetic language— more “literal,” because as with his choice o f “low” subjects, it is 
designedly unpoetic, in the sense that it eschews the conventional, highly figurative diction 
of formal verse of the preceding century—the “personifications o f abstract ideas,” the 
“mechanical devicefsl o f style” that served as “a family language which Writers in metre 
seem to lay claim to by prescription” (323A)—and purports to be the “language really used 
by men.” “Such a language,” Wordsworth argues, “arising out o f repeated experience and 
regular feelings, is a more permanent, and a far more philosophical language, than that 
which is frequently substituted for it by Poets, who think that they are conferring honour 
upon themselves and their art, in proportion as they separate themselves from the 
sympathies o f men, and indulge in arbitrary and capricious habits o f expression” (32 IB). 
These “arbitrary and capricious habits of expression” would seem not only to estrange 
poetry from “the sympathies o f men” who live “common” lives, but to perpetuate the 
distinctions and gradations of genre, thereby preserving the notions of “high” and “low” 
poetry. By bringing the language of poetry closer to that of everyday experience and 
“regular feelings,” Wordsworth would not only put the reader into closer contact with the 
world of the poem, but erode one basis of generic classification. Can the designations of 
epic, pastoral, and lyric, for instance, have much meaning if  the poet, rejecting the received 
topics of poetry rejects likewise the received “family language” of poets and keeps his eye 
steadily upon the object before him (or the mind’s eye), writing in the language it inspires? 
It is more than likely that the language of all poetry would in consequence be more concrete 
rather than abstract or allegorical, particular rather than general, local rather than allusive, 
and Anglo-Saxon rather than larin in origin. It would, in short, be closer to the prosaism 
of everyday speech than to the constructions of conventional poetic diction. And so, 
whereas Warton had faulted Pope’s poetry for being but versified prose, for Wordsworth,
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the language of poetry need not and indeed should not differ greatly from that of good 
prose. Defending the prosaic in his own poetry, he asserts that “not only the language of a 
large portion of every good poem, even of the most elevated character, must necessarily, 
except with reference to the metre, in no respect differ from that o f good prose, but 
likewise that of the most interesting parts o f the best poems will be found to be strictly the 
language of prose when prose is well written” (323B).10
Greater literalism in subject and language would seem to have a democratizing 
effect upon poetry, obviating the need, for instance, for a classical education or for a  great 
familiarity with formal modes and conventions, requiring only that readers be alive to the 
world about them as it is actually peopled, and as its people actually live and speak. Taking 
Wordsworth’s resolutions and prescriptions at face value, we might in fact expect by 
training the public eye upon heretofore obscure or neglected features of the social landscape 
and by making poetry itself more accessible they might thereby enlarge the forum for public 
poetry, reinvigorating a mode whose figurative excesses had cost it much o f its cultural 
relevance and authority. Indeed, some such reform is not for from Wordsworth’s mind, for 
if, as we have seen him declare in this piece and in the Essay Supplementary, misguided 
expectations for poetry have hindered broad acceptance of his own compositions, such 
expectations must be appropriately recast, that a reformed poetry aiming at true genius 
might “wid[enj the sphere of human sensibility, for the delight, honour, and benefit, of 
human nature,” might introduce “a new element to the intellectual universe: or, if that be not 
allowed, [apply its] powers to objects on which they had not before been exercised, or
10 Byron savages Wordsworth for this assertion in English Bards and Scotch Reviewers (1809). Calling 
Wordsworth a “dull disciple” of the Southey school, a “mild apostate from poetic rale,” (11.235-236), 
he further characterizes him as one
Who both by precept and example, shows 
That prose is verse, and verse is merely prose;
Convincing all by demonstration plain.
Poetic souls delight in prose insane;
And Christmas stories tortured into rhyme 
Contain the essence of the true sublime (11.241-246).
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[employ] them in such a manner as to produce effects hitherto unknown” (Essay 
Supplementary, 346A).
However, though the “new mission” of poetry might be to “extend [the] kingdom” 
of passion and sublimity “and to augment and spread [their] enjoyments” (Essay 
Supplementary, 346B), the employment o f more literal subjects and language actually 
diminishes the viability of the public mode. On the one hand, Wordsworth’s programme 
turns its back upon the topics of primary and immediate interest to the reader’s own public 
attentions; on the other, it undermines the communality of poetry by doing away with the 
specialized diction and versification that Wordsworth scornfully terms a false “symbol or 
promise” of “the genuine language o f poetry” (“Appendix" to the Preface o f 1802,331B): 
stylized such language may have become from Pope’s day to Wordsworth’s, but for all that 
nonetheless recognizable as the language of poetry, emblematic o f a broadly intelligible 
poetic mode, capable of evoking complex patterns of perception, thought, and response. 
Put simply, Wordsworth’s programme shifts the responsibility (one might say prerogative) 
for setting the criteria for writing and reading poetry from the public sphere to the 
individual poet, whose own poetic sensibility will be shaped—if we may judge from 
Wordsworth’s statements here—by comparatively unique personal experiences and highly 
idiosyncratic emotional reactions to them. The public is effectively disenfranchised: it must 
take the poet’s word that this or that subject is truly poetic, that in throwing over it “a 
certain colouring of imagination , whereby ordinary things should be presented to the mind 
in an unusual aspect” the poet has treated it poetically, and that the medium of such 
treatment—language as it is “really spoken by men,” but purged of “the vulgarity and 
meanness of ordinary life” (Preface, 324A)—is somehow essentially poetic.11
11 Defending his choice of employing meter in a mode of writing between whose language and that of 
good prose “there neither is, nor can be, any essential difference” (324A), Wordsworth insists upon the 
following distinction:
In the [case of Augustan poetry], the Reader is utterly at the mercy of the Poet, respecting 
what imagery or diction he may choose to connect with the passion; whereas, in [the case 
of poets such as himself, who constrain themselves to feel and speak as “other men” do],
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But it is the third element of Wordsworthian literalism—literalism of affect—that 
poses the most serious challenge to the public mode o f poetry. Wordsworth’s notion of 
affective literalism follows logically from his prescriptions for greater literalism in subject 
and language. Wordsworth argues, for instance, that if “the Poet’s subject be judiciously 
chosen, it will naturally, and upon fit occasion, lead him to passions the language of 
which, if selected truly and judiciously, must necessarily be variegated, and alive with 
metaphors and figures” (324A-B). The poet’s close attention to the object before the 
physical or mental eye allows that object to excite in him feelings that of themselves prompt 
the imagination toward the language necessary to express them. At first glance, this seems 
strongly reminiscent of Longinus' receipt for achieving the sublime, and Wordsworth’s 
subsequent admonishment that “it will be the wish of the Poet to bring his feelings near to 
those of the persons whose feelings he describes, nay, for short spaces of time, perhaps, to 
let himself slip into an entire delusion, and even confound and identify his own feelings 
with theirs” (325A) sounds very much like Longinus when he asserts that the poet must 
first seem to feel what the audience is asked to feel, or when he speaks of the truly sublime 
image as a passage “in which, carried away by your feelings, you imagine you are actually 
seeing the subject of your description, and enable your audience as well to see it” (121). 
However, if Wordsworth’s resolve to use the emotional power of his poetry to trace “the 
primary laws of our nature: chiefly, as far as regards the manner in which we associate 
ideas in a state of excitement” is indeed a promise to evoke a more “literal” affect than his 
classical and neo-classical counterparts, its greater “psychological realism” (as what we 
might call it today) lies partly in the fact that the emotions he purports to describe are not
the metre obeys certain laws, to which the Poet and Reader both willingly submit because 
they are certain, and because no interference is made by them with the passion, but such 
as the concurring testimony of the ages has shown to heighten and improve the pleasure 
which co-exists with it” {Preface, 327A-B).
As 1 see it, however, the very grounds that lead Wordsworth to object to Augustan poetic diction as 
being “arbitrary, and subject to infinite caprices, upon which no calculation whatever can be made” 
(327A-B) may be turned against him, point for point.
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stylized according to the demands o f particular generic conventions, but drawn from the 
life.12 Moreover, the sublime Wordsworth would achieve is not founded upon an appeal to 
an elevated subject and style, but upon what his declared object of discovering “the manner 
in which we associate ideas in a  state of excitement” suggests is a  neurologically correct 
understanding of the relation of physical, intellectual, and emotional sensation, as well as (I 
would say, especially) the make up of and connections among the complexes of human 
affect: how our feelings are allied, how they are aroused, and how they trigger one another 
once aroused.
This might bring Longinus to mind yet again, but in feet Wordsworth has inverted 
the ends and thus the principles and methods o f classical affective mimeticism. Note, for 
instance, that for Longinus the poet should aim at achieving a readily communicable 
sublimity of effect that unites poet and audience in a shared figurative realm, whereas for 
Wordsworth the passions roused by poetry are an end in themselves; they are not so much 
a vehicle to a shared world beyond the Self (or even, keeping in mind The Prelude, into the 
obscurer realms of the individual Self), as they are a means of making us more intensely, 
more completely self-aware at any given moment — *to send the soul into herself, * as 
Wordsworth explains in his Essay Supplementary, “to be admonished of her weakness, or 
to be made conscious o f  her power" (346B; emphasis added). Accordingly, whereas 
Longinus would have the poet execute images of sufficient credibility and vividness to 
transport both himself and his listener or reader beyond themselves and their immediate 
sensory surroundings, for Wordsworth the “appropriate business o f poetry,. . .  is to treat 
of things not as they are, but as they appear: not as they exist in themselves, but as they
12 Wordsworth asserts, for instance, that the affective properties of poetry are “undoubtedly1* connected 
“with our moral sentiments and an im at sensations, and with the causes which excite these; with the 
operations of the elements, and the appearances of the visible universe; with storm and sunshine, with 
the revolutions of the seasons, with cold and heat, with loss of friends and kindred, with injuries and 
resentments, gratitude and hope, with fear and sorrow. These, and the like, are the sensations and 
objects which the Poet describes, as they are the sensations of other men. and the objects which interest 
them" (Preface, 327A).
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seem to exist to the senses, and to the passions” (Essay Supplementary, 336A), and 
therefore, given the highly subjective nature of perception and affective response, “the 
feeling therein developed [in these poems] gives importance to the actions and situation, 
and not the action and situation to the feelings ” {Preface, 322A; emphasis added). Longinus 
would heighten our (figurative) perception of an object or situation in order to rouse in us 
the feelings appropriate for it; Wordsworth, however, reverses this, insisting instead that 
the appropriate passions must be roused in order to rightly apprehend the object or 
situation. And so whereas for Longinus metaphors and other figurative rhetorical 
constructions are to be employed to heighten the affective power of the image, for 
Wordsworth the feelings will all but articulate themselves with language “variegated, and 
alive with metaphors.” If Longinus would transport us via the image, for Wordsworth the 
image is important mainly as a focal point for our overflow o f feeling. To risk 
oversimplifying the matter for Wordsworth, as the end of poetry is to excite feeling so as 
to heighten our sense of being at a given moment, the matter of poetry serves primarily as 
an outlet, as the target or context of that feeling.
Though Wordsworth’s shift in affective emphasis necessitates his use of generally 
familiar subjects and language, it has nonetheless greatly reduced the degree to which 
poetry composed according to its principles might be public. For one thing, a heightened 
literalism of affect invites the reader to turn inward toward his or her own personal physical 
and (especially) emotional sensations, toward what he or she alone may feel. Such an 
inward turn effectively estranges the reader from the larger community, despite 
Wordsworth’s insistence to the contrary in the Essay Supplementary, 13 and despite 
Shelley’s half-articulate insistence in A Defence o f Poetry (1821) that “The imagination is
13 There, Wordsworth argues that poetry must aim—through attainment of “the profound and exquisite in 
feeling, the lofty and universal in thought and im agination; or, in ordinary language, the pathetic and 
the sublime”—toward “divesting the reader of the pride that induces him to dwell upon those points 
wherein men differ from one another, to the exclusion of those in which all men are alike, or the same; 
and in making him ashamed of the vanity that tenders him insensible [to the merits of] men who may 
stand below him in the scale of society” (345B).
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enlarged by a sympathy with pains and passions so mighty that they distend their 
conception the capacity o f  that by which they are conceived; the good affections are 
strengthened by pity, indignation, terror, and sorrow; and an exalted calm is prolonged 
from the satiety of this high exercise of them into the tumult o f familiar life'’ (176). For 
when the feelings excited by poetry are effectively an end in themselves and are given no 
definite object in “the tumult o f familiar life,” the desired enlargement of good will and 
sympathy either remains too unfocused to have any practical effect or else becomes 
excessively self-reflective. In reality, if there is any specific, particular fellow-feeling 
excited by the poetry o f sensibility, it is solely between poet and reader. Indeed, as 
Wordsworth explains it in his Essay Supplementary, the feelings roused in the reader must 
in large part serve as complement to the poet’s own emotional engagement in his subject: 
the pathetic and sublime, he says, cannot be achieved by appealing to the “passive” faculty 
of taste, “And why? Because without the exertion of a co-operating power in the mind of 
the Reader, there can be no adequate sympathy with either o f these emotions: without this 
auxiliary impulse, elevated or profound passion cannot exist” (345B-346A). In sum, the 
reader’s attentions, when they are not turned inward upon themselves, are to be directed 
toward the poet and thus away from the public sphere. Returning for a moment to 
Wordsworth’s assertion that the poet must “bring his feelings near to those of the persons 
whose feelings he describes, nay, for short spaces of time, perhaps, to let himself slip into 
an entire delusion, and even confound and identify his own feelings with theirs,” we 
should note that whereas Longinus would have the poet see what he describes, 
Wordsworth has him fe e l with his subjects, to the point o f merging his affect with theirs. 
The reader is thus made a  spectator not so much to the poet’s images, but to the poet’s own 
capacity for depth and delicacy of feeling—and thus the true subject of all such affectively 
literal poetry is, ultimately, the poet himself.
And of course the poet himself feels and composes far from the bustle of the larger 
society. Recall that Wordsworth’s famous—and notorious—declaration in his Preface that
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“poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings” is immediately and rather 
jarringly qualified by the observation that this overflow “takes its origin from emotion 
recollected in tranquillity: the emotion is contemplated till, b y  a species o f re-action, the 
tranquillity gradually disappears, and an emotion, kindred to that which was before the 
subject of contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually exist in the mind” 
(328B). Mo journalistic exercise in observation and recording, this, but rather the habit of 
one who moves through the world making careful note o f the affective sensations its scenes 
and experiences excite in him—not allowing himself to feel them fully while on the scene 
or in the midst o f the experience, but only when his leisure affords him opportunity to 
unfold them privately, without fear of interruption, as a child will unwrap a piece of candy 
filched from the forbidden dish only once a safe getaway has been made. And as the tang 
of the child’s treat is made the sweeter by the knowledge that it is a  pleasure savored in 
secret, so, it seems, does the Wordsworthian poet relish more than the original emotion 
itself the pleasure o f self-consciously reconstructing it bit by bit, revelling in each affective 
sensation it can be made to yield, and taking especial pleasure in the essential autonomy of 
the imaginative a c t “Grand thoughts (and Shakespeare must often have sighed over this 
truth),” Wordsworth observes plaintively in the Essay Supplementary, “as they are most 
naturally and most fitly conceived in solitude, so can they not be brought forth in the midst 
of plaudits, without some violation of their sanctity” (347A). This is the aesthetic of the 
connoisseur. And if the reader responds with diffidence to Wordsworth's demand upon his 
or her attention— his demand, that is, that the reader serve as spectator, as auxiliary to the 
movements of his sympathetic imagination—it is in fact precisely because Wordsworth 
claims for the poet (and, by implication, the sensitive reader) a more exquisite affective 
faculty than his fellows. Though it is true that the poet’s “passions and thoughts and 
feelings are the general passions and thoughts and feelings of men,” the poet is yet “chiefly 
distinguished from other men by a greater promptness to think and feel without immediate 
external excitement, and a greater power in expressing such thoughts and feelings as are
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produced in him” (327A). The Augustan poet—the public poet generally, the satirist 
particularly—also appealed to the reader’s sense of exclusivity, but o f “being in the know” 
with regard to knowledge readily attainable and toward the sources o f which (literature, 
history, public life) the poet directed the reader’s attention. Wordsworth, however, would 
shift the aesthetic prerogative from the circles of the learned, the cultured, to a new 
aristocracy o f the sensitive, an elite far more exclusive than the former because its 
qualifications are immanent rather than enumerable, innate rather than acquired. We can 
always bring ourselves to know more; it is far more difficult to feel more, or to feel more 
finely. Moreover, insofar as the quest for sensibility invites the aspiring poet to seek out the 
new and unique, and to respond to these idiosyncratically, the impulse toward literalism of 
affect leaves the reader in much the same predicament as those toward more literal subjects 
and language: we are forced to take the poet’s word that what he feels is genuine, and 
(more problematic) appropriate for his subject For instance, when Goldsmith tells us of 
Switzerland in “The Traveller, or, A Prospect of Society” (1764) that “No product here the 
barren hills afford, /  But man and steel, the soldier and his sword” (11. 169-170), what we 
know of the land allows us either to believe or doubt him. When, on the other hand, 
Shelley addresses Mount Blanc thus, “Thou hast a voice, great Mountain, to repeal / Large 
codes o f fraud and woe; not understood / By all, but which the wise, and great, and good / 
Interpret, or make felt, or deeply feel” (11. 80-83), our knowledge o f  the Alps is quite 
irrelevant; we have little choice here but to allow the highly subjective poetic truth of the 
lines—or scoff, and risk being charged with ignorance, pettiness, and perversity.
Their own inward turn away from the public sphere and the public mode no doubt 
increases the willingness o f Wordsworth and Shelley to draw absolute, oppositional 
distinctions between the sensibility of the poet and his coterie and that o f the larger 
society—distinctions that more than hint at the Romantic poets’ essential antipathy toward 
the common reader. Not that this antipathy is theirs alone. When Warton, for example, 
argues for the segregation o f the literal and figurative elements Pope had joined so
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problematically, he implies that a  poetic treatment o f the prosaic only eclipses right notions 
of true poetry among the reading public, confirming the public in its appetite for the topical 
and trivial, and in its aversion to the richer food of the pathetic and sublime. Is Pope yet 
more widely read than Milton? No wonder, Warton observes, for “it cannot be doubted, 
that the Odes of Horace which celebrated, and the satires which ridiculed, well-known and 
real characters at Rome, were more eagerly read, and more frequently cited, than the £neid 
and the Georgic of Virgil” (Essay, ii, 521). And when Young argues against imitation, he 
seems as much as anything to chafe at the indiscriminately broad access to poetic 
composition such a practice affords: “An original may be said to be o f a vegetable nature; it 
rises spontaneously from the vital root of genius; it grows, it is not made: imitations are 
often a so n  o f manufacture wrought up by those mechanics, a n , and labor, out o f 
preexistent materials not their own” (Conjectures on Original Composition, 330B; 
emphasis added). Anyone with a  well-stocked library and a knack for rhyme can imitate; 
originality is reserved for genius alone. A similar anti-demotic sentiment runs through the 
frequent Romantic and post-Romantic complaint that the methods of versification Dry den 
and Pope had perfected provided the public at large with an entrfe into the preserve of true 
poets, inviting it to mix with the aesthetic elect We have already seen Wordsworth’s attack 
on the prior age’s legions o f undifferentiated versifiers— “utterly worthless and useless” 
except as evidence for “what a  small quantity o f brain is necessary to procure a stock of 
admiration, provided the aspirant will accommodate himself to the likings and fashions of 
his day” (344B); and we have seen Macaulay’s scorn for Pope’s reduction of versification 
to “a matter of rule and compass,” which put all would-be poets “on a level”: “Hundreds of 
dunces who never blundered on one happy thought or expression were able to write reams 
of couplets which, as far as euphony was concerned, could not be distinguished from those 
of Pope himself” (“The Life and Writings of Addison,” 333). To these we might add 
Keats’s observation in Sleep and Poetry (1817) that if the preceding age constituted “a 
schism” (1. 181) in the history o f English poetry it is because, “Nurtured by foppery and
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barbarism” (1. 182), those “who did not understand / His [Apollo’s] glories” nonetheless 
“with a puling infant’s force / . . .  swayed about upon a rocking horse, /  And thought it 
Pegasus” (11.184-187):
But ye were dead 
To things ye knew not of—were closely wed 
To musty laws lined out with wretched rule 
And compass vile: so that ye taught a school 
Of dolts to smooth, inlay clip, and fit,
Till, like the certain wands of Jacob’s wit,
Their verses tallied. Easy was the task:
A thousand handicraftsmen wore the mask 
Of Poesy (11193-201).
This disdain for the “handicraftsmen” of poetry—for a widespread public interest 
and participation in the production and consumption of poetry (if one may extend the 
application of the epithet more broadly)— should not surprise us, given the poet- 
centeredness of the Romantic ethic. In fact, unlike his Augustan counterpart, the Romantic 
poet owes his cultural authority to the mystique of an autonomous exclusivity fiercely 
independent of and even hostile to the world beyond his circle. His estrangement from 
society throws him into greater social prominence by underscoring the uniqueness of his 
affective faculties; his defiance o f that society suggests that those faculties are indeed 
superior to the common sort. Wordsworth, for one, might lament that “the poet must 
reconcile himself for a season to few and scattered hearers” when, as in his own poetry, 
“life and nature are described or operated upon by the creative or abstracting virtue of the 
imagination; [whenl the instinctive wisdom of antiquity and her heroic passions uniting, in 
the heart of the poet, with the meditative wisdom of later ages, have produced that accord 
of sublimated humanity, which is at once a history of the remote past and a prophetic 
enunciation o f the remotest future” (Essay Supplementary, 346B-347A). But Wordsworth 
must know that poetry as he has reformed it can never be appreciated by more than a few. 
Here, for instance, he makes the heart of the poet (that is, the innate, sovereign sensibility 
of a member o f the culture’s most elite vocation) the expressionistic forge for his
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reconstitution o f poetry’s means of defining the historical present (largely, he suggests
here, by serving as an emblem o f “sublimated humanity*—an index to a society’s collective
spiritual advancement). And in any event, throughout his critical pieces he takes too much
glee in baiting the ssthetic expectations and opinions of that fraternity o f  ardent though
amateur readers corresponding to the coffeehouse habitues o f Dry den and Pope’s day,
exhibits too much self-satisfaction in spiting “the clamour of that small though loud portion
of the community, ever governed by factious influence, which, under the name of the
PUBLIC, passes itself, upon the unthinking, for the people” (347A) for us to take his
lament very seriously. Shelley, at least, is more open in his contempt for the broadly public
and the readily pragmatic in poetry: “Didactic poetry,” he declares in the preface to
Prometheus Unbound (1818-1819),
is my abhorrence; nothing can be equally well expressed in prose that is not 
tedious and supererogatory in verse. My purpose has hitherto been simply 
to familiarize the highly refined imagination of the more select classes of 
poetical readers with beautiful idealisms of moral excellence; aware that until 
the mind can love, and admire, and trust, and hope, and endure, reasoned 
principles of moral conduct are seeds cast upon the highway of life which 
the unconscious passenger tramples into dust, although they would bear the 
harvest of his happiness (208).
3. Poetry and Public Memory After Pope 
It will not do, of course, to associate Wordsworth too closely with Shelley, and I 
would not be understood to imply that the two poets—or, more generally, the two 
generations of Romantic poets—availed themselves o f the same poetic materials and 
manner. In fact, Wordsworth’s literalist impulse did not survive even the first wave of 
Romanticism. As Thomas Love Peacock observes in his waggish history of English letters, 
The Four Ages o f Poetry (1820), whereas Wordsworth sought inspiration in the “village 
legends” told him by “old women and sextons” (that is, in the materials o f living, local 
memory), his contemporaries, rummaging yet more deeply in “the rubbish of departed
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ignorance,” were likely to find theirs in the ancient, exotic, o r eccentric: “Mr. Scott digs up 
the poachers and cattle-stealers of the ancient border. Lord Byron cruizes for thieves and 
pirates on the shores o f the Morea and among the Greek Islands. Mr. Southey wades 
through ponderous volumes of travels and old chronicles, from which he carefully selects
all that is false, useless, and absurd and Mr. Coleridge, to the valuable information
acquired from similar sources, superadds the dreams o f  crazy theologians and the 
mysticisms of German metaphysics" (763B). As for Romanticism's second wave, the most 
perfunctory perusal of the compositions of Shelley and Keats (and, for that matter, of their 
Victorian successors: Tennyson, Arnold, Browning, the Rossettis, and Swinburne) will 
reveal their authors' highly un-Wordsworthian interest in the trappings of classical 
mythology and remote history, particularly the Middle Ages.
However, if these poets deviate from Wordsworth’s example in their choice of 
poetic materials, they seem to have followed his example in the purpose toward which they 
turned them. Consider: local legends, folklore, personages and events made fabulous by 
time or distance, the elaborate metaphorical conceits of the speculative mind, antiquity’s 
archetypes—these are precisely the materials by which the historical present had been 
explicated and woven into the fabric of public memory during the Augustan period. They 
might still have been put to such a use, if poets were not now employing them instead in 
the exposition o f their own immediate moods and feelings, their own idiosyncratic 
perceptions and understandings of the world about them. Thus Peacock says of 
Wordsworth himself—“the great leader of the returners to nature”—that “he cannot 
describe a scene under his own eyes without putting into it the shadow of a Danish boy or 
the living ghost o f Lucy Gray, or some similar phantastical parturition of the moods of his 
own mind” (763A). And of the Lake Poets generally—that “egregious confraternity of 
rhymesters"—he observes,
They wrote verses on a new principle; saw rocks and rivers in a  new light;
and remaining studiously ignorant of history, society, and human nature,
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cultivated the phantasy only at the expence of the memory and the reason; 
and contrived, though they had retreated from the world for the express 
purpose o f seeing nature as she was, to see her only as she was not, 
converting the land they lived in into a sort o f  fairy-land, which they 
peopled with mysticisms and chimsras (763A).
Charged through with ironic hyperbole though they may be, Peacock’s statements say
nothing of the operations and subjects of the new poetic sensibility that Wordsworth has
not said or implied himself, nothing that Coleridge does not say or imply in his description
of the reconstitudve power of die secondary imagination. They convey a fairly precise idea
of the use Shelley makes of Greek myth in Prometheus Unbound, when, amidst “the
mountainous ruins o f the Baths of Caracalla, among the flowery glades and thickets of
odoriferous blossoming trees,” gleaning inspiration from “the bright blue sky of Rome”
and “the vigorous awakening spring in that divinest climate,” he goes about recasting
Aeschylus’ drama according to the ideas and imagery “drawn from the operations of the
human mind or from those external actions by which they are expressed” (205). They
account as well for Keats’s object in revivifying classical Arcadia in his “Ode on a Grecian
Urn”: not to illuminate his own age by means of the past, but to erect a conceit upon which
to hang a reverie on the power of the imagination—“Heard melodies are sweet, but those
unheard / Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes play on; / Not to the sensual ear, but, more
endear’d, / Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tune” (11. 11-14)—and to trace in the “flowery
tale” (1.4) arrested upon the vase an emblem of the particular instant in his own being when
a momentary complex of thought and emotion gave rise to that poetic Idea his verses
perhaps only half-suggest13
*3 Tennyson makes similar use of cultural myth in his proto-Symbolist poem, “The Kraken” (1830), and 
Matthew Arnold recasts Greek history for a purpose analogous to Shelley’s in his Byronic Empedocles 
on Etna (1852). A. Dwight Culler includes the following note on the poem in his edition of Arnold’s 
selected poetry and criticism: “In the summer  of [1849] J. Campbell Shairp, an Oxford friend, wrote to
[Arthur Hugh] Clough, ’I saw the said Hero—Matt—the day I left London He was working at an
“Empedocles”—which seemed to be not much about the man who leapt in the crater—but his name & 
outward circumstances are used for the drapery of his [Arnold’s] own thoughts.” Indeed, Arnold’s close 
identification with his protagonist’s desperate course had much to do with his state of mind at the time 
of the poem’s composition: “These are damned times," he wrote to Clough in September 1849, 
“every th in g  is against one—the height to which knowledge is come, the spread of luxury, our physical
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This somewhat paradoxical appropriation of the materials of the common cultural 
inheritance for the explication of the private Self had many and profound short- and long­
term consequences for poetry and its readers, for habits o f social self-perception, and, 
ultimately, for the fashioning of public memory. We should begin, however, by noting the 
special characteristics of the particular channel into which this appropriation had diverted 
the mainstream o f English poetry. A poem may focus upon highly personal or broadly 
public matters (that is, upon the Self or the larger society); its primary sources and materials 
may be either literal or figurative in nature (comprising, respectively, either the immediate, 
the local, the situational, and the demonstrably actual, or else the precedential, the 
archetypal, the fabulous, and the metaphorical); and it may be kept private or subjected to 
public scrutiny. Typically, the particular configuration of these characteristics within a 
given poem is consistent with that poem’s overall mode, whether private, semi-public, or 
fully public. Renaissance courtly lyrics, for example, may break into the common store of 
imagery from classical myth and literature for the (figurative) materials with which to 
articulate the private psyche, but then these lyrics are for the most part circulated only 
among the poet’s immediate circle and, kept from the public gaze, make no demands upon 
the notice of society at large. Conversely, though much Augustan poetry is thoroughly 
occasional, its use of figurative apparatus to throw the circumstances, personages, and 
events of the present moment into a more general cultural relief and its insistence upon 
securing and influencing the attentions of a broad spectrum of readers mark it out as fully 
public. Only when we get to the Romantic period does this essential consistency of aim, 
audience, and mode break down. Perversely enough, the Romantic poet insists upon the 
primacy o f the feelings and meditations of the autonomous Self as poetic subjects while
enervation, the absence of great natures, the unavoidable contact with millions of small ones, 
newspapers, cities, light profligate friends, moral desperadoes like Carlyle,—our own selves, and the 
sickening consciousness of our difficulties’' (qtd. in Culler, 543).
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simultaneously demanding the attentions and approbation of a sizable reading public.14 The 
Romantic poet turns his back upon the public sphere and its inhabitants, scorns those of 
meaner or more conventional sensibility, gives expression to a passing psychological state 
unique to himself—all the while taking it for granted that we will be so eager to play the 
spectator to his “overflow o f powerful emotions” as he reflects upon them in tranquillity 
that we will actually pay for the privilege.
Though perverse enough in itself, this new relationship between poet and reader 
had such detrimental consequences for poetry’s public role and, more broadly, for the role 
of figurative habits of mind in the fashioning of public memory, because it also entailed the 
separation of poetry’s figurative materials from the public sphere. Appropriated for largely 
private ends, the rich cultural lexicon that had given shape to communal memory and 
identity was over time effectively excised from social discourse. It could hardly be 
otherwise. A given icon—whether historical, literary, mythological, or aesthetic—cannot 
function as an emblem of the universal and the individual simultaneously. It either elicits 
broadly common associations or narrowly personal ones. These two sets o f associations 
may largely coincide; or we may find the latter set compelling in its novelty or 
idiosyncrasy. No matter. In either case we recognize that the depiction, use, and final 
significance of the icon before us is personal and at most only indirectly public. It would be 
absurd to pretend that personal considerations play no part in public poetry or that public 
poets will always agree on the content and connotations of the cultural lexicon they employ. 
Usually the reverse is true. However, when we consider that the true subject of much 
Romantic poetry is the poet’s affective capacity, we can make this distinction, that whereas 
for the public poet even a problematic icon plays its part in the public fashioning of public 
self-perception and identity, for the private poet the most potent, most self-evident icon is
14 With the perhaps obvious exception of W illiam  Blake—but then it mattered very little to Blake if the 
larger public noticed or heeded his eccentric private visions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
584
but a catalyst, focus, or prop for the stream of thought and feeling that is (or becomes) the 
primary occasion of his poem. The icon is thus reduced from a cultural archetype to an 
emblem of some portion of the poet’s personal experience. Keats makes such use of his 
Grecian urn, for instance, that readers o f  his rhapsody upon it are required neither to 
participate in the formation (or confirmation) o f a broad cultural artifact oy extending their 
own knowledge and understanding o f ancient Greece to the poet’s exposition, nor to allow 
(let alone actively encourage) the imaginative world evoked by the poem to inform—to 
transfigure—the circumstances of their immediate, everyday world. Rather, they are asked 
to play the more passive role of approving witness or spectator to the operations of the 
poet’s sensibility, for which they are rewarded with perhaps a momentary identification 
with that complex o f thought and feeling that gave rise to the poet’s vision. Our 
identification with the poem may indeed be intense—so much so that its images become 
emblematic of our own experiences, and the poem itself, such a potent embodiment of our 
physical and psychological circumstances at the occasion of our first reading it that even 
years later the mere glimpse of its title may transport us to that exact moment so wholly and 
so forcefully that in reverie we seem to be reliving i t  In such a case, we only replicate the 
poet’s treatment of the original icon: the poem becomes a private artifact a vehicle for 
recapturing a moment quite apart from the “now" of our lives, an affective experience 
unique to ourselves—both at any given instant as segregated from the attentions of others 
as the poet’s private vision is from the sphere o f public life.
This segregation has three main consequences for the figurative elements of social 
self-perception and public memory. The first, logically enough, is that as readers over time 
become accustomed to seeing poetry employ its figurative elements toward private ends, 
the historically or culturally rich associations traditionally attaching to these elements cease 
to reverberate in the public sphere. Instead, as these associations become ever more closely 
associated with the individual imagination, they come to be regarded as a quaint auxiliary— 
if that—to our apprehension of the world about us rather than an integral part of our
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perception and understanding o f i t  In short these elements lose their capacity to lend 
public experience a readily intelligible iconographic significance. In fact once it becomes 
habitual, instinctive to distinguish between the figurative and the public, even a poem that 
seems to invite its readers to draw parallels between its world and their own—Tennyson’s 
Idylls o f the King, for instance—we find it difficult if not outright impossible to inhabit 
both worlds simultaneously, for we have lost the reflexive expectation that one will 
meaningfully inform the other. In the case of Tennyson’s poem, the contemporary reader is 
either immersed in Arthur’s world (as the poet has configured it) or in Victoria’s world 
reading a series of Arthurian tales in blank verse. Poetry and life have become different 
things altogether.
We acquiesce in this estrangement largely because the diminution in the 
transmutative power and cultural authority of poetry’s figurative elements changes our 
expectations for poetry itself—and for ourselves as readers o f i t  For if  the figurative 
becomes closely identified with the operations of the private imagination, thanks to the 
poet’s inward turn poetry becomes associated with both, and comes thereby to be seen as 
something not only to be written apart from the bustle of the public world, but experienced 
apart as well. And so instead o f turning to poetry for an explication of the events, 
personages, and circumstances o f our time, readers are now likely to erect a  psychological 
wall between it and their everyday lives and relegate it to a means of escaping from the 
world beyond their window. Poetry had always sought to delight and instruct; now if 
anything it had become merely a diversion or recreation—something that existed for its 
own sake, with no particular claims upon its readers’ public sensibilities (like much of the 
learned matter devoted to its study, both then and now).
This state of affairs was not altogether unprecedented. During the Renaissance, 
poets (perhaps taking at face value Sidney’s assertion that poetry and literal truth have little 
to do with one another) prided themselves on their ability to transport their readers to 
idealized fictional worlds far removed from everyday realities. Marlowe’s passionate
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shepherd, to cite a famous example, would seduce his nymph—and enchant us—with a 
vision of Arcadian paradise; and Donne’s persona in “The Canonization” (1633) assures 
his mistress that “if unfit for tombes and hearse / Our legend be, it will be fit for verse; / 
And if no peece of Chronicle wee prove, /  We’ll build in sonnets pretty roomes” (11.29- 
32). In fact, so long had poetry encouraged its readers to dwell apart in its “pretty roomes” 
that by the time Dry den had set up for a poet in London the poetic mode itself had fallen 
into public disregard, and even as he set himself the task of bringing the images and 
language of poetry meaningfully to bear upon political and social questions, Dry den at 
times greatly doubted the possibility of success.15 But even with his occasional misgivings 
it would have been impossible for Dry den to imagine the width o f the chasm that had come 
to divide the poetic and the public by Tennyson’s day. For when Tennyson in “The Palace 
of Art” (1833; 1842) confronts the impossibility of inhabiting the two worlds 
simultaneously, he speaks not of being immured in a  sonnet’s pretty room but of confining 
his soul within a vast, self-sufficient edifice, a  world unto itself. Having “built my soul a 
lordly pleasure-house, /  Wherein at ease for aye to dwell” (11. 1-2), to “live alone unto 
herself” (1. 11), the poet bids her “while the world runs round and round” to “Reign thou 
apart, a quiet king, / Still as, while Saturn whirls, his steadfast shade / Sleeps on his 
luminous ring” (11.13-16). Content at first among the splendours o f her own imagination, 
the poet’s soul at length finds her “Godlike isolation” 0-197) from “the darkening droves 
of swine / That range on yonder plain” (II. 199-200) and from the incessant brawls of sects 
(1. 210) to have reduced her to “a spot of dull stagnation, without light / Or power of 
movement” (11. 247-248). Fearing that madness will be her portion, she rejoins the larger
15 Winn notes, for instance, that in Astraea Redux (1660) Dry den ultimately discredits his apostrophe to 
General Monck by designating as one of “the fond chinugras we [poets] pursue” (1. 159) his extended 
analogy of the artist and military man's power to reduce chaos to order. "By retreating from the 
apparent earlier equation of the 'Arts of Sway’ with the arts of pencil, brush, and pen,” comments 
Winn, "he makes at a personal level a distinction like the one Virgil had made between Greek and 
Roman arts. Yet it was from Virgil’s seriousness, elevation, and moral complexity that Dry den would 
learn to develop a poetic voice that could have a real effect on politics” (112).
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world, exchanging her palace for “a cottage in the vale," “where I may morn and pray" (U. 
291-292). Yet she would not have her lofty towers razed: “Perchance I may return with 
others there /  When I have purged my guilt" (11.295-296). A resolution portending poetry’s 
return to the public sphere? By no means. On the contrary, it is a  sign of just how removed 
from the public sphere poetry now is that Tennyson here casts the separation of life and art 
as a purely personal struggle, a  conflict between the social and aesthetic motives within the 
individual Self.
Further, it is a sign of our revised expectations for ourselves as readers of poetry 
that we do not bid Tennyson an ironic welcome when he decides to end his self-imposed 
solitude and rejoin our world o f peace, wars, sectarian brawls, and “filthy sloughs” (1. 
201) filled with madded swine, or greet his anguished epiphany that one cannot live in Art 
with a shrug and a yawn. For even as Tennyson’s theme is borne in on us, we find that our 
experience of his poem has been much akin to his own solipsism: the poem has not asked 
us to conflate its world with the circumstances of our own, but rather to let the latter go by 
and play passive, appreciative witnesses to the rich tapestry of the poet’s imagination. And 
we are likely to comply, for if the poet’s appropriation of the figurative means we are no 
longer his partners in the creation o f broad cultural meaning, we can yet pride ourselves on 
our ability to appreciate the pleasing images proffered us. We can revel in our gifts as 
connoisseurs—as knowing consumers—of the poet’s productions.
Our expectation that poetry should be enjoyed as well as written apart from the 
larger society points up the second consequence of the separation o f the figurative from the 
public sphere: its loss of real social and cultural relevance. Or we might say that when we 
no longer expect the figurative to resonate communally, when we no longer demand that it 
signify readily beyond the individual sensibility, then whatever its aesthetic appeal, the 
figurative has effectively lost much of its cultural authority. That is, it is no longer capable 
of intimating a cohesive collective identity either among its readers or between the present 
day and the past: it loses its power to compel belief in and elicit reliance upon the
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universality and timelessness of experience within a given culture, and thus loses as well its 
power to provide patterns of such experience by which we may perceive, define, and 
explicate the historical present Instead, when figurative materials are consigned to the 
private sphere they become, as we have seen, yet another vehicle by which the individual 
can define him- or herself against the collective identity (multilayered or amorphous as it 
may be) and extend his or her personal autonomy at the expense of the aggregate power of 
society. But at base, as the separation of the figurative from the public sphere entails a loss 
of cultural relevance, so does this loss of relevance over time foster in poetry's readers (not 
to mention those who have no use for it) expectations of its irrelevance for the public 
sphere; this in turn discourages the poet from offering up his productions to the public 
weal, and the public, from taking such efforts seriously.16 The cycle is self-perpetuating: 
the longer the figurative’s absence from the public sphere, the less likely its return—and the 
less likely the re-emergence o f poetry itself from its indenture to the individual 
consciousness, the less likely its restoration to cultural authority. For if  the figurative is 
imperilled by the poet’s inward turn, the poet’s appropriation of figurative materials so 
undermines the viability of public poetry as to all but guarantee its extinction: as the former 
forfeits the best (and last) forum for the figurative, so the latter deprives poetry not only of 
its power to capture, frame, and interpret collective experience (as I have just suggested), 
but o f its unique ssthetic appeal as well. Public poetry need not be exclusively or even 
highly figurative; individual poems in the public mode may be only minimally figurative, if 
at all. Yet without recourse to credible figurative elements that can transform common 
experience, uniting discrete, even disparate, individual perceptions within the compass of 
common icons, poetry itself has no special claim upon public attention, and therefore little 
power to compel public attention—and thus effectively ceases to be public. Nor is this all.
When asked by National Public Radio if she planned to write a poem commemorating the Million Man 
March, Maya Angelon replied that she found it difficult to write public poetry. In fact, she said, “ft's a 
contradiction in terms, really, ‘public’ and ‘poem.’ I don’t think one can write a poem for the public."
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Once poetry has surrendered the last o f its erstwhile prerogatives to the specialists—the 
historians, philosophers, moralists, psychologists, scientists, sociologists, and 
anthropologists all claiming their portion—poetry that would be public may well prove 
noxious to society and individual poet alike, its figurative treatment compromising 
verifiable fact, its necessary breadth o f appeal an affront to the integrity of one’s private 
vision (see note 16, below).
The cultural restoration o f the figurative and indeed o f public poetry is made the 
more unlikely by the third consequence of the separation of the figurative from the public 
sphere, the decay of figurative materials and of the figurative habit itself. If it happened that 
in a certain village the inhabitants ceased to speak to one another, and whether alone or in 
company spoke only to themselves, over time not only would the significations of their 
words diverge, becoming increasingly subject to personal associations, but eventually the 
words themselves would change, modified by the tendencies of individual tongues and 
palates. A common language would thus fragment into any number o f individual patois, 
still mutually intelligible, perhaps, but none of them singly either capacious or authoritative 
enough for the conduct of public affairs. The figurative materials o f poetry decay in an 
analogous way, and for a similar reason. The body of such materials in a given community 
is, like its language, ever changing: the exigencies of experience and expression mean that 
its elements are continually being added to, deleted, and modified. And yet, though this 
body is by no means static, the values of its components not absolute, so long as it 
participates in the social life of the larger community these components, however inflected, 
will remain broadly and readily intelligible. When, however, the larger community no 
longer presides over the figurative vocabulary, when it is resigned instead to the usages of 
the individual poet, this vocabulary is likely to grow corrupt Its terms detached from the 
social milieu that generated and sustained them, the broadly cultural significations of these 
terms become arrested, and soon cease to be vital, organic. Replaced by an indefinite 
number of narrowly personal associations, these erstwhile significations are first
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diminished as their connotative power is constricted—then lost altogether. As for the terms 
themselves, their use in articulating the private Self s ephemeral caprices and moods will 
tend to compromise their identification with the universal and timeless, and thus trivialize 
them, undermining their cultured credibility and authority. Ultimately, however, when the 
passage o f time has obscured its denotative origins and promiscuous application has eroded 
its connotative significance, the allegorical, historical, literary, or aesthetic icon will largely 
cease to reverberate even within the poet’s own consciousness. Never having thought of it 
as a living thing, the poet will be as ignorant of it as the public from which he has emerged 
and would distinguish himself, as conditioned to regard what little he has seen of it to be 
dated and quaint, the trappings o f ages and mindsets rightly consigned to extinction. When 
the figurative does glint here and there amidst the prosey lines o f the poet who has regained 
some knowledge of it, we are as likely to be struck by its taint o f self-consciousness as by 
the frustrating strangeness of it—as when we come across an English paragraph peppered 
needlessly with words from a language we do not understand. True it is that our appetite 
for the figurative lingered long enough into the twentieth century to allow Freud to explain 
experience allegorically, and Jung, archetypically. But if  Freud’s allegories were too 
shifting, their significations too dependent upon the minute particulars of the individual 
psyche to merit general application, Jung’s archetypes were too for removed from everyday 
experience to be quite compelling. And in any case, however attractive the systems of 
Freud and Jung may have proven, the essential loss of the operative figurative language 
and frameworks by which poetry once explicated the historical present is revealed by the 
failure of Yeats, Eliot, and Pound to resurrect and reintroduce those elements, to reinfuse 
them into their depictions of everyday life.The cultural allusions and locutions had already 
grown too obscure for readers o f poetry—now so very few in number—to have any
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chance of integrating them into their day-to-day negotiations of the early twentieth 
century.17
And so for the figurative, segregation from the public sphere leads to decay; decay, 
to ignorance and misuse; and these, to extinction—and so an ancient common tongue is 
lost. Lost, because the figurative habit itself is compromised by the removal o f the 
figurative lexicon from the public sphere.
It would face other serious challenges as the nineteenth century wore on and gave 
way to the twentieth: industrialization, which tended to reduce the individual’s role in the 
economic life o f the community, and thus his or her presence in the community itself; 
urbanization, which compounded the isolation and alienation attendant upon industrialism 
by throwing together hordes of mutual strangers in metropolises simply too vast to be fully 
comprehended, let alone culturally cohesive; the progress o f science and the specialization
17 To take Eliot as example: few poets have ever insisted upon the necessity of cultivating a sense of the 
past as forcefully as Eliot did in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919). Tradition, he says, 
“cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. It involves, in the Erst
place, the historical sense [,] a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence;
the historical sense compels a man to write not merely with his own generation in his bones, but with 
a feeling that the whole of the literature of Europe from Homer and within it die whole of the literature 
of his own country has a simultaneous existence and composes a simultaneous order” (38). Such a 
resolution certainly seems to promote the poet’s facility with figurative vocabulary and frameworks. 
But apart from the difficulty of acquiring an idiom as esoteric awl exotic as this passage concedes the 
literary tradition to be, is the laborious self-consciousness with which Eliot actually carried out this 
programme. Citing Eliot's assertions in “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921) that “poets in our 
civilzation, as it exists at present, must be difficult" and that “the poet must become more and more 
comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect, in order to force, to dislocate if necessary, language into 
his meaning” (65), Richard Poirier suggests that this credo is “designed to intimidate his readers, to 
make them assent to what he is trying to exhibit by his technique of allusiveness, which is that he is a 
great poet working directly in the idiom of other poets known to be great” (39). Eliot uses the artifacts 
of tradition to make himself a high priest of Western culture, conducting his ritual explications of it in 
a language made all but unintelligible not simply by his audience's ignorance of its terms, but by 
Eliot’s investing these terms with his own highly personal associations. Poirier discusses a “notorious 
example" I cannot resist quoting in full, the epigraph to “Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a 
Cigar” (1919-20):
The epigraph is a hodge-podge of six quotations, starting with a rather supercilious ‘Tra- 
la-la-la-la-la-laire,” this being the call of the gondolier in Venice taken from a poem by 
Thdophile Gautier, from whom Eliot was im itating the highly accelerated stanza form of 
the poem. This is followed by 'nil nisi stabile est; caetera fumus.' The first word ought 
to be ‘nihil’ and the phrase means ‘only the divine endures; the rest is smoke.’ The Latin 
is from an inscription in a painting by Mantegna, one of Eliot’s favorite painters, found 
in a church in Venice, on the subject of the martyrdom of St. Sebastian.. . . .  The next 
four allusions are respectively to The Aspem Papers, Othello, both set in Venice, and 
then to Browning and Marston (39-40).
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of learning, which both drew upon and fostered the specialization o f language, throwing 
into relief the distinction between the literal and the figurative and favoring the former over 
the latter; and the development of technologies—photography, the telegraph (which made 
global journalism possible), film, sound recordings, radio—that not only increased the 
speed and efficiency with which information could be gathered and disseminated, but w oe 
able, seemingly, to realize and convey the moments they recorded without the aid of 
figurative apparatus. Having given us new means o f capturing experience in itself (as it 
were), such media have in fact changed  our notions o f it, making it seem individual, local, 
unique, its separate instants perhaps vaguely part o f some pathless linear progression, but 
each effectively whole in itself, autonomous from what came before or what will come 
after—and the more completely realized the moment, the more autonomous, the more 
authentic it may be supposed to be. If such changes in demography as the last century and a 
half has seen have predisposed the individual consciousness to turn inward, to assign its 
own private cognitive and narrative patterns (or mnemonic system, since memory is 
patterned experience) to what it experiences, to regard the significant events of the public 
sphere world as merely so many signposts, so many associative triggers that bring discrete 
points o f these patterns to mind again, the successive advances in communication 
technologies have made images of events in the public sphere increasingly ubiquitous and 
uniform, so crystallizing their historical moments as to preclude their fusion into a greater 
cultural narrative: the very clarity of such images refer us only to a particular instant or 
configuration o f circumstances, and to their most proximate associations. And thus when 
we are asked where we were and what we were doing when Kennedy was shot, or when 
Apollo 11 landed on the moon, or when we heard Challenger had exploded, though we 
may briefly share with him or her a certain specific mnemonic catalyst, we are prompted by 
the habit of self-reference, by our new assumption o f a self-contained present, and by the 
structure of the questions themselves not to seek out and partake of whatever collective 
significance may be assigned to such events, but to see that moment in isolation from its
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larger context and then turn inward to our private experience o f it, to look back upon it in 
after days, reflecting upon its role in the formation o f our own individual identity. 
Preoccupied with our own personal preservation of the moment, we become the market for 
ready-made souvenirs and mementoes such as commemorative plates, coins, figurines and 
stamps; or, if  we resist these objects, our preoccupation at least predisposes us toward 
accumulating artifacts (also mass-produced, -distributed, and -marketed) that represent or 
come to represent the separate episodes along the timelines o f our lives. In this way, then, 
the loss o f cultural continuity leads ultimately to the commodification of experience, 
memory, and identity.
The separation of the figurative from the public sphere reinforces the perceptual and 
mnemonic habits inculcated by these and other features o f our modem world and 
sensibility. Insofar as disuse of the figurative entails its corruption, the loss of a viably 
public figurative lexicon means that readers will over time lose the ability and desire to read 
figuratively—perhaps even the bare notion that it is possible to do so. In its turn, such a 
development will, by closing off what had been the broadest, most reliable avenues to the 
larger society and the common cultural heritage that binds an individual to the community 
and the community to its past, tend to isolate us within ourselves and within the present 
moment. Indeed, Pound was only making a virtue o f necessity when he laid out his 
programme for Imagism in the first years of this century. Defining the all-important image 
in his 1918 essay, “Retrospect,” as “that which presents an intellectual and emotional 
complex in an instant of time” (4), Pound enumerates the three tenets of the Imagist 
movement
1. Direct treatment of the “thing” whether subjective or objective.
2. To use absolutely no word that does not contribute to the presentation.
3. As regarding rhythm: to compose in the sequence o f the musical phrase, 
not in the sequence of the metronome (3).
These principles recall Pound’s assertion in his earlier essay, “Vorticism” (1914), th at, “In
[an Imagist poem] one is trying to record the precise instant when a thing outward and
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objective transforms itself, or darts into a  thing inward and subjective” (467). The moment 
is all, complete in and unto itself, and the image that captures it is and must be at “the 
furthest possible remove from rhetoric” (“Vorticism,” 462): “[T]he author must use his 
image because he sees it or feels it, not because he thinks he can use it to back up some 
creed or some system o f ethics or economics” (464). The image and the moment it 
subsumes are not, in other words, to make any pretense of participating o f public affairs. 
Indeed, the image, properly rendered, is so self-referential as to transcend language and 
become the idea of the “thing” itself: “The point o f Imagisme is that it does not use images 
as ornaments. The image is the speech itself. The image is the word beyond formulated 
language” (“Vorticism,” 466). The fully realized Imagist would thus be very much at home 
among the projectors of Swift’s Lagado, who, having at last achieved an absolute one-to- 
one correlation of word to thing, conduct their conversations by showing one another the 
physical objects themselves. Entirely self-contained, the image admits o f nothing beyond 
itself, nothing that is not absolutely intrinsic to it; it cannot, therefore, be alloyed with the 
figurative trappings that might imbue it with a significance beyond itself, nor lend itself to 
any application beyond its immediate context The moment is the image, and the image, the 
moment; poetry’s taslr is to conflate the two utterly. Pound here prescribes rather narrowly, 
for a single poetic effect, but his precepts and practice—and the example o f the generation 
of poets he and Eliot helped shape—would sufficiently transcend the immediate objectives 
of Imagism to make the image as he defined it the goal of much twentieth century poetry.
It may be that Pound’s prescriptions proved so influential because they accorded so 
well with what poetry in English was fast becoming—or perhaps, with what poetry had 
essentially been for much of the preceding century and before. Consider the principles for 
Imagism as set forth by Amy Lowell and Richard Aldington in the first o f their three 
Imagist anthologies (1915):
1. To use the language of common speech, but to employ always the exact 
word, not the nearly exact, nor the merely decorative word.
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2. To create new rhythms— as the expression of new moods— and not to 
copy old rhythms, which merely echo old moods. We do not insist upon 
“free verse” as the only method o f writing poetry. We fight for it as for a 
principle of liberty.. .  .In poetry, new cadence means a new idea.
3. To allow absolute freedom in the choice of sub ject. . .
4. To present an image (hence the name: "Imagist”). We are not a school of 
painters, but we believe poetry should render particulars exactly and not 
deal in vague generalities, however magnificent and sonorous.. . .
5. To produce poetry that is hard and clear, never blurred nor indefinite.
6. Finally, most of us believe that concentration is of the very essence in 
poetry.18
Whatever anxiety of influence may have caused many Modernists to reject the objectives 
and achievements of their Romantic forebears, these tenets demonstrate that nothing is as 
derivative as rebellion. The emphasis on “the language of common speech,” the quest for 
new rhythms and moods, the insistence on “absolute freedom in the choice o f subject,” the 
notion that “poetry should render particulars exactly,” the repudiation of imitation, of 
established forms and diction, o f ornamental language and “vague generalities, however 
magnificent and sonorous”—such ideas might have been cribbed from Wordsworth’s 
critical pronouncements of exactly one hundred years earlier. Wordsworth, it is true, never 
championed free verse (though he likely would have regarded Lowell’s defense of it as “a 
principle o f liberty” an important assertion of the poet’s fundamental autonomy from the 
philistine tastes o f “the public”); free verse, however, is but the final step in making poetry 
as prosaic, as based in the immediate, the individual—the literal—as the novel had been 
since Defoe, as capable now as that genre to record, in W oolfs phrase, “the atoms as they 
fall upon the mind, in the order in which they fall,” to “trace the pattern, however 
disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the 
consciousness” (“Modem Fiction,” 155).19 In a sense, then, Lowell’s tenets bring us full
18 Quoted in Coffman, Stanley K., Jr. Imagism: A Chapterfor the History o f Modem Poetry. Norman: U 
of Oklahoma P, 1951.28-29.
19 Woolf s next sentence is equally apropos to my argument here: “Let us not take it for granted that life 
exists more fully in what is commonly thought big than in what is commonly thought small."
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circle,20 return us to that moment when poetry broke from its Augustan norms, show us 
perhaps what that break had meant for poetry all along, that it would henceforth, first by 
design then by necessity, increasingly adapt itself to those modem habits o f mind—the 
inward turn; the conception o f time as a series o f discrete moments, each with its defining 
complex o f thought and emotion; and the consequent forfeiture o f an historical present in 
favor of a largely self-referential, perpetual Now—that make it possible to isolate and thus 
commodify experience, and with it, memory, and with memory, identity.
When poetry retreats from the public sphere, it deprives the figurative habit and its 
language of their last, best forum, and the cultural impulse toward the figurative grows 
moribund; once it has, for good or ill, the mythic gives way to the material.
20 Not that Lowell is the last to assert what she does. I find it significant—and pleasantly ironic—that as 
Pound, Eliot, and Lowell aid up reaffirming what they claim to reject, so decades later would Philip 
Larkin, representative of a generation of poets that repudiated much of Modernism’s doctrines and 
posturings, echo his bogeys so closely. In his short essay, “The Pleasure Principle” (1957), Larkin 
asserts that writing a poem “consists of three stages: the first is when a man becomes obsessed with an 
emotional concept to such a degree that he is compelled to do something about it. What he does is the 
second stage, namely, construct a verbal device that will reproduce this emotional concept in anyone 
who cares to read it, anywhere, any time. The third stage is the recurrent situation of people in different 
times and places setting off the device and re-creating in themselves what the poet felt when he wrote 
it” (80). This is the process Larkin would refer to in his essay, “Writing Poems” (1964), as “verbal 
pickling” (83). It is true that in “Subsidizing Poetry” (1976) Larkin rejects Eliot’s conception of 
poetry—propounded in “Tradition and the Individual Talent” (1919)—“as a living whole of all the 
poetry that has ever been written” (40). Calling Eliot’s view “the American, or Ford-car, view of 
literature, which holds that every new poem somehow incorporates all poems that have gone before it 
and takes them a step further” (89), Larkin argues that “the drawback of such a notion is that it 
suggests that poems are bom of other poems, rather than from personal non-Iiterary experience, and for 
a poet this is disastrous. He will become obsessed with poems that are already in existence, instead of 
those it is his business to bring into being by ex te rn a liz in g  and eternalizing his own perceptions in 
unique and original verbal form” (89). But even in his advocacy of a “small,” local poetry, of a poetry 
that is immediate, broadly accessible, and ever mindful of its readers’ interest and pleasure, he no more 
than Eliot can keep from segregating the experience of poetry from the other formative experiences of 
life, cannot help seeing poetry as something very different than and essentially divorced from real life. 
Insofar as poetry is a ratified encounter its is a qualified, compromised one, because to that degree it is 
engaged apart from the gritty business of living and of making sense of life. There could hardly be a 
clearer sign of just how absolutely poetry (in itself and as a vehicle for the figurative) has been 
expunged from the scenes of everyday life, private as well as public.
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4. The SoHoiad: Or. The Masque o f A n
To appreciate just how disorienting, even unsettling the figurative as a mnemonic 
device has become, we might consider a poem that first appeared some years ago in The 
New York Review o f Books—no doubt to the general puzzlement o f its readership. The 
SoHoiad: or. The Masque o f A n  (1984), by the Australian art critic Robert Hughes, is, as 
the title page tells us, “A Satire in Heroic Couplets Drawn from Life,” taking for its subject 
the figures, fads, and tastes o f the New York art world of the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. 
It is at once a lament for the narrow, self-referential insularity of much modem art and art 
criticism and an indictment of the cynical manufacture and marketing o f artistic trends. In 
theme, The Sohoiad offers up an apt, if  incidental demonstration o f how experience, 
memory, and identity come to be commodified (here, by artists, their handlers and clients); 
in effect, the form, scope, pose, and usages of Hughes’ poem, taken together, throw into 
clear, jarring relief what we have forfeited by eschewing the figurative—and the essentially 
figurative notion of an historical present—in our portrayal of the moment immediately 
before us.
From the title’s announcement that the poet’s satire will be conducted in couplets, 
the late-twentieth-century reader is likely to be on unsteady or at least unfamiliar ground. 
Most of us encounter rhyme only in greeting card verse, typically so bad that we may be 
forgiven an instinctive identification of rhyme with the frivolous, mawkish, and absurd.21 
But granting that rhyme might be turned to a serious purpose, it has been so thoroughly 
displaced by free verse that its appearance is likely to suggest the contemporary poet’s 
affectation of the antique. Far from adapting the dress of his poem to the fashions of the 
times, however, Hughes deliberately sets about heightening the quaintness of the piece by
21 A venerable, well-meaning poet once admonished our poetry writing seminar at the University of 
Nebraska-Lincoln to avoid rhyme unless we were aiming at a comic effect.
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adopting eighteenth-century diction, locutions (epic sim iles; cano, fuit, and dixit 
constructions; syntax inverted for “heroic” effect), typography (personified nouns are given 
as frivolity , YOUTH, and CHAOS; significant or ironically used words are italicized; 
hyphens frequently take the place o f letters in proper names), and spellings (Dulness, 
Apodictick, Critick). In addition, Hughes makes no attempt to mitigate or explain the 
poem’s implicit and explicit allusions. To begin with the title, few indeed are the readers 
who will discern in “SoHoiad” an echo o f “Dunciad,” or recognize that the bare similarity 
of sound is itself a clue to what we will find in a poem that takes Pope’s work as its model: 
it will be a mock-heroic survey of its subject; it will offer within a loose narrative 
framework a series o f satiric pen-portraits o f the poet’s contemporaries; its collection of 
grotesqueries will not simply expose vice and folly, but seek to insinuate a set of stable, 
universally operative principles, moral as well as esthetic; and, despite the vigor and 
apparent success of its satire, it will conclude with a nightmare vision o f virtue, worth, and 
merit in defeat, Dulness and her Dunces (or their equivalents) trium phant Hughes in fact 
resurrects the characters o f Dulness and Chaos for The Sohoiad. The former is a denizen of 
“glamorous SoHo,” where she “dwells in sweats and glooms, / Gnaws her brown nails, 
and shakes ho- sable plumes” (405); while the latter, as in Pope’s poem, brings about the 
return, if not of anarchy, then o f chronic dissipation: “Now at thy hands, Great Chaos! are 
restored / The brief and foolish pleasures o f the bored: / The pompous novelty, the well- 
hyp’d trick /  Delivered in the merest Augenbliclfc” (406). These deities—and lesser 
goddesses reminiscent o f Pope’s Cloacina, such as “Ka k o pic t a , Muse of Transient 
Modes” (408)—accompany any number of verbal and stylistic allusions to the body of 
Pope’s satire, as when Hughes’ persona speaks of “Trustees who deal, and dealers none 
may trust” (407), or, more specifically, o f art pedlar Leo Castelli, who leads on collectors 
and critics “as the Organ leads the Ape" (411), or when he describes the present day as an 
age long ago foretold, “The gross Satumian age of iron and gold” (411). Such allusions 
adorn in new and unfamiliar guise the personages, circumstances, and character of an
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already esoteric milieu with which few may claim close acquaintance. And just who is it 
that presumes to put before us such an eccentric portrait o f the avant-garde? The 
pseudonym beneath the title (presuming we recognize it as a pseudonym) is not likely to 
give us much o f a clue. Few will discern in “Junius Secundus” a  reference to the 
anonymous Whig author whose satirical letters against the administration of George III 
appeared in The Public A dvertiser between 1769 and 1771, and whose own pen name 
derives from Marcus Junius Brutus (c. 85-42 BC), arch-republican assassin of the man 
who would make himself dictator o f a free people—and thus the implications of “Junius 
Secundus” for the character and aims of Hughes’ persona will go largely unrecognized.
Insofar as the formal and literary allusions of Hughes’ poem prove obscure to the 
reader the public’s loss o f a  working figurative vocabulary would seem to be confirmed. 
However, the difficulties The SoHoiad presents to the reader of the late twentieth century 
go beyond Hughes’ use o f antiquated trappings and references grown dim with time. For 
the poem asks its readers to pattern their experience o f the world before them in ways not 
simply unfamiliar but wholly antipathetic to their usual practices; it asks them, in short, to 
adopt broadly figurative habits o f perception and understanding.
The scope of the poem, its sheer breadth of subject, demands that we exercise one 
such figurative habit. By giving his poem the title, The SoHoiad, Hughes asks us to 
believe that the portraits, scenes, and images opening before us really do constitute the 
SoHo art world at a given time. Certainly Hughes would give us an encyclopedic view of 
that world. Here are the tasteless, “purblind V inuosr (406), among them the cloying 
Dolores G ruesom e , smothering protectress o f slim, half-fledged talents; here is the 
egomaniacal JULIAN Sn o r k el , “Poor SoHo’s cynosure, the dealer’s dream, / Much wind, 
slight talent, and vast self-esteem” (407); here, the “pliant and complaisant throng of Art- 
Reporters” that “flatulates along / with tongues a-wag and wits made dull by rust" (407); 
here, the trustees and dealers, and the curators “clutching freebies to their breasts” (407), 
here the critic “expounds her fribbling law / That scarce an A rtists’ Groupie was before”
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(407); here, the dull and incompetent who botch the masters they would plagiarize; here, 
the ranks of patrons: “mild stock-brokers with blow-dried hair” (409), “tanned regiments 
o f well-shrunk Dental Surgeons,” their “leather-swaddled spouses,” and “the prattling, 
lacquered Divorced” (410); here, the “An Advisers, I Dragging bewildered clients by the 
nose / Down Spring Street, through the lofts and studios” (410); and here, the grand 
debaucher of SoHo, “pale ANDY WARBLE,” whose “life in Art is ever to confer / With 
Stars and Catamites, a keen Voyeur” (411-12). We are, in feet, to infer from the dazzling 
variegation of the poem that its canvas is comprehensive, or effectively so, that in its 
personalities and productions SoHo itself has been captured complete, entirely compassed. 
The multifarious spectacle we witness here is a  “masque,” after all, and thus possessed of 
at least a latent design. Indeed, to believe or assume that such totality o f vision and 
portrayal is possible we must first presuppose that despite its bewildering variety and 
boiling chaos the world is essentially a narrow, orderly place—sufficiently so at any rate to 
allow the poet to reduce it to coherence with the allegorical conceit, the pen portrait, and the 
couplet And sufficiently so to allow us to see the whole in the part: for though the poem 
captures the merest fraction o f the workings of one endeavor in one area of a vast 
metropolis, Hughes’ title, The SoH oiad: or, The Masque o f Art, asks us to equate the 
poem’s few telling particulars with the entirety of the art trade in SoHo—and the art trade in 
SoHo with the state o f Art itself. We are asked, that is, to believe that the world is so much 
of a piece that the part replicates the whole, and therefore that the local may be identified 
with the universal, the latter understood by careful scrutiny of the former. One might say 
that the scope of the poem asks us to see what is not before us in any literal sense (order, 
completeness, the typical) while asking us to see what is there (the random, the 
fragmentary, the particular) synecdochically, as emblems o f an immanent comprehension.
The form of the poem elicits another figurative habit in the reader. Hughes’ use of 
conventions readily identifiable with The Dunciad but also with such works as Horace’s 
Satire 1.10 (“Yes, I did say Lucilius’ lines occasionally falter”), his epistle to Augustus,
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Rochester’s An Allusion to Horace, Dry den’s “MacFlecknoe,” and Byron’s English Bards 
and Scotch Reviewers suggests that our world and what we know o f it may be organized 
according to age-old models. This moment in history, its inhabitants, and their impulse to 
depict compellingly their circum stance s  and experiences are not so unique as to be without 
precedent. Continuity o f form implies larger continuities: o f cultural identity, o f human 
nature, of aesthetic standards. And it is to a sense of such continuities that Hughes’ poem 
appeals, for it is upon their axis that its satire turns. Like all good epics, mock or genuine, 
The SoHoiad opens upon an apparently climactic pass, specifically, that moment when a 
resurgent Chaos has restored “the brief and foolish pleasures o f the bored” (406), when the 
crass, philistine ethics o f art’s marketplace have supplanted taste, sense, and perspective— 
“Opinion bows and scrapes, to Trade defers, / As Disco-Owners turn to Connoisseurs; / 
Historians to the urinous subway fly / To scribble theses on ‘The Spraying Eye’” (406)— 
effecting a broader cultural dissolution. When, at the poem’s climax, M ammon’s “acolytes 
and nautch-girls” dance about the triumphant god’s monstrous effigy (its eyes “glazed with 
fiscal lust /  And nostrils caked with prime Peruvian dust”), the narrator observes ruefully, 
“Thus is arriv’d, as in the past foretold, / The gross Satumian age o f iron and gold” (410- 
411). But worse is to come—and must come. As, “pervasive, fruity, sulphurous, full, and 
ripe,” the distinctive “odour o f an Art World Hype” escapes from the effigy’s “gilt behind,” 
the gas is unluckily set alight and in the resulting explosion “Galleries totter, boutiques are 
laid bare” / . . .  “The crowd o f celebrants is whirl’d from sight / As PHOEBUS disappears, 
and all is Night” (412-413). Abhorrent in themselves, their productions hideous, the real 
danger posed by those serving Lucre under the guise o f Art is that when their bubble finally 
bursts Art itself will lose its credibility and social sanction, imperilling its true devotees and 
their cultural vocation—as here Mammon’s immolation obscures Phoebus himself and 
thereby plunges all into darkness. “Thus,” reflects Hughes’ persona, “to distracted culture 
justly come / The punishments o f Herculaneum” (413). Though the particulars o f our 
moment of cultural collapse are unique to it, such moments have been witnessed by other
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cultures—by the hapless residents o f Herculaneum, for instance, and, after them, the
ancient Romans. Early in the poem, Kakopicta, “muse o f transient modes," encourages her
dispirited minions by rem inding them that “As once the tourist, 'm idst the ruins o f Rome, /
Cull'd from the earth the decor for his home, / A cornice here, a  herm or statua there, /  To
prink the prospect o f the dull parterre" and “[cumber] his house with false Etruscan urns"
(408), so now they may profitably scavenge the “orts and fragments” of past and current
masters that bestrew the esthetic wasteland of SoHo. The destruction o f its classical
forebears, Hughes implies, prefigures the ultimate fate of our own decadent civilization.
As he aligns the moment before us with its historical precedents, we realize that one
target of Hughes’ satire here is our general disinclination to see the past in the present, the
present in the past So far as art is concerned, this means that we are left vulnerable to those
who, exploiting our ignorance, literally capitalize upon i t  passing off the old as new, the
ancient as original. “Such," vaunts Kakopicta, “is the custom of our Post-Modemes
Post-Modernism long ago took note
That when Invention flags, we needs must quote:
And when the cobbled-up quotation drops 
To semi-illiterates and earnest fops 
(American collectors), the convention 
Is to extol it as a new Invention.
Thus to advance, but likewise to retard,
Is purpos’d by the Post-Trans-Avant-Garde.
So in our world the energies are spent—
What few remember, dullards may invent (408-409).
Such subterfuges separate us from our money, but their long-term effects are far more
serious. By occluding our sense o f historical and aesthetic perspective, they prevent us
from applying the standards such perspective would instill and sustain, forcing us to take
the market’s word that what it offers is worth buying. But by the time we have become
“semi-illiterates and earnest fops," our common cultural heritage has likely been so eroded
as to deprive us o f our sense o f an historical present and our place in it—deprive us, in
short, of our identity.
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If Hughes would have us regard the present as an extension or reiteration of the 
past, he would likewise have us think o f individuals not as an absolutely unique, 
enigmatically complex beings, but as representatives of well-defined, broadly recognizable 
types. To recognize the type in the individual and the individual in the type, however, we 
must assume that the individual is but a unique configuration o f timeless, universal 
characteristics, and to make this assumption we must further assume that human nature in 
general is sufficiently finite in its variety and its several varieties sufficiently constant and 
predictable to bear greatly reductive categorization. For such assumptions seem, ultimately, 
to cast us as the dramatis personae in a  vast, self-renewing diorama, each o f us taking our 
turn at roles that recur in equivalent terms toward equivalent ends age after age after age. At 
any rate, this is the perspective we must adopt if we are to appreciate the method and aim of 
the The SoHoiatTs pen-portraits. Consider, for instance, what is perhaps the poem’s most 
effective character sketch, that o f JULIAN SNORKEL, “the hybrid child o f H ubris” (406). 
Though Snorkel pretends to great talent, he is in feet possessed of “ten fet thumbs”; though 
he would be taken for a profound thinker, Snorkel only “babbles, whines, and prates / Of 
Death and Life, Careers and Broken Plates / (The larger subjects for the smaller brain) / 
And as his victims doze, he rants again” (407). No matter, for Snorkel’s megalomania is as 
blinkered as it is brazen:
Shall I compare me to Picasso? Yes!
Within me, VAN GOGH’s vision, nothing less,
Is wedded to the genius o f T itian
And mixed promiscuously, without permission,
With several o f Bob RAUSCHENBERG’S devices.
The market’s fixed to underwrite my prices—
Compared to my achievement, Jackson Pollack’s 
Is nothing but a  load of passe bollocks;
My next show goes by Concorde to the Prado:
‘Painter as Hero: Snorkel, Leonardo.’
Yet the comparison’s a trifle spotty,
Since Leo says I’m heir to BUONARROTI.
' Though those old Guineas knew a thing or three,
They’d certainly know more if they’d known me (407).
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Here is the arch-egotist, the poseur exposed by his own pretensions. We know him well, 
for he is the kin of such literary cousins as Zoilus, Robert Greene, Sir Richard Blackmore, 
John Dennis, Colley Cibber, D.H. Lawrence, and Gore Vidal. But if, as Hughes hopes, 
we recoil in contemptuous exasperation from Snorkel's picture here, it is because Snorkel 
himself has cornered us at parties and prattled ad nauseam about his raison d ’etre, his 
politics—or his boat; has numbed us in the lecture hall with his intellectual preening; has 
driven us from the coffee-house with his poetry or singing on open-mike nights; has filled 
the pages o f his many, many books (both pedantic and popular) with fatuous posturing and 
gassy self-congratulation. Should we fly to altars he would find us, and there talk us dead, 
for fools still rush in where angels fear to tread. In other words, so well has Hughes 
captured the type o f the minimally talented boor that we are ready to acknowledge the 
veracity o f the portrait, even before we consider whether or not it depicts an actual person, 
even if Hughes’ real-life model escapes us in whole or in part. In fact, the details of 
Snorkel’s character and career are intended to bring painfully to mind and viscera those of 
the artist, promoter, and SoHo celebrity Julian Schnabel,22 who, Hughes reports, once 
“recorded his solemn opinion that his ‘peers’ were ‘Duccio, Giotto and van Gogh’” (303), 
and whom Hughes would characterize in the same 1987 essay23 as the art world’s 
consummate fraudeur, “a true self-constructed American”: “His entry [into the art scene and 
public consciousness in general] was propelled by a megalomaniac, painfully sincere belief 
in his own present genius and future historical importance” (301). Schnabel and his friends 
might protest that Hughes’ sketch is too distorted, reductive, and angry to render a true 
likeness o f its original, but such objections would miss the point The satiric pen-portrait
22 Schnabel recently produced a film biography of his sometime proteg6, Jean-Michel Basquiat, here 
renamed by Hughes JEAN-MICHEL B ASKETCASE.
23 “Julian Schnabel.” Republished in Nothing i f  Not Critical (1990). 299-308.
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makes no pretense to strict biographical accuracy or photorealism; it is rather a compelling 
caricature that distends the singular features o f its subject until they become recognizable as 
emblems of the vices and follies they would expose and ridicule. Snorkel is Schnabel, but 
Schnabel dressed in the gaudy rags o f Imposture. Thus attired, SoHo’s would-be 
Prometheus stands forth no hero, merely the latest scion of an ancient house.
Even if we are charmed by Schnabel’s practice o f affixing broken plates to his 
canvasses—“which," Hughes notes, “have lately developed the irksome habit o f falling o ff 
the paintings, so that he now has a factotum who flies about America gluing them back on" 
(304)—we are likely to roll our eyes at the artist who proclaims himself heir to da Vinci, 
Michelangelo, Titian, van Gogh, and Picasso. Indeed, the satirist counts on our doing so, 
and can assume we will, for though our acquaintance with Schnabel’s work may be slight, 
we are familiar enough with the others’ (or its reputation) to know that any given 
contemporary artist is unlikely to merit such a comparison. But if the juxtapositioning of 
Schnabel and his crockery with these masters excites our sense of the absurd, Hughes has 
succeeded in arousing our sense o f a third continuity, that of aesthetic standards. Not 
necessarily the exact same standards: it is self-evident than Titian and Picasso cannot both 
be accounted deathless unless we apply very different criteria to Renaissance and Modernist 
modes. I mean rather that whatever specific rules an age or public may impose upon its 
artists, certain essential assumptions will always apply. One is that standards beyond the 
artist’s immediate aims, whims, and interests do exist Merit is not simply what an artist’s 
ego or avarice would have it be, nor what his incompetence or poverty obliges him to 
declare it to be. Snorkel would have us take him for the equal of Picasso and the rest on the 
strength of his word and that o f his promoter, Leo Castelli—a bit o f wishful puffery 
designed to ensure that the market will remain “fixed to underwrite my prices" (407). 
Another assumption is that an artist will either submit to the current standards—thereby 
giving us the means to assess his work and relate it that of others—or defy them 
compellingly, offering us a vision at once original and coherent Snorkel cannot pretend to
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greatness by plagiarizing “several o f Bob RAUSCHENBERG’s devices"; or the Post-
Modemes, by “cobbling up" quotations and passing the resulting product off as a new
invention; or David Salle (here renamed David SILLY), by basing “a whole career"
reiterating “one late PICABIA" (409); or “GEORGE BUNGLEWTTZ," 24 by “painting some
lumpish Frablein's upside-down" (409). Nor will anyone be long remembered for his
“well-feigned homage to the Man tic Arts" when he “express[es] [him]self in spastic fits and
farts" (409). For underlying our disdain of such is a third assumption, that whatever
liberties they might take with literal or representative form, the truly great will have shown
themselves to be masters o f i t  As Hughes notes in his essay on Schnabel,
With scarcely an exception, every significant artist o f the last hundred years, 
from Seurat to Matisse, from Picasso to Mondrian, from Beckmann to de 
Kooning, was drilled (or drilled himself) in ‘academic’ drawing—the long 
tussle with the unforgiving and real motif which, in the end, proved to be 
the only basis on which the great formal achievements o f modernism could 
be raised. Only in this way was the right to radical distortion within a 
continuous tradition earned, and its results raised above the level of 
improvisory play (306).
To be creditable, the artist must first be a competent draftsman. Snorkel, we remember, has
“ten fat thumbs"; Bunglewitz is known by his “thick wrists, thick neck, thick skull, and
thicker paint" (409). But the formalistic deficiencies o f these two merely reflect the general
decline of the most basic skills:
A generation past, Abstraction's sway 
Prevailed from Brooklyn to remote Bombay,
Extracting homage from the subtle Jew,
The coarse Australian, and the mild Hindoo—
And on repealing its presumptuous law 
’Twas found that none remembered how to draw:
Yet this proved less a problem than a quibble,
Since none, it seemed, had quite forgot to scribble:
Thus from Academies in every nation
Arose the chant Expressive  Figuration! (409)
24 Georg Baselitz, whom Hughes describes in his essay, “Art and Money" (1984), as “that sturdy German 
fountain of overwrought mediocrity” (Nothing I f Not Critical, 403).
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Much as our knowledge o f human nature allows us to discern Snorkel’s shortcomings in 
the very shifts he makes to obscure them, so does our presupposition that art should refer 
recognizably to what we know or can imagine lead us to suspect that “expressive 
figuration” is simply a ruse by which the untrained or untalented would lay claim to an 
undeserved esteem, making a  virtue o f necessity as they rename failure perfection. But only 
the ignorant and philistine would give voice to their suspicions.
We should note that Hughes’ own effort here makes no such evasions, but fulfills 
the standards it would impose, reinforces the sense of aesthetic continuity which it 
implicitly invotes. The genre, structure, and conventions of the poem not only invite us to 
compare it with its illustrious antecedents, but in themselves suggest the criteria by which 
we may assess this poem’s individual merits. The couplets, for instance, if  not turned just 
as Pope’s would be, or quite as well, are more than competent enough to demonstrate the 
poet’s knowledge o f the rules o f one of the most demanding English verse patterns as well 
as his ability to execute them. They move us efficiently through the narrative and capture 
alive the targets of his satire; but moreover, they offer an apt instance of form following 
function, deftly turning observation into epithet, and lending epithet the force of truth and 
law.
But who is Hughes to lay down the law—and in such manner as this?
The question brings us to the third figurative demand The SoHoiad makes o f us, 
that in acceding to the authoritative pose of the poet and his poem—accepting the premise 
that the piece does indeed depict the world of SoHo; approving the justice o f its tone, the 
aptness o f its caricatures; crediting the learning and judgement o f the author; sim ply 
allowing ourselves to be m oved by turns to scornjul laughter and despairing 
exasperation—we subscribe likewise to a number of implicit fictions fostering our 
identification with a wholly figmentary community.
The first concerns the poet himself. Who is it that addresses us here, unfolding 
before us The SoH oiad's outre milieu? Not Robert Hughes, but his persona, Junius
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Secundus, whose “Apodictick Rhyme” presents itself as “the Gadfly, yet the M irror o f its 
time” (406). Whereas Hughes is a  human being circumscribed by human limitations, 
weaknesses, and biases, a  specific, identifiable individual possessed o f  a certain 
recognizable personality and any number o f defining idiosyncrasies, Junius Secundus is an 
entity that has no existence anywhere save in the shared imagination o f poet and audience; 
he is bodiless, timeless, placeless, and therefore not subject to the restrictions in 
perception, knowledge, and authority such considerations typically impose. Consequently, 
Secundus can lay claim to powers and a purpose far beyond anything Hughes himself may 
assert. He may, for instance, pretend to comprehensiveness of vision. When he describes 
himself as the Mirror o f his time, we are to infer that his eye takes in, his poem renders not 
only the panorama of SoHo but the very souls o f its inhabitants, missing nothing—and 
indeed the putative scope o f the poem, its wealth of detail, its movement from scene to 
scene, personage to personage, would tend to reinforce the impression, would seemingly 
realize the poet’s claim. Moreover, since his vantage point lies outside time, Secundus can, 
as we have seen, read the past as clearly as the present; he can discern, therefore, the rise, 
fall, and reemergence o f historical patterns and aesthetic idiom. The omniscience bom of 
this Godlike perspective allows Secundus to assert the veracity o f his vision, the 
infallibility of his pronouncements—as he does when he pronounces his rhyme to be 
“apodictic,” that is, self-evidently true, incontestable, “established on incontrovertible 
evidence” (OED). Such wisdom and probity, joined to an encyclopedic knowledge, make 
Secundus the perfect agent to undertake what for the real-life Hughes would be an absurd, 
vainglorious mission, to set up for “the gadfly o f his time”: to step before the public and 
address it disinterestedly, for its own good; to brave its displeasure as he decries its follies 
and moral lapses and instructs it in the hard yet needful truths and principles that alone can 
restore and maintain its aesthetic and spiritual health. Junius Secundus is thus more than 
Hughes’ alter ego; he is a wholly public entity, an emblem of ourselves, our cultural values
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and identity. To heed his address is to participate in the reification our own collective sense 
o f Self.
But if Junius Secundus is wholly emblematic, so are the space he occupies, the 
public he addresses, and the occasion that prompts him to address i t  For instance, though 
the speaker alludes to identifiable real-world landmarks in SoHo and Manhattan, to actual 
inhabitants we might see in a  restaurant or pass on the sidewalk, the poem’s particular 
configuration of topography and faces is merely the operative framework for a given 
narrative and theme and exists nowhere save in imagination. However, we are likely to 
accept it as representative of New York and its art world figures because the allusions to its 
places and people are at once concrete enough to orient us, yet sufficiently adumbrated to 
allow us to project our personal memories and associations onto the fabric o f the poem 
without serious risk of contradiction. We are induced, in fact, to take our particular, 
subjective experiences o f SoHo for a  fair approximation o f the poet’s own vision. By 
doing so, as the public poet well knows, we are not so much reducing the poem’s settings, 
actions, and characters to our individual experiences of them as allowing those experiences 
to be abstracted into elastic, emblematic notions (or impressions) adaptable to the poet’s 
needs. When, for example, Secundus transports us to “the urinous subway” to witness the 
“graffitists” throng from Kutztown and the Bronx, to hear “the spray-cans hiss, the ghetto- 
blaster shriek” (406), we nod in recognition, for his images bring others before the mind’s 
eye: the undergrounds we have ridden; the murals of script twining over local buildings, 
bridges, and sidewalks; the distinctive rattle o f a marble inside an aerosol can; the thudding 
bass o f the boombox; the sullen, ill-dressed youth bobbing to the beat—no doubt 
contemplating a night of surreptitious creativity. Hughes’ poem appropriates such private 
imagery, effectively reconstituting it by placing it in a new or wholly fanciful context. 
Here, the graffiti artists are cast as “Noble Savages on sneakered feet,” patronized by the 
patronizing DELORES GRUESOME, who herds her young charges to “the doors of Fifty- 
seventh Street,” where, happily at play in a studio that is “part day-care center, part Baieau-
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Lavoir,” “the infant dauberfsl” are allowed to deface “Belgian Flax instead of walls” (406). 
Such reconstitutions are necessary because though we have all seen the work of these 
young prodigies, we have not seen the same graffiti in the same places under the same 
circumstances. The image o f spray-can Picassos exhibiting their craft in museums where 
“the matrons twitter and the Cash-Bell rings” (406) forces us to pool our past individual 
experiences in the fashioning o f an altogether new collective one; it orients us individually 
even as it brings us together in the only public space our separate perceptions and 
associations allow us to share, an amalgam (of subway, museum, nursery, and emporium) 
seen only in the mind's eye, occupiable only in the imagination.
We acquiesce in the poet’s appropriation and reconstitution in part because they 
seem to verify, to lend authority to what we ourselves have seen and heard and thought 
Moreover, the capaciousness o f the poet’s images or their configuration teases us into the 
rather gratifying conceit that we are part of a greater society, that we indeed experience this 
public space collectively. Yet the public with whom, presumably, we share the world of 
The SoHoiad is as illusory as the space it seems to occupy in the poem: figurative settings 
and events can have no literal witnesses. Nevertheless, the poem induces us to think 
ourselves among a throng watching the “infatuate procession” (406) of Mammon's 
triumph—first by seeming to place us in the familiar setting of the parade, a very public 
progress o f curiosities and grotesques, and thereby, secondly, encouraging us to project 
our experience of the poem onto those fellow spectators who may be supposed really to 
exist: readers like ourselves, who presumably see what we seem to see, and respond to it 
as we do. Under these circumstances such projection is all but instinctive, not simply 
because we like to suppose that our notions are widely held, but because as social creatures 
we find comfort in and derive identity from our connections with groups whose members 
have shared our historical moment, have experienced what we have experienced, and thus 
traverse the same cultural topography. Much the same thing occurs when, having seen a 
major disaster or scandal reported on the evening news, we suppose that the people we
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encounter the next day are turning the event over in their minds as compulsively as we are. 
There is, however, this difference, that whereas television tends to reinforce our 
separateness from other viewers (in part because the mediation of the camera keeps us from 
spectating directly, and thus in company with others), poems such as The SoHoiad allow 
the public poet to use imagery and allusions that accommodate our many individual 
observations and associations and thus to sidestep the hopeless tangle of multiple 
perspectives and radical relativism, turning private experience against itself by making the 
unique seem universal.
If the public poet is able to make us believe that we sit amidst a larger public, he has 
gone a long way toward persuading us to accept perhaps the most daring figure of all, that 
we have indeed gathered in a certain place at a certain time to witness an event of great 
import unfold before us. In the present case, Hughes-as-Secundus would have us believe 
that we are immediately present at the gilded pageant of Mammon, and thus present, at a 
farther remove, for what Mammon’s trampling of taste, sense, and merit represents, a 
moment a cultural collapse that has visited itself upon other places, other peoples.25 But as 
the god’s minions prance only in the imagination, so a glance out our drawing room 
window, a stroll down the streets o f SoHo, will reveal neither an angry Vesuvius nor 
hordes of barbarians laying waste to the studios, galleries, and museums o f Manhattan. 
Though Secundus effectively exposes the follies and corruptions of the art world, the 
occasion upon which he addresses us is merely a figurative apparatus. And yet, if the
25 I should concede that for all his cynical deprecation here, Hughes is not as despairing as Pope at the end 
of Book IV of The Dunciad. Concluding his essay, “Art and Money," Hughes writes, not unhope fully. 
The slide [in art prices] will begin with graffiti and it will gather momentum from there.
It will not affect every artist, because there are many reputations with the justifiable 
solidity that will enable them to survive such vicissitudes. But it will shake the 
confidence of the art market, and of the art world as a whole. It won’t happen in 1985, or 
1986, but we shall see what has happened as the millennium crawls closer. Nor will all 
its effect be bad. One does not lament the pricking of the South Sea Bubble, or the sudden 
collapse of the Tulip Mania. At the very least, it may cure us of our habit of gazing 
raptly into the bottom of the barrel, in the belief that it contains the heights of Parnassus 
(404).
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poet’s figure makes no claims to literal truth, we are likely to find it compelling 
nonetheless, for though the settings, persons, and action o f The SoHoiad are wholly 
figmentary, they are the occasion o f highly perceptible, quite genuine psychological 
events—an orderly, if metaphorical apprehension o f the world about us, for instance, as 
well as the sense that our manner o f comprehending it merges us with a greater cultural 
whole—that have the very real consequence o f shaping our understanding o f and thus our 
response to the present historical moment Indeed, if we give ourselves over to the fiction 
of this or similar poems, we are temporarily caught up in the illusion that so much in our 
world is concerned in the outcome o f the events we seem to witness and in which we are 
obliged to participate.
Because they make us feel that we are part o f a  moment inclusive o f but not limited 
to our experience of i t  the speaker, setting, public, and occasion of the poem become 
emblematic of a yet greater emblem, the larger cultural superstructure that informs, 
sustains, and draws upon our individual sensibilities: the community that inculcates the 
principles and habits by which we perceive, interpret, remember our shared historical 
moment the community we suppose to be ever at our elbow, ever attentive to us, ever 
concerned in our affairs, and whose stake in those affairs lends them weight significance; 
the community that we may therefore shape and redirect by merging the private into the 
collective Self, by recasting the dark hieroglyphics of private consciousness into the 
common tongue of public discourse. No doubt the community presupposed by The 
SoHoiad and public poetry in general is entirely chimerical; at any rate, if we have not 
utterly lost our belief in this community, we have come to regard the idea of such an entity 
with suspicion, as an agent o f compulsion and conscription, an enticer to complicity, an 
enforcer o f conformity. Yet, however figmentary this community may be, however 
tenuous or reluctant our belief in it, the presupposition of community makes possible a 
fourth figurative habit (one at work in the previous three), that of seeing the literal infused 
with non-literal elements. Community allows the poet to bid us look upon the world, its
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inhabitants, their social, political, and esthetic backdrops, and see them not as they 
demonstrably are, but in terms o f their typological, mythological, or precedential values, 
that is, in terms of their place in an over-arching figurative apparatus. The literal thereby 
acquires a significance it did not, could not possess before. Moreover, as poet and reader 
meet in the forum o f a figurative apparatus, the bond between them, and thus between 
poetry and the public, is strengthened, as are the bonds between readers, between the past 
and their present, between their present and the future, and between the truth of verifiable 
fact and the truth of the imagination—this last bond nothing less than the forge of meaning.
5. Conclusions
If this examination o f The SoHoiad has allowed me to demonstrate something of 
the antipathy of the figurative mode to modem sensibilities, and in doing so, to summarize 
the elements of that mode, it has also allowed me to reintroduce Pope and a consideration 
of the Augustan habits of memory into my discussion. Some decades ago, M.H. Abrams’ 
classic study, The M irror and the Lamp (1953), taught us to think of the shift in poetic 
sensibility between the Augustan and Romantic periods as one from a mimetic to an 
expressivist orientation, taught us to see the simultaneous inward turn of the poet as a shift 
in the perceived function of poetry from a pragmatic to an “objective” rationale in which 
aesthetic merit rather than tuitionary power becomes the source, end, and test of art. 
Though Abrams’ model and terminology remain useful, I find I must recast both—as well 
as the conception of literary history that gives rise to them—if I am to account, not only for 
what the present study has (I hope) discovered, but for the conclusions I would draw from 
those discoveries as the arc o f my argument nears its aid .
We should begin with the matter of dating this shift in poetic sensibility. I hope to 
have demonstrated in my chapter on Pope’s peculiar employment o f satiric figures in the 
fashioning of his “epitaphic vision” that long before the first generation of Romantics,
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poetry had been used by a major poet— the major poet o f his day, perhaps the most 
celebrated to that point in English history—as a vehicle for the public exposition of an 
unapologetically idiosyncratic, highly expressionistic account o f  England’s historical 
present. As I have explained above, the extreme figurative nature o f Pope’s portrait 
effectively estranged the world o f his poetic fiction from the everyday world beyond the 
window. This estrangement in turn inspired (in the short run) a  reaction against the 
figurative in poetry in favor o f the literal, and (in the long run) allowed Wordsworth to 
declare Pope’s mode of verse moribund and articulate a new aesthetic and purpose for 
poetry. And yet we must recognize that it is the cultural authority Pope amassed for the poet 
and his poetic vision that effected an important change in the relation between poet and 
audience without which it would have been nearly impossible for Wordsworth to step 
before the public at century’s end and make himself the new arbiter o f poetic principles—or 
for Shelley, say, or Keats (or Tennyson, or Arnold, or Swinburne), to appropriate the 
materials o f the common cultural inheritance for their own use in explicating the private 
Self. For it is Pope’s creation of the role o f poet as social icon in Britain that provides 
Wordsworth a place to stand before the public gaze, Pope’s compelling, if quixotic hubris 
(at times bordering on monomania) that commands public attention and deference even as it 
turns its back on them that gives Wordsworth and the later Romantics license to do the 
same. Pope is the first English poet to strike such an extreme pose o f “heroic” autonomy. 
So while we must acknowledge a shift in poetic sensibility between the Augustan and 
Romantic periods, I would argue that the shift constitutes no “Romantic revolution,” but a 
long, slow transformation, its foundations laid earlier in the eighteenth century rather than 
later.
Moreover, in acknowledging the fact o f the shift itself, we should observe that it 
need not be described solely in terms of the poet’s choice of subject (Nature or the Self— 
the mimetic / expressivist model) or according to the aims of his or her composition (the 
pragmatic / objective model). Instead, we might look at the nature o f the poet’s materials
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
615
themselves. Has the poet reclaimed them from historical, literary, and mythological 
precedents, or is their origin in immediate, everyday experience? Does their application to 
present-day circumstances render them metaphorical, requiring the reader to make a mental 
“leap” from what he perceives to what he is to understand, or, being so applied, do the 
poet’s materials remain measurable and verifiable, significant for what they are in 
themselves? And then, are they more readily conducive to the explication of collective or 
private consciousness? To this last question we might respond that the example o f Pope’s 
Dunciad demonstrates that a largely idiosyncratic worldview may in fact seek to take its 
place before the communal eye, may seek to shape its perception and win the approbation 
of the community at large. Therefore, we should turn to a second consideration, one that 
subsumes the first: What is the forum  of the poem to be? Does the poet seek to engage a 
fairly wide readership in a matter that concerns it at large, or is he to be the poem’s primary 
audience and write mainly of things that concern himself alone? With these considerations 
in mind, we might look back upon the foregoing survey and observe on the one hand that 
since Pope’s estrangement of the figurative and literal elements Dryden’s generation had 
managed to meld workably, poetry’s figurative materials and frameworks have withered, 
gradually giving way to the literal (and where the figurative has been retained, it has been in 
the service of articulating an actual moment o f experience, an actual psychological 
complex), and on the other, that since Pope’s appropriation of the public sphere for his 
private ends, the forum of poetry has become primarily private and only secondarily, 
incidentally public.
To describe the changes in English poetry between Pope’s time and our own 
according to these models and in these terms is to do more than exchange old labels for 
new. For by adopting them we effect significant changes in the scope and focus o f our 
view of literary history and the history of social sensibility. For one thing, to consider 
poetry according to its public, semi-public, or fully private status is to impose new 
criteria—cultural authority and social utility—for our evaluation (and approbation) not only
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of individual poems but o f whole schools and periods o f poetry as well. Such 
considerations reconfigure the broad panorama o f English poetry, and though one cannot 
claim it makes our view of it any more disinterested or objective, the new configuration 
does at least throw the strengths o f “second-rate” periods such as the Augustan into greater 
relief and force us to acknowledge the inherent limitations o f poetry that is not accountable 
to the public. Moreover, in reintroducing the idea that poets and poetry might be significant 
agents for the community, we reintroduce likewise a notion of the possibility o f community 
itself, the materials from which it may be fashioned and the means by which it may be 
maintained. For another thing, when we have recovered the idea o f the figurative 
representation we recover also our sense, say, o f historical contiguity—that is, o f the 
present's connection with the past and future (but also our awareness o f the many moments 
recalled in the present one)—and of the simultaneous multiplicity o f cast and significance of 
our immediate circumstances—that is, the many parallel ways in which these circumstances 
may be plausibly discerned and their meaning construed. Thus we are restored to the 
possibility o f “locating” ourselves by means of continuities instead o f innovations and 
interruptions, to the possibility o f patterning our private and collective experience according 
to the figurative apparatus o f history, culture, myth, and metaphor, o f fashioning our 
memories o f ourselves and our times from them, and therefore o f founding our identity 
upon them.
In sum, if  these new models and terminology put us in mind o f how the develop­
ment of poetry over the last 250 years has largely paralleled and reinforced the English- 
speaking world’s turn from the mythic to the material, as well as the withdrawal o f its 
individual members from the larger community into a narrow personal autonomy, they also 
remind us that memory and identity need not consist merely o f gathering about us our 
clusters o f mass-marketed souvenirs, that though our individual consciousness is ours and 
no other’s, that ceaseless swirl o f perception, thought, and memory need not be a hopeless 
chaos, nor need the ordering of it be situational, segregated, solitary.
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